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Introduction
The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: 
Continuity Amid Discord
Mark A, Pollack 
Gregory C. Shaffer
From 2000 through 2004, transatlantic political disputes intensified over the 
establishment of an international criminal court, the status of the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change, the US conduct of the war on terror, and the war in Iraq, among 
other matters. High-level officials in the United States (US) spoke o f “punishing” 
France and “ignoring” Germany. Not only pundits, but business leaders feared that 
the acrimony over political and security matters could spread to the economic 
realm. Ad hoc boycotts were organized against French wines in the United States 
and US products in Europe. Disputes escalated over steel tariffs, agricultural 
subsidies, aircraft production subsidies, tax subsidies, consumer, food safety, and 
environmental laws and regulations. The various transatlantic dialogues among 
“civil society” groups, which had been established during the 1990s to spur public 
participation in the transatlantic sphere, lost momentum. Had the hopes o f a “new 
world order” underpinned by the transatlantic alliance faded away? Would the 
economic side of the 1990’s “New Transatlantic Agenda” (“NTA”) wither from 
neglect?
Names appear in alphabetical order. This introduction, like our previous work, represents an 
equal and ongoing intellectual partnership.
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These developments marked a stark contrast to the hopes triggered by the end o f  
the Cold War and the initial enthusiasm raised by economic globalization during the 
early and mid-1990s. In February 1990, the United States (under the first Bush 
administration) signed a Transatlantic Declaration with the European Union (EU) 
which promised “regular and intensive consultation” on wide-ranging policy 
matters. In December 1995, the Clinton administration and the European 
Commission followcd-up by signing the New Transatlantic Agenda, which 
provided a framework for economic and security cooperation at all levels o f  
government. In the economic realm, the NTA called for an elaborate multi-tiered 
network of cooperation among US and EU officials designed to govern and 
facilitate the growing transatlantic marketplace. In order to foster a closer 
relationship at the grassroots level, the NTA also worked to “build bridges” across 
the Atlantic between “business people, scientists, educators and others.”
Alongside the traditional processes o f trade negotiation and trade dispute 
resolution, the transatlantic partners forged new mechanisms for cooperation among 
economic regulators in areas ranging from competition policy to data privacy, the 
environment, and food safety. By the end o f the 1990s, the US and the EU had 
concluded “mutual recognition agreements" (“MRAs”) in six regulatory sectors, 
including the fields o f telecommunications, electrical safety, medical devices, and 
pharmaceuticals. They also signed agreements to enhance the compatibility of their 
regimes for cross-border mergers and acquisitions, privacy protection, and 
veterinary inspections, among other matters. They entered into a new framework 
agreement for regulatory cooperation and proposed an “early warning” system to 
avoid trade disputes. They advocated greater day-to-day cooperation in an array o f  
regulatory areas.
Yet despite the initial hopes, by the end o f the 1990s, both sides had become 
disappointed with the NTA’s results. In the view of many participants, the “low- 
hanging fruit” of economic cooperation had been picked. Governments on both 
sides now found it increasingly difficult to move beyond symbolic agreements and 
rearguard efforts at conflict resolution. Enhanced cooperation among regulators had 
not prevented new and bitter trade disputes from arising. The transatlantic political 
conflicts that arose at the twenty-first century’s start boded poorly for the economic 
relationship, raising the question whether the New Transatlantic Agenda had run 
aground after less than a decade.
This volume probes beneath transatlantic political conflicts to assess the health 
of the transatlantic economic relationship and of the networks of regulatory 
cooperation established during the 1990s. It focuses our attention on the largely 
underappreciated economic side o f the transatlantic relationship, and covers an 
array of sectors. The contributors include leading academics and policy makers 
from both sides o f the Atlantic.
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We highlight three primary findings that emerge from the chapters. First, despite 
the concerns, transatlantic foreign policy rifts did not spill over into the economic 
realm or trigger economic backlash of any significance. Rather, the bulk of the 
evidence presented in this volume points to the continuity in the transatlantic 
economic relationship and the resilience o f  the transatlantic economic marketplace 
in a period o f  political turmoil. As Joseph Quinlan and Daniel Hamilton show in 
chapter 2, transatlantic trade and foreign direct investment have actually flourished 
in recent years, notwithstanding the bitter conflict over Iraq. As they conclude, “No 
other commercial artery in the world is as integrated and fused together by foreign 
investment, a fact lost on many pundits, parliamentarians and policy makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic.”
Similarly, Bruce Stokes (in chapter 3) maintains that trade relations during the 
first term of the Bush administration did not substantially differ from the Clinton 
years. Trade disputes, from tax subsidies to the regulation o f genetically modified 
foods, simply intensified, subsided, or replaced former ones. EU Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy and US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick actually 
enjoyed a closer relationship than their predecessors. They defused a number of 
major trade disputes that they inherited. The United States and EU successfully 
resolved long-standing disputes over the EU’s banana licensing regime and US 
corporate tax subsidies. In the tax dispute, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
had authorized the EU to retaliate against the United States in the amount of 
S4 billion per year in trade, an event that Zoellick characterized as a “nuclear” threat 
to the global trading system. As can be seen from Stokes’ chapter, the content and 
timing of these disputes is largely explained by conventional domestic politics, and 
not by any geopolitical or administrative shift. In sum, the transatlantic economic 
relationship remains extremely strong, punctuated by periodic disputes in various 
sectors which implicate a relatively small percentage of overall transatlantic trade.
Second, the chapters present dramatic differences in the degree o f  success (or 
failure) o f  transatlantic cooperation across regulatory areas. In some areas, such as 
competition policy, US and EU regulators continue to hold broadly similar 
mandates and regulatory philosophies (chapter 4). The record o f transatlantic 
cooperation in this area continues to be largely complementary, based on the 
sharing of information and resources. Occasional disagreements, such as the 
Commission’s rejection of the GE/Honeywcll merger, may be spotlighted in the 
media, but they arc atypical (chapter 5). In other areas, however, such as the 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), US and EU regulators 
operate with starkly different regulatory philosophies and styles in a highly 
politicized policy environment (chapter 8). The record of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation in this sphere has been highly contentious, prompting the United States 
to file a legal complaint before the WTO. Regardless of the case’s outcome, the 
management of this dispute will continue to try both sides.
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In between the extremes of daily cooperation and polarized litigation, we find 
cases such as the transatlantic mutual recognition and data privacy protection 
agreements, in which the US and EU have found, to a certain extent, a modus 
vivendi between their different regulatory systems (chapters 6 and 7). In botli eases, 
however, implementation has raised ongoing challenges. A notable change has 
occurred in financial services regulation, where both EU and US regulators have 
made impressive efforts to accommodate each other's regulatory systems by 
recognizing the adequacy of each others standards in specific areas, as explored in 
chapter 9. Maria Green Cowles likewise shows how the functioning of the NTA’s 
civil society dialogues has varied (chapter 10). While the transatlantic environment 
dialogue folded and the labour dialogue is inactive, the consumer and business 
dialogues continue. Nonetheless, even the flagship Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
struggled to attract the sustained attention of business leaders, reflecting the 
sporadic and uneven performance o f the NTA in delivering business demands. 
Attempting to explain this sectoral variation in policy outcomes raises important 
questions for future research, for which our final point indicates one approach.
The volume's third finding is that changes in institutional and market power 
have shaped policy outcomes in distinct regulatory areas. Assessments of power 
have been relatively absent from previous studies of transatlantic economic 
relations. Previous studies have tended to emphasize the impact of economic 
globalization on the demand and supply o f regulatory collaboration, and depicted 
the EU/US relationship as one of economic equals. Yet across the range of issues, 
the success of transatlantic cooperation, and the pattern of concessions by each side, 
has reflected varying power resources. These resources arc not military ones, nor do 
they simply reflect market size, a traditional measure of economic clout. Although 
market size generally explains the growing role of the EU as a global actor in 
economic and regulatory fields, US and EU bargaining power also is affected by 
each side's institutional characteristics. In the ease of financial services, for 
example, Posner maintains that it was not simply the size of the EU market, but also 
the establishment o f the EU’s regulatory competence and its extraterritorial reach 
which mattered. Institutional developments in the EU affected powerful US firms 
who, in turn, motivated the US Securities and Exchange Commission to work with 
EU authorities to accommodate and recognize EU standards in a number of areas. 
This development occurred following an extended period of benign (or malign) US 
neglect of European approaches to financial services regulation.
In keeping with Robert Putnam's (1988) discussion o f two-level games, it 
appears that domestic institutions on both sides can influence bargaining outcomes 
by allocating “veto points" to domestic actors and thus allowing negotiators to 
claim that their hands arc tied. This phenomenon is most apparent in the ease 
studies of transatlantic mutual recognition agreements and the regulation o f 
genetically modified foods. In the former case, Nicolaidis and Steffenson show' that
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the European Union has complied with the terms of the existing MRAs, while the 
United States has largely reneged on three o f these agreements after independent 
regulatory agencies (the FDA and OSHA) refused to recognize the equivalency of 
European certifiers. In contrast, the EU’s institutional structure has provided 
multiple veto points to opponents o f GM foods and crops which have undermined 
transatlantic attempts to reconcile US and EU regulatory approaches, resulting in 
deadlock.
Previous studies o f transatlantic economic relations have tended to emphasize 
the joint gains from transatlantic cooperation, and we agree that significant gains are 
at stake. Yet the studies in this volume also show how power factors influence not 
only the overall potential for transatlantic cooperation on a sector-by-sector basis; 
they also influence the patterns of concessions and compromises offered by each 
side, and thus the distributional outcome for a sector.
The structure of the volume is as follows: In chapter 2, Joseph Quinlan and 
Daniel Hamilton examine transatlantic international trade and investment flows, 
noting how they have flourished in seeming oblivion to the political discord to date. 
Bruce Stokes assesses transatlantic trade negotiations and disputes in chapter 3, 
finding that the relationship between US and EU trade administrations has actually 
improved. In chapters 4 and 5, William Kovacic (Federal Trade Commission) and 
David Gerber respectively assess competition policy from institutional, pragmatic, 
and cognitive perspectives.
Turning to other regulatory areas, in chapter 6, Yves Poullet and María Verónica 
Perez Asinari examine the problems of implementing the US-EU data privacy “safe 
harbour” agreement. Kalypso Nicolaidis and Rebecca Stcffcnson analyze the 
analogous challenges confronting the various transatlantic mutual recognition 
agreements, in chapter 7. In chapter 8, Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack assess 
regulatory policy making for genetically modified organisms in the United States 
and Europe, noting how the US and EU have competed to advance their approaches 
in distinct bilateral and multilateral fora. Elliot Posner addresses the rising clout of 
the European Union as an actor in the field of financial services in chapter 9. 
Finally, in chapter 10, Maria-Green Cowles provides an update of the status and 
prospects for the various civil society dialogues established in the 1990s. In each 
case, these contributions arc complemented by commentary from a leading 
academic or policy maker from the other side of the Atlantic, respectively Hugo 
Pacmcn (former EU ambassador to the United States and Co-chairman of the 
European-American Business Council), Emst-Ulrich Pctersmann (director of EUI’s 
Transatlantic Programme), Stephen Wilks, Gregory Shaffer, Alasdair Young, 
Christian Jocrges, and Nigel Wicks (former member of the EU Committee of Wise 
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets).
This volume arose out of a transatlantic collaboration between the University of 
Wisconsin's European Union Center (under its Transatlantic Initiative), the Robert
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Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI) 
(under its Transatlantic Programme), and Johns Hopkins University’s Center for 
Transatlantic Relations in Washington DC. We thank these institutions for their 
funding that made this transatlantic study and exchange possible. We also thank a 
number of others associated with the project, including our co-organizers David 
Andrews, Daniel Hamilton, and Joe Quinlan for their support; Helen Wallace for her 
extraordinarily engaged directorship of the Robert Schuman Centre; Laura Burgassi 
for her exceptional administrative assistance; and Rachel Epstein who took the reins 
of the Schuman Centre’s Transatlantic Programme in September 2004 from David 
Andrews’ able stewardship and saw this volume to fruition. Our most profound 
thanks, finally, go to the presenters and discussants at the transatlantic workshop at 
EUI in June 2004. Representing a mix of Europeans and Americans, academics and 
practitioners, they provide us with empirical updates of the status of the transatlantic 
economic relationship at the beginning of 2005 and introduce us to new w'ays o f 
thinking about the ongoing promise and considerable challenges posed.
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Chapter 2
Partners in Prosperity:
The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy
Daniel S. Hamilton 
Joseph P, Quintan
Executive summary
• One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the past 
decade has been the increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic 
economy. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between 
Europe and America than between any other two continents.
• European and American economics and societies have not drifted apart 
since the end of the Cold War; they have become even more intertwined and 
interdependent.
• Despite the perennial hype about the significance of Nafta, the “rise o f Asia” 
or “big emerging markets,” the United States and Europe remain by far each 
other’s most important commercial partners. The economic relationship 
between the United States and Europe is by a wide margin the deepest and 
broadest between any two continents in history—and those ties arc 
accelerating.
• The years since the Cold War—the years when the fading “glue” of the Cold 
War partnership supposedly loosened transatlantic tics—marked in fact one 
of the most intense periods of transatlantic integration ever.
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• The transatlantic economy generates roughly S2.5 trillion in total 
commercial sales a year and employs over 12 million workers in mutually 
“insourced” jobs on both sides of the Atlantic who enjoy high wages, high 
labour and environmental standards, and open, largely non-discriminatory 
access to each other’s markets.
A. It's Foreign Investment, Stupid
• Transatlantic trade squabbles steal the headlines but account for only 1-2 % 
of transatlantic commerce. In fact, trade itself accounts for less than 20% of 
transatlantic commerce.
• Trade flows are a misleading benchmark of transatlantic economic 
interaction. Foreign investment, not trade, drives transatlantic commerce, 
and contrary to common wisdom, most US and European investments flow 
to each other, rather than to lower-wage developing nations.
• Foreign affiliate sales, not trade, are the backbone of the transatlantic 
economy. In 2001 foreign affiliate sales amounted to $2.8 trillion, more than 
five times the S549 billion in total trade. Despite tensions over Iraq, foreign 
affiliate sales were up in 2003 and then again in 2004.
• When one adds investment and trade together to get a more complete 
picture, one secs that US economic engagement remains overwhelmingly 
focused on Europe. The transatlantic economy is where the markets arc, 
where the jobs arc, where the profits arc.
• Foreign affiliate sales not only dwarf transatlantic trade flows but also every 
other international commercial artery linking the United States to the rest of 
the world. In 2001, total foreign affiliate sales between the U. S. and Europe 
were more than double US-transpacific foreign affiliates sales, more than 
three times larger than total transpacific trade flows, and more than four 
times larger than foreign affiliate sales between the US and Nafta partners 
Mexico and Canada.
« Despite transatlantic tensions over Iraq, US firms ploughed a ncar-rccord 
SI00 billion into Europe in 2003. In 2004, US investment to Europe soared 
by another 50% in the first of 2004 to S60 billion, setting it on pace to reach 
a record high of $120 billion.
• Europe accounted for nearly 65% of total US foreign direct investment 
in 2003.
• Even though US-German relations ebbed to one of their lowest levels since 
World War II, American firms sank S7 billion in Germany in 2003, a sharp 
reversal from 2002, when US firms pulled some $5 billion out o f Gcnnany.
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• Despite Franco-Amcrican diplomatic tensions, US investment flows to 
France in 2003 rose by more than 10% to S2.3 billion, and US affiliates more 
than doubled their profits in France to S4.3 billion, French firms were also 
among the largest European investors and largest foreign sources of jobs in 
the US—Corporate France invested S4.2 billion in the United States in 2003.
• US investment in Ireland alone in 2003 (S4.7 billion) was more than two- 
and-a-half times greater than US investment in China (S1.7 billion).
• US investment flows to Denmark between 2000 and 2003 (S4.1 billion) 
were nearly three times greater than US flows to India (SI.5 billion).
• The SI9.2 billion of US investment in the Netherlands alone in 2003 was 
not far behind total US investment in all of Asia ($22.4 billion).
• Europe’s investment stakes in the US, on a historical-cost basis, exceeded 
SI trillion in 2002, 20% more than America’s stake in Europe. Europe’s 
investment stake in the US doubled between 1998 and 2002. Europe 
accounts for nearly three-fourths of all foreign investment in the US No 
other region of the world has made such a large capital commitment to the 
United States. European firms have never been as exposed to the US 
economy as they arc today.
• Virulent anti-war sentiment across Europe did not prevent European firms 
from investing S36.9 billion in foreign direct investment in the US in 2003. 
That represents a sharp rebound from the depressed levels o f 2002, when 
European FDI inflows to the United States totalled $26 billion.
B. Europe and A merica: That *s Where th e Profits Are ...
• Europe is the most important commercial market in the world for corporate 
America by a wide yet underappreciated margin. US companies continue to 
rely on Europe for half their total annual foreign profits.
• Similarly, the United States is the most important market in the world in 
terms of earnings for many European multinationals. The annual earnings of 
Europe's US affiliates has risen tenfold since the end o f the Cold War, from 
S4.4 billion in 1990 to S 44 billion in 2003and $60 billion in 2004.
• Despite talk o f transatlantic boycotts or consumer backlash due to 
European- American tensions over Iraq, 2003 was a banner year for 
transatlantic profits as measured by foreign affiliate income.
• US foreign affiliate earnings from Europe surged to a record $ 82 billion in 
2003, a 25% jump from 2002.
• US affiliate earnings in 12 European markets (France, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, 
Czech Republic and Poland) reached record highs in 2003. US affiliate
Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy
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profits in France more than doubled. Profits earned in Ireland surged by 
45%, in Italy by 40%, and in the Netherlands by 24.5%.
• 2003 was also a record year for profits of European affiliates operating in 
the United States. Despite the strong euro, European affiliate camings of S 
44 billion easily surpassed earnings of 2002 (S32.23 billion) and 2001 
($17.4 billion), and the previous peak in camings of S38.8 billion in 2000.
• British, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish foreign affiliates all enjoyed record US 
profits in 2003.
C. That’s Where the Markets Are..*
• Corporate America’s foreign assets tallied over $5.8 trillion in 2001, The 
bulk of these assets—roughly 60%—were located in Europe.
• Most of the top destinations for US investment in the world in 2002 were 
European: the UK (l), the Netherlands (3), Switzerland (4), Germany (6), 
Bclgium/Luxembourg (8) and France (10).
• Transpacific linkages based on trade arc relatively shallow in comparison to 
the deeper transatlantic linkages rooted in foreign direct investment.
• The United Kingdom is the most important market in the world for 
corporate America. US assets in the United Kingdom—roughly SI.4 trillion 
in 2001—were more than 50% larger than the entire US asset base in Asia 
and almost equivalent to the combined overseas affiliate asset base of Asia, 
Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.
• The UK, not China or Mexico, was at the forefront of America's great 
overseas investment boom of the 1990s, attracting just over 20% of total US 
FDI over the period. The Netherlands was second.
• Despite all the talk about Nafta and the “Pacific Century,” over the past decade 
US firms have ploughed ten times as much capital into the Netherlands as into 
China, and twice as much into the Netherlands as into Mexico.
• US assets in Germany in 2001 of S320 billion were greater than total US 
assets in all o f  South America.
• In 2001, US affiliates accounted for 16% of Ireland’s total output, 7.2% of 
the UK’s aggregate output, and 6.2% of the Netherlands.
• Europe accounted for roughly 55% of the total gross global product of US 
affiliates in 2001—S583 billion.
• European firms held some S3.7 trillion in US assets in 2001, nearly 70% of 
the total.
• US foreign affiliates in Europe achieved sales of $1.5 trillion in 2001 
—5% times the $276 million in US exports to Europe.
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• Europe accounted for just over 51% of global US foreign affiliate sales 
in 2001.
• US affiliate sales in Europe were more than double affiliate sales in the 
entire Asia-Pacific region in 2001. US affiliate sales in the UK alone 
(S428 billion) exceeded aggregate sales in Latin America.
• Even though US affiliate sales in China have soared, they have done so from 
a very low base. Sales of S36 billion in China in 2001, for example, were on 
par with those in Sweden (S33 billion) and well below sales in either 
Germany ($240 billion) or France ($135 billion).
■ Weak European growth means lost opportunities for Americans. Growth of 
just 3% in Europe would create a new market the size of the entire country 
of Argentina for companies and investors from the US and other countries.
• Affiliate sales, not trade, also represent the primary means by which 
European firms deliver goods and services to US consumers. In 2001 
European affiliate sales in the US ($1.4 billion) were over four times larger 
than European exports to the US
• UK affiliate sales in the US in 2001 were more than five times the amount 
of UK exports to the US German affiliate sales in the US were more than 
four times greater than German exports to the US—a striking statistic for 
Germany, a country commonly thought to be a classic “trading” nation.
• Contrary to most assessments of transatlantic drift since the end o f the Cold 
War, Europe’s investment stake in the US has deepened dramatically since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall: Income of European affiliates in the US rose ten­
fold between 1990 and 2003—from $4.4 billion to $ 44 billion.
D. That *s Where the Jobs Are...
• The bulk of corporate America’s overseas workforce is employed in Europe, 
not in low-wage countries like Mexico, China or India. Of the nearly 9.8 
million workers employed by US foreign affiliates in 2001, roughly 43% 
work in Europe.
• The US also “insources” more jobs from Europe than it “outsources" across 
the Atlantic. In fact, the US enjoys a “million worker surplus” with Europe. 
In 2001 European affiliates of US firms directly employed roughly 
3.2 million workers, while US affiliates of European firms directly 
employed just over 4.2 million US workers.
• The US insourccd more jobs from Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland than it outsourced in 2001. US firms employed 
slightly more workers in the United Kingdom than British firms in the 
United States.
Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy
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• The transatlantic workforce directly deployed by US and European foreign 
affiliates is massive, totalling over 8.4 million workers in 2001. That is three 
times the number of total workers employed by US affiliates in Nafta 
partners Canada and Mexico (2.8 million). It is also well above total foreign 
employment of US foreign affiliates in Asia and Asian foreign affiliates in 
the United States (2.3 million).
• Europe is by far the greatest source o f America’s insourced jobs. European 
finns employed roughly two-thirds o f the 6.4 million US workers on the 
payrolls of foreign affiliates in 2001. The top five employers in the US are 
the United Kingdom (1.1 million), Germany (734,000), France (578,000), 
the Netherlands (571,000) and Switzerland (546,000).
• Figures tracking direct employment due to investment alone do not include 
indirect employment related to non-equity arrangements like strategic 
alliances, joint ventures and other deals. Moreover, affiliate employment 
figures do not include jobs supported by trade with Europe. Employment 
related trade is substantial in many US states and European regions. In total, 
and adding in indirect employment, we estimate that the overall transatlantic 
work force numbers some 12-14 million workers.
E. That’s Where Trade Opportunities Still Lie...
• 2003 was a record year for transatlantic trade flows. Total transatlantic trade 
in goods grew by 7% to $391 billion in 2003. In 2004, it was projected to 
increase again to S475 billion.
• US exports, supported by the weaker US dollar, recovered from the two-year 
downturn in trade with Europe and grew by 4.8% to $150.6 billion in 2003.
• US imports from Europe jumped 8.5% to a record $245 billion in 2003 
—despite a 20% appreciation o f the euro against the dollar. America’s trade 
deficit with the EU widened by 15% to a record $94.3 billion in 2003. 
Surging imports from Europe produced record US trade deficits with 
Germany, Italy, Ireland, France and the Netherlands.
• Surging US demand for European products in 2003 offset the dampening 
trade impact of weak European economic growth and a surging euro. 
Roughly 57% of total US imports from Europe is considered related party 
trade, which means more than half of US imports from Europe arc affected 
less by exchange rates than by US demand. 67% of US imports from 
Germany, 59% of US imports from the Netherlands and 54% of US imports 
from the United Kingdom are considered related party trade.
• The US current account deficit with Europe in 2003 reached an estimated 
$94 billion, up 9% from 2002.
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F. That 's Where Opportunities Are fo r  States and Regions...
• The commercial relationship between the United States and some regions of 
Europe, such as Baden-Württemberg, Ile-de-France, or South East England, is 
greater than that between the United States and most countries in the world.
• Three German states—Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and North Rhinc- 
Westphalia—invested more in the United States in 2001 than they did in the 
entire European Union outside of Germany.
• Despite much talk of big emerging markets, three German states—Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg and North-Rhinc Westphalia—have a higher GDP than 
the four Asian tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.
• The Pacific coast state of California is Europe’s main commercial partner in 
the United States and is the sixth-largest economy in the world, just behind 
France and Britain.
• California alone exported some S20.4 billion in goods to Europe in 2003, an 
amount greater than total US exports to OPEC.
• Texas ranked as the top US state for European investment in general and for 
French investment in particular in 2001. Europe’s investment stake in Texas 
topped S68 billion in 2001. There is more European investment in Texas 
alone as all US investment in Japan and China put together.
• European companies are the top foreign investor in 45 states, and ranked 
second in the remaining five states in 2001.
• The Southeast of the United States accounted for nearly 23% of total 
European investment in 2001 and ranks as the top US region for British, 
French, Dutch, Swedish and Belgian investments. No other region of the US 
benefits more from European investment.
• The Great Lakes region ranks second to the Southeast in overall investment 
attractiveness to Europe, and is the favoured destination of German firms.
• The United Kingdom ranked as the number one European export market for 
25 states in 2003. Germany was a distant second, ranking as the top 
European export market for 10 US states in 2003.
G. That's Where Services Are...
• The service economies of the United States and Europe have never been as 
intertwined as they are today, notably in such activities as financial services, 
telecommunications, utilities, insurance, advertising, computer services and 
other related functions.
• Foreign affiliate sales of services on both sides of the Atlantic have 
exploded over the past decade. In fact, affiliate sales of services have not 
only become a viable second channel of delivery for US and European
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multinationals, they have become the overwhelming mode of delivery in a 
rather short period of time. Nothing better illustrates the ever-deepening 
integration of the transatlantic service economy.
• Sales of services by US foreign affiliates in Europe soared from S85 billion 
in 1994 to roughly S234 billion in 2001—a 175% increase, well ahead of the 
64% rise in US service exports to Europe over the same period.
• US foreign affiliate sales of services in Europe—after being roughly equal 
to US service exports to Europe in 1992—were more than double the value 
of US service exports in 2001.
• Europe leads the way in terms o f US foreign affiliate sales of services, just 
as it does in global US affiliate sales of goods. In 2001, Europe accounted 
for 54% of total US affiliate sales (S432 billion), with Asia (a 20% share) 
and Latin America (13%), a distant second and third, respectively.
• Foreign affiliate service sales o f S124 billion in the UK alone in 2001 were 
greater than foreign affiliate service sales in all of Asia ($87 billion) and 
Latin America ($54 billion).
• Sales of services by US affiliates of European firms have also soared over 
the past decade. As Europe’s investment position in services has expanded 
in the US, so have Europe’s foreign affiliate sales of services. The latter 
totalled $249 billion in 2001 versus $86 billion in 1994, a jump of 190%, 
well ahead of the 83% rise in European service exports to the US over the 
same period.
ƒ/. That's Where the Research Is...
• 60% of US corporate research and development conducted outside the 
United States is conducted in Europe. R&D expenditures by US foreign 
affiliates are greatest in the UK, Germany and France, in that order.
• European R&D expenditures in the US are substantial and dwarf 
expenditures spent by Asian counterparts, namely Japan,
/. That's Where the Money Is...
• Europe is not only a critical source of revenue for blue-chip companies, it is 
also a key supplier of capital or liquidity for the debt-stretched United 
States, which presently must borrow over Sl.4 billion a day to finance its 
current account deficit.
• European investors purchased a record S169 billion in US corporate bonds 
in 2003—52% more than in 2002.
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J. That \  H ho Is Connected in a Globalizing World.»
• Interregional internet bandwidth underscores the “thick” nature of 
transatlantic connectivity. Between 2001 and 2003 transatlantic internet 
bandwidth doubled, to more than three times that of North American 
connections to Asia and the Pacific, IV2 times that between North America, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 87 times that of European 
connections to Asia and the Pacific.
K. Drifting Apart? Or Growing Together?
• In sum, the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have witnessed the 
greatest period of transatlantic economic integration in history. Our mutual 
stake in each other’s prosperity and success has grown dramatically since 
the end of the Cold War. Ignoring these realities is short-sighted and short­
changes American and European consumers, producers, investors, workers 
and their families.
II . M ars, V cnus-or M ercury?
Com m erce T rum ps Diplomacy in a Y ea r of W ar
These days, political pundits arc fond of quoting Robert Kagan’s quip that Americans 
arc from Mars and Europeans arc from Venus. Those images were reinforced by 
transatlantic disputes over Iraq in 2003. But the related talc of 2003 is that both Mars 
and Venus should take greater heed of Mercury, the god of commerce.
For transatlantic relations, 2003 was a year o f political bust and economic boom. 
Even as transatlantic bickering engendered by America’s war with Iraq plunged 
transatlantic political relations to one of its lowest points in six decades, the economic 
tics that bind the United States and Europe together only grew stronger in 2003.
2003 was a banner year for the transatlantic economy (see Table 1). 
Transatlantic trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows and profits all 
rebounded robustly from the cyclical economic downturn of 2001-02. Economic 
integration strengthened in a year of political disintegration. What is perhaps most 
striking is that during the first six months o f the year—the months of greatest 
transatlantic political tension—economic engagement deepened considerably 
between the United States and those two bad “old” boys of Europe, France and 
Germany.1
Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy
1 US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described France and Germany as part of “old 
Europe" and countries such as Spain, Britain, Poland and other central European nations as 
part of ‘‘new Europe” when asked why some European countries were supporting the US 
effort against Iraq while others were opposed.
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2003: A Record-Setting Year for the Transatlantic Economy
The following all-time highs were recorded in 2003:
Transatlantic Investment
European net purchases of US corporate bonds: SI 69 billion 
Transatlantic Trade
Total transatlantic trade in goods: S395 billion
US trade deficit with European Union: $94.3 billion 
US current account deficit with the European Union: S94 billion 
US imports from the European Union: S244.8 billion
US imports from Germany: S68.1 billion 
US trade deficit with Germany: S39.2 billion
US imports from Italy: S25.4 billion 
US trade deficit with Italy: S14.9 billion
US imports from Ireland: S I8.1 billion 
US trade deficit with Ireland: S25.8 billion
US imports from Spain: S6.7 billion
US trade deficit with France: $12.2 billion
US trade deficit with the Netherlands: $9.7 billion
Transatlantic Profits (affiliate income)
US profits in Europe: $82 billion
US profits in the Netherlands: $17.9 billion 
US profits in Switzerland: S I0.7 billion 
US profits in Ireland: S6.8 billion 
US profits in France: S4.3 billion 
US profits in Italy: $3.1 billion 
US profits in Spain: S2.5 billion 
US profits in Belgium: $2.0 billion 
US profits in Denmark: SI.4 billion 
US profits in Sweden: SI.2 billion 
US profits in Austria: $578 million 
US profits in Poland: $466 million 
US profits in Czech Republic: $182 million
European profits in the US: $46.4 billion
UK profits in the US: $16.5 billion 
Netherlands profits in the US: $8.9 billion 
Switzerland profits in the US: $6.4 billion 
Sweden profits in the US: S2.1 billion
Source: US Department o f Commerce
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Despite Washington’s war-related frustrations with Europe, corporate America 
pumped over SI00 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Europe in 2003. 
That represents a jump of more than a third over 2002 and was more than double 
the rate of growth of total US investment outflows for the year. As is customary, US 
investment flows to the United Kingdom dominated total EU investment, with US 
firms sinking nearly S25.4 billion in the UK in 2003, roughly 30% of the EU total. 
Yet even after adjusting for massive flows to United Kingdom, US foreign 
investment to Europe approached $62 billion in 2003, a staggering rise of 29% from 
a year earlier.
Germany was one favoured destination of US firms in 2003, notwithstanding the 
fact that US-German relations ebbed to one of the lowest levels since World War II. 
American firms sank $7 billion in Germany in 2003, a shaip reversal from the 
corresponding period in 2002, when US firms pulled some S5 billion out of 
Germany. One of the largest deals involved Procter & Gamble’s S5.7 billion 
acquisition of Wella.
Transatlantic commerce with other European countries flourished. US 
investment in Ireland ($4.7 billion) was more than two-and-a-half times greater than 
US investment to China ($1.7 billion). The $19.2 billion of US investment in the 
Netherlands was not far behind total US investment in all of Asia ($22.4 billion). 
And despite intense diplomatic tensions between the US and France in 2003, US 
investment flows to France rose by more than 10% to $2.3 billion.
In short, while the US House of Representatives spent its time changing French 
fries to “freedom fries," US firms in France and other parts of Europe were busy 
seeking out strategic acquisitions, further deepening transatlantic tics. In a year 
when US-Europcan political relations had seldom been rockier, American firms 
remained confident and committed to Europe, with the region alone accounting for 
nearly 65% of total US foreign direct investment in 2003.
Meanwhile, virulent anti-war sentiment across Europe did not prevent European 
firms from investing S36.9 billion in foreign direct investment in the US in 2003. 
That represented a sharp rebound from the depressed levels of the prior year, when 
European FDI inflows to the United States totalled S26 billion. As is usually the 
case, British firms lead the investment foray into the US, yet even after excluding 
the UK, European investment flows to the US totalled just over $10 billion in 2003, 
roughly on par with aggregate inflows in 2002. Ironically, French firms were among 
the largest European investors in the US in 2003, with Corporate France sinking 
some S4.2 billion in the United States. German foreign investment in the US 
declined again in 2003 (with disinvestments of $1.2 billion), although the 
contraction in investment was a fraction of the decline experienced in 2002 
($4.6 billion).
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Corporate America's Bias Towards Europe
US foreign direct investment (FDD outflows to Europe as % of total
55.8
2002
64,1
2003 2000-2003
(Cumulative)
In addition to the nearly S37 billion in foreign direct investment the US received 
from Europe in 2003, Euroland investors (excluding the United Kingdom) ploughed 
another S50 billion into US dollar-denominatcd assets like US Treasuries, 
government agency bonds, corporate bonds and US equities, European investors 
(including UK flows) were particularly enamoured with US corporate bonds, 
purchasing a record S I69 billion in corporate bonds in 2003—52% above the levels 
of the prior year. The UK accounted for the bulk of purchases o f corporate bonds 
($108 billion), but net corporate purchases from Euroland still totalled a record 
$29 billion in 2003, a rise o f 82% from the previous year.
On a country basis, German portfolio managers snapped up nearly $10 billion in 
total US securities in 2003, following net purchases of just $1,1 billion in 2002. 
French investors bought $4 billion in US securities in 2003, down from S5.6 billion 
the prior year. Total net purchases from the United Kingdom totalled a staggering 
$164.4 billion in 2003. However, net buying from London, reflecting the city’s role 
as a global financial hub, includes net purchasing from the Middle East, eastern 
Europe and other geographic areas.
All totalled, transatlantic capital flows—both foreign direct investment and 
portfolio flows—rose dramatically in 2003. Whenever and wherever strategic
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opportunities presented themselves, US firms were unhesitant about acquiring 
European firms. General Electric, Procter & Gamble, United Technologies—a fairly 
representative body of Corporate America—all made European acquisitions in 
excess of SI billion in 2003. In the United States, European firms like Henkel, Axa 
and Deutsche Post did the same, building out their strategic US presence amid all 
the threats of a transatlantic alliance in crisis. European portfolio managers, 
meanwhile, were busy adding high-grade US corporate bonds to their portfolios.
2003 was also a record year for transatlantic trade flows. Total transatlantic trade 
in goods rose to S391 billion in 2003. US imports from Europe hit a record 
S245 billion in 2003—despite the massive appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar. America’s goods deficit with the EU widened to a record S97 billion in 
2003. Meanwhile, the US current account deficit with Europe reached a record 
S94 billion, up 9% from the prior year.
The rise in the euro against the dollar has spawned a great deal of angst across 
Europe. However, the strong euro/wcak dollar did not have much effect on US 
imports from Europe in 2003. In fact, US imports from Germany, Italy, Ireland, and 
Spain all reached record levels in 2003, with strong US demand offsetting the
Euroland Net Purchases of US Securities
120
-20
^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
Excludes purchases from the United Kingdom 
Source: US Treasury Department
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negative effect from the strong euro. Not surprisingly, surging imports from Europe 
produced record US trade deficits with Germany, Italy, Ireland, France and the 
Netherlands.
Finally, despite all the talk of a transatlantic boycott or a consumer backlash on 
both sides of the ocean, 2003 was a banner year for transatlantic profits as measured 
by foreign affiliate income. US foreign affiliates in Europe reaped a profits windfall 
from the declining US dollar against the euro, with the dollar sliding over 40%  
against the euro from the end of 2001 to the end of 2003. The effect was to greatly 
inflate the dollar-bascd earnings of US affiliates in Europe. Indeed, US foreign 
affiliate income from Europe surged to a record S 82 billion last year, more than a 
30% jump from the prior year. Over the same period, US affiliate profits in France 
more than doubled, to S4.3 billion, while profits earned in Ireland surged by 45%, in 
Italy by 40%, and in the Netherlands by 24.5%.
In all, US affiliate earnings in some twelve European markets (France, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
Austria, Czech Republic and Poland) reached record highs in 2003.This broadly- 
based profits bonanza helped boost total US pre-tax corporate profits by 18% last 
year, one of the strongest annual rises in decades.
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2003 was also a record year for profits of European affiliates operating in the 
United States, Notwithstanding the strength of the euro against the US dollar 
— a significant headwind to earnings—European affiliate earnings of S44 billion in 
2003 easily surpassed camings of 2002 (S32.23 billion) and 2001 (S17.4 billion), 
and the previous peak in earnings of S38.8 billion in 2000. The camings boost was 
driven by robust US demand, which greatly offset the negative effect of the 
appreciation of the euro and the British pound, as well as weak European growth 
again in 2003. British, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish foreign affiliates all enjoyed 
record US profits in 2003.
At first glance, the news is good: transatlantic commerce, fuelled by mutual 
investment, remains robust and seems more attuned to good economics than bad 
diplomacy. But the underlying reality is that the relationship between the 
transatlantic strategic and economic agendas has reversed. During the Cold War, 
leaders strove to keep transatlantic economic conflicts from spilling over to the core 
political alliance. Now the challenge is to keep transatlantic political disputes from 
damaging the core economic relationship.
Pouring French wine down the drain or vandalizing McDonald's may make for 
splashy headlines, but the more significant development is the accelerating 
integration of the European and US economies. Transatlantic divorce? We literally 
cannot afford it.
Case Study
Why Exchange Rates Matter Less Than We Think:
The Story o f Related Party Trade
How Related Party Trade Influences Transatlantic Trade Flows
Transatlantic trade rebounded in 2003 following a two-year slump, which saw total 
trade between the US and European Union fall 4% between 2000 and 2002. In 
2003, total transatlantic trade in goods rose to S396 billion, a 7% increase from the 
prior period.
Not unexpectedly, US exports, supported by the weaker US dollar, recovered 
from the two-year downturn in trade with Europe, rising to SI50.6 billion in 2003. 
That represented a healthy 4.8% annual increase—yet US export growth pales in 
comparison to US import growth from Europe in 2003. In fact, US imports from 
Europe jumped 8.5% in 2003, rising to a record S245 billion in a year wrhcn the Euro 
appreciated by 20% against the dollar between year-end 2002 and year-end 2003.
Following such a large shift in prices or exchange rates, Economics 101 would 
have predicted a rebalancing of bilateral trade. Theory would have expected US 
export growth to outstrip US import growth, leading to an improvement in the 
overall trade balance. In fact, the opposite occurred: America’s trade deficit with
2 3
DANIELS. HAMILTON and JO SEPH  P. QUINLAN
Europe actually widened by nearly 15% in 2003, with the deficit jumping to a 
record $94.3 billion.
Seemingly impervious to the strength of the euro, US imports from Gennany 
rose by nearly 9% in 2003. US exports to Germany actually declined, dropping by 
over 11%, leaving a record trade deficit of S35.9 billion with Europe's largest 
economy. Elsewhere, US imports from the Netherlands rose by 11.2% in 2003, 
while imports from Spain jumped by nearly 10%. US imports from France did fall 
in 2003, by 6.6%, but so did US exports to France, leaving a record US trade deficit 
of just over SI 2.2 billion.
The fact that transatlantic trade flows have yet to adjust to the massive 
revaluation of the euro against the US dollar have confounded many on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Two years after the euro’s stunning rise against the dollar, 
America’s trade deficit with Europe should have begun to narrow, with US exports 
growing at a faster pace than imports. That is conventional wisdom, which has not 
panned out.
Missing from the debate over trade and missing from conventional analysis is 
this: an unusually large percentage of US imports from Europe are considered 
related party trade, or trade that takes place between a parent cooperation, such as 
Siemens of Gennany, and its foreign affiliate in the United States.
Parent-affiliate trade is less responsive to shifts in prices or exchange rates and 
more attuned to domestic demand. Accordingly, while a strong euro, in theory at 
least, would be associated with a decline in European competitiveness in the United 
States, the fact that many European multinationals produce, market and distribute 
goods on both sides of the ocean gives firms a high degree of immunity to a 
dramatic shift in exchange rates. Roughly 57% o f total US imports from Europe arc 
considered related party trade, which means more than half of US imports from 
Europe arc not affected by exchange rates in the traditional sense. That is well 
above the global average for the US, with some 48% of all US imports considered 
related party trade.
Related Party T rade 2002
U S  Im ports: U S  Exports:
Related P a rty  Trade, Related Party Tra d e ,
as %  of Tota l as %  of To ta l
Eu ro pean Union ! 5 6 ,8 31,0
Fra n c e 4 2 ,6 27,9
G e rm a n / ! 6 7 ,2 3 3 ,6
N etherlands 5 8 ,9 42,6
United Kingdom i 5 3 ,3 28,1
O th e r E u ro pe a n  Union 55,1 28,1
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Under this structure, trade flows are driven more by demand in the host nation. 
As such, when the US economy exhibits strong growth, as in 2003, European 
affiliates in the United States produce and sell more products, which in turn, 
generates more demand (a.k.a imports) from the parent company for parts and 
components irrespective of exchange rate movements.
Related party trade can have a significant impact on bilateral trade between 
individual nations. Only after recognizing that roughly two-thirds o f US imports 
from Germany arc considered related party trade, for example, can one begin to 
understand and explain why US imports from Germany remained so strong in a 
year when the dollar plummeted against the euro (US imports from Germany rose 
8.8% in 2003 from the prior year). Roughly 59% of US imports from the 
Netherlands arc considered related party trade; around 54% of US imports from the 
United Kingdom are classified as related party trade as well.
Around one-third of US exports to Europe arc classified as related party trade, 
lower than US imports from Europe. This, in part, reflects the fact that US affiliates 
in Europe source more goods from local sources, thus reducing trade, than 
European affiliates in the United States.
III. The Tics That Bind: Quantifying the Primacy 
of the Transatlantic Economy
Many feared the United States and Europe were drifting apart in 2003 and that a 
seismic geopolitical shift was in the making. The reality, however, is that while the 
"Iraq*’ effect did place a great deal of stress on one of the world’s most important 
bilateral relationships, one reason why the transatlantic alliance held together in 
2003 is that it is firmly anchored by deep and far-reaching commercial tics.
Loose talk about an alliance without common bonds, or a partnership devoid of 
relevance, ignores the simple yet powerful fact that transatlantic commercial ties arc 
the largest and deepest in the world—bar none. The transatlantic economy is bound 
together by foreign direct investment (a deep form of integration) as opposed to 
trade (a shallow form of integration). Foreign affiliate sales, not exports, are the 
primary means by which US firms deliver goods and services to customers in 
Europe. The same holds true for European firms delivering products in the United 
States—trade flows arc secondary to foreign affiliate sales. This has been the 
transatlantic norm for decades, not years. While exports and imports are the most 
common measures used in the media or by political pundits to evaluate cross-border 
activity between two parties, foreign direct investment and the activities o f foreign 
affiliates arc the backbone of transatlantic commercial activity.
Lost in the transatlantic debate is the fact that the US and European companies 
invest more in each other’s economies than they do in the entire rest of the world. 
Transatlantic commercial ties are the largest in the world, with total commerce
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amounting to roughly $2.5 trillion in 2001. That figure includes total two-way trade 
between the US and Europe, plus total foreign affiliate sales, adjusted for potential 
double counting o f affiliate sales and exports/imports. This relationship employs 
directly or indirectly over 12 million people on both sides of the Atlantic who enjoy 
higher wages, higher labour and environmental standards, and open, largely non- 
discriminatory access to each other’s markets.
Despite rhetorical flourishes one hears about shifting American priorities due to 
Nafta or the “Asian Century,” over the past decade American investment in the 
Netherlands alone was more than twice what is was in Mexico and nearly ten times 
what it was in China. Europe, not Asia or Latin America, is the most important 
source of global earnings for American companies. Similarly, for many leading 
European firms, the United States remains the most important market in the world.
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America's M ajor Commercial Arteries
$2.8 Trillion
InCUllfflllS AfWNltfflC A»ia/Pacitic NAFTA NAFTA Trarwattantic Latin America Latin America
Total Foreign T«al Foreipt Tool Trade Tola) Foreign Tflal Trade Total Trade Tael Foreign Total Trade 
Affiliate Sales Affiliate Sales Affiliate Sales Affiliate Sales
Foreign affiliate sales: data for 2001
Total trade: data in goods & services for 2002
Source: US Department o f Commerce
Total transatlantic sales of foreign affiliates topped S2.8 billion in 2001, the last 
year of available data. That is some five times greater than total transatlantic trade
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of goods and services. Foreign affiliate sales not only dwarf transatlantic trade flows 
but also every other cross-border commercial artery linking the United States with 
the rest of the world. For instance, total foreign affiliate sales between the United 
States and Europe were more than double the comparable figures for total US- 
transpacific foreign affiliates sales in 2001 and more than three times larger than 
total transpacific trade flows. They were also four times larger than foreign affiliate 
sales between the United States and its North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Nafta) partners, Mexico and Canada.
A. Seven Key Indices o f  Transatlantic Commercial Activity
The primacy of foreign affiliate sales in driving transatlantic commerce reflects the 
underlying commercial infrastructure that links the United States with Europe. This 
infrastructure has been in the making for over a century, yet remains largely 
invisible to policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. After examining the 
following seven variables, however, a clearer picture of the transatlantic economy 
emerges.
I. Gross Product o f  Foreign Affiliates
In various European countries, the presence of US affiliates remains striking. In 
Ireland, for instance, US affiliates accounted for 16% of the nation’s total output in 
2001. US affiliates accounted for 7.2% of the UK’s aggregate output in the same 
year and 6.2% of the Netherlands. In the United States, the total output of British 
affiliate topped $100 billion in 2001; the economic output of German, Dutch and 
French foreign affiliates totalled $50 billion, $44 billion and $40 billion, 
respectively.2
The 2001-2002 cyclical recession dampened transatlantic affiliate output. Total 
output of US foreign affiliates in Europe and of European affiliates in the United 
States declined in 2001 on account of weak economic growth on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Output of US foreign affiliates in Europe dropped 3% in 2001 from the 
prior year, yet still totalled some $318 billion for the year. European affiliates in the 
United States produced some $308 billion in output in 2001, down sharply from the 
$345 billion in total output in 2000. Since the US economy was the weakest link of 
the transatlantic economy in 2001, with the US experiencing a three-quarter 
economic recession, European affiliates in the US bore the largest brunt of the 
transatlantic downturn of 2001. However, with foreign affiliate output on both sides
An affiliate is defined as a business enterprise whereby a US or foreign firm owns or controls 
10% or more of the voting securities of the incorporated firm. Gross product of affiliates is for 
majority-owned affiliates.
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of the Atlantic in excess of S300 billion, US and European affiliates—even in a bad 
year—generate more economic output every twelve months than most countries. On 
a global basis, the gross product of US affiliates slumped to $583 billion in 2001, 
down from S606 billion in 2000. Europe accounted for roughly 55% of the total.
2. Overseas Assets o f  Foreign Assets
Corporate America's overseas commercial presence as measured by foreign assets 
totalled S5.8 billion in 2001, with the bulk of these assets located in Europe* Total 
US assets in Europe exceeded S3.3 trillion, representing roughly 60% of the global 
total. The largest share of US assets arc in the United Kingdom, America’s long­
standing favourite destination in terms of foreign investment. US assets in the 
United Kingdom -roughly S1.4 trillion in 2001—were more than 50% larger than 
the entire US asset base in Asia. In Germany, US assets of S320 billion were greater 
than total US assets in South America. As for foreign assets held in the United 
States, European firms held some S3.7 trillion in US assets in 2001, nearly 70% of 
the total. The geographic reach of Europe’s investment in the United States is quite 
diverse. In fact. European companies arc the top foreign investor in 45 states, and 
ranked second in the remaining five states in 2001.
3. Affiliate Employment
The transatlantic workforce deployed by US and European foreign affiliates is 
massive, totalling over 8.4 million workers in 2001. That is three times the number 
of total workers employed by US affiliates in Nafta partners Canada and Mexico 
(2.8 million). It is also well above total foreign employment of US foreign affiliates 
in Asia and Asian foreign affiliates in the United States (2.3 million).
On a global basis, US foreign affiliates employed nearly 9.8 million workers in 
2001, with roughly 43% toiling in Europe. US majority-owned affiliates employed 
some 3.8 million workers in Europe in 2001, with the workforce evenly split 
between manufacturing employment and services. While the number of 
manufacturing workers in Europe as a percentage of the global total of US affiliates 
has levelled off in recent years, US firms still employed 1.9 million manufacturing 
workers in Europe in 2001. That is more than double the number of manufacturing 
workers employed by US affiliates in Asia. The transportation equipment sector 
w'as the largest source of manufacturing employment in Europe; wholesale 
employment w'as among the largest sources o f service-related employment, and 
includes employment in such areas of logistics, trade, insurance and other service- 
enhancing activities.
European affiliates employed roughly 4.3 million American workers in 2001, 
slightly more than US affiliate employment in Europe. The top five employers in 
the US w'crc from the United Kingdom (1.1 million), Germany (734,000), France 
(578,000), the Netherlands (571,000) and Switzerland (546,000). Out of the
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6.4 million US workers on the payrolls of foreign affiliates in 2001, European firm: 
accounted for roughly two-thirds of total employment. As a footnote, the figurci 
cited above understate the employment effects o f investment in that the numbers arc 
for direct employment only, and do not include indirect employment related to non­
equity arrangements like strategic alliances, joint ventures and other deals. 
Moreover, affiliate employment figures do not include jobs supported by trade with 
Europe. Employment related trade is substantial in many states. In total, and adding 
in indirect employment, we estimate that the transatlantic work force numbers some 
12-14 million workers.
4. Research & Development (R&D) o f  Foreign Affiliates
Foreign affiliate R&D has become more prominent over the past decade as firms on 
both sides o f the Atlantic seek to share the costs of development, spread the risks 
and tap into the intellectual talent of other nations. Alliances, cross-licensing o f  
intellectual property, mergers and acquisitions and other forms of cooperation have 
become more prevalent in the transatlantic economy over the past decade. Indeed, 
the advent and spread of the internet on both sides of the Atlantic has been key in 
bolstering greater R&D collaboration: interregional internet bandwidth between the 
North America and Europe is V/z times greater than bandwidth between North 
America and Asia.
Asset-augmenting strategics of firms point to greater transatlantic economic 
activity in knowledge-based sectors o f the economy. The R&D demands of both US 
and European firms dictate that companies tap into innovative talent on both sides 
of the ocean. The cyclical recession o f 2001 took a toll as global R&D expenditures 
of US foreign affiliates declined to S I9.4 billion from S20.4 billion in 2000, an 
expected outcome given the weak profit performance of many firms. In Europe, US 
foreign affiliate R&D totalled $11.7 billion, down from $12.9 billion, although 
Europe still accounted for roughly 60% of the global total. The United Kingdom, 
Germany and France, in that order, were the top three markets where R&D 
expenditures by US foreign affiliates were greatest. No comparable figures for 
Europe's R&D investment in the US arc available. However, given America’s 
highly skilled labour force and the research intensity of many European sectors 
(chemicals, telecoms, automobiles), European R&D expenditures in the US arc 
substantial and dwarf expenditures spent by Asian counterparts, namely Japan.
As a recent example o f expanding European R&D expenditures in the United 
States, Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant, recently opened a research and 
development centre in Boston, a strategic move designed to tap the intellectual 
capital of the greater Boston area. The move will bolster the innovative capacity o f  
the firm, while providing high-paying jobs for American workers.
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5. Intra-Jinn Trade o f  Foreign Affiliates
Foreign affiliate sales arc the primary means by which transatlantic commerce is 
conducted. Cross border trade is a secondary means of delivery, although the modes 
o f delivery—affiliate sales and trade—should not be viewed independently of each 
other. They arc more complements than substitutes, since foreign investment and 
foreign affiliate sales increasingly drive and determine trade flows. A substantial 
share of transatlantic trade is classified as intra-firm trade or related party trade, 
which is cross border trade that stays within the ambit of the company—for instance 
when Siemens of Germany sends parts and components to Siemens North Carolina, 
or when a Dupont affiliate in Delaware exports a specialty chemical to an affiliate 
in the Netherlands, This type of trade is evident among countries or regions with 
deep, investment-led linkages, which defines the transatlantic economy. 
Accordingly, roughly 55% of US imports from the European Union consisted of 
related party trade in 2002. In the case of Germany, the percentage (66%) was even 
higher. Meanwhile, roughly 30% of US exports to Europe in 2002 represented 
related party trade. Related party trade also played a key role in shaping 
transatlantic trade flows in 2003.
6. Foreign Affiliate Sales
With over 20,000 foreign affiliates dispersed around the world, US firms easily 
derive more sales from foreign affiliates than exports. That is notably the case with 
Europe, with US foreign affiliate in Europe achieving sales of $1.5 trillion in 2001 
versus US exports of $276 million to Europe in the same year. Of global foreign 
affiliate sales in 2001 (a record $2.9 trillion), Europe accounted for just over 51% of 
the total. On a comparative basis, affiliate sales in Europe were more than double 
affiliate sales in the entire Asia/Pacific region in 2001. Affiliate sales in the United 
Kingdom alone (S428 billion) exceeded aggregates sales in Latin America. While 
sales in China soared over the 1990s on account of surging US foreign direct 
investment, sales of only S36 billion in China in 2001 were on par with total sales in 
Sweden (S33 billion) and well below sales in both Germany (S240 billion) and 
France ($135 billion).
Affiliate sales are also the primary means by which European firms deliver 
goods and services to US consumers. In 2001, for instance, European affiliate sales 
in the US ($1.4 billion) were over four times larger than US imports from Europe. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the gap between affiliate sales and imports was 
even wider, with UK affiliate sales in the US more than five times the amount of 
US imports from the UK. German affiliate sales in the US were more than four 
times greater than US imports from Germany—a striking statistic for Germany, a 
country commonly thought to be a classic “trading” nation.
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7. Foreign A ffiliate Profits
In terms of profits, Europe remains by a wide market the most important region in 
the world for corporate America. Indeed, US corporate profits soared to record 
highs in 2003 due in large part to US dollar weakness, which helped inflate the 
bottom line of many US multinationals and drive the major US financial indices to 
robust levels. It was the US dollar's weakness against the euro—with the greenback 
depreciating by over 20% against the euro in 2003—that provided the most bang for 
the buck to US firms, since Europe typically accounts for half o f US global earnings 
(earnings outside the US). For all of 2003, US foreign affiliate income from Europe, 
a proxy for global earnings, topped a record S82 billion, up about 30% from the 
prior year. In the United Kingdom, the sharp slide of the US dollar against the 
British pound helped boost affiliate earnings by 18.4% in 2003. In all, US affiliate 
earnings in some twelve European markets (France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Italy, Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Czech Republic, and 
Poland) reached record highs in 2003.
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Similarly, the United States remains the most important market in the world in 
terms of earnings for many European multinationals. Profits of European foreign 
affiliates in the United States also reached new highs in 2003, also sparking solid 
gains across various Europe stock markets. European affiliate profits totalled just 
over S44 billion in 2003, with the earnings boost driven by strong US demand, 
which offset the adverse price effect from the strength of the euro and pound. 
British, Dutch, Swedish and Swiss foreign affiliates all enjoyed record US profits in
2003. Contrary to most assessments of transatlantic drift since the end o f the Cold 
War, Europe’s investment stake in the US has deepened dramatically since the fall 
o f the Berlin Wall: European affiliates’ earnings rose ten-fold between 1990 and 
2003, or from S4.4 billion to S44 billion.
U.S. Foreign Affiliate Income Breakdown, 2003
Source: Bureau o f Economics Analysis
European sectors most exposed to the US market include automobiles, media, 
financial services and pharmaceuticals. In the pharmaceuticals sector, revenues 
from the North American market, namely the United States, accounted for 52.2% of 
total global revenues in 2002, according to figures from Morgan Stanley. In the 
same year, Europe’s media sector derived some 38% of total revenue from North 
America; Europe’s financial service sector, meanwhile, relied on North America for 
36% of total revenue in 2002, while European automobile manufacturers generated 
nearly 30% of total revenues from North America.
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In terms o f individual European countries, the Netherlands is the most exposed 
to the North American market, according to survey results from Morgan Stanley, 
deriving some 41.8% o f total revenue from North America in 2002. Ireland 
(32.5%), Switzerland (31.9%, the United Kingdom (22.7%), Germany (21.6%), and 
Belgium (21.3%) were also significantly exposed to the North American market.
Europe's Exposure to North America 
Share of total revenues generated by North America, 2002 
45
41,8
Source: Morgan Stanley
In sum, these seven indices convey a more complete and complex picture o f  
international economic flows than simple tallies of exports and imports. Foreign 
direct investment represents the backbone of the transatlantic economy, with other 
variables such as overseas assets, affiliate employment and sales, and R&D all 
derived from the level and depth of investment linkages. No other commercial artery 
in the world is as integrated and fused together by foreign investment, a fact lost on 
many pundits, parliamentarians and policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic.
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Hugo Paemett
When, in 2003, the Center for Transatlantic Relations published Joseph Quinlan’s 
first survey of the Transatlantic Economic Relations (“Drifting Apart or Growing 
Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy”), it reminded us o f the fact 
that, notwithstanding the growing importance of other economic actors in the world, 
the US and Europe have remained—and have increasingly become—each other’s 
major bilateral partner in their exchanges of goods, services and investment. The 
new and extended survey, done jointly with Dan Hamilton (“Partners in Prosperity: 
The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy”), consolidates this 
assessment. On the much belabored “drifting apart” theme, the authors conclude 
their Executive Summary with the observation that “In sum, the years since the fall 
o f  the Berlin Wall have witnessed the greatest period of transatlantic economic 
integration in history. Our mutual stake in each other’s prosperity and success has 
grown dramatically since the end of die Cold W ar...”. This trend seems to continue, 
as appears from the figures for 2003, despite the transatlantic acrimonies over trade 
disputes or the US-led war in Iraq.
One of the most interesting observations of the Quinlan/Hamilton survey, is the 
special link between trade and investment. As the sequential relationship between 
the two activities has largely changed in the globalizing economy, and even more so 
in the transatlantic market, the development of the one cannot be correctly assessed 
without taking into consideration the situation of the other. The best illustration of 
this connection is their finding that, in both directions, affiliate sales have become 
three to four times larger than direct exports.
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Evenly interesting is their finding that these two so-called mature economies are 
also each other's most profitable markets. The same can be said of their mutual job 
creation. While, on a global basis, US companies employ more workers overseas 
(nearly 9.8 million) than foreign firms employ in the US (6.4 million), the European 
companies employ more workers in the US (4.2 million) than American firms do in 
Europe (3.2million)
The new survey is greatly enriched by providing us with regional data for the 
individual States in the US, for the EU Member States, the sub-federal states in 
Germany and even for the recently acceded states of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Many interesting comments can be derived from the wealth of economic data. The 
overall impression is that o f a progressive integration of the two economics. In the 
US this integration is confirmed by the near “invisible” foreign character of the 
European investments, while in Europe the American investors have wisely 
followed the developments linked to the gradual enlargement o f the Union, which 
notably appears from the progressive geographic re-orientation of their new 
investments following the accession of new Member States.
The data of the Survey arc convincing and reassuring for all those who care 
about the Atlantic Relationship. For that reason, the answers to three categories of 
questions, which arc outside the scope of the present Survey, could usefully 
complete, or possibly qualify, the overall positive assessment by the Survey of the 
Transatlantic economy:
1) While most of the European investments in the US arc in the 
manufacturing sectors (with the car industry representing the larger share), 
the orientation of American investments in Europe has considerably 
changed over the years, as has been clearly illustrated in the survey. From 
being fairly balanced between manufacturing and services until the early 
1990s, US investment in Europe now seems to be largely geared toward 
services. In 2002 nearly three-fourths of the total investments seems to 
have taken place in services sectors. The employment situation shows the 
same shift: service employment by US affiliates in Europe more than 
doubled during the last decade. It appears that US investment in Europe 
has shown a high degree of flexibility and a capacity to adapt its strategic 
focus to the changing structural and political developments on the 
European continent. There do not seem to be indications o f the same 
degree of flexibility of the European investment activities in the US. It 
would be interesting to know in how far such a comparison is justified and 
what the conclusion would be. In other words, a study and comparison of 
the “quality” o f the investment and trading flows would be a valuable 
complement to the interesting infomiation already collected by Quinlan 
and Hamilton.
Comments on 'Partners in Prosperity...*
2) A second question is somehow linked to the previous one. It concerns the 
longer term impact which the continuation of a divergent economic growth 
pattern in the US and Europe would have on the trade and investment 
relationship. In that respect the data on the already substantially divergent 
per capita GDP in the US and Europe, mentioned by Frcdcrik Bergstroem 
and Robert Gidehag in US vs. EU  (June 2004), should be examined. In 
how far would they encourage a somewhat more qualified assessment of 
the—longer term—state of the transatlantic economy?
3) Thirdly, the inevitable question of the possible contamination of the 
economic relationship by the acrimonious political atmosphere has 
become an increasing concern of business leaders on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Especially global companies, which expect and are prepared to 
deal with the political, legal and regulatory difficulties in certain parts of 
the world, loathe the thought of being confronted with a resurgence of 
trade disputes over the Atlantic. The (mainly political) future alone will 
tell us how this will finally turn out. In the meantime, we should be 
encouraged by certain developments in some sectors of the transatlantic 
dialogue, like financial services, auditing, trade, homeland security and 
others, which underneath the ominous political clouds seem to justify a 
more positive mood.
Joseph Quinlan can claim credit for having reminded the two sides of the 
Atlantic and the rest of the world of the central role of the transatlantic exchanges in 
the world economy. His statistical compilation and analysis give an impressive 
picture of the integration already achieved by the two economics. It would be 
particularly useful if, based on the data in his two surveys, some further economic 
analysis were to be made, which would allow for a more qualitative assessment of 
the transatlantic integration process.
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Chapter 3
Trade Negotiations 
Bruce Stokes
I, Introduction
The Atlantic Alliance, tested m wars both hot and cold, faces new challenges in the 
first decade of the 21st century. But while the 20lh century challenges were largely 
security related, today’s challenges arc increasingly economic: how to deepen the 
integration of the emerging transatlantic marketplace and how mutually to 
maximize the benefits of the global trading system. How the United States and the 
European Union manage their bilateral and multilateral trade relations in the years 
ahead will shape the future nature of the transatlantic relationship.
II. History and Performance
The US and EU have a long history of cooperation in both the multilateral and 
bilateral trade arenas, at times achieving great success, at times experiencing 
embarrassing failures.
Europe and the United States created the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and drove successful tariff cutting negotiations in the GATT. It was 
Washington and Brussels that cooperated in 1986 to launch the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade talks, that brokered the Blair House agreement on agriculture in 
1992 that broke the Round’s deadlock and that jointly agreed on the shape and 
function of the World Trade Organization.
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It was Robert B. Zoellick, the US Trade Representative and Pascal Lamy, the  
European Union’s trade minister who jointly drove the launch of the WTO's current 
Doha Round. They worked to craft a development agenda to insure Third W orld 
support for the negotiations. In the wake of the disastrous failure to initiate a round 
in Seattle in 1999, they realized that disputes that divided rather than united W TO  
member countries—disagreements over labour rights, over the details o f an 
agricultural agreement, over investment and competition policy—should be sw ept 
under the rug, to be dealt with at a later date. It has been the United States and the 
European Union that drafted a joint agricultural reform proposal before the W TO ’s
2003 ministerial in Cancún. And it was Europe giving up export subsidies and 
America agreeing to cut domestic fann support that forged agreement August 1,
2004 on a framework to continue the Doha negotiations.
But this cooperation, as useful as it has been, is increasingly demonstrating its 
limitations. No longer can Brussels and Washington dictate outcomes in multilateral 
settings. This was demonstrated in Cancún, when the US-EU proposal was roundly 
rejected. And it will be tested again next year when negotiators attempt to finalize 
the Doha agreement.
Bilaterally, in December, 1995 the European Union and the United States signed 
the New Transatlantic Agenda that created a new partnership framework that 
included a commitment to expanding world trade, to closer economic relations and 
to building bridges across the Atlantic.
In the NTA Brussels and Washington promised to:
Create a New Transatlantic Marketplace by progressively reducing or 
eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital 
between us. We will carry out a joint study on ways of facilitating 
trade in goods and services and further reducing or eliminating tarilT 
and non-tariff barriers. We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in 
particular by encouraging regulatory agencies to give a high priority to 
cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to 
address technical and non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from 
divergent regulatory processes. We aim to conclude an agreement on 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which includes 
certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as 
possible. We will continue the ongoing work in several sectors and 
identify others for further work.
This NTA built on the Transatlantic Business Dialogue established earlier that 
year, which included both European and American business leaders. They 
committed themselves to work with government to remove barriers to trade through 
a building block approach, identifying particular impediments and cooperating to 
remove them.
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In 1998, the EU and US signed the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, which 
involved a wide range of bilateral co-operative actions and a regular dialogue on 
multilateral trade policy issues. Under the TEP, they have subsequently concluded 
agreements to remove technical barriers to trade by mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment, and worked together on customs procedures.
The TABD and the NTA reflected a commitment by the Clinton Administration 
to put US-Europcan Union relationship at the center of American efforts to 
liberalize trade globally. The extent of the administration's willingness to make the 
EU America's primary interlocutor on trade in Europe was unprecedented. And it 
was a high mark of US-EU ambition and cooperation on the transatlantic 
marketplace.
Since then, the TABD has gone through debilitating internal change, with 
business leaders questioning its effectiveness and the value of their participation. In 
its latest incarnation, in 2004, the TABD urged Washington and Brussels to pursue 
creation of a barrier-free transatlantic market.
The TABD, the NTA and the TEP have served useful purposes. They symbolize 
an official recognition of the importance of the deepening transatlantic economic 
relationship. If they did not exist, someone would propose inventing them. But they 
have fallen far short of expectations.
But, until recently, the TABD had devolved into narrow discussions about 
individual problems affecting a small number of active companies. Lost in the 
weeds, the TABD lacked strategic impact. The building block approach to creating 
a transatlantic marketplace was widely discredited.
Nevertheless, the NTA and TEP have forced officials on both sides of the 
Atlantic to focus energies on bilateral concerns. They facilitated bureaucratic 
interaction, a useful process. And combined with the TABD, this structure has 
enabled the United States to communicate its concerns more directly to EU member 
states—on services issues for example—and vice versa. This ability to bypass the 
Commission is widely appreciated in Washington if not Brussels. But this dialogue 
was not uscfi.il in expanding the transatlantic agenda to include needed issues such 
as competition policy or health and safety standards. And the mutual recognition 
agreements and other groundbreaking ambitions of the initial signatories of the 
NTA and TEP have been frustrated.
III. Primary Impediments to Transatlantic Success
A. Structural Problems
Structural differences that have nothing to do with trade and everything to do with 
the differing natures of the European and American systems of governance have 
proven to be an ongoing impediment in transatlantic trade relations.
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The federal nature of the United States has, at least up until now, created far 
clearer lines of authority and responsibility for trade issues than has the looser 
nature of the European Community/Union. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s 
critique of the European Community, on trade matters there is a telephone number 
to call in Brussels, but when someone answers its not clear if he or she speaks for 
the European Commission or for Europe. The Commission ostensibly has trade 
competence, but the member states have a far greater say in trade matters than do 
individual US states.
Moreover, the Commission is still a work in progress, attempting to grow its 
authority and responsibility and to articulate a European point of view and set of 
interests. From an American perspective, this has at times led the Commission to 
strike a posture in international negotiations that is all about demonstrating to the 
member states that the Commission can do more to balance outcomes than the 
member states could have done themselves. This often leads to least common 
denominator negotiating positions and rigid stances that can’t be changed because 
they arc based on very fragile internal EU compromises. At other times, this need to 
define itself has led the Commission to take the bit in its teeth and run with an issue 
despite misgivings by member states. The Commission’s insistence on pursuing the 
FSC case against the United States—when the EU challenged how the United States 
taxed the overseas profits of its multinational corporations—is just one example of 
this arguably shortsighted self-assertiveness.
From a European point of view, the gravest US structural defect may be the 
insidious role campaign money plays in American politics. The transatlantic banana 
dispute in the 1990s arose because o f major campaign contributions by the 
chairman and CEO o f Chiquita International Brands, Inc., and affiliated companies 
and executives to key Republican members of Congress and to the Clinton 
presidential campaign. Similarly, various US administrations have repeatedly 
refused to negotiate cabotage—the right of foreigner shipping interests to transship 
goods between US ports—because of targeted campaign contributions to key 
Congressional committee members by the US maritime industry that wants to keep 
such rights to itself
There is also a transatlantic imbalance in the relative bureaucratic weight o f the 
EU trade commissioner and the USTR. Trade has always been a big portfolio in 
Brussels, if only because it is one of the Commission's few clear competencies. 
USTR is weak bureaucratically—with roughly 200 staff members it is relatively 
small by Washington standards. And the agency is even more out o f the loop 
politically. At times, because of the USTR’s personal relationship with the 
president—when Robert Strauss was USTR in the Carter Administration, when 
Mickey Kantor was USTR in the Clinton Administration—the USTR has had real 
political clout. But Zoellick is known not to be close to President George W. Bush 
and this hurt Zoellick politically, diplomatically and bureaucratically.
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Going forward—as bilateral trade issues increasingly involve negotiation over 
domestic regulations—American federalism may prove less of an asset to the 
United States in trade deliberations, US states have jurisdiction over much public 
procurement, over many services—they regulate insurance—and they certify many 
professionals—such as lawyers. Already a number of states are denying USTR the 
right to unilaterally commit them internationally on public procurement issues.
B. Differing Authorizing Environments
The profound difference in bureaucratic and political settings in which HU and US 
trade officials must operate in Brussels and Washington has proven an ongoing 
obstacle to closer transatlantic cooperation on trade.
The US constitution gives Congress control over international commerce. As a 
result, all changes in US domestic law necessitated by trade agreements must have 
Congressional approval. To facilitate this process, since 1974, subject to periodic 
renewal, Congress has agreed to forego its right to amend trade legislation brought 
before it and to vote up or down on trade deals. This concession comes at a price, 
growing Congressional oversight of trade negotiations. This “fast track” trade 
negotiating authority must be renewed again in the first half of 2005 and will 
undoubtedly come with a number of bells and whistles.
Congress’ role in trade policy keeps any USTR on a short leash. It means he or 
she must be particularly responsive to Congressional concerns. And when a USTR 
lacks Washington political skills—a problem that dogged Zoellick—the resulting 
antagonism between USTR and Capitol Hill can limit the USTR’s freedom of
manoeuvre.
This unique structural aspect of US trade policy making means EU trade 
commissioners spend an increasing amount of time lobbying Capitol Hill on trade 
issues ranging from tax policy to food health and safety. They must constantly 
confirm with key members of Congress what a USTR is telling them. It also means 
that EU trade sanctions against the United States often are tailored, in part, to 
influence particularly pivotal members of Congress.
The EU trade commissioner’s authorizing environment poses its own problems 
for the United States. The EU Commission has a mandate to negotiate 
internationally for the member states on traditional trade issues. But the lack of a 
clear mandate to negotiate on services caused repeated problems in the Uruguay 
Round. Moreover, American negotiators complain that the Commission’s lack of 
day-to-day accountability has led it to strike postures that reflect a Commission 
point of view, which often turn out to not have the support of the member states at 
the end of the day. Going forward, the evolving nature of EU competence will 
continue to pose difficulties, as it has in recent years in efforts to strike an EU-US 
open skies agreement.
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The emerging role of the European Parliament and its growing interest in trade 
policy—especially now that Parliament will have a separate trade committee— 
poses new challenges—not dissimilar to those USTR faces with Capitol Hill— both 
for the EU trade commissioner and for American negotiators attempting to gauge 
his or her negotiating leeway. Moreover, it’s the Parliament’s actions—on beef 
hormones, on GMOs, on animal welfare and the testing of chemicals—that are 
increasingly the actions that trigger transatlantic trade disputes. It was not 
coincidental that Zoellick spoke before the EU Parliament before he spoke to 
Congress. US trade negotiations will have to spend more and more of their time 
dealing with Parliament.
But problems associated with different authorizing environments arc not limited 
to the trade portfolio. The EU farm commissioner has purview over agricultural 
policy, the central conflict in the Doha Round. Similarly, the US Department of 
Agriculture controls American farm programs. But to complicate matters, US farm 
trade negotiations are run out of USTR. Lamy and Franz Fischlcr, the EU farm 
commissioner, have done a fair job of coordinating their positions. But US 
agricultural secretary Ann Veneman has not been a player in the Doha Round as 
secretary Dan Glickman was during the Clinton Administration on a variety of 
bilateral trade issues. This void has been filled by the US Congressional agricultural 
committees, which have long been fiefdoms unto themselves and wrote the tradc- 
distortionary 2002 US farm bill on their own with no input from Veneman. Any 
future WTO deal on farm subsidies will necessary require Congressional assent, 
which will prove no easy task.
C. Personality
Bad blood is repeatedly cited by trade negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic as a 
serious complicating factor in transatlantic relations in the 1990s. Sir Leon Brittain, 
EU trade commissioner, and USTR Mickey Kantor—two aggressive lawyers, 
neither of whom had a background in trade—had a prickly relationship in the first 
Clinton years. When Charlene Barshefsky, who had been Kantor’s deputy, took 
over for Kantor in the mid-1990s, Americans believe Brittain could never accept her 
as his equal, creating very awkward moments. It was this personal antagonism that 
may have contributed to Barshefsky not taking seriously Brittain’s suggested 
proposed transatlantic trade deal. Americans also believe that Sir Leon so irritated a 
significant minority of EU member states that Washington was never sure of his 
political mandate on particular issues. This was evident during the 
telecommunications and financial services talks in the WTO or when Brittain 
proposed a transatlantic trade agreement only to have the French reject it. 
Europeans, for their part, felt Kantor always couched every decision in the context 
of re-electing Clinton and that Barshefsky had the narrow mentality o f the anti­
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dumping lawyer that she had been in private life and that she lacked a broader 
diplomatic perspective.
Personal differences have also wTecked havoc at the career staff level. The 
appointment of Peter Carl in 2000 as the EU trade ministry’s director general was 
greeted with dismay in Washington. Carl was viewed as anti-American and the 
single most combative European that American trade negotiators had faced in recent 
times. It was Carl who masterminded Europe’s successful World Trade 
Organization case against US tax breaks for American multinational corporations. 
US trade officials felt the case broke a gentlemen’s agreement not to attack each 
others’ tax regimes and that it was filed out of pique over the US WTO cases on 
bananas and beef honnoncs.
D. Cultural Differences
Finally, veteran negotiators acknowledge that cultural differences—contrasting 
European and American attitudes toward negotiation—have frequently frustrated
one side or the other.
Americans tend to see issues as problems to be solved, not managed. And they 
claim Europeans arc often more interested in outmaneuvering their counterparts 
than in resolving disputes. Europeans see themselves as more willing to take a 
longer view and to manage problems not ready for solution. Europeans claim 
Americans are prone to wrap themselves in ideological purity and strike grandstand 
negotiating stances—such as initially calling for the elimination of all farm 
subsidies in the late 1980s or all industrial tariffs at the start of the Doha Round. 
Americans sec Europeans as jealous defenders o f the status quo. Europeans say 
Americans are on an extremely short political leash, too responsive to being jerked 
around by special interests. Americans say European Community officials as often 
out o f touch with member state interest, pursuing a European Commission rather 
than European member state agenda.
IV , W hat Has W orked
A. Personal Ties
The personality and experience of trade officials, rather than bureaucratic structures 
or fonnal cooperation mechanisms, is cited again and again by trade experts in both 
Washington and Brussels as the single most important attribute in effectively 
managing the transatlantic trade relationship in recent years.
Hugo Paemen, the EU negotiator in the Uruguay Round and subsequently the 
EU ambassador in Washington in the 1990s, consistently wins high praise for his 
adroit management of the trade relationship, often skillfully navigating waters that 
had been riled by senior trade officials. His long experience in the trade field and
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his diplomat’s touch were often a useful counter balance to the lack of international 
trade experience and hard-nosed negotiating style of Sir Leon Brittain, Mickey 
Kantor and Charlene Barshefsky.
Stuart Eisenstadt, the Clinton Administration’s first ambassador to the European 
Union, had political tics in Washington that made him a player in US-EU relations 
unlike most of his predecessors or his successors. His vision and ambition for the 
relationship helped energize American interests and was instrumental in issuance o f  
the New Transatlantic Agenda and the creation of the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue. In subsequent posts in the Clinton Administration—as undersecretary o f 
Commerce for international trade, as undersecretary of State for economic affairs 
and as deputy Treasury secretary—Eisenstadt’s follow up on these initiatives 
proved invaluable, demonstrating another important attribute to successful 
relationship management: longevity and continuity.
The trade experience, shared strategic vision, long-time friendship and personal 
compatibility of USTR Zoellick and EU trade minister Lamy was undoubtedly the 
defining element of US-EU trade relations in the first Bush Administration.
Lamy and Zoellick got to know each other as sherpas for the G-7 summits in the 
1980s. They continued their personal relationship while pursuing business careers 
in the 1990s. Despite differing political backgrounds—Lamy is a French socialist, 
Zoellick a Republican—they shared a commitment to the importance of open, 
internationally competitive markets. They both came to office with experience at 
high levels of government: Lamy the former chef de cabinet for EU president 
Jacques Delors and Zoellick the former counselor to US Secretary of State James 
Baker. And both had private sector experience in the financial services sector. 
Unlike most of their predecessors, they were grand strategic thinkers. But they were 
also pragmatic deal makers. Both men were cerebral and intense—sharing a passion 
for long distance running. They were personally very ambitious and young enough 
to see their trade jobs as stepping stones to even more influential posts. And they 
shared a fatal flaw, neither was a very good domestic politician and both lacked 
some of the necessary influence in Brussels and Washington.
Their personal ties and shared world view and operating style is widely credited 
with enabling Zoellick and Lamy to settle the long-festering US-EU dispute over 
the European banana import regime. Washington objected to the regime because it 
discriminated against imports from nations in Central and South America where US 
growers had investments. The United States had won a WTO judgement against the 
EU and Brussels was paying damaged rather than change practices. The dispute had 
become a cause célèbre on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly irritating President 
Bill Clinton. Defusing the issue demonstrated that Lamy and Zoellick could do 
business, unlike their predecessors. It meant that they intended to do bigger things, 
not trifle with irritants. And it shrewdly created the perception that their friendship
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was their ace in the hole, a not insignificant public relations asset in a media-driven 
age when perceptions are often as important as reality.
That perception subsequently served them well. It created an aura of 
transatlantic solidarity that helped launch the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in late 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks when 
many trade experts thought the world was not ready for such an initiative. It 
prevented the bitter US-EU fight over the Bush Administration’s imposition o f steel 
tariffs in 2002 from undermining cooperation on other issues. And it helped both 
sides manage a potentially explosive and expensive trade war over the imposition o f 
European tariffs on US products because of US taxing policies.
Not withstanding the demonstrated importance of close personal tics in 
achieving transatlantic trade cooperation, the current cult of personality that built up 
around the relationship between Zoellick and Lamy exaggerated the significance of 
such ties between trade negotiators in general. Bitter personal foes have 
accomplished a great deal when key US and EU economic interests were at stake. 
And no amount of personal chemistry can settle some disagreements.
Despite barely being on speaking terms, Charlene Barshefsky and Sir Leon 
Brittan presided over successful completion of multilateral negotiations to liberalize 
global financial services and telecommunications markets. They worked together to 
pass the information technology agreement, which eliminated tariffs on $500 billion 
worth of trade when it was signed in 1996.
It is true that the financial services and telecommunications deals were teed up 
for completion at the end of the Uruguay Round. And much of the credit for these 
successful agreements can also be attributed to Barshevky’s and Brittain’s deputies, 
who actually negotiated the deals. But this can be said for almost any trade 
agreement. And it is disingenuous to blame the bad blood between Barshefsky and 
Brittain for all the problems in transatlantic trade in the late 1990s, while ignoring 
all that was accomplished on their watch. Despite the dominant folklore among 
trade experts, their successes in transcending their personal differences arguably 
exceeded their failures.
Similarly, the Lamy-Zocllick relationship has demonstrated serious limitations. 
Their ties may have facilitated defusing a SI00 million banana dispute, but they 
were powerless to avoid the subsequent S4 billion confrontation over differences in 
the taxation of multinational corporations, which was not resolved until the very 
end of their tenure. Nor were they able to avoid ongoing friction over hormone 
treated beef and GMOs.
Personal compatibility clearly matters in transatlantic trade relations, if  only 
because the trade policy community believes it does and, more importantly, the 
press and thus the public have come to see it as important. But its not a panacea.
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B. Trumping Bilateral Concerns with Multilateral Goals
Sublimating bilateral trade concerns to the broader multilateral good has repeatedly 
proven effective in breaking seemingly intractable transatlantic trade deadlocks. 
Trade officials in Washington and Brussels have shrewdly used impending global 
trade negotiations as a rationale to force compromise among their domestic interest 
groups to enable them to resolve issues that had theretofore proven intractable.
In 1986, newly-minted USTR Clayton Yeutter was laying the groundwork to 
launch what became known as the Uruguay Round trade negotiations. But a m ajor 
obstacle to cooperating with Europe on the launch was a trade dispute triggered by 
the entry of Spain and Portugal into the European Community at the beginning o f 
that year. Their entry had led to higher tariffs on imports of US com and sorghum, 
and lost US sales of about S500 million a year. Washington threatened retaliation 
against European agricultural products, wines and pasta. With all chances o f 
launching a new trade round at risk if a transatlantic trade war erupted, Yeutter flew 
to Brussels and personally negotiated an end to the “Pasta War.”
Similarly, Zoellick and Lamy realized that they needed to clear the decks o f 
bilateral irritants if they were to have any hope of launching the Doha Round. Some 
problems, such as the tax dispute, were too big or too complex for easy resolution. 
But the banana dispute was ripe for solving. The WTO had ruled against the EU, so 
there was no reason to further delay settlement. Neither Washington nor Brussels 
had banana producers who voted. And the dispute had become a popular symbol o f 
ridiculous trade bickering, the butt of jokes on American television. Both Zoellick 
and Lamy realized the symbolic political value of ending the fight, despite its 
economic insignificance, and they struck a deal in 2001. It is testimony to their 
insight that almost every subsequent journalistic account o f their personal 
relationship cites resolution o f the banana dispute as an example of the value o f 
those ties.
C  Convergent Economic Interests
Convergence of interests has also been a driver of cooperation.
The Uruguay Round stumbled along for 6 years until the European Union and 
the United States reached the Blair House agreement on agriculture in November 
1992. The deal fell far short o f initial American ambitions but was the most the EU 
could stomach. It served US interests—particularly those of the service and 
intellectual property industries—to break the deadlock. And it enabled the EU to 
use international pressure to nudge forward reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy.
In the first Clinton Administration USTR Kantor used to joke bitterly that in 
dealing with China, Brussels was more than willing to hold America’s coat while 
the United States did the fighting. In particular, he resented Europe’s unwillingness
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to press China on protection of intellectual property rights, a dispute that led the 
United States to threaten massive retaliation against Beijing before obtaining 
promises of a crackdown on piracy, law enforcement that European firms would 
benefit from just as much as American companies.
But by the second Clinton Administration, when USTR Barshefsky was 
negotiating China’s WTO accession, there was close cooperation between Brussels 
and Washington, with the principal US and EU negotiators talking on the phone 
once or twice a week. They double-teamed the Chinese on issue after issue. The US 
and EU positions were coordinated on services, tariff measures and anti-dumping 
among other issues.
More recently, Washington and Brussels jointly developed an agricultural 
proposal for the ill-fated WTO Cancún ministerial. While this US-EU effort was 
roundly criticized by developing countries—despite the fact that it was put together 
at their request—it served as the basis for post-Cancun agricultural deliberations, as 
evidenced by the coordinated European proposal to end export subsidies 
complemented by the US willingness to end export credits. Such proposals reflected 
a growing transatlantic convergence of farm interests that led to the Doha 
framework agreement in August, 2004.
V. Challenges A head
A. Differences in Economic Interests
Conversely, the greatest challenge facing future multilateral and bilateral 
transatlantic trade cooperation is differences in economic self-interest. Such 
differences have always existed and there is no conclusive means of testing whether 
they are greater or lesser now than they were in the past. Suffice to say there arc 
differences and they will affect both the willingness to cooperate and the depth of 
that cooperation.
Throughout the post-war era, the United States has had a rising interest in the 
global economy and a more diverse set of regional interests than has Europe.
Both the European Union and the United States are primarily regional traders. 
For the United States, the plurality of its exports go to Canada and Mexico. For EU 
member nations, three-fifths o f their exports go to each other. Beyond that, interests 
diverge. As a buyer of US exports, China’s share o f total US exports has grown 8 
fold in the last half century and it now supplies a tenth of US imports. European 
trade with China has not grown nearly as much.
Similarly, Eastern Europe’s share of Western Europe’s exports has grown by 
half in recent years. US exports to Eastern Europe, as a share of total US exports, is 
static.
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At the same time, one-in-six US exports go to Latin America, up from one-in- 
cight just a few years ago. Latin America’s share of European exports has fallen 
from 4.5 per cent to 2 .1 per cent, according to World Trade Organization data.
With a greater and growing stake in more regions of the world, its little w onder 
that the United States has pursued regional and bilateral free trade agreements with 
a range of nations: Mexico and Canada, Morocco and Bahrain, 5 central Am erican 
republics and the entire Western Hemisphere.
Europe has hesitantly attempted to replicate this experience, with little success 
to date. Four years in to the EU-Mcxican free trade agreement, the European m arket 
share in Mexican imports has increased only slightly, from 8.6 per cent in 2000 to 
10.5 per cent in 2004. Brussels’ effort to negotiate a free trade arrangement with the 
Mercosur countries o f South America—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay—  
has yet to bear fruit. But it has already generated transatlantic friction. Brussels 
allegedly offered Mercosur greater access to the European market in return for its 
cooperation in limiting the ambition of the Doha Round with regard to agricultural 
reform. This attempt to leverage cooperation drew howls of protest from around the 
world. Europeans retorted that they have long felt Washington used its expanding 
network of regional trade agreements to buy cooperation in multilateral 
negotiations. Whether the pot or the kettle is blackest is less important than the fact 
that regional trade entanglements are likely to increasingly preoccupy Washington 
and Brussels. The United States plans deals with Thailand, Peru, Ecuador and 
Colombia and various nations in the Persian Gulf arc knocking on the American 
door. The EU will increasingly be preoccupied with Eastern Europe, Turkey and the 
former Soviet Union.
Recent Brussels’ negotiations with Moscow over Russia’s application to join the 
World Trade Organization are evidence of the kinds of tensions these differing 
regional interests could cause in the future. The EU had two key concerns in the 
deliberations. To force Russian producers to pay market prices for energy so that 
they will not have an unfair competitive advantage when exporting into the EU. 
And to get Moscow to sign the Kyoto global warming treaty. When the Russian 
government of Vladimir Putin acceded on those two issues, Brussels signed o ff on 
Russia joining the WTO. From the European point of view, as the buyer of 60 per 
cent of Russia’s exports, Brussels was simply pursuing its self-interest. But this rush 
to settle embittered Americans in Washington. The United States still has aircraft 
tariff issues to settle with Russians, access to the telecommunications, banking and 
insurance markets and food health and safety issues to resolve. By settling with the 
Russians, the EU has put the onus of delaying Russia’s WTO membership on the 
Americans. Compared with the close EU-US coordination of negotiations on 
China’s WTO negotiation, this lack of coordination suggests Brussels’ regional 
interests may now trump transatlantic cooperation, a possibility that docs not bode
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well as Europe deepens trade ties with North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, 
the Caucuses and Turkey.
B. The US Trade Imbalance
Another manifestation of differing interests going forward is embodied in the 
historically unprecedented US trade deficit, which is now approaching 5 per cent of 
the American GNP. International Monetary Fund studies show that no major 
industrial nation has ever sustained a current account deficit of this magnitude for 
long. Such imbalances have always ended badly. And while the United States may 
be able to sustain such deficits for longer than anyone else, thanks its size and the 
inherent strength and dominance of the American economy, history and the 
fundamentals of economics are ultimately likely to prevail and a correction will 
have to take place.
This need for the United States to correct its trade imbalance gives Washington 
compellingly different economic interests than Brussels. The United States needs to 
boost exports by opening markets abroad or else the correction will come 
disproportionately from a decline in US imports, through a weakening of the dollar 
and protectionism, both disastrous for the American consumer. This structural 
difference will inexorably lead Washington to press harder for market opening in 
developing countries, to be more confrontational with China and India and to fight 
Europe over new import barriers, be they bans on imports of GMOs or hormone 
treated beef.
Eventual correction of the US global trade imbalance is also likely to sour the 
Transatlantic trade atmosphere. To date, discussion of the US deficit has focused on 
the bilateral imbalance with China and Japan. But the bilateral merchandise trade 
deficit with the Europe Union was $94.3 billion in 2003 and is on a path to run a 
deficit of S90.3 billion in 2004, second only to its deficit with China and worse that 
its imbalance with Japan. Since World War II, the US and Europe have prided 
themselves on balanced trade.
No more. The United States has now run a deficit with the European Union for 
11 straight years, the longest stretch in post-war history. This imbalance has 
worsened each of these years, suggesting that even if  it turns around, as it may in 
2004, it could take another decade to rebalance. This is not now a political problem 
in the United States, but it could always become one. More important for 
Europeans, correction of this imbalance (and Europe will have to absorb some 
portion of the correction of the American global imbalance) will prove 
economically painful in Europe, with attendant resentment toward the United States 
and a weakening dollar or rising protectionism. This will not necessarily prove an 
atmosphere conducive to greater transatlantic trade cooperation.
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C. Public Opinion
Broadly speaking, Europeans and Americans share similar views about the value of 
trade and globalization. Two-thirds of Americans (65 per cent) and British (67 per 
cent) and more than half the Germans (55 per cent) think globalization has been 
positive for themselves and their families’ interests, according to a late 2003 survey 
by Globalscan Research Partners. Only in France do people disagree. Only a third 
(35 per cent) of the French see globalization in a positive light.
But such broad generalizations mask a politically important erosion in public 
support for trade, at least in the United States. The American farm community, long 
the cornerstone of the free trade coalition in Washington, is now wavering in  the 
face of growing international competition from Brazil and elsewhere. A recent poll 
by the University of Maryland found that six-in-ten US farmers felt that other 
countries benefit more from trade than does the United States and a sim ilar 
proportion felt that even if the new jobs that come from free trade pay higher wages, 
overall it is not worth the disruption of people losing their jobs. Given the 
disproportionate influence American farmers have in the US Senate, where Senators 
represent land not people, these changing attitudes can not be ignored looking 
forward to Senate approval of a Doha Round agricultural agreement.
Similarly, American white-collar workers, who have long thought they were 
immune from the challenges of globalization, now fear that their jobs will be shifted 
to India. This promises profound political ramifications. The same University of 
Maryland poll found that among white collar workers in America support for 
greater trade fell from 57 per cent in 1999 to 28 per cent today. More ominously, 
nearly half of the white-collar voters in the 17 American states considered to be the 
battle ground for the 2004 presidential election believe trade liberalization should 
actually be slowed, stopped or reversed, compared with only a third who feel that 
way in the country at large.
Pessimists in Washington worry that such declining support for trade 
liberalization among politically influential American constituencies will be 
interpreted by the next US administration as yet another reason to move slowly on 
both multilateral and bilateral trade cooperation with Europe. Optimists interpret 
Americans’ support for trade in general as evidence that American voters are 
becoming more pragmatic about trade policy and less ideological. This could signal 
a convergence o f European and American views on a range o f trade issues, from 
farm policy to how far to go in opening markets to Third World products.
So far, the data hardly merits such optimism. There is no convergence on trade 
liberalization, at least as it relates to opening the US market to the developing 
world. Three-in-five Americans oppose allowing more food and clothing imports 
from developing countries if it would mean significant job losses. By comparison,
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three-in-flvc British and Germans would favor such imports, suggesting a 
divergence on the development goals of the Doha Round.
Differences in public attitudes toward the role of the United States in the world, 
toward transatlantic ties and toward each other also suggest differing political 
climates in Europe and the United States that will complicate deeper cooperation on 
trade issues.
Support for the United States among the core countries of the European Union 
has collapsed. Thrcc-in-four (75 per cent) people in Britain had a favorable attitude 
toward America in the summer of 2002. In March, 2004, only threc-in-five (58 per 
cent) held such positive views. Anti-Americanism is even worse on the continent. In 
France, favorable ratings for the United States have fallen from 63 per cent to 37 
per cent in France and 61 per cent to 38 per cent in Germany, according to surveys 
done by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.
At the same time, European support for a more independent European foreign 
policy has grown. In April, 2002, 47 per cent of those surveyed in Britain by Pew 
supported Europe striking more of its own course in the world. By March, 2004, 
that proportion had grown to 56 per cent. Similarly, 75 per cent of the French 
wanted greater distance from the United States compared with 60 per cent two years 
earlier. And 63 per cent of the Germans wanted more independence, compared with 
51 per cent in 2002.
Finally, transatlantic animosity, which has heretofore manifested itself only at a 
national level, has begun to get personal. Historically, in the 1960s, again in the 
1980s and in the last few years, Europeans have differentiated between their 
episodic distaste for American policies while continuing to like Americans. Today, 
Europeans love affair with Americans as a people seems to be waning. In 2002, 83 
per cent of the British had a favorable view of Americans, according to Pew. In 
2004, only 73 per cent held such views. The falloff in support has been even greater 
in France, w here in 2002, 71 per cent of the French held a favorable attitude toward 
the American people. Now only 53 per cent of the French are so positive. The 
animus is reciprocated in the United States. In 2002, 90 per cent of Americans held 
the British in high regard. In 2004, only 73 per cent had such sentiments. Support 
for the French fell from 79 per cent to 33 per cent and for the Germans from 83 per 
cent to 50 per cent.
For European politicians, such differences signal that there is little political 
benefit to be gained by greater cooperation with the United States in any realm, 
including trade. For American elected officials, there appears to be little public 
demand for working more closely with the Europeans, on greater trade 
liberalization or anything else.
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X). Differing Values
Differences in public attitudes arc complicated by transatlantic differences in public 
values. To the extent that trade differences reflect values’ differences, some future 
transatlantic trade problems may prove particularly intractable.
Current and prospective US-EU fights over hormones in beef, over public 
procurement rules, over animal welfare and over how to price pharmaceuticals are 
not generated by old-fashioned protectionism, but by differences in collective 
preferences.
As transatlantic commerce has grown and evolved over the years, once largely 
value-free economic transactions involving commodities and manufactured 
products have increasingly been supplanted with commerce in services and products 
often laden with “ideological content [that pharmaceutical research and 
development should be funded through the marketplace, that scientific evidence is 
the only rational for restricting trade in food stuffs] more sensitive to differences in 
collective preferences,” according to a European Union discussion paper “The 
Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade.” It is perceived threats 
to the diversity of such collective preferences that drives many current transatlantic 
disputes.
For example, Europeans have failed to comply with a 1999 WTO decision that 
requires the EU to have a scientific basis for banning imports of meat treated with 
hormones. Brussels asserts that EU consumers have a collective preference not to 
consume such meat because o f concerns about its look-term health effects. And 
Europe has been paying more than $100 million in sanctions per year as the price 
for such a preference.
Europe is also in the process of setting animal welfare standards for chickens, 
pigs and cows, specifying how much space each must be given in their cages, how 
many hours they can be transported before they get to rest and so forth. Once such 
rules arc in force throughout Europe, farmers are bound to object to imports o f 
American produce raised under less stringent and costly standards. And they are 
likely to argue that restricting such imports is the only way Europeans can 
successfully exercise their collective preference for protecting animal welfare when 
the EU’s trading partners have different priorities.
On the other side of the Atlantic, in its recently negotiated free trade agreement 
with Australia, Washington demanded that Canberra end price controls on imported 
pharmaceuticals. Aussie trade officials refused, noting widespread domestic 
opposition to higher drug prices. The Bush Administration argued that the most 
effect way to fund R&D is through pharmaceutical prices set by the market. The 
Australians, and most European governments, believe that a free market drives 
prices so high that needed pharmaceuticals are out of the reach of too many
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consumers. It is a classic clash of conflicting collective preference. It is only a 
matter of time before the United States raises this issue with the Europeans.
The greatest challenge facing transatlantic trade relations in the years ahead, 
predicted EU trade minister Pascal Lamy in a March 5,2004 speech at a conference 
of the Greens/Europcan Free Alliance at the European Parliament in Brussels, may 
be “how we organize market opening in such a way as to uphold the varying 
collective preferences of different societies?” It will require both Brussels and 
Washington to make tough choices, separating the wheat of collective preference 
from the chaff of self-interested protectionism masquerading as collective 
preference. It may necessitate self-restraint, with Washington not attacking 
European trade barriers its knows Brussels is politically incapable of removing. And 
it may require new international trade rules that would permit countries to defend 
their own social choices about global commerce—banning the imports of sweat­
shop labor or capping the price of imported drugs—while compensating foreigners 
who are hurt by such actions.
VI. What Can Be Done?
A. Re-establish a Political Commitment
Transatlantic trade cooperation during the Cold War was driven by a shared 
perception that opening markets would foster economic growth, strengthen 
democracies and ward off Communism. That rationale is gone and no compelling 
motivation has replaced it.
Deepening transatlantic divisions over the unilateral conduct of American 
foreign policy, the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
the Kyoto global wanning treaty and other issues have led to calls for closer US-EU 
economic cooperation—through a free trade area or some similar effort—to offset 
these tensions. So far, such proposals have fallen on politicians’ deaf ears and 
excited no interest among the public at large. Such proposals arc intended to 
compensate for transatlantic differences in non-economic arenas rather than to 
pursue a jointly shared goal. With no consensus on that jointly shared economic 
objective, there is no political consensus on some grand transatlantic economic 
project.
At the same time, a technical, below the radar screen, building block approach to 
solving transatlantic trade problems one at a time has bogged down in minutia time 
and again, failing to capture public or political imagination.
Enhanced transatlantic trade cooperation will require overt political commitment 
at the highest level. In the 1990s, then US Speaker o f the House of Representatives 
Newt Gingrich and then Senate majority leader Robert Dole both spoke favorably 
of creation of a transatlantic free trade area. Then European Union president
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Jacques Santcr and British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind propounded a vision 
o f a transatlantic marketplace. And US Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
proposed a joint effort to bridge the Atlantic. It wasn’t enough. When EU trade 
commissioner Sir Leon Brittain proposed a transatlantic free trade area, his idea w as 
soundly rejected. It will take an explicit, shared public vision by both the president 
o f the United States and the president of the European Union to energize their 
publics and their bureaucracies to take the next major step in transatlantic economic 
cooperation.
Without such commitment, US-EU cooperation will necessarily focus on 
marginal improvements in a largely successful working relationship.
B. Be Quick O ff the Blocks
Even if a personal relationship docs not exist prior to taking office, the next USTR 
and the new EU trade commissioner should move to establish one. Kantor met with 
Brittain three days after assuming his post. It didn’t help, but it was the right 
instinct.
The experience o f Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoellick suggests that early in their 
tenure, before they become personally bogged down in bilateral disputes that have 
arisen on their own watch, the EU trade commissioner and the USTR have a 
window of opportunity to accomplish joint efforts.
In early 2005 the new European and American trade czars should identify some 
low hanging fruit and harvest it. This may mean finally resolving the beef hormones 
or GMO disputes. Whatever the issue, the two trade leaders need to demonstrate 
early on that they can solve problems.
At the same time, they need to put their personal stamp on an EU-US agenda for 
their tenure. For Zoellick and Lamy this joint goal clearly was the launch o f the 
Doha Round. For their successors it may be completion of the Round or, if that 
appears too difficult, some goal that shifts attention away from the impossible 
toward the achievable. If history is any judge, history will judge both, at least in 
part, by how they have handled transatlantic trade relations.
C. Create Space fo r  Closer Bilateral Ties
When Charlene Barshcfsky left office, she said one of her greatest regrets was not 
pursuing a free trade agreement with Europe. At the end of Zoellick’s tenure, USTR 
is beginning “listening” sessions with stakeholders in the transatlantic marketplace, 
to assess how to strengthen ties.
Rather than regret not doing enough as they go out the door, the next USTR and 
EU trade commissioner should propose a transatlantic wisemen’s group o f elected 
officials, business leaders, former trade officials, security experts and 
representatives o f non-governmental organizations to report back to them in
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18 months about what kind of transatlantic marketplace is politically feasible and 
what needs to be done to get there. As part of this exercise, they should commission 
a study of the costs of not creating a single market between Europe and the United 
States.
D. Strengthen Ties with Each Others Authorizing Environments
Zoellick spoke to the European Parliament in spring 2001, even before he addressed 
the US Congress. During his many trips to Washington, Lamy often spent more 
time talking to members of Congress than with Bush Administration officials. 
Groundwork for closer communication with the elected representatives of the 
people on both sides of the Atlantic has been laid. It needs to be built upon.
US and EU regulators need to talk more to each other. This has long been the 
case. But regulators on notoriously inward looking and domestically preoccupied. 
So, if  the mountains won’t come to Mohammed, then Mohammed must go to the 
mountains. The USTR and EU trade commissioner need to seize the initiative. They 
need to convene meetings between regulatory counterparts in Washington and 
Brussels and include the chairmen of their authorizing legislative committees. If the 
head of the US Food and Drug Administration thinks USTR will be talking 
pharmaceuticals with the Europeans, he or she may find the time to be part of the 
discussion.
USTR also needs to continue close working relationships with officials in the 
EU member states. The Commission will object, as it has in the past, but the 
Commission’s competence on a range of future trade issues—those involving 
domestic regulatory matters—is still not clear. And Washington needs to maintain 
lines of communication to national capitals to insure America’s self-interest is not a 
victim of internecine European power struggles.
E. Develop a Joint Multilateral Strategy
Brussels and Washington need to begin talk about what to do after the Doha Round. 
The Round will either be completed on the watch of the next USTR and EU trade 
commissioner—in 2006 or 2007—or it will peter out. In either case its not too soon 
to start thinking about what to do next with the multilateral system. Obviously a 
Doha failure will create more complications than a success, but even a successful 
outcome for the Round will be limited, given the compromises that have already 
been made and the negotiating problems to date. All this raises new doubts about 
the efficacy of further rounds in the future.
There has long been discussion about institutional change at the WTO, with 
Brussels pushing for more fundamental reform than Washington. This issue can no 
longer be ignored. To break the deadlock, it may be necessary for non-trade 
officials—diplomats and security experts with long international experience, a stake
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in a more successfully functioning multilateral trading system, but no stake in  the 
Geneva culture and tradition of the increasingly dysfunctional WTO—to be brought 
into the dialogue to make suggestions and put pressure on the system to reform .
At the same time, the EU and the US need to begin to evolve com m on 
approaches to dealing with the emergence o f China and India in the world trad ing  
system, to the functioning and use of the WTO dispute settlement—where pane ls  
are increasingly creating new obligations that were never negotiated, underm ining 
WTO support in both the business community and among the general public— and 
so forth. While such US-EU cooperation will increasingly draw cries o f  p ro tes t 
from the Third World—as it did when the EU and the US developed a new  farm  
proposal for Cancún—Washington and Brussels can’t afford not to defend th e ir  
own self interests.
Finally, the EU and the US must jointly address the long-tcnn im plications—  
both for the multilateral system and for global business—of the proliferation o f  
bilateral and regional free trade agreements that are leading to what former depu ty  
USTR Jules Katz used to called a “spaghetti bowl” of rules of origin and conflicting 
regulatory obligations. With Japan, China and Brazil beginning to negotiate free 
trade agreements of their own, which do not include either the EU or the U nited  
States, Brussels and Washington need to decide if  its time to regain some control 
over the Genie they have let out o f the bottle. This may include new W T O  
disciplines on such trade deals.
F. Reassess the Needs o f USTR and DG-Trade
Are USTR and DG-Trade up to these challenges? A new USTR and a new EU trade 
commissioner will be best positioned to make that assessment and implement
changes.
In Washington, USTR as an agency has little institutional clout. But the U STR 
will be accorded political clout if he or she is perceived as speaking for the 
president. Zoellick suffered from the perception he lacked that line to the W hite 
House. Kantor benefited from his long-standing ties to Clinton. The next USTR 
should have an obvious and close personal relationship with the president to 
compensate for the agency’s small size, bureaucratic coordinator’s role and limited 
history.
In Brussels, trade commissioners have always had greater clout due to the 
Commission’s competence in trade. But with the emergence of the European 
Parliament as a player on trade issues, with the emergence of a president of the 
European Council and the development o f a common European foreign and security 
policy, the trade commissioner risks losing some relative power. This needs to be 
resisted.
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Finally, at a functional level, the next US administration needs to appoint a 
politically well connected ambassador to the European Union. It will send all the 
right signals and provide someone with a personal career stake in driving closer 
transatlantic ties. Similarly, the EU needs a politically attractive ambassador in 
Washington to be the public face for a Community that is still not well understood 
in the United States.
Comments
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
I largely share the analysis o f the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in 
sections I to V of Bruce Stokes’ conference paper, albeit with some reservations 
concerning his criticism o f the “short-sighted self-assertiveness” of the EU 
Commission’s pursuit o f the FSC dispute in the WTO. His conclusion that the TEP 
has “fallen far short o f expectations,” reflects the practical experience that 
transatlantic cooperation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the 
settlement of transatlantic disputes through WTO dispute settlement procedures, 
have proven effective and more important (e.g. joint EU/US leadership for 
advancing the multilateral Doha Round negotiations in the WTO) than 
complementary bilateral negotiations in the various TEP institutions. Bruce Stokes’ 
policy conclusions, in section V on “What Can Be Done?,” are not always 
convincing: The proposals to set up a “transatlantic wisemen’s group [...] to report 
back [...] in 18 months about what kind o f  transatlantic marketplace is politically 
feasible,” and to “commission a study o f the costs of not creating a single market 
between Europe and the United States,” appear premature up to the conclusion o f 
the Doha Round negotiations, presumably only in 2007. The needed EU-US 
leadership for institutional changes in the WTO (e.g. enlargement of the WTO 
Secretariat, provision for powers of the WTO Director-General to initiate proposals 
and defend the collective WTO interests, creation o f a small WTO Executive Body 
and of a comprehensive WTO Consultative Body, broader involvement o f 
representative NGOs in WTO consultations) should not wait until the end of the 
Doha Round. Even though the Doha Round Work Programme does not include 
such institutional reforms, the experience with the similar situation in the Uruguay
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Round negotiations demonstrates that EU-US leadership could succeed in including 
such institutional rcfonns into the final package of Doha Round Agreements. Once 
the Doha Round Agreements have been agreed upon, it may last another decade 
before WTO Members may launch another round of negotiations on new WTO 
rules and institutional reforms. If the Doha Round negotiations fail, the economic 
and legal arguments for concluding a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) 
would remain strong. If the Doha Round negotiations succeeds in liberalizing 
agricultural trade and market access for goods and services, there may no longer be 
enough economic and political incentives for concluding a TAFTA. Yet, joint EU- 
US leadership for further refonns of the world trading system and WTO dispute 
settlement system should remain a priority of transatlantic policy-coordination. For 
example, many intergovernmental disputes in the WTO about private rights (e.g. 
regarding the trademark “Havana Club”) could be de-politicized and de-centralized 
following the example of EC law where EC trade rules tend to be enforced by 
private traders in domestic courts and the EC Court rendered only two judgments on 
disputes among EC member states since the entry into force of the EC Treaty in 
1958. The example of China’s WTO membership also illustrates that the 
significance of the WTO requirements of rule of law and independent national 
courts goes far beyond economics. Just as the EC Treaty has turned out to be one of 
the most successful peace treaties, the WTO legal system contributes not only to 
economic welfare, but also to rule of law, transparent governance, protection of 
private rights and peaceful cooperation across frontiers.
Comments on “Trade Negotiations"
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Part II
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation

Competition Policy Cooperation 
and the Pursuit of Better Practices*
William E. Kovacic
Chapter 4
I. Introduction
Progress toward greater cooperation in competition policy between the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US) is a success story in the modem transatlantic 
relationship. Despite differences in philosophy, procedure, analytical technique, 
and, occasionally, substantive outcomes, the past decade has featured important 
enhancements in measures by public and non-governmental bodies in both 
jurisdictions to improve cooperation in the formulation of competition policy 
governing transatlantic commercial activity. Although EU and US efforts to build 
effective means for cooperation antedated the establishment of the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995, developments in the EU-US relationship over 
the past decade arc generally consistent with the NTA’s goals for regulatory 
cooperation. Not only have the EU and the US taken significant steps to strengthen 
their own relationship, their cooperation has provided important insights for 
building a framework of global and regional cooperation through multinational 
networks such as the International Competition Network (LCN) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The views presented here are the author's alone and not necessarily those o f the US Federal 
Trade Commission or any o f its members. The author thanks the participants in the Fiesole 
workshop for many useful comments and suggestions.
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This paper examines the status of efforts to realize the NTA’s aims in th e  field 
of competition policy. Part II of the paper summarizes the NTA’s objectives and 
their application to competition policy. Part III then identifies measures that th e  E l 
and US have taken to improve regulatory cooperation in competition policy 
particularly in the years following workshops convened on the topic o f  NT4 
implementation at the University of Wisconsin and the European University 
Institute in 1999 and 2000, respectively.1 This part also identifies substantive results 
that can be attributed to recent EU and US cooperation measures. Part IV identifies 
areas for improved cooperation and describes means that the EU and US can tak e  to 
accomplish such improvements. The paper concludes with observations about basic 
decisions that face the EU and the US agencies as they decide how to allocate 
resources to the transatlantic dialogue and to other international initiatives.
II. The NTA Objectives and their Application to Competition Policy
The NTA seeks to improve the quality and reduce the cost of regulating 
transatlantic commerce by improving cooperation between the European U nion and 
the United States. As Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer have characterized its 
approach,2 the NTA seeks to strengthen EU/US regulatory coordination by 
enhancing:
• Intergovernmental contacts among the chiefs of government and other high 
level public officials (such as agency or department heads);
• Transgovernmental contacts on a day-to-day basis among lower level 
officials; and
• Transnational contacts among non-govemmcntal institutions and 
individuals, including academics and the business community.
This process-oriented approach has a number of applications to transatlantic 
competition policy and supplies a mechanism by which the EU and US competition 
policy might move toward the common adoption of superior norms.3 Efforts to 
promote convergence between the EU and the US competition policy systems often 
urge the adoption of what often are called “best practices.” Experience in other
1 These workshops yielded the papers collected in Transatlantic Governance in the Global 
Economy (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001; hereinafter Transatlantic 
Governance).
2 See Mark A. Pollack & Gregoiy C. Shaffer, “Transatlantic Governance in Historical and 
Theoretical Perspective,” in Transatlantic Governance, at 3,5.
3 “Norms” are consensus views within a group about how members of the group ought to 
behave. For an application of the concept o f norms to the development o f competition policy, 
see William E. Kovacic, “The Modem Evolution of US Competition Policy Norms,” 
71 Antitrust Law Journal 377 (2003) (hereinafter Norms).
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areas of public and private law suggests that convergence across jurisdictions in 
competition policy might take place in a three-step process: decentralized 
experimentation at the national or regional level, the identification of superior 
approaches, and the opting-in to superior approaches by individual jurisdictions.4
The experimentation inherent in the distribution o f competition policy authority 
across jurisdictions supplies a useful means to test different substantive commands, 
analytical techniques, and procedures. When experience in one jurisdiction 
illuminates superior approaches, such methods ought to become focal points for 
possible emulation by others. Without a conscious process to identify and adopt 
superior ideas, decentralization cannot fulfil its promise as source o f useful policy 
innovations. The NTA can be seen as a vehicle for accomplishing the second of the 
three steps mentioned above—the identification of superior norms—and 
encouraging EU and US policy makers to undertake the third step of opting in to 
such noons.
Before examining recent EU/US cooperative activities in this field, it is useful to 
identify what the competition policy community realistically might expect the 
pursuit of initiatives consistent with the NTA agenda to accomplish. Rather than 
speaking of the promotion o f “best” practices, it might be more accurate and 
informative to say that the objective is the pursuit of “better” practices. The 
development of competition policy in any jurisdiction is a work in progress. This 
stems from the inherently dynamic nature of the discipline. Most competition laws, 
including the laws of the EU and the US, can be envisioned as consciously 
evolutionary systems that contemplate the adaptation of analytical concepts over 
time to reflect new learning.5 To speak of “best” practices may suggest the 
existence of fixed objectives that, once attained, mark the end of the task. 
Envisioning problems of substance or process as having well-defined, immutable 
solutions may neglect the imperfect state of our knowledge and obscure how 
competition authorities must work continuously to adapt to a fluid environment that 
features industrial dynamism, new transactional phenomena, and continuing change 
in collateral institutions vital to the implementation o f competition policy.
Perceiving the proper role o f EU and US competition agency officials to be the 
continuing pursuit of better practices can focus attention on the need for the 
continuing reassessment and improvement of competition policy institutions. As
Competition Policy Cooperation and the Pursuit of Better Practices
4 This model of convergence is presented in Timothy J. Mûris, “Competition Agencies in a 
Market-Based Global Economy" (Brussels, Belgium, July 23, 2002) (prepared remarks at the 
Annual Lecture of the European Foreign Affairs Review), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speech es/murts/020723/bmssels.
5 On the evolutionary qualities o f the US system, see William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 
“Antitrust Policy: A Century o f Economic and Legal Thinking,” 14 Journal o f Economic 
Perspectives 43 (2000).
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suggested below, a commitment to accomplish the forms of cooperation em bodied  
in the NTA can encourage the EU and the US to make the cycle of reassessm ent 
and refinement a core element of their operations. The inquiry anticipated by th is  
routine process of evaluation should focus on at the adequacy of the ex isting  
legislative framework, the effectiveness of existing institutions for implementation, 
and the quality o f substantive outcomes from previous litigation and non-litigation 
interventions.
III. EU and US Cooperation Initiatives and Substantive Results
A summary stocktaking o f cooperation initiatives corresponding to the three-level 
NTA agenda intergovernmental, transgovcmmental, and transnational contacts 
reveals considerable activity throughout the decade since the NTA's adoption and 
an intensification of activity in the past five years. It is difficult to link these 
developments to a conscious pursuit of NTA aims, for significant EU and US 
cooperation measures in competition law originated well before NTA.6 One could 
say that the intensification o f cooperative activity since 1995 has been inspired as 
much as anything else by the highly visible disputes between the jurisdictions in the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and General Elcctric/Honeywell mergers and the 
perceived need to explore ways to avoid similar policy disagreements in the future. 
Nonetheless, without treating NTA as the cause of policy adjustments in recent 
years, it is accurate to say that the progression of modem cooperation contacts in all 
three NTA dimensions have been consistent with the NTA proposals.
Intergovernmental contacts have continued at the highest levels of the European 
Commission's Competition Directorate (DG COMP) and the US Department o f 
Justice (DOJ) and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These have occurred 
in a variety of contexts that go beyond the regular, formal EU/US bilateral 
consultations. For example, the EC Commissioner for Competition, the DG Comp 
Director General, DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and the FTC ’s 
Chairman played pivotal roles in the formation of the ICN in 2001 and have 
cooperated extensively in the design and implementation of the ICN's working 
plan. Contact among this high level EU and US officials is also commonplace at 
conferences and in discussions about specific policy matters. Measured either by the 
sheer volume of contacts or the breadth and depth of discussions, the 
intergovernmental level of discourse in competition policy is more robust today 
than at any period o f the EU/US relationship.
6 See  Youri Devuyst, “Transatlantic Competition Relations,” in Transatlantic Governance, at 
127 (hereinafter Devuyst) (describing pre-NTA origins of transatlantic cooperation on 
competition matters).
6 8
A recent, important dimension of the intergovernmental relationship that goes 
beyond competition policy alone deserves special emphasis. In the past three years, 
the FTC has undertaken extensive discussions with DG COMP and DG SANCO to 
explore policy connections between competition policy and consumer protection 
policy. This has been identified as an increasingly important concern in matters 
such as health care and nutrition, where decisions taken on issues such as 
advertising have significant competition and consumer protection implications. 
What we are seeing is the beginning of a new framework o f regulatory relationships 
that recognizes the interdependency of what may have been conceived of as largely 
independent policy regimes. At the same time the FTC has expanded cooperation 
with EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, that, like the FTC, combine 
the competition and consumer protection portfolios in one agency and have 
expressed an interest in promoting the integration of policymaking between these 
two disciplines.
The same can be said for experience with transgovenmwntal contacts. In recent 
years, the EU and US competition authorities have expanded the work plan of the 
existing staff-level merger working group and have established a new working 
group dealing with antitrust/intcllectual property issues. The frequency of staff-level 
meetings, by teleconference or face-to-face meetings, also has increased to address 
a variety of matters within and outside the context o f the formal working groups. 
For DOJ and the DG COMP, there has been a noteworthy expansion of interaction 
as DG COMP has implemented its own variant of the DOJ’s leniency program for 
the prosecution of supplier cartels. Regular staff-to-staff contacts also have 
increased dramatically in the context of joint work on ICN and OECD projects.
A similar intensification of activity can be documented for transnational 
contacts. Measured by the agenda of conferences and non-conference activities, the 
major professional legal societies—among them, the American Bar Association and 
the International Bar Association—have expanded the energy they devote to EU/US 
competition policy. Beyond activities sponsored by these bodies, there has been a 
noteworthy increase in the number of conferences and continuing legal education 
programs with a large transatlantic component that attract a substantial transnational 
audience of academics, practitioners, and governmental officials. The same can be 
said for trade associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
and academic bodies, including new institutions such as the Association of 
Competition Economics (ACE) based in Europe. Collectively, these non­
governmental networks have played a crucial role in educating the academics, the 
business community, and the legal profession about the foundations o f competition 
policy in both jurisdictions and about current policy developments. By engaging 
governmental policymakers and participants from non-governmental constituencies 
in formal public debate and informal discussion, these bodies help formulate a 
consensus about competition policy norms and provide a key source of relational
Competition Policy Cooperation and the Pursuit of Better Practices
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glue for the competition policy community. Their significance can be observed in 
the growing tendency of government-based networks, such as ICN and O E C D , to 
include non-governmental parties in their work.
It is possible to trace a number of specific policy outcomes to the three levels of 
contacts (intergovernmental, transgovemmental, and transnational) sketched above. 
Though not a complete accounting, the following list includes noteworthy measures 
rooted in the expanded interaction between governmental and non-govemmenta! 
parties across the two jurisdictions.
• Enhancements in formal EU/US protocols involving merger review, 
including the coordination of pre-merger inquiries in both jurisdictions.
• New EU guidelines on merger policy and intellectual property licensing that 
featured significant discussion with US competition authorities and non­
governmental bodies (such as the internationally-oriented legal societies and 
business associations) and reflected, in a number of respects, contributions 
by the US agencies and by the non-govcmmcntal groups.
• Continuing augmentation and implementation of the EU leniency program 
in ways that reflected substantial consultation and interaction with D O J's 
anti-cartel unit.
• Greater transparency in US practice for merger and non-merger matters, 
including emulation in a growing number o f instances of the EU practice of 
providing explanations for a decision not to prosecute where the 
enforcement agency has undertaken a substantial investigation.
• The successful launch of a new multinational competition policy network 
(the ICN) and the healthy invigoration of the work plans of existing 
networks such as OECD.
These and other measures likely would not have occurred when they did or as 
extensively as they did without the deeper transatlantic integration fostered by the 
three-level contacts that the EU and US have undertaken in a manner that at least is 
consistent with the NTA, if  not necessarily inspired by the NTA.
IV. A Suggested Agenda for the Future: Concepts and Means
The three-level framework of cooperation supplies a basis for additional work to 
improve the EU/US relationship in the field of competition policy. Discussed below 
are possible conceptual focal points for further cooperation and a description o f  the 
specific means that the EU and US competition policy communities might take to 
address these points.
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A, Concepts
For all of the progress in cooperation achieved to date, there is considerable room 
for learning about basic forces that shape policy in the EU and US and therefore 
influence the transatlantic relationship. Discussions among governmental officials 
and within non-governmental networks tend to focus on specific enforcement 
developments (e.g., the resolution in the EU and the US of each jurisdiction’s 
Microsoft cases) or matters of practical technique and not to ask basic questions 
about the origins and institutional foundations of the systems. The discussion below 
suggests that the agenda for discourse inevitably must expand to incorporate 
examination of these considerations if cooperation is to be enriched and common 
progress toward better practices is to be achieved.
1. Toward a Deeper Understanding o f the Origins 
and Evolution o f  Both Systems
The many recurring discussions about transatlantic competition policy often rest 
upon a terribly incomplete awareness about how the EU and US systems originated 
and have evolved over time. An relatively small subset of the US competition 
policy community engaged in transatlantic issues is familiar with the distinctive 
path by which competition policy concepts developed within the EU member states 
and supplied the foundation for the EU competition policy regime itself.7 European 
specialists in competition policy likewise often display a fractured conception of the 
origins and evolution of the US system—a conception often derived from the works 
of US scholars whose grasp of the actual path of US policy evolution is itself 
infirm.8 An accurate sense of where the policies originated and how they have 
unfolded is essential to understanding the influences that have shaped modem 
results in specific cases. To move ahead, discourse at all three levels embodied in 
the NTA must look back for a richer understanding of competition policy history.
7 The pre-eminent account o f this history is David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in 
Twentieth Century Europe -  Protecting Prometheus (Oxford paperback edition: 2001).
8 For example, in his excellent essay in Transatlantic Governance, Youri Devuyst observes: 
"During the Reagan administration, the Department o f Justice and the FTC engaged in a 
historically low level of antitrust enforcement in line with Ronald Reagan's economic 
philosophy opposing government intervention in the marketplace. Under the Bush and Clinton 
administrations, the federal agencies resumed stricter enforcement of the antitrust laws." 
Devuyst, at 128. Devuyst seems to have based this observation on the work of American 
scholars who endorse the "pendulum'’ interpretation o f US antitrust history that likens 
changes in US policy to wild swings from excessive intervention in the 1960s and 1970s to 
inadequate intervention in the 1980s, followed by a sensible equilibrium in the 1990s. 1 have 
argued elsewhere that this is both an inaccurate and, for purposes of future policy 
development, a seriously flawed understanding o f US experience. See Kovacic, Norms.
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2. Scrutinizing the Analytical and Policy Assumptions in Specific Cases
The modem EU/US relationship has featured important instances o f disagreem ei 
and will do so again in the future. Amid the many discussions o f  cases su ch  as 
Boeing/McDonncll Douglas, GE/Honeywell, and Microsoft, two things seem t, 
have received inadequate attention. The first, which only the competition agency 
can perform, is a careful, confidential examination of the specific theo ries  
intervention and an examination of the evidence upon which each jurisdiction relies 
in deciding how to proceed. The side-by-side, behind-closed-doors dcconstructios 
of the decision to prosecute (or not to prosecute) would seem to be a valuab le  wa\ 
to identify alternative interpretations and test them in an uninhibited debai; 
involving agency insiders (and, perhaps, experts retained by each agency to assist ii 
the review of the case). Yet discussions of this type generally do not take p lace.
Even more general discussions of cases that occupy considerable a tten tion  a: 
conferences and seminars infrequently come to grips with what appear to  bi 
differences in assumptions about the operation o f markets and the e fficacy  of 
governmental intervention as a tool to correct market failure. Embedded in E U  and 
US agency evaluations of the highly visible matters mentioned earlier are differins 
assumptions about the adroitness of rivals and purchasers to reposition themselves 
in the face of exclusionary conduct by a dominant rival, the appropriate tradeoff 
between short-term benefits of a challenged practice and long-term effects, and  the 
robustness of future entry as a means for disciplining firms that presently enjoy 
dominance. Putting these and other critical assumptions front and centre in  the 
discussion, along with the bases for the assumptions, would advance the 
transatlantic in the future.
3. Focusing on How Institutional Design Affects Doctrine
In discussing competition law, there is a tendency for academics, enforcement 
officials, and practitioners to focus on developments in doctrine and policy and to 
assign secondary significance to the institutional arrangements by which doctrine 
and policy take shape. This tendency can cause one to overlook the im portant role 
that the design of institutions can play in influencing substantive results. It is 
impossible to understand the development of EU and US competition law without 
considering the impact of:
• Private rights of action and mandatory treble damage liability in shaping the 
views of US courts and enforcement agencies about the appropriate 
boundaries of substantive doctrine concerning antitrust liability.
* The experience gained by European competition authorities in carrying out 
responsibilities for policing excessive pricing as an abuse of dominance in 
informing their views about the wisdom and administrability o f measures 
that mandate access to specific assets.
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• The nature and timing of judicial oversight in merger control.
• The internal organization of competition agencies, including the placement 
of economists within the agency organization chart and the procedure for 
their participation in the decision to prosecute.
• The decision to accept a revolving door in recruitment—the manner in 
which the competition agency recruits professional personnel and the 
backgrounds of the agency’s professionals who work for the agencies and 
the parties who appear before the agencies.
Consider the possible impact of creating robust private rights o f action in the 
American style—with mandatory treble damages, with relatively permissive 
standards for the aggregation of class claims, and asymmetric fee-shifting in which 
only a prevailing plaintiff recovers its fees.9 In establishing this variant of a private 
right of action, the jurisdiction must keep in mind the possible interaction between 
the operation of private rights of action and public law enforcement. If courts fear 
that the private party incentives to sue are misaligned with the larger interests of the 
public (put another way, when the courts do not trust the private plaintiff as much as 
they trust a public prosecutor) or they fear that the remedial scheme (e.g., 
mandatory treble damages for all offences) deters legitimate business conduct 
excessively, the courts will use measures within their control to correct the 
perceived imbalance, The courts may “equilibrate” the antitrust system by 
constructing doctrinal tests under the rubric of “standing” or “injury” that make it 
harder for the private party to pursue its case; adjust evidentiary requirements that 
must be satisfied to prove violations; or alter substantive liability rules in ways that 
make it more difficult for the plaintiff to establish the defendant’s liability.
The first of these methods only governs suits by private plaintiffs. Of particular 
significance to public enforcement authorities is the possibility that the courts, in 
using the second and third measures listed above, will endorse principles that apply 
to the resolution of all antitrust disputes, regardless o f the plaintiffs identify. In the 
course of making adjustments in evidentiary tests or substantive standards to correct 
for perceived infirmities in private rights of action, courts may create rules of 
general applicability that encumber public prosecutors as much as private litigants.
This hypothesis may help explain the modem evolution of US antitrust doctrine. 
Since the mid-1970s, the US courts have established relatively demanding standards 
that private plaintiffs must satisfy to demonstrate that they have standing to press 
antitrust claims and have suffered “antitrust injury.”10 In this period, the courts have
Competition Policy Cooperation and the Pursuit of Better Practices
9 The discussion here is based in part on William E. Kovacic, “Public Participation in the 
Enforcement of Public Competition Laws,” in Current Competition Law Volume II, at 167
(Mads Andcnas et al. eds., 2004).
10 These requirements are described in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Fundamentals 
838-69 (5th Edition 2003).
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endorsed evidentiary tests that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to  provj 
concerted action involving allegations o f unlawful horizontal and  vertical 
contractual restraints. With some variation, courts also have given dom inan t firm  
comparatively greater freedom to choose pricing and product developm eir 
strategies.
Collectively, these developments have narrowed the scope of the U S  antitrus: 
system. Most of the critical judicial decisions in this evolution of doctrine have 
involved private plaintiffs pressing treble damage claims. Perhaps th e  most 
interesting area to consider the possible interaction between the private r ig h t of 
action and the development of doctrine involves the fields of m onopolization and 
attempted monopolization law. Litigation involving exclusionary conduct b y  IBM 
provides a useful illustration.11 In the late 1960s, the Department of Justice initiated 
an abuse of dominance case that sought, among other ends, to break IBM  up  into 
several new companies. By 1975, roughly 45 private suits had been filed against 
IBM alleging unlawful exclusionary conduct and seeking treble damages against 
IBM. The sum of all damage claims in the private cases exceeded S4 b illio n —a 
considerable amount at the time.
My intuition is that courts reacted to the private cases with apprehension and 
were ill at ease with the possibility that a finding of illegal monopolization would 
trigger the imposition of massive damage awards against IBM. The courts in these 
matters could not refuse to treble damages if  they found liability, but th ey  could 
interpret the law in ways that resulted in a finding of no liability. IB M  paid 
settlements to a small number o f the private claimants, but it achieved vindication in 
most of the private cases. The results in the private damage cases against IB M  and 
several other leading US industrial firms in this period imbued US monopolization 
doctrine with analytical approaches and conceptual perspectives that viewed 
intervention sceptically.12
My hypothesis about the American competition policy experience is tha t US 
antitrust doctrine would have taken a somewhat different path had there been no 
private rights o f action, or if the damage remedy in private actions had been less 
potent—for example, limiting recovery to actual damages, or permitting trebling 
only for violations o f per se offences such as horizontal price-fixing. Specifically, 
US antitrust doctrine would have assumed a more intervention-oriented character if
11 For a discussion o f the government and private suits against IBM in the late 1960s and  in the 
1970s, see William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm 
Misconduct, 31 Connecticut Law Review 1285, 1289-90 (1999).
12 As a further point o f  reference, I find it significant that the context for the US Supreme 
Court's Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices o f Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 124 S. Ct. 872 
(2004) was a private class action lawsuit. The defendant telecommunications companies 
warned of incurring billions upon billions o f  dollars o f potential liability if the Court were to 
vindicate the plaintiffs theory o f  liability.
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the power to enforce the American competition statutes were vested exclusively in 
public enforcement authorities, or if the private right of action had been 
circumscribed in one or more of the ways indicated above.
This raises the question o f what will happen in the EU and its Member States if  
private rights of action grow more robust My tentative prediction is that an 
expansion of private rights could lead judicial tribunals to adjust doctrine in ways 
that shrink the zone of liability. For example, an expansion in private rights of 
action could cause EU abuse o f dominance doctrine to converge more closely upon 
US liability standards governing monopolization.
4. Devoting Attention to Inter- and Intra-jurisdictional Multiplicity 
and Interdependency
Efforts to formulate effective competition policy increasingly will require EU and 
US competition agencies to study more closely how other governmental institutions 
affect the competitive process. To an important degree, both jurisdictions resemble 
a policymaking archipelago in which various governmental bodies other than the 
competition agency deeply influence the state o f competition.13 Too often each 
policy island in the archipelago acts in relative isolation, with a terribly incomplete 
awareness of how its behaviour affects the entire archipelago. It is ever more 
apparent that competition agencies must use non-litigation policy instruments to 
huild the intellectual and policy infrastructure that connects the islands and 
engenders a government-wide ethic that promotes competition.
To build this infrastructure requires competition authorities to make efforts to 
identify and understand the relevant interdependencies and to build relationships 
with other public instrumentalities. This is particularly evident in the relationship 
between competition policy and intellectual property.14 Better coordination could 
limit inconsistencies between the two systems and ensure that both can more 
effectively encourage innovation and competition. While cooperation and 
convergence activities involving competition policy and intellectual property policy 
have grown more intense in recent years, to date they have tended to be intra- 
disciplinary. Few cooperation and convergence activities account for the 
interdependency of the competition policy and intellectual property regimes.
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13 The dimensions and consequences of policymaking fragmentation within individual 
jurisdictions are analyzed in Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan U. Baker, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy (20021. 
See also William E. Kovacic, “Toward a Domestic Competition Network," in Competition 
Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 316 {Richard A. Epstein & 
Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (describing fragmentation of policymaking affecting 
competition in US).
14 See  William E. Kovacic & Andreas Reindl, “An Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving 
Competition Policy and Intellectual Policy" (April 2004).
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Members of the EU and US competition policy community could use several 
means to address the conceptual issues outlined above. Most means invo lve  a 
reorientation of bilateral activity to invest more expansively in a knowledge base 
that would inform routine discussions at all three levels of the NTA framework. 
Possible specific techniques are summarized below.
5. Periodic Comprehensive Reviews o f  Institutional Arrangements
Both jurisdictions at regular intervals should undertake a basic evaluation o f  the 
effectiveness of their competition policy institutions. In many respects, the  EU 
stands far ahead o f the US in carrying out this type of assessment. The major 
institutional reforms introduced in the past year—modernization, reorganization of 
DG Comp, and the introduction of a new position of economic advisor—indicate 
the EU’s close attention to these issues.
Key focal points for a parallel inquiry in the US ought to include the scope of 
coverage of the competition policy system, the adequacy of existing substantive 
rules and remedies, the type and consequences of public enforcement, the ro le  of 
private rights of action, and the design and administration of public enforcement 
bodies. Such an assessment ought to involve participation of governmental officials, 
private parties, consumer groups, and academics. Given the continuing changes 
that confront competition agencies, the two systems should undertake this 
comprehensive assessment less than once per decade.
6. Ex Post Evaluation
The EU and the US routinely should evaluate its past policy interventions and the 
quality of its administrative processes.15 In every budget cycle, each authority 
should allocate some resources to the ex post study of law enforcement and 
advocacy outcomes. Beyond studying what it has achieved, a competition authority 
should choose selected elements of its enforcement process and methodology for 
assessment. Rather than treating ex post evaluation as a purely optional, luxury 
component o f policy making, we must regard the analysis of past outcomes and 
practices as a natural and necessary element of responsible public administration. 
Even if definitive measurements arc unattainable, there is considerable room for 
progress in determining whether actual experience bears out the assumptions that 
guide our acts. One clement of the process of examining past decisions would be 
the type o f detailed case study mentioned earlier in this paper. An elaborate 
deconstruction of specific cases would provide an informative basis for analyzing
15 The potential contributions of ex post analysis o f completed government interventions to the 
development of competition policy are examined in William E. Kovacic, “Evaluating 
Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments o f Government Enforcement Decisions to 
Inform Competition Policy,” 9 George Mason Law Review 843 (2001).
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differences in philosophy and substantive perspective and for identifying variations
in procedure.16
7. Enhancement and Disclosure o f Data Bases
The EU and the US should prepare and provide a full statistical profile o f their 
enforcement activity. The maintenance and public disclosure of comprehensive, 
informative data bases on enforcement are distressingly uncommon in our field. 
Every authority should take the seemingly pedestrian but often neglected step of 
developing and making publicly available a data base that (a) reports each case 
initiated; (b) provides the subsequent procedural and decisional history of the case; 
and c) assembles aggregate statistics each year by type of case. Each agency should 
develop and apply a classification scheme that permits its own staff and external 
observers to sec how many matters of a given type the agency has initiated and to 
know the identity of specific matters included in category of enforcement activity. 
Among other ends, a current and historically complete enforcement data base would 
promote better understanding and analysis, inside and outside the agency, of trends 
in enforcement activity.17 For example, access to such data bases would give 
competition agencies greater ability to benchmark their operations with their peers.
8. Assessment and Enhancement o f  Human Capital
Continuous institutional improvement will require the EU and US competition 
agencies to regularly evaluate their human capital. The capacity of an agency’s staff 
deeply influences what it can accomplish. The agencies routinely must examine die 
fit between their activities and the expertise of their professionals. The agencies 
could share views about developing a systematic training regimen for upgrading the 
skills of their professionals. For example, where the agencies are active in areas 
such as intellectual property that require special expertise, the agencies could 
explore whether they have acquired the requisite specialized skills— for example, by 
hiring some patent attorneys. The experiences of the agencies with entry and lateral 
recruitment—including the costs and benefits of the revolving door—would be 
useful focal points for discussion. A fuller program o f staff exchanges also might 
supply an effective means for improving the discussion at the staff level and 
educating each agency about how the other builds capability.
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16 For a suggestion of the content of such a case study, see William E. Kovacic, “Transatlantic 
Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy," 
68 Antitrust Law Journal 805 (2001).
17 For a formative treatment of the value of good statistical records for the analysis of 
competition policy, see Richard A. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” 
13 Journal of Law & Economics 365 (1970).
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An essential element o f continuous institutional improvement is the enhancement of 
the competition agency’s knowledge base. In many activities, particularly in 
conducting advocacy, the effectiveness o f competition agencies depends on 
establishing intellectual leadership. To generate good ideas and demonstrate the 
empirical soundness o f specific policy recommendations, competition authorities 
must invest resources in what FTC Chairman Timothy Muris has called 
“competition policy research and development.” 18 Regular outlays for research and 
analysis serve to address the recurring criticism that competition policy lags 
unacceptably in understanding the commercial phenomena it seeks to address.
Examining the R&D function is one element of exploring larger questions about 
how the competition agencies should set priorities and, within the larger 
competition policy community, about what competition agencies should do. The 
question of setting priorities is likely to assume greater importance in the EU  as 
certain functions that once occupied considerable EU attention devolve to the 
Member States, freeing resources for the DG Comp to design new programs. The 
consideration of how we measure agency performance, and assess the mix o f  its 
activities, is a topic for a larger discussion within the competition community. For 
example, on the scorecard by which we measure competition agencies, there is 
continuing awareness that we should count the suppression of harmful public 
intervention just as heavily as the prosecution of a case that forestalls a private 
restraint.19
9. Investments in Competition Policy R&D and Policy Planning
V. Conclusion: Future International Relationships
The best practice in competition policy is the relentless pursuit of better practices. 
The EU/US relationship in competition policy has reflected this principal in a 
manner consistent with the aims of the NTA. A basic implication of past work and 
the future program I have suggested here is that the competition authorities (and 
non-govcmmental bodies) must be willing to invest significant resources in the 
development and maintenance of the relationships as a dedicated objective even 
though such investments do not immediately generate the outputs—most notably,
18 The concept o f “competition policy research and development” and its role in determining 
institutional capability are analyzed in Timothy J. Muris, “Looking Forward: The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Future Development o f  US Competition Policy,” 2003 Columbia 
Business Law Review 359.
19 Competition agencies must confront government restrictions on competition with the same 
commitment and determination with which they challenge private restraints. See Timothy J. 
Muris, “State Intervention/State Action -  A US Perspective” (New York, N.Y., Oct. 24. 2003) 
(remarks before the Fordham Annual Conference in International Antitrust Law & Policy), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/specches/muris/fordham031024.pdf
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cases—by which competition authorities traditionally arc measured. The success of 
the relationships requires investments in the type of overhead and network building 
that commentators, practitioners, and, perhaps, legislative appropriations bodies 
often view with some scepticism. Thus, one challenge is for the competition 
authorities to develop acceptance of a norm that regards these investments as 
valuable and necessary.
Competition agencies also must confront the question of how many resources, 
even in the best of circumstances, they can devote to the construction and 
maintenance of networks that provide the framework for international relations in 
this field. The EU and the US are engaged not only in their own bilateral 
arrangements, but also bilateral agreements with other jurisdictions, participation in 
regional initiatives, and work in multinational networks such as ICN, OECD, and 
the competition policy working group of the World Trade Organization. The EU 
and US are major partners in all of these overlapping ventures, and each year each 
agency must decide, through its commitment o f personnel, to “buy,” “sell,” or 
“hold” its position in each venture. Each agency is aware that the participation in 
these activities cannot be carried out effectively—namely, with good substantive 
results—except through the allocation of first-rate personnel. There is no point in 
trying to do this w'ork on the cheap.
The hazard is that the EU, the US, and other jurisdictions may experience, or 
may now be encountering, some measure of international network or relationship 
fatigue. Thus, a further focus for consideration by the two jurisdictions, individually 
and jointly, is how best to devote their resources. In this decision, both agencies are 
likely to regard the transatlantic relationship as a top priority. This is true because of 
the importance of the relationship to the regulation of transatlantic commerce and 
because the EU and the US always will have distinctive interests and common 
issues owing to their comparatively larger base of experience. Moreover, the EU/US 
relationship has served, in effect, as a bilateral test bed for substantive concepts and 
processes that can be rolled out in a larger multinational setting. Experience within 
the bilateral relationship has usefully informed EU and US decisions about what 
might be accomplished in the larger spheres. As the EU and the US approach 
perceived limits on how much they can dedicate to this growing collection of 
international initiatives, the larger competition policy community will need to 
abandon a casc-ccntric vision o f what agencies should do and accept the need for 
institution building, at home and abroad, as a vital ingredient of sound competition 
policy for the future.
Competition Policy Cooperation and the Pursuit of Better Practices
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Chapter 5
Transatlantic Economic Governance:
The Domains and Dimensions of Competition Law
David J. Gerber
I. Introduction
In June, 2001, the European Commission prohibited a merger between two very 
large US Corporations, General Electric and Honeywell, which would have been 
one of the largest corporate mergers in history. The merger had previously been 
approved by the US Department of Justice, and few thought that the Commission 
would dare to prohibit it. When it did, the result was widely-publicized outrage 
from many in government and business circles in the United States. The 
Commission’s response was, in essence, we are just applying our law, and we have 
every right to do so.
This type of altercation was not supposed to happen. Since the early 1990s, 
transatlantic regulatory interaction had been increasingly discussed in network- 
based terms,1 and mechanisms of cooperation between antitrust authorities in the 
US and the EU had been developing since the mid-1990s.2 As a consequence, many
1 For discussions of this relationship, see Mark A. Pollack and Grcgoiy C. Shaffer, 
Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (2001) and George A. Bermann et al.. 
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems a n d  Policy Prospects (2000).
2 For discussion of some of these mechanisms, see, e.g., David J. Gerber, The European-US  
Conflict over the Globalization o f  Antitrust Law, 34 New England L. Rev. (1999).
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were surprised that these cooperate relationships not only were unable to prevent 
the conflict, but also seemed to play no role in discussions of the events. These 
cooperative mechanisms had been widely viewed as a new form of governance that 
was more appropriate for a globalizing world titan the traditional state-centred 
fonns of law,3 and many believed that this form of governance would largely 
eliminate such conflicts or at least minimize the damage they caused.
As a result, the transatlantic governance relationship presented a murky and 
ambiguous picture. It intertwined and intermingled two quite different images of the 
relationship, and they often seemed to conflict. One was the rosy image of 
cooperation o f well-intentioned regulators moving toward ever more harmonious 
governance on the basis of common interests. Here power and national interests 
seemed to play little, i f  any, role. The other image was darker. In it, national power 
and traditional forms of national interests seemed to be the key elements in the 
relationship. The indistinct intertwining of these images clouded interpretations of 
the events. These two images also hint at the central theme of this essay.
The uncertainty about the transatlantic governance relationship that the 
GE/Honcywcll conflict created was not limited to competition law, but often 
extended to the relationship generally. Competition law was an area that seemed to 
many to be particularly suited to cooperative initiatives. Moreover, progress in 
developing such initiatives in the area had been rapid. Discussions of a new era of 
transnational regulatory cooperation had provided an alternative way of looking at 
the relationship, but it now seemed to bring confusion rather than analytical clarity. 
The conflict thus foregrounded a fundamental question: how should transatlantic 
regulatory issues be analyzed? Network theory had flagged the issue, but it had yet 
to provide a full range o f conceptual tools for analyzing it.
This essay sketches some tools that may be of value in analyzing the 
transatlantic governance relationship. It then demonstrates the potential utility of 
these tools by applying them to the GE/Honeywell conflict. Finally, it draws some 
implications from this analysis and makes some modest suggestions for improving 
transatlantic economic governance.
I examine four claims about transatlantic economic governance. The first and 
most basic is that we can usefully identify two separate domains or dimensions of 
the relationship. One is the domain of the network, whose central principle is 
cooperation. The other is the domain of law, where difference and conflict typically 
shape decisions. The two domains operate according to different logics and are 
informed by different experiences. A second claim is that the relationship between
3 For a recent and extensive discussion of the network governance issue, see Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A New W orld Order (2004). See also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture o f 
International Cooperation: Ti a ns go vernm ental Networks and the Future o f  International 
Law. 43 Virginia L. Rev. 1 (2002).
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these two domains plays important roles in shaping the dynamics of transatlantic 
economic governance. Third, the essay claims that national laws and legal cultures 
shape each domain as well as the interactions between the two domains. They 
enable cooperation, but they also limit it, and they shape and fuel conflicts. The 
fourth claim is that effective analysis of transatlantic economic governance requires 
a multidimensional lens in which networks, law, private and public interests and the 
imaging of each arc interrelated.
Note that I here use the term “economic governance” to refer to the exercise of 
normative influence on economic conduct, regardless of the specific structure or 
origin o f that influence. The term is often used today to designate only those 
nonnative influences that are associated with regulatory networks. In this usage, it 
is often seen as an alternative form of normative influence that is the opposite of 
traditional legal operations and barely, if at all, related to them. In my view, this 
tends to distort analysis by severing the conceptual link between the two. Both 
regulatory networks and traditional legal institutions exercise nonnative influence 
on decisions, and it is their relationship in doing so that is critical to understanding 
those decisions.
II. The Domains of Competition Law Governance
The concept “domain” is central to the analysis. I use it to refer to a distinct 
component of a governance relationship that influences in systematic ways a 
defined set of decisions within the relationship.4 At least three conditions must be 
met in order to identify such a domain. First, it must include an identifiable group of 
participants. Second, these participants must address each other and respond to each 
other regarding the relevant set of decisions. Third, they must share a common set 
of reference points in referring and responding to each other. These may include, 
e.g., a shared image of the relationship, shared assumptions and shared experiences. 
In identifying a domain it is necessary to specify the set of decisions to which the 
domain refers. For purposes of this essay, those issues relate to the application of 
competition law norms.
A. Cooperation: The Domain o f the Network
One domain of the transatlantic competition law relationship can be identified in the 
network of regulatory officials from the US and Europe who are involved directly 
or indirectly with the application of competition law in transatlantic contexts. These 
officials often talk with each other about existing or possible violations of
4 The terms “dimension” and “mode" could also be used for this purpose, but the term 
“domain" more effectively captures the image of a distinct set of influences on a specified set 
o f decisions.
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competition law, the problems of identifying anticompetitive conduct and similar 
regulatory issues.
The participants are few in number and have often met with each other 
personally (sometimes often). They share the same basic set of objectives—i.e., to 
more effectively apply competition law in situations which extend beyond national 
or other jurisdictional borders. It is, therefore, a cooperative relationship in which 
the participants have significant incentives to work together and few incentives to 
oppose each other.
Interactions between members of the group arc not widely known outside the 
group, and thus group members seldom have incentives in interacting with each 
other to take into consideration the views and/or interests of group outsiders. 
Moreover, although they represent their governments and the administrative offices 
in which they are employed, they have little incentive in interacting with each other 
to consider goals other than the cooperative goals that they share with others in the 
group.
The set of decisions to which this domain refers is limited, and this conditions 
the internal dynamics of the domain. In general, the interactions among the 
members o f this group consist in supplying each other with information. The extent 
to which they are authorized to exchange information is determined by bilateral 
agreements between the EU and the US.5 In general, the range of information that 
can be exchanged consists of two types: (1) general information about markets and 
market conditions and (2) specific infonnation acquired pursuant to the 
investigation of potential competition law infractions. The latter category is further 
limited by the requirement that specific information acquired pursuant to an 
investigation can generally be exchanged only where the party involved approves 
the exchange. This limited sphere of operation is a major factor in shaping the 
incentive structures within the group.
This shared experience is the central point of reference for all members of the 
group. In addition, it is the basis for a shared image of transatlantic economic 
governance. In it, the EU-US relationship is portrayed as essentially cooperative. 
Officials share the same basic interests and objectives. It is important to note that 
this shared image refers to process rather than output. Moreover, it does not 
generally include claims about specific levels or fonns of effectiveness. In this 
context, misperceptions and misunderstandings that occur between group members 
can be readily and unobtrusively corrected, precisely because intra-group 
communications are generally not public.
5 These agreements provide other limited forms of interaction. For example, the so-called 
“positive comity” concept permits one government (A) to request that another (B) take 
specified enforcement actions under B law. The requested state is not under an obligation to 
adhere to the request, and these interactions appear to play a minor role in network operations.
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The image is private in the sense that the conduct to which it relates is not 
public. It is generally held and propagated either by group members or by outsiders 
who view and propagate it in relatively abstract and sometimes idealistic terms. 
This means that external interests do not easily attach to the propagation of the 
image. Few are in a position to promote the image, but, conversely, there are also 
few incentives to contest it.
B. The Domain o f  Law6
A second domain of the transatlantic economic governance relationship represents a 
sharp contrast. Here the relationship is conceived in terms of law. It consists 
primarily of two systems of norms and institutions that come into contact with each 
other at specific points. The interactions are formal and juridical. They are also 
often political, with national interests and power positions playing the central roles 
in particular encounters.
This domain is more inclusive in terms of participation and generally broader 
and more poorly defined than the network domain. All who are involved in or who 
seek to influence national competition law decisions with transnational implications 
are included. States are central actors, because they make and enforce laws, and 
because their interests arc often closely tied to the reach and effectiveness of those 
laws. Also included, however, are sub-state actors who view those laws and their 
implementation through the lens of their own interests. Businesses who may benefit 
or lose from competition law decisions generally participate in the domain, as do 
lawyers, accountants and others who represent or seek to represent those businesses. 
The experience that provides a common reference point here is the experience of 
national laws and legal systems. Each participant has experienced the operations of 
her own national legal system, typically her own national competition laws, and 
thus that experience of national law tends to become the reference point for thought 
and discussion of transatlantic governance relationships. From this perspective, for 
example, a central issue is how to enforce legal provisions—how the state can 
increase compliance with its wishes.
Participants in this domain share an image of the transatlantic economic 
governance relationship that centres on contact between the components o f legal 
systems (principally, norms and institutions). This conception of the relationship is 
inherently conflictual, because each system has its own rules and procedures, and 
thus points of interaction are perceived as the locus of loss or gain. As a result, each 
point of contact and difference represents a potential point of conflict.
6 Use of the word “ law" to describe this domain is not optimal, because the term is used in a 
variety of ways. 1 use it here because it focuses attention on the distinguishing analytical 
characteristic of this domain B, i.e., the centrality of legal language, institutions, and 
experience in its operations.
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In this context, each system also symbolically represents an extension of the 
state as a political entity. Power thus becomes a defining feature in viewing the 
interaction of the US and EU systems. To enforce effectively one’s own laws is to 
assert effectively the power of the state that the laws represent. Where there is a 
conflict of state interests, a state’s effectiveness vis-à-vis the other state is seen as an 
issue o f winning or losing. In this light, to give ground is seen as a sign of 
weakness.
This domain involves several levels of interaction. At the state level, the 
relationship is formal: rights and obligations produced by agreements between 
governments. In this formal context, governments have no common goals other than 
those embodied in formal agreements, and in the competition law context these are 
typically limited to general statements about the need to cooperate. Governments 
provide domestic legal mechanisms to effectuate political goals, and they have no 
obligation to avoid conflicts or to aid each other, except to the limited extent 
provided in the relevant agreements.
At the sub-state level, the respective sets of domestic actors (US and European) 
pursue their own interests by seeking to influence political and legal decisions. In 
specific cases, these domestic interests typically have little incentive to push 
governments to cooperate and significant incentives to use domestic institutions to 
further their own private ends. For example, firms tend to prefer the advantages of 
being subject to their own laws, because they are more likely to be in a position to 
both ascertain the operative rules and to influence the decisions of those making and 
enforcing the rules.
Participants in this domain often respond to each other in public. They make 
claims and counterclaims in the public media. Given that the group is large and non­
exclusive, and given further that the participants do not perceive a common goal, 
there are often incentives to make claims based exclusively on domestic political 
appeal. Here the incentives to promote cooperation are limited, especially where 
that cooperation takes place within a group of administrators whose actions are 
generally not observable by outsiders and from which private parties are generally 
excluded.
Differences in law and legal culture shape the dynamics of these interactions. 
Points of differences are also points o f potential conflict. They tend to create 
rigidities and to represent fixed positions. Where, as here, interactions are public, 
external interests readily attach to any such position. Moreover, in this context, 
simple misunderstandings (e.g., about the meaning of concepts or the function of 
institutions or the rights and responsibilities of public decision makers) often 
unnecessarily and mistakenly become points of conflict, simply because there is no 
mechanism for easily and unobtrusively explaining the differences or negotiating 
the elements of misunderstanding.
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The two domains thus provide sharp contrasts. In one, the relationship is based 
on shared personal experiences and operates on a largely cooperative logic. In the 
other, the relationship is conceived as an encounter between legal systems and is 
driven largely by national interests.
III. Relating the Domains
Identifying and analyzing these two domains has an additional benefit. It makes 
possible an analysis of the relationship between the two. This turns out to provide 
potentially valuable insights into transatlantic economic governance. The question 
here then is how the two domains influence each other—i.e., how7 they interact in 
influencing decisions.
Looking first at direct influences, we note that the two domains influence each 
other, but that the relationship is asymmetrical. Law’s domain directly shapes the 
operations of the network, but the network has little influence on the operations of 
the legal domain. The legal domain controls the very existence of the network, 
because it provides authority for network participants to share information. This 
means, of course, that it also limits the scope of operations of the network by 
limiting the authorized conduct of its members. In contrast, the network has limited 
capacity to provide incentives or disincentives for decisions within the legal 
domain.
Indirect influences exhibit a similar asymmetry. Participants in each domain 
have incentives to sell their version of the relationship. Network participants gain 
status by emphasizing the importance and the potential of a cooperative vision of 
the relationship. Lawyers, politicians and businesses tend to benefit from 
emphasizing the dominant role of law (and their capacity to influence it). Given, 
however, that the latter is a public image and the former is generally known only to 
network insiders, the law-based image is more widely known than is the network 
image.
IV. The GE-Honeywell Merger: Law-Network Interactions
The GE-Honeywell case demonstrates the potential value of using the analytical 
framework sketched above. I do not suggest that it represents proof o f any claim. I 
use it only to demonstrate how the analysis might be applied.7
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of a different kind of analysis. See David J. Gerber, The European Commission's GE/ 
Honeywell Decision: US Responses and Their Implications, 1 Journal o f Competition Law 87 
(2003).
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LOur concern here is not with the legal issues in the respective decisions of the 
respective EU and US regulatory authorities. The focus here is on the governance 
relationship in which those decisions were imbedded and on their significance for 
assessing that relationship.8
The planned merger between GE and Honeywell was widely and prominently 
reported in the US press in early 2001. It was to be an extraordinary event, perhaps 
the largest merger in history. According to most reports, the only question as to 
whether it would be consummated was whether the US antitrust authorities would 
approve it. Few noted the possibility that the EU competition authorities would 
prohibit the merger. When the US authorities approved the merger, most assumed 
that the merger would take place. Many were shocked, therefore, when shortly 
thereafter the EU commission disapproved the merger, despite both private and 
public appeals from high-ranking US officials. This led to abandonment of the 
merger and widespread condemnation of the Commission decision in the US media 
as well as in US political circles. It also led to a wave of doubts about the future of 
EU-US relations.
When we apply a domain-based lens to the developments, however, the structure 
of the conflict and the dynamics o f decision making become clearer. Each domain 
functioned within its own sphere and according to its own logic, and they related to 
each other in predictable ways. We look first at the two domains and then at their 
relationship.
A. The Marginal Role o f  the Network
The network of regulatory officials did what it was supposed to do, and operated as 
it could have been expected to operate. Officials discussed the issues, identified ; 
differences in positions and provided information to each other. These are the ; 
operations it is authorized to perform. In the end, these interactions did not avoid j 
the conflict or otherwise apparently influence its development. This does not I 
however, mean that they were meaningless. For example, by disseminating j 
information and improving awareness o f  existing legal differences within the ; 
network they laid the groundwork for more intensive exchanges both within and 
outside the network after the conflict subsided. If the network did not fulfil the 
expectations of many, the problem lay primarily in the expectations and in lack of 
awareness o f the two distinct domains o f operation within the governance 
relationship.
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8 For detailed analysis of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger case, which played a 
significant role in setting the background for the GE-Honcywcll case, see William E. Kovacic, 
Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-M cDonnell Douglas Merger and International 
Competition Policy’, 68 Antitrust L. J. 805-873 (2001).
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B. The Domain o f Law: The Conflict
The locus of the conflict was in the domain of law, which dictated the logic and 
language in which the issues were formulated. The operations of the network were 
separate and distinct from this sphere of operation and, from the perspective of its 
participants, largely irrelevant. The conflict consisted primarily of the reactions of 
US participants to the Commission decision, and thus a brief analysis o f those 
reactions reveals the dynamics of the domain in which they operated.
1. Response Themes
Four themes were particularly prominent in US responses to the decision. These 
themes were common and influential, but not all US responses contain all the 
elements described here, and some differed significantly. The sample illuminates, 
however, the dynamics of the relationship.
One response was outrage that the EU would dare to prohibit a merger between 
two US companies that had been approved by US authorities. According to one 
account, “[...] Americans arc asking how a foreign authority could scuttle a deal that 
involved only US companies and the Justice Department and about a dozen other 
competition authorities had approved with modest concessions.”9 The underlying 
assumption was that the EU simply had no right, legal or moral, to do what it did.
A second theme was that the decision was not based on the application of law, 
but was instead motivated by political considerations—specifically, the desire to 
protect domestic European iridustrics. The economist Gary Becker claimed that 
“Europe appears to be guilty of caving in to powerful interests.”10 The claim 
is based on two assumptions: (1) that prohibiting the merger would benefit 
European competitors of US firms and (2) that such supposed benefits influenced 
the Commission’s decisions. Seldom, if  ever, was evidence adduced in support of 
either claim.11
A weaker fonn of this claim was that the system was “regulatory” in nature, and 
thus impliedly less “legal,” less neutral and less objective than the US system. The 
implication was that this allowed the Commission to pursue its own political 
objectives. According to one commentator, for example, “these differences [in
9 William Kolasky & Leon B. Greenfield, The Lost GE/IIoneywell Deal Reveals a Trans- 
Atlantic Clash of Essentials. Legal Times 28 (July 30,2001).
10 Gary Becker, What U.S. Courts Could Teach Europe's Trusthuslers, Business Week, Aug. 6, 
2001, at 20. In a letter to the European authorities. Senator Ernest Boilings, Chairman of the 
Senate Commerce Committee, stated that the Commission had applied “an apparent double 
standard” that favoured European companies and disadvantaged their U.S. competitors.” U.S. 
Steps in over EU Opposition to G.E. Deal, Financial Times, June 16/17, 2001, at 1.
11 In fact, the most strenuous opponents o f the merger were probably US firms rather than 
European firms.
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outcome]—and the strengths and weaknesses of the two systems—flow from the 
fact that while the Antitrust Division [of the Justice Department] operates in a law 
enforcement context, the Merger Task Force [of the EU Commission] operates in a 
regulatory system.”12
A third claim, particularly common among antitrust specialists, was that the EU 
Commission was simply wrong in its analysis.13 Here the assumption was that the 
US and EU decision makers were applying the same standard and seeking the same 
objectives, but the EU misunderstood the economics of the case and thus got the 
analysis wrong. There was seldom explicit reference in such claims to the standard 
that was applied in arriving at this conclusion, and they seldom reflected careful 
comparison of the standards and objectives used in US and EU law.
Finally, and related, it was often claimed that the objectives of EU competition 
law were wrong—in the sense that they were inappropriate for competition law. A 
frequent claim was, for example, that “EU law protects competitors, while US law 
protects competition.” Charles James, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
stated in a press release that “clear and longstanding US antitrust policy holds that 
the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors. Today’s EU decision reflects 
a significant point of divergence.”14 This claim perceives the differences in 
outcomes as the result not of faulty analysis based on similar standards, but of an 
unjustified discrepancy in objectives.15
2. Underlying Assumptions , . .
These claims rest on basic assumptions and beliefs about law that were shared by 
the US participants in the network and were often assumed by them to be shared all 
participants in the legal domain. Their common point of reference is national legal 
experience.
One set of assumptions relates to the way competition law functions. It casts 
competition law decision-making as subject to political influence. The claim that 
the Commission was acting politically is not supported by evidence, and thus the 
conclusion that it was acting politically appears to be produced by the interpretive 
assumptions of those who made the claim rather than the evidence available.
12 Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and 
Lessons, 16 Antitrust 18,22 (Fall, 2001).
13 Sec, e.g., William j. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: I t 's  A Long Way 
from  Chicago to Brussels, address before the George Mason University Symposium, 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 9, 2001 (http://www.usdoj jov/atr/public/speechcs/9536.htm).
14 Charles A. James, Statement on the E U ’s  Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition 
(July 3, 2001), available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8510.htm).
15 For discussion o f this claim, see Edward T. Swaine. ‘Competition, Not Competitors,’ Nor 
Canards: Ways o f  Criticbing the Commission, 23 U. Penn. J. Inti. Econ L. (2002).
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This is associated with the further assumption that legal decisions are 
specifically intended to promote the single-state interests of the decision-makcr. The 
distinction here is between single-state and shared interests. Governmental decision 
makers generally pursue the interests of the state in which they operate; the issue is 
how they define those interests. The assumption at work in these responses is that 
the Commission acts to produce direct and tangible benefits to its domestic political 
constituents and that these interests take the form of advantages over the US 
competitors of European businesses. A shared interests perspective would also 
consider benefits to the state that may provide benefits to other states (e.g., more 
effective competition law development or more effective international cooperation).
Assumptions and beliefs about the relationship between law and economics 
form a further structural element in many US responses. They often assume that 
economics is the controlling language in competition law matters, that it represents 
an independent and universal standard against which competition laws arc to be 
measured and assessed. Typically, this is accompanied by a further assumption that 
the economics standard is a specific form of economic analysis known generally as 
“Chicago school" analysis, which focuses on short-term price increases as the 
measure of economic efficiency.16 This conception of economic analysis is used as 
the standard to which all competition law systems should adhere.
This assumption is of crucial importance for two reasons. First, it disregards 
differences in the laws of the two systems and tends to preclude serious discussion 
of those differences. Where the discussion is reduced to the language o f economics, 
other factors that a decision maker may be required or expected to take into 
consideration—such as, e.g., the articulated legal standards provided by the laws 
being applied —arc excluded. The result may be to misunderstand and distort the 
decisional processes involved and the motivations of the decision makers. In the 
GE/Honcywcll context, its implication is that EU decision makers were at liberty to 
act on what they considered to be the best economic analysis, regardless of existing 
statutes and policies. Second, it tends to disregard differences in economic analysis. 
Short-term price effects may currently be the sole concern in US antitrust, but that 
docs not mean that they are the only concerns of economics.
A third set of assumptions involves the relationships among actors in the 
competition law arena. US responses assume certain characteristics of those 
relationships, and this leads to further assumptions about the probable effectiveness 
of particular response strategies.
The logic of power suffuses US responses. They frequently assume that US 
responses must not only be heard, but also heeded and followed. The tone is often
16 For a classic discussion of this approach, see Robert 11. Bork, The Antihust Paradox: A Policy 
at IVar with //.vc// (1978).
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that the US commentator has a right to expect that the Commission will make 
changes in accordance with her comments and that failure to do so (i.e., to follow 
the US example) will produce harmful consequences for the Commission. The fact 
of US power both encourages this type of response and implicitly turns such 
responses into threats.
In these responses, the relationships among competition law actors are seldom 
portrayed as legally imbedded. Existing principles of international law that 
obviously govern aspects o f the relationship were seldom mentioned. For example, 
under public international law a state may apply its own law to conduct that has a 
substantial effect within its territory. This conclusion is based on the effects 
principle of international law, which is widely accepted as a general principle, 
although there continues to be controversy about its range and about how it should 
be applied in particular cases. j
From this perspective, there is also little incentive to engage in serious ! 
comparative analysis—to learn about the traditions, objectives and dynamics of | 
another system. Such knowledge appears to be, at best, useless; at worst, it may : 
interfere with power-based response strategics. This logic may help to explain why 
US responses frequently lack rigorous analysis of the differences between the US 
and EU competition law systems and the reasons for them.
3, Vie Experience Base in US Law ami Legal Culture
These assumptions and perspectives derive from US legal experience. That 
experience is both general and antitrust-related, and it has both external and 
domestic components. 1
On one level, the external influence is obvious. The experience of US political 
leaders, lawyers and academics since the Second World War has been one of 
leadership (some might say “dominance”) in its relationships with Europe. The 
political and economic power o f the US has been accompanied by a general 
assumption in the US (and to some extent in Europe) that Europeans have an 
obligation to avoid serious interference with US goals. This power relationship 
easily leads to the further assumptions (1) that the US is “entitled” to tell the EU 
Commission what it should do and (2) that the EU Commission is “obligated” to 
heed US demands.
Perhaps less obvious is the experience of US antitrust lawyers and scholars in 
their relations with their analogues from foreign countries (mainly Europe). US 
antitrust law is often seen as the progenitor (usually, “father”) of antitrust law. Until 
after the Second World War, it was the only significant competition law, and it has 
long been the centre of the antitrust universe. Others, including the Europeans, have 
been expected to look to and learn from US antitrust law, and the Europeans have
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frequently done so. Moreover, many still assume that European competition law is 
merely an import from the US.17
Among members o f the US antitrust community, this has often generated an 
assumption that US antitrust law is simply better, more sophisticated and better 
developed than other competition law systems. In any event, they have seldom 
experienced situations in which they have been expected to lcam from other 
competition law systems. As a result, the idea that the US can learn from others 
remains little developed, and this further contributes to an implicit sense of the 
superiority of the US system.
It also inhibits serious comparative analysis o f EU competition law in the US. 
There is, of course, much writing and knowledge about particular cases and 
regulatory texts, but in-depth analysis of the goals, traditions, institutions and 
processes of European competition law remains uncommon in US legal discussions 
and scholarship.
The domestic experience of US antitrust lawyers and officials also helps to 
explain some o f the assumptions that we have here encountered. Careful analysis of 
that experience can provide valuable insights into US responses, particularly 
because US experience of antitrust law is in many ways unique. Here are a few 
examples.
The assumption that antitrust officials arc strongly influenced by political 
considerations is encouraged by US antitrust history. US antitrust law, and 
particularly US antitrust enforcement, has undergone fundamental and often rapid 
changes at several points in its history, and these changes have often been based on 
political factors. In some ways the most fundamental of these changes is very 
recent. I refer to the victory of law-and-economics methodology that began in the 
1970s and radically changed much in US antitrust law. These changes are often 
assumed to have been to a large extent driven or at least supported by political 
factors, most notably the policies of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. This experience 
tends to predispose members of the US antitrust community to assume that such 
political factors play similar roles in other systems as well.
This is further related to attitudes toward administrative decision making that are 
common in society, but particularly prevalent within the competition law 
community. In the US, administrative officials are often assumed to be vulnerable 
to political pressure, and this assumption is readily applied in the area o f antitrust 
because of the magnitude of the economic and political interests that are often 
involved in antitrust decisions. This set of beliefs about administrative dccision-
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17 I have demonstrated that this assumption is inaccurate, but it persists nonetheless. For 
discussion o f the evolution of competition law in Europe and the role o f U.S. antitrust law in 
that evolution, sec David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe ( 1998, 
pbk.2001).
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making, particularly in the competition law arena, is readily applied to all systems. 
Given that administrators play a more central role in the application of El' 
competition law than they do in the US, the step to assuming political vulnerability 
in that system is a short one.
In the US system, the political vulnerability of administrators is thought to be 
offset by the central role of the federal courts in the system. For example, the 
Department of Justice generally must file suit in court in order to transatlantic 
enforcement action under the antitrust laws. This is understood as a mechanism for 
constraining political influence within the system. In the EU context, the 
Commission has extensive decisional and enforcement powers that are used with 
little or no court involvement. Its decisions may be reviewed by one of the two 
Community courts, but reviews often take several years, and relatively few have led 
to reversal of Commission decisions. This encourages suspicions about the 
Commission's objectivity as well as its motives.
The most prominent element o f US antitrust experience over the last 25 years 
has been the victory o f law and economics. Not surprisingly, this victory plays key 
roles in the shaping of US antitrust views. In particular, it shapes the way members 
of the US antitrust community view both the phenomenon of competition law and 
those who hold other views of competition law.
Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars identified with the “law-and-cconomics” 
(L&E) movement have argued that the goals of antitrust should be defined solely by 
reference to economic theory, in particular, the Chicago school of economics. This 
recent, rapid and impressive tlvictory” has generated belief in the rectitude of the 
ideas, and it helps to explain why they have come to form a kind of orthodoxy in the 
US The speed and ease of the victory are often seen as proof of their power: if they 
can be so successful in such a short period of time, they must be powerful. From 
here the step to assuming that they are also “right” in a universal sense is easy and 
often taken.
The experience o f this victory has also created a kind o f post-victory mode of 
thought, according to which the battle has been won, and ideas that prevailed 
previously have been shown to be wrong. Some of these ideas are perceived to be 
similar to ideas advanced by the European Commission, leading some members of 
the US antitrust community to discredit them by association.
This brief review of the GE Honeywell conflict highlights the distinctive 
operations of the two domains that operate within transatlantic governance. It also 
demonstrates important elements o f the relationship, particularly the extent to which 
the conflict was a product of the logic and status of the domain o f law in the 
transatlantic governance relationship. Finally, it demonstrates some o f the ways in 
which domestic experience with law and legal culture shape interactions within the 
domain of law.
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V. Potential Policy Implications
This analysis has potential policy implications. I note here a few examples. I assume 
for purposes of discussion that there are two policy goals:
1) To increase the effectiveness of competition law in influencing business 
decisions, and
2) To reduce conflicts within the governance relationship.1 *
Given the above analysis, this should generate strategies designed to increase the 
influence of the network domain. That domain conceives the relationship in 
cooperative, conflict-reduction terms, and it functions in ways that favour such 
outcomes. Assuming that other factors remain unchanged, therefore, increasing the 
influence of that domain should favour the designated objectives.18 9
A detailed analysis would, of course, also include reference to the points at 
which changes in the role or function of the network could be expected to alter its 
dynamics. If, for example, the network were to become more influential, outside 
interests would have greater incentives to seek to influence its operations. This level 
o f analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, but the analysis suggested here 
identifies the conditions of network operations and thus provides the basis for a 
more extended analysis.
One strategy would be to increase the scope of network operations. If network 
decision making is more likely to lead to the objectives stated, then increasing the 
scope o f those operations should promote the attainment of those goals. Even small 
steps could be of benefit here. For example, under the current legal regime, most 
information exchanges handled by the network in specific cases are voluntary—i.e., 
they must be approved by the parties involved. By expanding the scope of 
information exchanges to include some that are not voluntary in this sense, the 
potential influence of the network may also increase.
A second strategy would be to increase the influence of the network image of 
the governance relationship.20 That image portrays the relationship as cooperative 
and conflict-resistant. If more participants in the relationship were to view it that 
way, this may, depending on the circumstances, lead to increased expectations of 
conduct consistent with this image and to conduct modification consistent with 
those expectations. This strategy might include steps as simple as increasing 
resources for disseminating information about network operations.
18 These objectives are, o f course, contestable. Some would suggest, for example, that such 
conflicts serve useful functions.
19 Network analysis is attractive for some precisely because of its apparent propensity to foster 
such goals.
20 This could also generate a different result, depending on the circumstances. It could, e.g., lead 
to increased resistance from those opposed to the network view of the relationship.
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Another strategy focuses on conceptions of law. The conception of law that 
tends to generate conflict within law’s domain is based on national rather than 
international law. As we saw in the GE/Honeywell context, equating law with 
national law and, therefore, viewing transnational relations in terms of national 
power and/or national interest tends to generate conflicts. Jf, however, the perceived 
relevance of international law were to increase within the domain of law, this could 
be expected to lead to increased consideration of reciprocal duties and obligations 
within that relationship and reduce not only the points o f conflict, but also the 
incentive to attach interests to specific points of difference between legal systems. 
Specific international agreements regarding competition law (e.g., in the context of 
the WTO) could be expected to alter thinking in this direction by requiring domain 
participants to pay increased attention to the international rather than merely the 
national dimensions of law.
Finally, as we have seen, law’s domain is rooted in national experience, whereas 
the experiential point of reference for the network is transnational. Changing the 
experience base of participants in law’s domain and/or expanding awareness within 
the legal domain of cooperative experience within the network may also increase 
the influence of cooperative experience. One specific way of supporting this 
influence may be, for example, to create a joint commission to evaluate potential 
conflict situations within the transatlantic relationship. Its members might include 
influential academics, political figures and business leaders as well as network 
participants—from both sides of the Atlantic. Experience in this group would 
develop a shared reference base of experience that would be similar to that of 
regulatory cooperation and may over time lead to similar patterns of thought among 
its members.
VI, Concluding Remarks
This essay suggests the potential value o f developing an analytical framework that 
is capable of detecting distinct domains within governance relationships. Applying 
such a framework to the transatlantic economic governance relationship yielded 
insights that otherwise might not have been detected. It revealed two distinct 
domains of the relationship. Each influences decisions in systematic ways, and each 
influences the other in detectable ways. Distinguishing these distinct modes of 
operation and thought then allowed us to detect forces within the relationship that 
had been rarely been noted, if  at all.
Existing analytical tools—e.g., network theory, rational choice theory, and 
public choice theory—reveal aspects o f  the transatlantic governance relationship, 
but each also misses significant elements of it. The framework sketched here relates 
them to each other and thus yields a richer, more nuanced and, hopefully, more 
accurate image of that relationship.
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Stephen ƒ?. M. Wilks
Here we have two sophisticated papers from two of the leading figures in the 
comparative study of competition law and policy. The presentations have added 
vibrancy and richness to the papers and it is difficult to know where to start. I 
propose to take three cuts at commentary to cover first, reflections on their analysis; 
second, to talk about some “dogs that did not bark”; and thirdly, some comments on 
convergence of regimes.
First, reflections on the analysis. Both papers stress the success of the network of 
relationships built up between competition practitioners. In his presentation William 
Kovacic actually referred to the “manic” level o f interaction between governments 
and individuals involving conferences and meetings of professional associations. 
Regular interaction has become the norm and it involves extensive exchange of 
information and rests on great goodwill.
But both papers also identify disappointments with the outcomes from 
networking and they emphasise the distance still to travel. Kovacic does this 
implicitly by sketching out an agenda of future engagement, and it is an ambitious 
agenda aimed at facilitating real understanding. David Gerber does this explicitly by 
underlining the very limited impact that the network domain has had on actual 
conflictual cases, especially of course GE/Honeywell, so that there is a disjuncture 
between the network domain and the legal domain.
What explains this disappointment? One reason is that the legal systems remain 
very different, That’s rather an obvious statement and it would matter less if the two 
sides recognised and understood the differences. However it is clear that the 
Europeans on the whole do nut understand American antitrust. Moreover, not only
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do the Americans not understand European competition law, they are—to use 
Gerber’s phrase— “outraged" at the extraterritorial impact o f European decisions. 
So both papers stress the need for reciprocal in-depth analysis not only of the cases 
but of the history and the basic dynamics o f the two systems. This is hugely 
important.
This legal incomprehension is of decisive importance for Gerber because policy 
implementation through law takes cases out of the control of the network. Cases 
become debated in terms that may be legal but arc also politicised and nationalised 
so that the imperatives o f cooperation are sidelined. For me as a political scientist a 
key factor is that both papers stress fundamental differences between legal and 
institutional systems. In Kovacic’s formulation “how institutional change affects 
doctrine” is vital. For instance his fascinating and perceptive account of how private 
actions and triple damages provoke judicial caution which spills over to narrow the 
scope of public action in the US and thus creates a perverse impact.
This brings me on to my second area. With apologies to Sherlock Holmes it 
concerns “dogs that did not bark". Let me touch on five areas where wc might also 
have expected some discussion.
Initially there is the question of multi-lateralism. Both papers stress bi-lateral 
engagement. Kovacic mentions some of the many multi-lateral initiatives (such as 
the well established OECD network and the newer International Competition 
Network) but it is notable that competition policy has not created international 
agencies or treaties. Why is this? Is it too law driven? Too market specific? Is there 
no real business pressure?
Then there is the interaction with trade policy. One of the sources of solidarity 
amongst competition policy specialists and practitioners has been the need to 
counter the powerful and historically predominant trade policy community. At the 
extreme trade policy doctrine would hold that complete liberalisation of trade would 
render competition policy redundant. While no competition policy advocate would 
accept that for a moment it is true that globalisation does alleviate some competition 
concerns and the collapse of international trade policy initiatives might have an 
impact on competition policy. Wc could discuss how competition policy has 
become more politically salient?
A third area is concerned more with the analysis and in particular I wonder 
whether there is a need to define “the network?” Gerber talks about “the network.” 
Kovacic discussed the “competition policy community.” Neither paper defines the 
membership and the dynamics of “the community” and I wondered if we should 
develop that concept. In particular, the literature on “epistemic communities” is 
very suggestive. An epistemic community is an international network of experts 
unified and mobilised by ideas. In this areas the experts centred around Claus-Dieter 
Ehlcrmann or Mario Monti constitute examples of communities and they appear
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very influential. But they appear much more influential in making policy than in 
implementing it.
Moving on, neither paper says very much about the role of business, the private 
sector companies who have a keen interest in the form and effectiveness of 
competition law. Do companies want a common transatlantic regulatory 
framework? How much influence do they have? Do companies actually oppose a 
more effective cooperative regime and isn’t the real challenge to educate companies 
and increase compliance?
My final silent dog relates to the impact of competition policy. How should we 
assess the impact of policy and do the US and Europe have a shared philosophy of 
policy targets? Should competition policy control economic power; or should it 
protect consumers; or should it increase competitiveness? The Americans have 
accused the Europeans of protecting competitors rather than competition but it may 
also be that European policy has been skewed by the nature of European capitalism. 
I was especially struck by Kovacic’s comments about the need for “competition 
policy R&D.” In other words for far more systematic research on competition 
policy which offers a role and a challenge for academics. One element of this for 
me would be to ask whether US-style competition policy is well adjusted to 
commercial realities. Is it well adjusted to what we can call “Rhineland capitalism” 
with its sensitivity to the social implications of intense competition? Is competition 
policy perhaps too Anglo-American for much o f continental Europe? Capitalist 
traditions that stress stakeholder involvement in companies and cross shareholdings, 
as in Germany, may still be accountable and efficient but may be threatened by 
competition policy. There has, for instance, been some recent thinking out loud by 
DG-Competition about whether cross-shareholding of the sort that virtually define 
the German corporate economy may actually be illegal under European competition 
law.
Can I conclude these comments with the big question of “convergence.” The UK 
has converged on American concepts. We have incorporated the US-style SLC 
(substantial lessening of competition) test into our new merger laws and the new 
EU merger regulation also make reference to SLC. Moreover Mario Monti, the 
outgoing European Commissioner, also talks about European convergence on US 
approaches. There is no question that Europe has changed. European antitrust is 
now a cornerstone of economic governance in a way that it certainly was not twenty 
years ago—and look at the ten new members whose socialist economies have been 
transformed and now comply with the competition rules! But the message o f these 
two papers is that the US should take European competition policy more seriously, 
both American officials and American companies. Is it time that the US itself ought 
to engage in some introspection and refonn? In Gerber’s terminology, has the child 
outgrown the parent?
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Finally can I say how much I have learned from these two papers and how much 
I am aware of the depth of knowledge that underpins the. Papers o f this calibre 
provide some reassurance that the comparative “competition policy R&D” can be 
achieved but it also needs to be disseminated.
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Privacy, Personal Data Protection 
and the Safe Harbour Decision 
From Euphoria to Policy. From Policy to Regulation?
M aria Verónica Pérez Asm an  
Yves Pouliet
1. Introduction
International trade took digital form in a sort of technological and market euphoria. 
Even if  the “extreme'1 euphoria of the 90’s has calmed down after the dot.coms 
crisis this new form of exchange has come to stay with us and became to be the 
most natural thing.
The advantages of information technologies in regards to multilateral economic 
relations were early pointed out as a key element of the transatlantic political 
dialogue. The Transatlantic Agenda mentions the will to create a New Transatlantic 
Marketplace and a Transatlantic Information Society, both of these in the frame of 
the third shared goal: “contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer 
economic relations.’’1
In the context of the digital marketplace, many national and multinational 
companies export and import personal data on a regular basis, for their management 
activities (human resources, customer care, direct marketing, etc.). Personal
1 Transatlantic Agenda, available at: http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm.
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information may even be their raw material for market research, profiling, etc., what 
can constitute the service itself or an added value to their “product” or 
“commodity.” Apart from this, and due to the architecture o f Internet protocols, 
consumers leave traces while using the net, sometimes consciously (e.g. when they 
purchase goods or contract services in e-commerce platforms and their name, 
address and other information is required for the deliverance), sometimes 
unconsciously (e.g. through the use made by companies of clickstream data, when 
cookies are placed on their hard drives, when invisible hyperlinks arc used, etc.).2 
Thus, personal data, as information on the net, crosses states’ borders very easily. It 
can be re-used for many other purposes than the purpose for which it has been 
initially gathered. Moreover, assisted by very cheap software, the result of this 
further data processing contributes to an economically viable result.
Given this reality, any dialogue about the digital marketplace policy must 
involve a concomitant dialogue on privacy and personal data use policy, due to the 
risks to certain rights o f the individual that an uncontrolled use o f personal data can 
create.
This paper will analyse, first, what were the initial political aims of the EU-US 
dialogue in the realm of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and related 
documents. Secondly, a brief description will be given of the EU and US regulatory 
choices in the privacy arena, aiming to provide the legal background for framing 
any effort of joint governance. Thirdly, we will analyse if there have been efforts of 
joint governance, and if  so, how have these efforts worked in practise: the Safe 
Harbour Decision, whether there have been impediments for a successful 
cooperation, and if so, what institutions and/or practises have been most effective at 
overcoming such obstacles. Fourthly, we will assess what concrete steps might the 
US and the EU undertake in the coming months and years, to strengthen 
cooperation and attain their common goals. Finally, we will conclude by assessing 
to what extent policy was translated into regulation (State regulation, co-regulation, 
self-regulation, regulation through technology).
2 J-M. Dinant Law and Technology Convergence in the Data Protection Field? Electronic 
Threats on Personal Data and Electronic Data Protection on the Internet, Deliverable 2.2.3, 
ECL1P, Project funded by the EC, 1ST programme, available at: http://www.eclip.org/ 
documcnts/deliveiable_2_2_3_privacy.pdf, last visited 31/05/04. J-M. Dinant Les traitements 
invisibles sur Internet, Cahiers du CR1D n°I6, Bruylant, 1999, pp. 271-294, also available at: 
http://www.droit.fimdp.ac.be/crid/eclip/luxembourg.html, last visited 31/05/04. C. Ducourtieux 
and S. Foucart Les profilcurs du Net traquent les internautes à leur insu, Le Monde, 10 
May 2002, page 20.
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II. Initial Political Aims: The NTA’s Perspective on
Privacy and Personal Data Protection
The NTA docs not specifically mention, in its third shared goal, any reference to 
privacy or personal data protection. Even when it refers to issues where trade 
intersects with other concerns, the document points out only the ‘■‘environment, 
internationally recognised labour standards and competition policy.” Could one 
imagine that there was no important intersection between trade and privacy or that 
this concern was still not obvious at the time when the NTA was drafted? We will 
see that it was not the case.
However, two other political documents highlight an intrinsic relationship 
between trade and the protection of privacy and personal data: (1) the Joint EU-US 
Action Plan* that accompanies the NTA, and (2) the Joint Statement on Electronic 
Commerce.'1
The Joint EU-US Action Plan sets out specific actions to which the EU and the 
US have committed themselves, describing concrete steps to carry out in order to 
achieve each of the four-shared goals. While addressing the New Transatlantic 
Marketplace, the document foresees that:
• [WJe will expand and develop the bilateral Information Society Dialogue, 
in order to further common understanding of global issues implying 
access to information services through public institutions, regulatory 
reforms, and technological cooperation, including the continuation of 
expert-level discussions in the following areas: [...] commercial 
communications; privacy and data protection...;3 45
• Furthermore, it refers explicitly to “data protection” in the following terms: 
[WJe will discuss data protection issues with a view to facilitating 
information flows, while addressing the risks to privacy.6
Clearly said, it means that even if privacy concerns must be taken into 
consideration, they might not affect disproportionably information exchange. 
Moreover, despite the fact that this document was supposed to “specify” concrete 
actions, it seems that this field remained in a “discussion” stage. The will/need to 
regulate or not regulate the privacy field was not mentioned.7
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3 Joint EU-US Action Plan, available at: http://www.eunmion.org/partner/actplan.htm.
4 Joint Statement released in conjunction with the EU-US Summit in Washington, DC,
December 5, 1997, available at: http;//www,eunmion.org/partner/summit/Sumniit9712/
clcctrst.htm.
5 Point I11.2.(i) devoted to “information Society, information technology and 
telecommunications.’’
6 Point lll.2.(k).
7 The degree of cooperation is quite diverse in the different topics addressed. Very concrete 
commitments are made in other areas. For instance, in Point UI.2.(d) “Veterinary and plant
103
MARÍA VERÒNICA PÉREZ ASINARI and YVES POULLET
The Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce establishes certain guidelines for 
the global expansion of e-commerce. Some statements are made, as far as 
governance choices are concerned, that goes in -what could be understood as- either 
“contradictory” or “complementary” ways. The document stipulates, in the relevant 
part, that:
• [Such] expansion will be essentially market-led and driven by private 
initiative;8
• The role of the government is to provide a clear, consistent and 
predictable legal framework, to promote a pro-competitive environment 
in which e-commerce can flourish and to ensure adequate protection of 
public interest objectives such as privacy, intellectual property rights, 
prevention of fraud, consumer protection, and public safety;9
• Industry self-regulation is important. Within the legal framework set by 
the government, public interest objectives can, as appropriate, be served 
by international or mutually compatible codes of conduct, model 
contracts, guidelines, etc., agreed upon between industry and other private 
sector bodies;10
• Finally, the parties agree, among other issues, to work towards:
[EJnsuring the effective protection of privacy with regard to the 
processing of personal data on global information networks.1'
In this case, the political instrument is more explicit, but fuzzy still. Hence, the 
document pleads in favour of a co-regulatory12 model founded on a certain partition
----------------------------—------------------------(contd.}
health issues,” it is stated that “[w]e will conclude an agreement to establish a framework for 
determining equivalence of veterinary standards and procedures for all live animals products.” 
Point II 1.2.(h) “Customs cooperation” declares, in the same line that the previously mentioned 
one, that “[w]e will endeavour to conclude by the end of 1996 a customs cooperation and 
mutual assistance agreement between the EC and the US. The agreement should cover....”
8 Point 3(i).
9 Point 3(ii).
10 Point 3(iii).
11 Point 4(iv).
12 More recently this partition of responsibilities has also been promoted by the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS) Declaration of Principles when this Declaration asserts: 
“The management o f the Internet encompasses both technical and public policy issues and 
should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international 
organizations. In this respect it is recognized that:
Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right o f States. They 
have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues;
The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the development 
of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields;
Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community 
level, and should continue to play such a role;
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of responsibilities among the State and private parties in the regulatory process. 
Privacy is one of the key issues for the e-commcrce political framework, but there is 
neither a definitive determination about the regulatory choice to address this 
important issue, nor the compromise for the signature of an agreement, as is the 
case in other areas of the NTA.13 It has to be noted that there is a dual 
reinforcement: on the one hand the role of the government in those areas where 
there is a public interest, and on the other, the role of private sector self-regulation 
in serving also those public interest objectives. Not surprisingly enough, the EU-US 
debate on privacy and data protection will be played in those extremes (as Internet 
governance in general),14 to find an eclectic and not definitive15 solution: the Safe 
Harbour (SH) framework.
III. R egulatory Choices in the  EU and in the US
These political documents above mentioned seem not to have been “naive” when 
leaving a blurred sensation about the regulatory choice. Indeed, this was (and still 
is) an intricate political and legal matter, where both parties have taken different 
roads for regulation. Indeed, this makes joint governance more difficult in this 
realm. A solution was a must, being information (remarkably “personal” 
information) the petrol of the digital marketplace. But, have there been truly “joint 
governance” efforts in the practise? We have to understand first the legal 
framework of both parties separately, in order to see how the joint political basis
13
14
15
----------------------------------- (contd.)
Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating role in 
the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues;
International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the 
development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.”
The WSIS has been organised by ITU in Geneva (10-12 December 2003). As previously 
decided, this first meeting will be followed by a second meeting to be held in Tunis in 2005. 
The WSIS was the result o f difficult, numerous and intense discussions at regional and global 
level. See: World Summit on the Information Society, Declaration of Principles. Building the 
Information Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium, Document WSIS- 
03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E, 12 December 2003, available at: http://www.itu.int/dms pub/itu- 
s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004! 1MSW-E.doc.
See footnote 7.
See: J. Bcrlcur, E. Brousseau, M. Coipck, T. Delmas, T. Dedcurwaerdcre, T. Ewbank dc 
Wespin, I. Falque-Pierrotin L. llennuy, Ch. Lazaro, C. Macsschack, Y. Poullet, R. Qucck 
Enjeux à débattre. Gouvernance de la société dc l'information. Loi. Autorégl cm entât ion. 
Éthique, Actes du séminaire, Namur, les 15 et 16 juin 2001, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2002. Y. 
Poullet How to regulate Internet: New paradigms for Internet Governance self-regulation: 
value and limits, Variations sur le droit de la société de l'information, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
2002, pp. 79-114. Y. Poullet De retour d"un sommet mondial de la société de l'information, 
Revue du Droit des Technologies de l'Information, no. 18, avril 2004, pp. 5-8. y
S*We will sec infra why, in our opinion, the SH is not a definite solution. - Y
T..1*
o-r
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rwas intended to be transmitted into practical and legal solutions, to contribute to the 
achievement of the NTA third shared goal.
Regulatory choices go beyond the very topic of this paper. State legislation, co­
regulation. private sector self-regulation, or technological regulation are the result 
of historical, cultural, economic, etc., choices of a given society. They are not 
“good” or “bad” in themselves, they depend on many other contextual premises and 
the application fashion to the concrete cases.16 Comparison o f these choices and the 
results in practise are often conducted in this arena, due to the differences they 
present, mainly, in the regulation of privacy and personal data protection in e- 
commcrcc and other Internet and new technologies applications.17 In what follows, 
we will have an approximation to the regulatory solutions the parties under analyses 
have adopted.
A. The European Framework
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms18 regulates the protection o f privacy as follows:
A rtic le  8: (1)
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.19
At supranational level, EU Community law has moved from being a pure 
economic integration process, to a more comprehensive framework. It has 
incorporated the protection of human rights, as one of its goals since the adoption of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.20 The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for
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16 Uased on Summers's doctrine, we do propose a triple test of the legal validity o f both self- 
regulatory norms and public regulations: legitimacy- conformity and effectiveness. On these 
triple criteria, see our reflections: Y. Poullet, “ICT and Regulation; Towards a New 
Regulatory Approach,” to be published in Internet Governance, M. Schellcckens (ed.), Kluwer 
Law Jnt,
17 See: G. Shaffer “Globalization and Social Protection: the Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the ratcheting up of US Data Privacy Standards,” Yale Journal of International Law, 
Winter 2000, vol. 25, pp. 1*88. J. Dhont and M.V. Perez Asinari “New Physics and the Law. 
A Comparative Approach to the EU and US Privacy and Data Protection Regulation,” in 
L'utilisation de la methode comparative en droit europeen, ed. F van der Mensbrugghc, 
Presses Universitaires de Namur, Namur, 2003, pp. 67-97. C. Manny “European and 
American Privacy: Commerce, Rights and Justice,” The Computer Law and Security Report, 
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 4-10, and Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 92-100.
18 Referred to in Article 6 o f the TEU and Article 286 of the TCE.
19 European Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4 November 1950, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
20 Treaty Establishing the European Community, available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ 
cn/trcLities/dat/EC_consol.pdf.
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rEurope21 has even included the Charter o f Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Despite the fact that this instrument is not in force yet, it shows an important 
advance: the provision o f an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of 
personal data,22 as individuated from the right to privacy.23 Privacy is no more 
envisaged only as a way to protect sensitive data and the confidentiality of 
communications but more broadly and more positively, as a way for ensuring the 
ability of human beings to their self-determination in an Information Society, where 
information might be considered as a power for data controllers vis-à-vis the data 
subjects.24
The exchange o f personal data across boundaries was early analysed in the—at 
that time—EEC from the perspective of the internal market: due to the adoption of 
privacy and data protection laws in different Member States25 obstacles to the free 
flow of data could be created due to the disparity of legislation.
The 80’s and beginning of 90’s are characterised by the effort to find 
international solutions: the OECD Guidelines on the protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data,26 the Council of Europe Convention no. 108 
on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal 
data,27 and the UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data 
Files.28 We can see that the nature of the instruments is different. Whereas the
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21 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Adopted by consensus by the European 
Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003, submitted to the President o f the European 
Council in Rome, 18 July 2003, available at: http://europa.eu.int/cur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/ 
2003/c 169/c 1692003071 SenOOOl 0105.pdf
22 Article 8: 1. “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of 
the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.”
23 Article 7: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.”
24 On this evolution, see D. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 90 California Law Review 
(2002), pp. 1088 and ss.
25 Land of Hesse (1970); Sweden (1972); Federal Republic o f Germany (1977); Denmark 
(1978); France (1978); Luxemburg (1979).
26 OECD Guidelines on the protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
23 September 1980. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRJV-EN.HTM.
27 Convention for the Protection o f Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing o f Personal 
Data ETS no. 108, Strasbourg 28 January 1981. Available at; http://conventions.coe.int/ 
trcaty/en/T reaties/I Itml/108. htm.
28 Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 45/95 o f 14 December 1990, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
mcnu3 /b/71.htm.
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OECD Guidelines and the UN Guidelines arc examples of soft law, Convention no. 
108 is the first international binding document All of them have been the source of 
the upcoming HU rules.
Some months before the signature of the NTA, Directive 95/46/EC29 was 
enacted, in order to harmonise divergent Personal Data Protection legislation in 
what concerns the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons 
(in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data), 
to fulfil the internal market’s requirement of free flow of personal data. As a 
consequence, it establishes some general principles in order to achieve this goal, 
describing rights for the data subject and obligations for the data controller when 
processing personal data.
Basically, it foresees that the data subject30 has the rights to information,31 
access,32 rectification, reassure and blocking.33
The data controller34 has to respect the data quality principles,35 the legitimacy 
o f processing activities,36 she has to notify the national Data Protection Authority 
the processing activities,37 and she has to implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures.38
Furthermore, to avoid the circumvention o f European law, the Directive has 
created a mechanism, that consists in a general principle for trans-border data flows 
(TBDF) and a series o f exceptions. Indeed, Article 25(1) of the Directive sets out 
the principle that Member States shall only allow a transfer to take place if the third
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and o f the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection o f individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement o f such data, OJEC L 281, 23/11/1995 P, 0031-0050. Hereinafter: “the Directive.”
30 The “data subject” is the person to whom the data relates. “Personal data” is defined as: “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject'*); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity,” Article 2(a) of the Directive.
31 Article 10 and L1 of the Directive.
32 Article 12(a) o f the Directive.
33 Article 12(h) o f  the Directive.
34 The “data controller” is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other 
body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing 
of personal data; where the purposes and means o f processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may 
be designated by national or Community law,” Article 2(d) of the Directive.
35 Article 6 o f the Directive.
36 Article 7 of the Directive.
37 Article 18 of the Directive.
38 Article 17 of the Directive.
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country in question ensures an “adequate level of protection.”39 This basic principle, 
forbidding any TBDF to countries not offering adequate protection might suffer 
certain exceptions: (a) certain specific derogations (Article 26[1]); (b) adequacy 
Decisions (Article 25[6]); and (c) protection taken by the sender and the receiver of 
the TBDF either by contractual means or by their common subjection to legally 
binding commitments (Article 26[2]).
Before analysing further the different means to ensure an appropriate protection 
in case o f TBDF, let us make a parenthesis here to analyse, very briefly, the concept 
o f “flow” to detennine which situations would be regulated under Article 25(1), The 
term is not defined in the Directive. A dictionary defines this term as “[t]he action 
and fact of flowing; movement in a current or stream; an instance or mode o f this. 
Orig. said of liquids, but extended in modem use to all fluids, as air, electricity, 
etc.”40 We have the idea o f movement and also the connection with things that can 
go from one place to another without recognising frontiers, like the case of the air. 
A dictionary of informatics defines more precisely the expression “trans-border data 
flows” as:
[C irc u la tio n  internationale p a r  télécom m unications des données de  
toutes natures (économ iques, techniques, e tc.) posan t des p rob lèm es  
m ultip les: dépendance vis-à-vis des détenteurs d e  l Inform ation (banques 
des données), p ro tec tion  des données et de la vie privée, tra item ent 
extraterritoria l de l'in form ation  entraînant un déplacem ent de la  p rise  de  
decision.41
It is interesting to see that the concept “international circulation of data by 
telecommunications” is very broad and can represent multiple situations.
In our sphere, this is the case of a company transmitting a database of clients, of 
potential customers, of employees, of business contacts, etc., to its partner or branch 
established outside the EU. It is also the case of a customer transferring her personal 
data via an c-commercc website located in another country in order to receive a 
good or service.42 Yet, is it the case of personal data made available on the Internet,
Privacy, Personal Data Protection and the Safe Harbour Decision...
39 This concept of “adequate protection” has been taken again by the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing o f Personal 
Data, regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows CETS No.: 181, Strasburg, 
8 November 2001.
40 A New Dictionary on Historical Principles, Ed. J. Murray, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 
1901, vol. IV.
41 M. Guinguay and A. Lauret, Dictionnaire d'informatique, 5c édition, Masson, Paris, 1992.
42 Even if this case constitutes a “flow” of personal data, it is not covered by the application of 
the Directive since the data controller, the person responsible for the website who decides the 
means and purposes of this data processing, is neither established on the territory o f one 
member state—Article 4.1(a)—nor is making use of equipment located in the ED—Article 
4.1(c).
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which can potentially be accessed by people in third countries? Does this data 
“flow” from one country to another? Quite surprisingly, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has understood this as not being a flow.43
In a recent decision, the ECJ concluded that:
[TJhcre is no transfer [of data] to a third country within the meaning of 
Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State 
loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored on an internet 
site on which the page can be consulted and which is hosted by a natural 
or legal person who is established in that State or in another Member 
State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects to 
the internet, including people in a third country.
Tlic ECJ based this decision on the fact that Chapter IV of the Directive contains 
no provision concerning use of the Internet. Furthermore:
[I]f Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there is a 
transfer [of data] to a third country every time that personal data are 
loaded onto an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer 
to all the third countries where there are the technical means needed to 
access the internet. The special regime provided for by Chapter IV of the 
directive would thus necessarily become a regime of general application, 
as regards operations on the internet. Thus, if the Commission found, 
pursuant to Article 25(4) of Directive 95/46, that even one third country 
did not ensure adequate protection, the Member States would be obliged 
to prevent any personal data being placed on the internet.
Coming back to the notion of flow and giving consideration to the technical 
perspective, each time an Internet user consults a website, information packets arc 
transmitted via routers. If, the final destination of this packet is located abroad (that 
is, the place of establishment of the user who consult the website, and who can 
process44 the data consulted) the information has been exported, so, there has been 
an international transfer or flow of personal data.
It is rather astonishing, then, that the Court have not considered this technical 
reality. Indeed, the way to solve legal problems derived from the application of 
technology is not the denial of the effects that technical reality cause, but the
43 Judgment o f the Court o f 6 November 2003, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, 
Case C -l01/01. Another problem is the case o f “flows” generated by cookies or invisible 
hyperlinks. Should we apply Article 4.1(c) o f the Directive, or both Article 4.1(c) plus the 
rules on TBDF?
44 The notion o f processing activity given by the Directive is very broad: “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such 
as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction,” Article 2(b) of the Directive.
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understanding of the need not to leave the cyberspace in anarchy, and the 
application of the existing law as far as it is legitimate. For instance, the ECJ could 
have considered that the exceptions to the application of Article 25(1), as described 
in Article 26(1) (see infra) are almost the same that the requisites described in 
Article 7 of the Directive45, which constitute the criteria for making a data 
processing legitimate. In those cases, then, if the processing activity consists in 
posting personal data on an open network, given the international character of it, 
and the fact that due to the technical state-of-the-art this posting implies the 
possibility that an indefinite number of people located abroad have access (and if 
desired further process) to this data, information to the data subject about this 
possibility of global access should be required. With this, the data subject would be 
more aware about the risks that could arise to her data if not adequately protected.
With the reasoning of the ECJ, if a data controller posts personal data on a 
website legitimised by Article 7(a) of the Directive (unambiguous consent), the 
given consent of the data subject would even be “informed” and valid if the 
controller does not mention the fact that this data can be accessed and further 
processed in countries where there is no or less protection. Could we really consider 
this consent as “informed?”
Indeed, die main difference between Article 26(1) and Article 7 is its paragraph (f), 
which stipulates:
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:
[».]
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom 
the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by 
the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject 
which require protection under Article 1.
When a transfer can not be covered by any o f the exceptions o f Article 26(1), 
being the processing legitimate in accordance to Article 7(f), the data controller can
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45 Article 7: “Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if: (a) the 
data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) processing is necessary for the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; o r (d) processing is 
necessaiy in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or (e) processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest o r in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms o f the data 
subject which require protection under Article 1 (1).”
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tseek legitimacy for the transfer in any of the other possibilities offered by the 
Directive (see infra). However, in the case of Internet postings, the other 
possibilities do not offer a global solution, as is the case o f Article 26(1). These 
other possibilities offer country or country-sectoral solutions (adequacy Decisions) 
or controller-to-controller/controller-to-processor specific-case solutions (standard 
contractual clauses). This does not mean that given the flexibility of Article 25(2) of 
the Directive, other solutions addressing global issues could not be found.
This finding itself and the concept of “flow”—from a theoretical and practical 
point of view—deserve, clearly, a deeper analysis. However, we could not avoid 
mentioning it here, due to the direct implication with the subject of this paper.
Coming back to the notion of “adequate” protection, we have to bear in mind 
that, this concept has to be linked to the degree of risk a transfer presents and to the 
nature of the data:
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall 
be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data 
transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country 
of origin and countiy of final destination, the rules of law, both general 
and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional 
rules and security measures which are complied with in that countiy.46
Directive 95/46/EC does not provide for a definition of “adequacy.”47 The 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has elaborated a working document 
which states a list o f the principles that are considered to be sine qua non for 
personal data protection and that must be present in a third country system to be 
considered “adequate.”48 This document is the basis for the analysis of third 
countries’ “adequacy” conducted by the European Commission. It has to be noted 
that this document is a guideline that has not the character of forma] law.
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46 Article 25(2) of the Directive.
47 Sec J. Dhont and M.V, Perez Asinari “New Physics and the Law...,“ op. cit., pp. 73-79.
48 Article 29 Personal Data Protection Working Party, Working Document Transfers of Personal 
Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the F.U Data Protection Directive," 
WP 12, 24 July 1998. The principles enunciated are the following: purpose limitation; data 
quality and proportionality; transparency; security; rights of access, rectification and 
opposition; restrictions on onward transfers; additional principles to be applied to specific 
types of processing: sensitive data, direct marketing, automated individual decisions; 
procedural and enforcement mechanisms; good level of compliance, support and help to 
individual data subjects, appropriate redress to the injured party.
112
“Adequacy” should be understood in a dynamic way, evolving together with the 
evolution o f EU law.49
The Directive also foresees a series of exceptions to this general principle:
A. D erogations o f  A rtic le  26(1)
There are some cases in which a transfer or a set of transfers of personal 
data to a third country that does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection can anyway take place. The Directive creates a set of 
derogations to the general principle, so the transfer will be possible 
when:
a) The data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the 
proposed transfer; or
b) The transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between 
the data subject and the controller or the implementation of pre- 
contractual measures taken in response to the data subject's request; 
or
c) The transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a 
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the 
controller and a third party; or
d) The transfer is necessary or legally required on important public 
interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of 
legal claims; or
e) The transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the 
data subject; or
0 The transfer is made from a register which according to laws or 
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and 
which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by 
any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent 
that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in 
the particular case.50
B. Adequacy Decisions
If none of the exceptions mentioned above are suitable for the particular 
typology of transfers to be conducted, there are other possibilities that 
can be used to make a legitimate transfer. The European Commission can 
adopt a Decision in order to declare the “adequacy” of a particular
Privacy, Personal Data Protection and the Safe Harbour Decision...
49 For instance, one may think about the influence of Directive 2002/58/EC in the concept of 
adequacy. Are the solutions of this Directive to the concrete cases regulated a direct 
application of the general principles o f Directive 95/46/EC? Does this new Directive go 
beyond the general principles imposing new obligations to data controllers? If this were the 
case, should “adequacy” be analysed on those grounds? In principle, a positive answer to this 
last question would be the proper approach.
50 Article 26(1) of directive 95/46.
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system. The European Commission has issued, so far, seven Decisions 
under Article 25(6). The “Safe Harbour”51 has been adopted in this 
context (see infra). It determines that a set of privacy principles and 
frequently asked questions provide adequate level of protection for 
personal data transferred from the EU to the US. Decisions have been 
adopted also concerning Switzerland,52 Hungary,53 Canada,54 
Argentina,55 Guernsey,56 and concerning the transfer of PNR airline 
passengers data to the US.57
C. Contractual Clauses
There is another alternative way for making a safe transfer as stipulated 
by Article 25(2) and 25(4). Appropriate contractual clauses can be 
proposed by the data controller to the Member State Data Protection 
Authority (DPA) for approval, they can be elaborated by this Authority
51 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC o f the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy o f the protection provided by the Safe Harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, OJEC L 215/7,25/08/2000.
52 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/CE of the European 
Parliament and o f the Council on the adequacy o f the protection provided in Switzerland. 
OJEC L 215,25/08/2000.
53 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/CE o f the European 
Parliament and o f the Council on the adequacy o f the protection provided in Hungary, OJEC 
L 215,25/08/2000.
54 Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC o f the European 
Parliament and o f the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the 
Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, OJEC L 2/13, 
4/01/2002.
55 Commission Decision of 30 June 2003 pursuant to Directive 95/46/CE o f the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy o f the protection provided in Argentina, OJEC 
L 168, 5/07/2003.
56 Commission Decision o f 21 November 2003 on the adequate protection o f personal data in 
Guernsey, OJEC L 308,25/11/2003.
57 Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained 
in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, C(2004) 1914, available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ 
mtemal_market/privacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/c-2004-1914/c-2004-1914 en.pdf. On this issue 
see M.V. Perez Asinari and Y Poullet “The airline passenger data disclosure case and the EU- 
US debate,” Computer Law & Security Report, Vol. 20 no. 2, 2004, pp. 98-116. See also, by 
the same authors, “Airline passenger's data: adoption of an adequacy Decision by the 
European Commission. Now will the story end?,” to be published in Computer Law & 
Security Report. Note that this arena exceeds the sole application o f Directive 95/46/EC (a 
first pillar instrument). In the context of the NTA, the second shared goal “Responding to 
global challenges” states what follows: “ [w]e are determined to take new steps in our common 
battle against the scourges of international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.” Indeed, the 
PNR case must be treated, in principle, in the context of both first and third pillar (Public 
security questions).
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as “standard contractual clauses" or even by the European Commission.
This is the case of a Commission Decision on standard contractual 
clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries (to controllers) 
under article 26(4) of Directive 95/46/EC58 and the Commission 
Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data 
to processors established in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC.59 
The use of these clauses is voluntary.
The general Directive is complemented by Directive 2002/58/EC,60 which 
regulates the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. This 
instrument provides specific rules for unsolicited electronic communications, traffic 
data, cookies, etc.
In the EU framework, self-regulation is foreseen61 as a “complement,” bringing 
“added value"62 to state regulation. The Directive foresees that trade associations or 
other bodies representing other categories of controllers may submit their Codes of 
Conduct to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party for an evaluation of 
compatibility with the Directive.
The Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making63 concluded recently by 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopts the following 
approach:
16. The three Institutions recall the Community’s obligation to 
legislate only where it is necessary... They recognize the need to 
use, in suitable cases or where the Treaty does not specifically 
require the use of a legal instrument, alternative regulations 
mechanisms.
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58 Commission Decision 2001/497/EC of 15 June 2001 on standard contractual clauses for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, OJEC L 181/19, 
4/07/2001.
59 Commission Decision 2002/16/EC of 27 December 2001on standard contracnial clauses for 
the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive 
95/46/EC.
60 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJEC L 201,
31/07/2002.
61 Article 27 of the Directive.
62 The Directive insists about the fact that specificities o f each sector must be taken into account 
in the drafting of Codes o f Conduct.
63 European Parliament, Council and Commission Interinstitutional Agreement on better law­
making, OJEC C 321/1,31/12/2003.
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Notwithstanding, the limit o f this approach is determined in the next paragraph:
17. The Commission will ensure that any use of co-rcgulalion or self­
regulation is always consistent with Community law and that it 
meets the criteria of transparency (in particular the publicising of 
agreements) and representativeness of the general interest. These 
mechanisms will not be applicable where fundamental rights or 
important political options are at stake or in situations where the 
rules must be applied in a uniform fashion in all Member States.
They must ensure swift and flexible regulation which does not affect 
the principles of competition or the unity of the internal market.
This approach reaffirms the orientation o f the Directive concerning alternative 
regulatory means.64
B. The US Framework
The US regulatory system is noticeably different to the EU one. It is a sort of 
“patchwork” of federal and state constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, 
tort law, and industry self-regulation.65 At international level, the US has signed, but 
not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights66 (Pact of San Jose, Costa 
Rica), which stipulates the right to privacy in its Article U.67 At national level, the 
US Constitution does not provide explicitly for a right to privacy. However, it 
foresees different mechanisms to protect the citizens against state intrusion (but not 
against private entities).68 The US system of privacy and personal data protection is 
characterized, then, by fragmentation. There is no general framework covering 
every sector (private and public, as is the case of the Directive, or Convention no. 
108) creating general rights, obligations and the figure of an independent authority
64 Fora broader discussion see: Y Poullet, “1CT and Regulation...,” op. cit.
65 See: P. Schwartz and J. Rcidenberg, Data Privacy Law. A Study of United States Data 
Protection, Michie Law Publishers, Virginia, 1996. J. Dhont and M.V. Perez Asinari “New 
Physics and the Law ...,” op. cit. Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy 
International, Privacy & Human Rights, USA, 2003.
66 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Pacto de San José de Costa Rica, 7 al 22 de 
noviembre de 1969. Available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-32.html. 
This Convention has been adopted in the context of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), and it has been ratified by all the Latin American countries, see: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/b-32.html.
67 Article I I .  Right to Privacy: “ 1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his 
dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object o f arbitrary or abusive interference with his 
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor
or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference l 
or attacks.”
68 “Most o f the private sector's data processing will not be subject to constitutional constraints”
P. Schwartz and J. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law. Law..., op. cit., p. 31.
Í
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(analogue to the European national DPAs). Indeed, the US has not translated 
internally the trend created by the OECD Guidelines.
Reidenbcrg and Schwartz underline that:
[CJonstitutional rights in the United States forbid government from doing 
certain things in a certain fashion, but usually do not require the state to 
take action. The Constitution does not compel the government to create 
data protection that allocates the burdens and benefits of the state's 
information use.69 70
70The authors identify four critical areas of US Constitutional law of Data Protection:
(1) associational privacy; (2) voting rights; (3) the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against search and seizure; (4) informational privacy
They analyse these areas vis-à-vis four elements o f the European approach71 to 
data protection searching for functional similarity. It is summarized, then, that:
[T]hc first two areas of constitutional law, associational privacy and 
voting rights, are directly related to deliberative democracy. The state's 
application of personal information regarding group affiliation and 
exercise of the franchise can harm individual participation in political 
self-government. Fairly strong constitutional protections exist in these 
two areas. As for the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s 
creation of a right of informational privacy, these areas of constitutional 
law concern deliberative autonomy, or the impact of the state's collection 
and application of personal information on the individual’s ability to 
make decisions in deciding how to live her life. Here, the Supreme 
Court's definition and application of these constitutional rights have 
provided less than satisfactory protection.72
Many specific laws have been adopted both for the public and private sector, 
such as: Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970), Fair Credit Billing Act (1974), Privacy 
Act (1974), Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974), Right to Financial Privacy Act 
(1978), Computer Matching Act (1988), Video Privacy Act (1988), Electronic 
Communications and Privacy Act (1986), Cable Communications Policy Act 
(1984), Telephone Consumer Protection Act(1991), Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act—HIPPA—(1996), Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Privacy, Personal Data Protection and the Safe Harbour Decision...
69 P. Schwartz and J. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law..., op. cit., p. 31.
70 P. Schw artz  an d  J. R e id e n b e rg , D ata  P rivacy  L a w .. .,  o p . c it., p . 36.
71 The four elements have been schematised as follows: “(a) the establishment of obligations and 
responsibilities for personal information; (b) the maintenance of transparent processing of 
personal information; (c) the creation of special protection for sensitive data; and, (d) the 
establishment of enforcement rights and effective oversight of the treatment o f personal 
information.” P. Schwartz and J. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law..., op. cit., p. 13.
72 P. Schwartz and J. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law..., op. cit., p. 43-44.
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A ct- COPPA—(1998), Can Spam Act (2003), etc. It has to be noted that this 
regulatory model leaves certain sectors unregulated.73
Further to this, the Restatement (Second) o f  Torts14 has classified privacy torts as 
follows: ( I ) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure o f private facts; (3) false 
light privacy; and (4) misappropriation o f name or likeness for commercial 
purposes. It has to be noted that, whereas in the EU data subjects can theoretically 
introduce a tort law action in case of any personal data protection legislation 
infringement that results in physical or moral damage, US tort law in the privacy 
arena is limited to the cases mentioned.75 Whilst the application of US privacy torts 
in the digital sphere remain dubious, Annex IV to the Safe Harbour Decision 
contains an answer to the European Commission’s request for clarification o f  US 
law with respect to claims for damages for breaches of privacy:
In the context of the safe harbour framework, “intrusion upon seclusion’ 
could encompass the unauthorized collection of personal information 
whereas the unauthorized use of personal information for commercial 
purposes could give rise to a claim of appropriation. Similarly, the 
disclosure of personal information that is standard of being highly 
offensive to a reasonable person. Finally, the invasion of privacy that 
results from the publication or disclosure of sensitive personal 
information could give rise to a cause of action for ““publication of 
private facts”.76
As far as the particular field of c-commerce is concerned,77 the White House 
issued a political document, during Clinton administration, giving guidelines for the 
regulatory approach.78 The document develops the following statements: (1) the 
private sector should lead, (2) Governments should avoid undue restrictions on 
electronic commerce, (3) where governmental involvement is needed, its aim 
should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple 
legal environment for commerce, (4) governments should recognize the unique 
qualities of the Internet, and (5) electronic commerce over the Internet should be 
facilitated on a global basis. In what concerns privacy it applies the same principles, 
being in line with the general philosophy of the paper:
73 Sec: See J. Dhont and M.V. Perez Asinari ‘“New Physics and the Law'.. op. cit., pp. 84-89.
74 Restatement of the Law Second, Torts 2d, § 652, Division St Paul, Minn., American Law 
Institute Publishers, 1977, pp. 376-403.
75 J. Dhont and M.V. Perez Asinari “New Physics and the Law..,,*“ op. cit., p. 89.
76 Italics added. We see that, even in the off-line world the application of these torts is quite 
restrictive.
77 See: J. Reidenbcrg, “Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce,” 14 Berkeley 
Tech. L. J., 1999, pp. 771 and ss.
78 The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, 1 July 1997, available at: 
http://u'ww.nyls.edu/cmc/papcrs/whgiifra.htm, last visited 31/05/04.
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[TJhe Administration considers data protection critically important. We 
believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperation with 
consumer groups are preferable to government regulation, but if effective 
privacy protection cannot be provided in this way, we will re-evaluate 
this policy.79 80
So far, the federal government has considered the e-market regulatory failure, in 
what concerns the protection of on-line children’s privacy, what derived in the 
adoption of COPPA. Apart from that, even if, in a certain moment the Federal Trade 
Commission has pointed out the necessity to adopt legislation to protect consumer 
privacy on the Internet/0 the FTC chairman referred that more study was necessary 
before the adoption of legislation in this field.81
That being the case, self-regulation is the US choice for the protection of privacy 
and personal data in the e-commerce context. There is a burden in the data subject’s 
side, she has to check what is the level of privacy each of her digital interlocutor 
offers. Protection is not provided by default. There is no legal obligation to provide 
protection, unless the US data controller (a website administrator, the company 
representative, or the person/body with legal capacity to oblige the company) has 
represented to guarantee i t  Then, if there is a misrepresentation, the data subject 
(the “consumer” in the US conception) can sue for “unfair and deceptive” practice 
under the FTC A ct/2 The industry has then self-regulated via the adoption of 
privacy policies posted on their websites, codes o f conduct, adhesion to privacy 
networks (such as NAI83 or OPA),84 adoption of labelling systems (such as 
TRUSTe85 86or BBBonline/6 etc.).
Certain significant problems, which indeed are not circumscribed to the US in 
their effects, have come to surface in the digital world:
Internet privacy has remained the hottest issue of the past few years.
Several profitable companies, including eBay.com, Amazon.com,
79 Ibidem.
80 Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Federal Trade 
Commission Report to Congress (May 2000), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy 
2000/privacy2000.pdf, last visited 07/06/04.
81 Protecting Consumers* Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, Remarks of FTC Chairman Timothy J. 
Mûris, October 2001, available at: http://www.cdiaonline.org/mediaroomdocs/ACF3194.pdf, 
last visited 07/06/04.
82 Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 USC §§ 41-58, as amended. Section 5 of the FTC Act 
prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the marketplace.
83 Network Advertising Initiative, see: http://www.netwoikadvertising.org/, last visited 
31/05/04.
84 Online Privacy Alliance, see: http://www.privacyalliance.org/, last visited 31/05/04,
85 Sec: http://www.truste.org/, last visited 31/05/04.
86 Sec: http://www.bbbonline.org/, last visited 31/05/04.
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drkoop.com, and Yahoo.com have either changed users’ privacy settings 
or have changed privacy policy to the detriment of users. A series of 
companies, including Intel and Microsoft, were discovered to have 
released products that secretly track the activities of Internet users. Users 
have filed several lawsuits under the wiretap and computer crime laws. In 
several cases, TRUSTe, an industry-sponsored self-regulation watchdog 
group, ruled that the practises did not violate its privacy seal program. 
Significant controversy arose around online profiling, the practice of 
advertising companies to track Internet users and compile dossiers on 
them in order o target banner advertisements. The largest of these 
advertisers, Doubleclick, ignited widespread public outrage when it 
began attaching personal information from a marketing firm it purchased 
to the estimated 100 million previously anonymous profiles it had 
collected...87
One of the issues that has been creating a major concern is the question of 
unsolicited commercial e-mails or unsolicited bulk e-mails (generally known as 
“spam”). The CAN-SPAM Act of 200388 has been adopted to tackle this problem. 
Indeed, this topic can serve as another example to show the different conceptions. 
Whereas, in Europe, this is an issue that is regulated by privacy laws,89 in the US, 
this recent Act does not make reference to privacy or personal data protection, but 
mainly to the monetary costs implications for recipients and Internet Access 
providers.
Interestingly, this US law has extraterritorial application. For instance, it 
punishes whoever:
[AJccesses to a protected computer without authorization, and 
intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial electronic 
mail messages from or through such computer;90 (orj 
[U]ses a protected computer to relay or retransmit multiple commercial 
electronic mail messages, with the intent to deceive or mislead recipients, 
or any Internet access service, as the origin of such messages.91
87 Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International, Privacy & Human Rights, 
op. cit., p. 530.
88 Public Law 108-187, 108th Congress, An Act to regulate interstate commerce by imposing 
limitations and penalties on the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail via the 
Internet. 16 December 2003 IS. 877], available at: http://lfwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ 187,108.pdf.
89 Directive 2002/58/EC.
90 Sec. 4(a)(1), emphasis added.
91 Sec. 4(a)(1), emphasis added.
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A “protected computer” is defined as a computer:
[WJhich is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a 
manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communications of 
the United States.9"
Apart from that, Section 12, “Restrictions on other transmissions,” stipulates 
another extraterritorial application:
Section 227(b)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 
227[b][l]) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
inserting “or any person outside the United States if the recipient is 
within the United Stales”, after “United States”.
Conscious of the factual limits of a national law in this domain, the Act 
acknowledges, in the Section dedicated to the “Congressional findings and policy,” 
that:
The problems associated with the rapid growth and abuse of unsolicited 
commercial electronic mail cannot be solved by Federal legislation alone.
The development and adoption of technological approaches and the pursuit 
of cooperative efforts with other countries will be necessary as well.92 3
IV. Have There Been Efforts of Joint Governance?
When Directive 95/46/EC came into force, certain scholars predicted a sort of 
catastrophe or trade war in case Article 25(1) of the Directive was enforced.94 A US 
civil servant has even declared that such a European regulation would be challenged 
at the WTO.95
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92 Sec. 3(13).
93 Sec. 2(12).
94 P. Swire and R. Litan, None of your Business. World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and 
the European Privacy Directive, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1998, 
p. 44.
95 Ira Magaziner—former responsible person for US discussions on e-commerce—has declared 
that she would “challenge EU privacy rules under the theory that they represent barriers to 
trade,” see “Notes from the OECD Ministerial Meeting on Electronic Commerce” at Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada. October 9, 1998, J. LOVE, Consumer Project on Technology, available at: 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/ottawa.html, last visited 31/05/04. Some authors have also 
referred to that possibility: P. Swire and R. Litan, None of your Business..., op. cit., p. 188- 
196. L Bergkamp “The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse Effects o f Europe’s Data Protection Policy 
in an Information-Driven Economy,” Computer Law & Security Report, vol. 18 no. 1, 2002, 
pp. 39-40. For another view see: G. Shaffer “Globalization and Social Protection...,” op. cit. 
G. Shaffer “Managing US-EU Trade Relations through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor 
Agreements: “New” and “Global” Approaches to Transatlantic Economic Governance?,” EU1 
Working Papers, RSC No. 2002/28, Robert Schuman Centre, 2002, available at:
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Clearly, a solution was required. A negotiation process started, then, based on a 
set of SH Principles and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) elaborated by the US 
Department of Commerce (DoC) jointly with representatives from the private 
sector. The reasons for the adoption of the SH could be summarized as follows:
• It was clear that the US system could not be considered “adequate” from the 
EU perspective. Lacunas arise from the different fragments o f US 
regulation. Even in those sectors regulated by statutory law, personal data of 
EU origin is not always granted the protection described in the Working 
Document no. 12 (for instance, the Privacy Act is only applicable to 
“citizcn[s] o f the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence”).96 The self-regulatory approach, as such, did not give evidence 
of covering all the “adequacy” principles.
• The Hungarian and Swiss models were not suitable for an adequacy 
Decision for the US. Those countries do have general data protection 
systems and they are both signatories of the Convention no. 108.
• Beyond the Directive, Member States have a positive obligation to 
safeguard the protection of fundamental rights.97
• However, the flow o f personal data is necessary from an economic point of 
view: there are many economic sectors that conduct trans-border data flows 
from the EU to the US. Moreover, the EU had assumed political
------------------------------------------------------( contd. )
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/retrieve/1606/02_28.pdf. M.V, Perez Asinari ‘is  there any Room 
for Privacy and Data Protection within the WTO Rules?,” Electronic Communications Law 
Review, vol. 9, 2003, pp. 249-280. M.V Perez Asinari “The WTO and the Protection of 
Personal Data. Do EU Measures Fall within GATS Exception? Which Future for Data 
Protection within the WTO e-Commercc Context?,” BILETA Conference, Controlling 
Information in the Online Environment, Institute o f Computer & Communications law. Queen 
Mary, University o f London, 14-15 April 2003, available at: http://www.bileta.ac.uk/ 
03 papcrs/perez.html.
96 The Privacy Act o f  1974, 5 USC § 552a (it regulates records handling by Federal, State or 
local government agencies).
97 D. Yemault “L'efficacité de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’homme pour contester 
le système ‘Échelon’,” in Rapport sur l'existence éventuelle d'un réseau d'interception des 
communications, nommé “Échelon,” Sénat et Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 25 
février 2002. In this article, the author studies the nature of the ECIIR: 1) as an instrument 
guaranteeing “European public order,” considered as a coherent whole, in the sense that it was 
qualified by the Strasbourg Court in 1995; 2) as an international treaty that gives place to the 
State's international liability; and 3) as an international treaty of a particular nature, due to its 
Article 53, by virtue o f which adherent States recognise its legal pre-eminence over any other 
internal or international regulation that would be less protective of Fundamental Rights than 
the Convention itself. See also: Y. Poullct “Le droit et le devoir de l'Union européenne et des 
états membres de veiller au respect de la protection des données dans le commerce mondial” 
in The Spanish Constitution in the European Constitutional Context, ed. F. Fernandez Segado, 
Dykinson SL, Madrid, 2003, pp. 1753-1772.
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compromises, with the US, by the adoption of the NTA, and also legal 
compromises at the WTO98 (and even if  privacy is foreseen as an exception 
to the application of the GATS99 rules, for this exception to proceed certain 
requisites must be respected).100
After more than two years of negotiations between the US Department of 
Commerce and the European Commission, the Safe Harbour Decision was issued 
on the basis of Article 25(6) of the Directive. In the meantime, the industry played 
an active role expressing its position in this regard, the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party elaborated many Opinions101 on the level of “adequacy” that the 
Principles and FAQs represented pointing out certain flaws, and the European 
Parliament questioned and seriously criticized the (draft) SH Decision.102
98 For studies about WTO implications see: G. Shaffer “Globalization and Social Protection...,” 
op. cit. G. Shaffer “Managing US-EU Trade Relations through Mutual Recognition and Safe 
Harbor Agreements...," op. cit. M.V. Perez Asinari “Is there any Room for..." op. cit. M.V. 
Perez Asinari “The WTO and the Protection of Personal D a ta .. .o p .  cit.
99 General Agreement on Trade in Services, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
serv e/2-obdis_e.htm.
100 Article XIV: “General Exceptions: Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: (i)the prevention of deceptive and 
fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects o f a default on services contracts; (ii) the 
protection of the privacy o f individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of 
personal data and the protection of confidentiality o f individual records and accounts 
[emphasis added], (iii) safety..."
101 See Article 29 Personal Data Protection Working Party: Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of 
data protection in the United States and the ongoing discussions between the European 
Commission and the United States Government, WP 15, 26 January 1999; Opinion 2/99 on 
the adequacy o f the “International Safe Harbor Principles" issued by the US Department of 
Commerce on 19 April 1999, WP 19, 3 May 1999; Opinion 4/99 on the frequently asked 
questions to be issued by the US Department o f Commerce to the proposed “Safe Harbor 
Principles,” WP 21, 7 June 1999; Working Document on the current state of play o f the 
ongoing discussions between the European Commission and the United States Government 
concerning the “International Safe Harbor Principles,” WP 23, 7 July 1999; Opinion 7/99 on 
the level of data protection provided by the "Safe Harbor Principles" as published together 
with the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and other related documents on 15 and 16 
November 1999 by the US Department o f Commerce, WP 27, 3 December 1999; Opinion 
3/2000 on the EU/US dialogue concerning the “SH" arrangement, WP 31, 16 March 2000; 
Opinion 4/2000 on the level o f protection provided by the “Safe Harbor Principles," WP 32, 
16 May 2000.
102 European Parliament resolution on the Draft Commission Decision on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked
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However, as we will see below, the SH was a very punctual effort. It tries to find 
an exception to the application of Article 25(1) of the Directive, but its application 
is quite restrictive,
A. Characteristics o f  the Safe Harbour
The “Safe Harbour”101 (SH) is not an “Agreement” from a Public International law 
or European Community law perspective.104 It is a Decision,105 adopted unilaterally 
by the European Commission, declaring that the Principles and FAQs annexed 
therein are considered to ensure an “adequate level of protection.”
US organizations adherence to the SH is voluntary. However, if  they self-certify 
to the US Department of Commerce their adherence they are bound by this 
commitment. They arc obliged, then, to comply with the Principles and FAQs to 
retain the benefits o f the SH and to publicly represent that they do so, normally in 
the form of “Privacy Policies.” The SH applies only to sectors which fall under the 
jurisdiction o f the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the US Department of 
Transportation (DoT).106 As a consequence, important economic sectors, such as 
banks, insurance or telecommunications are excluded from the SH framework. 
Moreover, even if the SH scheme refers explicitly to the human resources data, the 
jurisdiction o f the FTC in this field remains dubious.107 Then, a US organization can
----------------------------------------------------------------------- — ------------(contii.)
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (C5-0280/2000 - 2000/2144[COS]). 
OJECC 121/155,24/04/2001.
103 See generally J. Reidcnberg, “Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies,“ Hastings Law Journal, 
2003, voi. 54, pp. 877-898. J. Reidcnberg, “E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy," 
Houston Law Review, 2001, voi. 38, pp. 717-749. Y. Poullct, “The Safe Harbor Principles— 
An Adequate Protection?,“ paper presented at International Colloquium organized by 1FCLA, 
Paris, 15-16 June 2000, available at: http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/textcs/safcharbor.pdf, last 
visited 28 February 2004. See also the report prepared in the context o f the Safe Harbour 
revision: J. Dhont, M.V. Perez Asinari and Y. Poullct, with the collaboration of J. Reidenberg 
and L. Bygravc, Safe Harbour Decision Implementation Study, at the request o f the European 
Commission, Internal Market DG, Contract PRS/2003/A0-7002/E/27, not publicly available 
yet, to be published in DG MARKT website. Data Protection Unit.
104 When the European Parliament issued its resolution on the draft Commission SH Decision it 
pointed out: “3. Draws the Commission's attention to the risk that the exchange o f letters 
between the Commission and the US Department o f Commerce on the implementation of the 
“safe harbour" principles could be interpreted by the European and/or United States judicial 
authorities as having the substance of an international agreement adopted in breach o f Article 
300 of the Treaty establishing the European C o m m u n ity  a n d  the requirement to seek 
Parliament's assent (Judgment of the Court o f Justice of 9 August 1994: French Republic v. 
the Commission—Agreement between the Commission and the United States regarding the 
application o f their competition laws [Case C-327/91])."
105 Decisions are one o f the sources of Community law. Article 249 TEC, 4th paragraph.
106 Recital 6 o f the Commission Decision.
107 See J. Reidenberg “E-commerce and Transatlantic Privacy," op. cit., p. 743.
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qualify for the SH only if its failure to comply with its commitment to adhere to the 
SH principles is actionable under the Federal Trade Commission Act section 5 
(prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts) or Title 49 United States Code (USC) section 
41712, A deceptive practice is defined as a “representation, omission or practice 
that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers in a material fashion.” 108
The SH Privacy Principles are the following:
. NOTICE:
An organization must inform individuals about the purposes for which it 
collects and uses information about them, how to contact the organization 
with any inquiries or complaints, the types o f  third parties to which it 
discloses the information, and the choices and means the organization 
offers individuals for limiting its use and disclosure. This notice must be 
provided in clear and conspicuous language when individuals are first 
asked to provide personal information to the organization or as soon 
thereafter as is practicable, but in any event before the organization uses 
such information for a purpose other than that for which it was originally 
collected or processed by the transferring organization or discloses it for 
the first time to a third party,
. CHOICE:
An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) 
whether their personal information is (a) to be disclosed to a third party or 
(b) to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with the purpose(s) for 
which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the 
individual. Individuals must be provided with clear and conspicuous, 
readily available, and affordable mechanisms to  exercise choice.
For sensitive information (i.c. personal information specifying medical or 
health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the 
sex life of the individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) 
choice if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a 
purpose other than those for which it was originally collected or 
subsequently authorized by the individual through the exercise o f  opt in 
choice. In any case, an organization should treat as sensitive any information 
received from a third party where the third party identifies and treats it as 
sensitive.
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108 A practice is unfair if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injuiy to consumers which is 
not reasonably avoidable and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition: see 15 USC section 45(n) and letter o f 14 July 2000 from FTC Chairman Mr. 
Robert Pitofsky to Mr. John Mogg, Director, DG XV, European Commission (set out in the 
Commission Decision, Annex V).
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. ONWARD TRANSFER:
To disclose infonnation to a third party, organizations must apply the 
Notice and Choice Principles. Where an organization wishes to transfer 
information to a third party that is acting as an agent, as described in the 
endnote, it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party 
subscribes to the Principles or is subject to the Directive or another 
adequacy finding or enters into a written agreement with such third party 
requiring that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy 
protection as is required by the relevant Principles. If the organization 
complies with these requirements, it shall not be held responsible (unless 
the organization agrees otherwise) when a third party to which it transfers 
such information processes it in a way contrary to any restrictions or 
representations, unless the organization knew or should have known the 
third party would process it in such a contrary way and the organization 
has not taken reasonable steps to prevent or stop such processing.
. SECURITY:
Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating personal 
information must take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, 
misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
. DATA INTEGRITY:
Consistent with the Principles, personal infonnation must be relevant for 
the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization may not process 
personal information in a way that is incompatible with the purposes for 
which it has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. 
To the extent necessary for those purposes, an organization should take 
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, 
accurate, complete, and current.
. ACCESS:
Individuals must have access to personal infonnation about them that an 
organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that 
information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of 
providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the 
individual's privacy in the case in question, or where the rights of 
persons other than the individual would be violated.
. ENFORCEMENT:
Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring 
compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the data 
relate affected by non-compliance with the Principles, and consequences 
for the organization w hen the Principles are not followed. At a minimum, 
such mechanisms must include (a) readily available and affordable 
independent recourse mechanisms by which each individual's complaints 
and disputes are investigated and resolved by reference to the Principles
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and damages awarded where the applicable law or private sector 
initiatives so provide; (b) follow up procedures for verifying that the 
attestations and assertions businesses make about their privacy practices 
are true and that privacy practices have been implemented as presented; 
and (c) obligations to  remedy problems arising out o f failure to comply 
with the Principles by  organizations announcing their adherence to them 
and consequences fo r such organizations. Sanctions must be sufficiently 
rigorous to  ensure com pliance by organizations.
Furthermore, the 15 FAQs intend to provide clarification in certain key issues, 
such as sensitive data, the journalistic exceptions, the role of national DPAs, sclf- 
ccrtification, verification, dispute resolution and enforcement, etc.
B. Implementation o f the Safe Harbour in Practise and Beyond
Since the adoption of the SH Decision 508109 companies have adhered. It is not 
possible to state, a priori, i f  such a number represents a successful story or not. To 
make an evaluation, it would be necessary to know how many companies conduct 
flows of personal data from the EU to the US that are not covered by the exceptions 
of Article 26(1), appropriate or standard contractual clauses, or any other alternative 
method considered “adequate” by a national DPA.
So far, there has not been any complaint from a data subject or DPA as a 
consequence of a violation to the SH by a US organization. One could then deduce 
that the implementation is connect and that all the obligations and rights foreseen in 
the SH scheme arc fully respected by US organizations. Nevertheless, an analysis of 
the privacy policies content, or even the lack of publicly available privacy policies 
in certain cases, could demonstrate, to a given extent, the contrary. For instance, if 
we have a look at the SH list posted on the DoC website,110 wc will find cases 
where a direct access to the privacy policy is not possible. On the contrary, a 
hyperlink will lead us to the homepage of the US organization that has self-certified 
to the SH. When at this webpage, it is sometimes difficult to find the link to the 
privacy policy. After having reached the privacy policy, its terms may be not very 
clear, or the SH principles may not be all represented. Should we understand that if 
there is no representation of a SH principle there is no obligation vis-à-vis a 
European data subject? This remains unclear.
Whereas in the EU, the legitimacy of processing activities is structured around 
the concept of “purpose,” the purpose is usually difficult to find in SH privacy 
policies. Moreover, the DoC self-certification page does not foresee any entry for 
this specification to be made. This is just another example of the kind of problems 
that can be found in the implementation practise.
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109 As of 8/06/04. Check: http.7/web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list.
110 http://www.export.gov/safcharbor/.
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The enforcement mechanisms may present other kind of difficulties, for 
instance, the sanctions to which US organizations would be subject, if  they violate 
the SH principles, are not always specified in the privacy policies or privacy 
programmes. The same could be said concerning remedies or the obligation to 
reverse the effects o f breach.
One may wonder, then, if the EU data subject is aware of the transfer of her data 
to the US, and if so, to what extent she is conscious of the rights foreseen in the SH 
to protect her against illegitimate processing. One may wonder, also, if  US 
organizations that give evidence of good will by adhering to the SH and that make 
efforts and invest in the implementation of it into its business practises have a full 
understanding of a system that is quite different from the one they arc used to apply. 
Wc could say that, in principle, efforts remain to be made for a full implementation 
of the SH scheme.
Beyond the SH, we have to (re)considcr the scope of EU-US transatlantic 
cooperation broadly. The SH is just a first step to reach the goals described in the 
joint political documents. We have seen that its scope of application is restrictive. 
However, there have not been further efforts to enlarge its scope (at least no official 
negotiations have started).
C. Have There Been Impediments fo r  a Successful Cooperation?
What would be “successful cooperation” in this field? From the perspective of the 
NTA and the related political documents we have considered, it would be the 
creation of a legal framework for the effective protection of privacy and personal 
data that can contribute to the expansion of world trade and closer economic 
relations.
The SH is, indeed, a fragmented solution both within the framework o f the 
Directive scope o f application and the framework of the NTA. It covers only certain 
economic sectors and within these sectors only the US organizations that self-certify 
their adherence to the principles. Furthermore, it is limited to the US, not giving an 
answer to the organizations that work on a multinational basis.111 We may even 
wonder if it is a case of “joint governance” or just a unilateral instrument to solve, 
partly, a legal problem. Thus, the scope of cooperation beyond the SH has been 
quite limited.
The impediments are rather intrinsic. Privacy is a subject matter that has been 
regulated differently by both parties, however, certain degree of understanding on 
common legally-binding standards would benefit the development of the
111 Sec: Article 29 Personal Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Transfers of 
personal data to third countries: Applying Article 26 (2) of the EU Data Protection Directive 
to Binding Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, WP74,3 June 2003.
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Information Society in general, and of electronic commerce in particular. Here, we 
arc not strictly speaking about trans-border data flows that fall into the Directive’s 
scope of application. The normal use of open networks involves many activities that 
do not imply the application of Directive 95/46/EC (neither of Article 4.1 [c],112 nor 
of Article 25[ 1 ]).
Could this be the case, for instance, of a simple operation of e-commerce? The 
buyer (data subject) is located in the EU. The seller (data controller) is located in 
the US. The seller needs the data subject’s personal data to be able to deliver the 
product. She decides the means and purposes of the processing activity, but, as she 
is not located in the EU, and she is not making use o f equipment located in the EU 
to process personal data, she is not subject to Directive 95/46/EC.
However, even if the Directive is not applicable, there is a transatlantic political 
interest that this data be processed in legitimate terms and respecting certain rights 
of this data subject. If she realizes, for instance, that after the e-commcrce operation 
she starts receiving a lot o f unsolicited commercial e-mails she will suspect that her 
data has been shared or sold. Her consent has not been asked for such use. She reads 
again the privacy policy posted on the e-commercc site and realizes that the seller 
has neither made any representation about third parties data sharing, nor about the 
right of access. As a consequence, the data subject cannot sue the seller under the 
FTC Act. Even if the privacy policy would have made these kind of representations, 
it will be for the European data subject to scrutinize the content of this privacy 
policy and to introduce her complaint before a US Court, or before an unknown 
ADR located in the US, functioning under unusual rules and in a language that is 
not the one of the European data subject. This individual would be more than 
disappointed with this transatlantic experience.
The US self-regulatory approach may not give the EU data subject the 
protection to which she is used to. This can affect, indeed, a more active 
participation in c-commercc. Even if, in the case of the example, she has decided to 
provide her data, and this data is necessary for the performance of the contract, she 
would not like that data to be used for incompatible purposes, sold and integrated 
into an indetenninate number of different data bases to profile her, considering the 
type of good she has bought, etc.
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112 National law applicable: “ 1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts 
pursuant to this Directive to the processing of personal data where: [...] (c) the controller is 
not established on Community territory and, for purposes o f processing personal data makes 
use o f equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, 
unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the 
Community; 2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 (c), the controller must 
designate a representative established in the territoiy o f that Member State, without prejudice 
to legal actions which could be initiated against the controller himself.”
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“Impediments” for cooperation arise because the protection o f privacy and 
personal data is fostered through different mechanisms by both parties. Indeed, a 
solution “in the middle” is quite difficult to be reached. Could we blame the EU for 
not diminishing the protection deserved by a human right? Could we blame the US 
for not adopting a general privacy law when their national approach to most e- 
commercc related mattes (including privacy) is market-lead? The SH could be seen 
as this kind o f solution “in the middle.” Yet, is it desired to continue in this line, for 
example, extending the SH to the banking sector? Or, should negotiation stand 
beyond the Directive and consider that what could be affecting the development of 
c-commerce and global digital trade are cases that may fall outside the Directive? 
Could we say that “impediments” for cooperation can be found in the narrow- 
Articlc 25( I)-orientcd base of negotiation for transatlantic privacy?
D. Institutions and Practises for Overcoming Obstacles
The negotiation o f the SH has been actively conducted between the European 
Commission and the US Department of Commerce. Other organisations and bodies 
have supported those institutions. For instance, the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party113 has closely followed the evolution of the draft principles and 
FAQs, guiding the Commission for the achievement of a legitimate framework. The 
private sector has also participated in this process. Those institutions are to be called 
again for the improvement of SH implementation.
Within the SH framework, the practise that have been used to overcome the 
obstacles experienced was the use o f co-regulation techniques. The SH principles 
have been elaborated jointly by the public and the private sector.
E. Future Steps
Some of the future steps that the US and the EU might undertake, to strengthen 
cooperation and attain their common NTA goals, can be summarized as follows:
a) In the near future,
- Rectify the errors in the implementation of the SH;
- Clarify SH concepts that remain unclear, bearing in mind, that they wall 
be applied by US organizations that are not familiar with the EU 
Directive;
- Increase EU data subjects and US data controllers awareness of their 
respective rights and obligations under the SH, a task that has to be 
conducted by all the institutions with responsibilities and interests in the 
correct application of this scheme;
113 See footnote 101.
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- Grant an increasing role and visibility to the SH European Panel114 in 
order to assist the European data subjects in addressing their complaints;
- Clarify the statutes and competences of the ADR bodies.
b) In mid term,
- Enlarge the scope of application of the SH, to cover all the sectors 
involved in trans-border data flows
Beyond the SH, a closer regard to Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and 
the role of technical standards organizations (W3C, IETF,115 ISO, CEN, etc.) has to 
be encouraged, bearing in mind that they are a “complement” to traditional 
regulatory choices.116
Moreover, the adoption o f sector specific codes of conduct would motivate the 
active intervention and compromise o f the stakeholders involved. At European 
level, the Federation of European Direct Marketing (FEDMA) Code of Conduct117 18
could be an example of that trend.115 Further development of Binding Corporate 
Rules initiatives would be helpful for multinational companies’ need.119
c) In a longer term,
- Signature of an International Agreement containing harmonized personal 
data protection rules.
Again in the fonnula “beyond the SH,” an international Agreement seems to be 
a natural recourse to harmonize divergent regulations for a common understanding. 
However, what would be the framework for such an Agreement? A bilateral
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114 See FAQ 5 and 11 o f the SH. The website of the Secretariat of the S1I Panel is: 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/secureida/safeharbor/home.
115 For a description of roles o f the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) and the IETF (Internet 
Engeneering Task Force) see: J. Bcrleur and Y. Poullet "Quelles régulations pour l'internet ?," 
in Gouvernance de la Société de l'Information, op. cit.
116 See: J. Reidenberg "Lex Informatica: The Formulation o f Information Policy Rules through 
Technology," 76 Texas L. Rev., 1998, pp. 553-584. L. Lessig, Code and other laws of 
Cyberspace, Basic Books, 1999. J. Reindcnbcrg, “States and Internet Enforcement," Ottawa 
Journal on Law & Technology, Vol. 1 Issue 1, 2004, pp. 1-25. P. Schwartz "Beyond Lessig's 
Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information 
Practices,” Wisconsin Law Review, 2000, p. 743-788.
117 European Code of Practice for the Use o f Personal Data in Direct Marketing, available at: 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/intenial_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs2003/wp77-annex_en.pdf.
118 See: Article 29 Personal Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2003 on the European 
code of conduct o f FEDMA for the use o f personal data in direct marketing, WP77, 13 June 
2003.
119 See: Article 29 Personal Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Transfers of 
personal data to third countries: Applying Article 26 (2) of the EU Data Protection Directive 
to Binding Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, WP74,3 June 2003.
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instrument seems insufficient. Which international organization would be then 
called to assume responsibility and act proactively?
The OECD has a restricted membership, and its efforts, even if  innovative when 
adopted, arc not being used to solve concrete problems as the ones described herein, 
because of the “soft law” nature of the Guidelines. The WTO has considered, so far, 
privacy and data protection as an exception to its rules. Whilst the Doha agenda had 
foreseen these issues in the context o f the e-commerce discussion, no visible result 
has derived from Cancun in this realm. It is true that the topic will have to be faced, 
sooner or later, at the WTO. But this will imply another political discussion and 
choice, including, to what extent the WTO has jurisdiction in a matter that, at least 
for some members, is a question of human rights? Or, to what extent countries are 
willing to enlarge WTO competences in this direction? Would they be obliged to do 
so, not to leave people without human rights protection when a case involving them 
is decided in this international sphere?120
It has to be underlined that an integral approach to privacy is preferable, that is, 
not considered only as a “barrier” to trade that can be accepted under certain 
circumstances. Precisely for this reason, the intervention of the UN would be 
preferable, insofar this institution has to envisage all aspects of the global society 
not only the economic but also the cultural, social and human rights ones. The UN 
could be a discussion and decision-making body to be taken more into account, as a 
way to solve privacy and personal data protection implications of global networks. 
The UN has adopted the 1990 Guidelines on computerized personal data files. This 
document reflects broadly accepted fair information principles. In a more general 
spectrum. Article 12 o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitraiy interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.
This makes the UN a legitimized institution to develop a consistent answer to 
the problematic described herein.121
120 See: li-lJ Petersmann, “Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide 
Organizations.“ The Jean Monnct Program, Jean Monnct Working Paper 7/01, available at: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papcrs/0I/012301.rtf, last visited 20/05/04.
121 Furthermore, WSIS Declaration of Principles has stated: “20. Governments, as well as private 
sector, civil society and the United Nations and other international organizations have an 
important role and responsibility in the development of the Information Society and. as 
appropriate, in decision-making processes. Building a people-centred Information Society is a 
joint effort which requires cooperation and partnership among all stakeholders,“ emphasis 
added.
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V. Concluding Remarks
The early “euphoria” of the new economy revolution called the attention to certain 
rights of the individual that could remain unbalanced if not properly addressed. The 
structure of the Internet demonstrated that these intrinsic risks could, as a 
consequence of threatening individuals’ rights, hamper Information Society and 
c-commerce progress.
The “euphoria” of progress was, due to its influence in EU-US relations, 
transmitted into the NTA “policy.” The EU and the US jointly considered that, in 
order to contribute to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations, in 
particular for the expansion o f e-commcrce, it was necessary to ensure the effective 
protection of privacy with regard to the processing of personal data on global 
infonnation networks.
However, this political agreement has not been fully translated into regulation to 
guarantee its effectiveness. The way from “policy” to “regulation” has not been 
completed. Of course, the problem lies between the different conceptions about the 
type of “regulatory method” needed: State regulation, co-rcgulation, self-regulation, 
regulation through technology, and the degree of exclusion or complementarity 
among them. The point o f view of the EU and the US is quite different: European 
stakeholders arc more confident in legislation, administrative actions and criminal 
sanctions in order to fight against privacy threats. At the same time, we have to 
consider the scarcity of public awareness and Courts’ interventions. This attitude is 
criticized by certain American stakeholders, asserting that the market, under the 
pressure of the media and the Human Rights associations will lead to the adoption 
of appropriate privacy rules. To date, most of the Privacy cases have been 
developed within US, even if  (or “because o f’?) there is no comprehensive Privacy 
Act.
Nevertheless, this is not an issue that can be solved and legitimately decided 
only by the EU and the US, since the effects have a global impact. Potentially, the 
absence of a bilateral agreement could give room to a wider dialogue and solution, 
for instance at the UN level. Notwithstanding, such a wide Agreement would take a 
remarkable long negotiating period. In the meantime, the US and EU would have to 
look closer at the NTA and decide if they will continue the same line of action in 
what concerns privacy and data protection, and if so, they will have to try to reach a 
degree of consensus for harmonization. Consensus at this bilateral level, would 
pave the way for broader consensus.
So far, the transatlantic dialogue has been very concentrated on the search for 
solutions to avoid the application of Article 25(1) of the Directive to the US. A 
complete view of TBDF scenarios, applicable law and jurisdiction issues can help 
to have an understanding of other cases that are excluded from the scope of
Privacy, Personal Data Protection and the Safe Harbour Decision...
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application of Directive 95/46/EC, yet are surrounded by legal uncertainty fo r the 
digital market place actors.
Finally, it has to be noted that, after the tragedy of 11 September 2001, many 
initiatives involving TBDF for security and fight against terrorism issues have taken 
place. Those initiatives, e.g. the airline passengers’ data case, would affect not only 
the application of Directive 95/46/EC, but also other areas of EU law, like third 
pillar issues. In the scope of the NTA, it is clear that they exceed the third shared 
goal, but fall within the second shared goal. Thus, it will be necessary to assess to 
what extent the scope of privacy negotiations should be broaden also in this 
direction, bearing in mind that the solution already adopted by the European 
Commission may encounter certain limitations.122
122 Commission Decision of 14 May on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the 
Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection, C(2004) 1914, available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal market/pri vacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/c-2004-1914/c-2004-1914_en.pdf. See: see M V. 
Perez Asinari and Y. Poullet “The airline passenger data disclosure case...,” op. cit. See also, 
by the same authors, “Airline passenger’s data: adoption o f an adequacy Decision by the 
European Commission...,” to be published in Computer Law & Security Report.
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Comments
Gregory C. Shaffer
As Yves Poullet and Maria Verónica Pérez Asinari point out in their excellent 
overview, the US-EC agreement establishing Safe Harbor Principles has 
encountered significant problems in its implementation. In this comment, I will not 
reexamine why the agreement’s implementation has encountered challenges. I will 
rather point to two areas o f research that suggest ways in which the agreement could 
be having effects on both sides of the Atlantic.
First, as I have pointed out elsewhere, an analysis of the impact of the safe 
harbor agreement cannot be limited to an assessment of the number o f US 
companies that have signed up (603 as of November 2004)1 or the content o f these 
firms’ online policies, although these factors are o f course important. What is also 
o f  interest is how the Safe Harbor Principles may informally affect finn  practice, 
including through empowering and providing incentives fo r  market and government 
actors within the United States and Europe.2
Unlike the mutual recognition agreements assessed in chapter 7, the Safe Harbor 
Principles constitute a loose form of harmonization of social standards. The 
Principles go beyond current regulatory requirements in the United States to set
1 See http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (visited Nov. 7, 2004).
2 For a fuller analysis that takes such a socio-legal approach, see Gregory Shaffer, 
“Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the 
Ratcheting Up o f US Privacy Standards,*’ 25 Yale Journal o f International Law 1 (2000); and 
Gregory Shaffer, “Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits o f New 
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor 
Agreements,” 9:1 The Columbia Journal of European Law 29 (Fall 2002).
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general standards with which trading firms should comply if they wish to receive 
data from Europe without threat o f legal challenge within Europe. This loose 
harmonization is designed to affect only trading firms, and otherwise to create no 
legal obligations within the United States itself. The United States and European 
Community (“EC”) may thereby claim that they formally retain autonomy to enact 
whatever privacy legislation that they wish. However, any firm that engages in 
transatlantic exchange is subject to at least some pressure to take the Principles into 
account. Europe’s regulatory approach can thus have spillover effects within the 
United States, leading to some convergence in data privacy practices, despite 
differing US and EC regulatory systems.
Whether or not companies formally certify to the Safe Harbor Principles, those 
engaged in transatlantic business operate in the shadow of the potential enforcement 
of EC internal law, and, in particular, Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing o f Personal Data and the Free Movement 
of such Data (the “Directive”). Today, US businesses face potential litigation before 
European courts and administrative bodies under the Directive unless they adhere to 
the Safe Harbor Principles. Playing off the US-EC regulatory conflict and its media 
coverage, privacy advocates have been able to increase pressure on US federal and 
state politicians, regulatory authorities, and businesses. Even though privacy 
advocates have criticized the Safe Harbor Principles, privacy advocates can use 
them as part of their larger strategies. For example, Microsoft entered into a consent 
decree with the Federal Trade Commission in August 2002, resulting in Microsoft’s 
agreement “to be monitored for 20 years” by the Commission under the threat of 
severe civil penalties. The government charged Microsoft with not abiding by its 
privacy policies for users of its .NET Passport system. These privacy policies, in 
turn, were shaped by Microsoft’s agreement to adhere to the Safe Harbor 
Principles.3 The context in which US domestic debates about, and enforcement of, 
data privacy protection have been altered.
The Directive has particularly increased the demand for legal and consulting 
services within the United States regarding privacy policies. The Better Business 
Bureau OnLine created a privacy seal program which incorporates the Safe Harbor 
Principles, and which was revised to track “safe harbor” negotiations. The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based public interest organization, 
associated with information technology companies to launch a program named
3 See John Schwartz, “Settling with FTC. Microsoft Agrees to Privacy Safeguards,” New York 
Times, at C6, August 9, 2002. See also “EC Delays Revising Data Protection Edict; Survey 
Results to be Basis of New Proposal,” 19 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1169 (July 4, 
2002) (noting that “the provisions of the EU data privacy law[...] have triggered an inquiry 
into the Microsoft .NET Passport system that allow companies to control access to their Web 
site,” and that “EU member states arc also looking into the possibility that online music 
providers such as Real Audio are in violation o f the EU data privacy law”).
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TRUSTe to rate the privacy protection of Internet sites, which program was 
certified under Safe Harbor, Trade associations such as the Direct Marketing 
Association designed their own programs for their members to comply with Safe 
Harbor requirements. These certification groups have met with European data 
protection officials so that European officials are comfortable with the workings of 
their programs.
The EC Directive also helped to spur the creation of a new corporate position in 
the United States-the chief data privacy officer in a company’s human resources 
division. These company employees attend conferences on the Directive and US 
privacy legislation, write memoranda on privacy issues that they distribute within 
the firm, and generally increase firm awareness of privacy issues.4 In formulating 
and overseeing the implementation of company policies, they foster company 
compliance with applicable legal requirements. Outside law firms also market their 
services to firms regarding the Directive and the Safe Harbor Principles, again 
promoting adaptation o f US business practice. This conjunction of lawyer, 
consultant and “privacy officer” advice, rendered in the context of the Safe Harbor 
Principles, can lead to changes in privacy policies overtime.
While the Safe Harbor Principles do not formally apply to domestic data 
processing operations, US-based enterprises recognize that it will be difficult for 
them to use two sets of data privacy practices, one for EC residents (providing for 
greater privacy protection), and one for US residents (providing for less). Business 
databases will often include information about EC and US residents, in which case 
businesses will be pushed to comply with the EC’s more demanding requirements. 
As Robert Kagan notes in his evaluation o f business practices in multiple industries, 
there is “evidence for a dynamic toward trans-national “corporation-level” 
harmonization of regulatory compliance routines in multinational companies, keyed 
to compliance with the most stringent national standards (sometimes with a margin 
of error).”5
Secondly, the Safe Harbor negotiations can affect data privacy practices in the 
EC as well. In negotiating the Safe Harbor Principles and putting them into 
operation, European officials have become more comfortable with the potential of 
US governance approaches involving the use of private bodies, such as
4 See, for example, US Department of Commerce News release, “Compliance with EU Data 
Protection Requirements & Safe Harbor Workshop to be held in Chicago on November 18,” 
(on file, obtained from http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/, visited Nov. 7, 2004). The web site 
advertised, “Oil Thursday, November 18, 2004, the US Department of Commerce, in 
conjunction with HBBOnLine, will hold a workshop on EU data protection compliance issues 
and the US-EU Safe Harbor framework in Chicago, IL”).
5 See Robert Kagan, “Consequences of Adversarial Legalism.” in Regulatory Encounters: 
Multinational Corporations and American Adversarial Legalism (Robert Kagan & Lee 
Axelrod cds.), at 374.
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BBBOnLinc, for the monitoring and certification of privacy practices. As Henry 
Farrell points out, European officials have indicated that they are w illing to 
entertain the adaptation to the European context of less-centralized US regulatory 
mechanisms for data protection.6 The President of the European Parliament even 
called the Safe Harbor approach a “template for the future,” serving as a potential 
model for regulation in other policy areas,7
Although the EC Directive arguably provides for greater data privacy 
enforcement in Europe than in the United States, the true test lies in the practice of 
member state regulators. These practices are sure to vary because of different national 
traditions and social contexts. Yet, in general, European governmental authorities 
have limited staff and resources and cannot possibly monitor all company practices 
throughout the world, much less in their own countries. Officials thus realize that 
they may need to rely on public-private networks in order to ensure better practices 
afFecting European constituents. Their knowledge of the US system made possible 
through the negotiation and monitoring of the Safe Harbor Principles can spur 
adaptations in Europe to more market-based and private-oriented oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms. As a Commission representative noted, “[T]he discussions 
that eventually led to the Safe Harbor agreement were an enormous learning 
experience for both sides... Initially, we both took stances that were rather simplistic, 
because we didn’t know any better.”8 These developments in Europe, while upsetting 
some privacy advocates, could lead to convergences on the European side.
Effective regulation of data privacy in a global economy requires the meshing of 
different regulatory systems and a commitment from the various actors to sustained 
interaction to ensure trust and confidence in each other’s efforts. From a practical 
standpoint, the goals o f protecting individual privacy, on the one hand, while 
ensuring liberalized trade, on the other, arc inseparable. Regulation in a jurisdiction 
with less stringent data privacy controls has significant externalities, thereby 
affecting residents in other jurisdictions. The Safe Harbor Principles arc an example 
of an instrument for reconciling these regulatory concerns with the goals o f  a liberal 
trading order. They represent a form of compromise that recognizes different 
institutional approaches and social values, yet sets baseline rules where domestic 
values arc affected by trade.
6 Henry Farrell, “Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce-Tlie EU-US Safe 
Harbor Agreement,'" 57:2 International Organization 277 (2003).
7 Speech of Pat Cox, Sept. 8, 2000, cited in Farrell, supra note 9.
8 Cited in Farrell, Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce-The EU-US Safe 
Harbor Agreement, supra note 9. Farrell applies a constructivist approach to mutual learning 
among public and private actors on both sides of the Atlantic that made the agreement 
possible.
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Chapter 7
Managed Mutual Recognition in 
the Transatlantic Marketplace
Kalypso Nicolaidis 
Rebecca Steffenson
I. Introduction
The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) (1995) outlined EU-US intentions to pursue 
transatlantic mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for goods. The subsequent 
framework agreement for mutual recognition, which entered into force on 1 
December 1998, was soon praised as one of the greatest ‘‘deliverables” produced by 
the NTA process. Transatlantic policy officials proudly publicized the agreements 
as a “milestone” in EU-US regulatory co-operation (Nicolaidis and Egan, 2001, 
Shaffer 2002), and the incorporation of mutual recognition into the transatlantic 
marketplace was widely viewed as a great policy success (sec Steffenson, 
forthcoming 2005). Consequently, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) 
(1998) included a commitment to expand mutual recognition to other goods as well 
as service sectors. The TEP raised the stakes from the initial MRA negotiations and 
created hopes that the “success” of the 6 initial MRAs would lead to the negotiation 
of new annexes in additional sectors. Enthusiasm for mutual recognition as a 
regulatory strategy faded when three of the six goods sectors failed to pass from the 
transitional confidence-building process into operational agreements by the
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established deadlines.1 A new MRA was successfully negotiated for marine safety 
equipment, but other agreements did not materialize in other sectors such as road 
safety and cosmetics, which had been under consideration. Furthermore, 
negotiations failed to really get off the ground in any of the service sectors 
identified in the TEP. Instead, it appeared that other types o f regulatory 
co-operation were being discussed in sectors like insurance and financial services 
under the Positive Economic Agenda (2002). In addition, the focus o f  the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which had originally been “deeply embedded” in 
the MRA decision-making process (see also Cowles 2001), had also shifted by 2004 
to deeper forms o f transatlantic regulatory coordination including harmonization 
and equivalency agreements, which are admittedly a fonn of MRA by another 
name.2
The lack of movement on the MRAs created serious doubts about the feasibility 
of MRAs as a transatlantic regulatory strategy. This paper examines the debate 
surrounding the negotiation and implementation of these agreements. It has two 
aims. First, it examines the application of mutual recognition in the transatlantic 
marketplace and takes stock of the current state-of-play for both the implementation 
of MRAs in goods and the negotiations of MRAs for services sectors. The second 
aim of the paper is to drawn what lessons we can from the negotiation and 
implementation, or lack of, of these agreements. We argue that this case reinforces 
the need to craft “managed” processes of mutual recognition.
Section two outlines an analytical framework for managed mutual recognition 
and highlights different ways that the application of mutual recognition can be 
controlled. Section three uses these analytical tools to explain the disappointing 
outcome of the goods negotiations. It highlights the role that trade policy officials 
played in managing the negotiating process under the NTA. Section four turns to 
the EU-US negotiations for mutual recognition in the services sectors, which 
ultimately failed to produce a framework agreement. Finally, section five sheds 
some light on the impact of different choices made by negotiators during the 
crafting of the transatlantic MRAs. It questions more generally what conclusions 
can be drawn about the management of mutual recognition in the transatlantic 
marketplace.
1 The framework MRA allowed 18 months to three years for the transitional phases depending 
on the sector.
2 See http://www.tabd.com.
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II. Four Dimensions of Managed Mutual Recognition1
Mutual recognition is a complex regulatory tool for liberalizing trade which, 
depending on where it is applied, calls for conditions which in turn produce many 
different types of agreements. This is what we refer to as “managed mutual 
recognition.” As an outcome, managed mutual recognition can be compared with 
“pure” mutual recognition in the same sense as managed trade can be compared 
with total free trade. Pure mutual recognition implies granting fully unconditional 
and open-ended rights of access. In contrast, mutual recognition in operational 
terms actually involves complex sets o f rules and procedures, that may serve to 
reduce, if not eliminate, the open-endedness of mutual recognition. Four dimensions 
are outlined below to indicate how mutual recognition can be managed as a process. 
Most importantly, these conditions are introduced and can be traded against one 
another to make recognition possible even under difficult conditions.
A. Ex-ante Conditions fo r  Equivalence
Mutual recognition agreements aim to reduce redundant testing procedures or, in 
the case of professional services, duplicate licensing and/or accreditation processes, 
which inhibit the free movement of products and professionals. However, parties 
who agree to mutual recognition need to first establish that the level of regulatory 
protection provided will not be lowered by this arrangement. In order to do so, a 
decision must about the level at which equivalence is to be assessed. Equivalency is 
determined through a complex evaluation process, which usually takes places 
during a period of confidence building. In order to conclude this process regulators 
must be satisfied that their counterparts regulatory system adequately fulfils the 
objectives set out by its own. Failure to agree on equivalency of diverging 
regulatory systems limits the level at which an MRA can be pitched.
The European Commission makes a distinction between “traditional” MRAs, 
which focus on the mutual recognition of conformity assessment certifications 
without alignment of relevant standards, and “enhanced” agreements which are 
based on equivalence or, even better, common rules.3 4 It has now concluded that the 
former (e.g. traditional MRAs arc simply not feasible or viable. Recognisably there 
arc many grey areas between these black and white lines. The conditions of 
equivalence arc determined ex ante through an evaluation process which determines 
the compatibility of different regulatory systems. For mutual recognition o f goods, 
substantive requirements for product approval and/or the conformity assessment
Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace
3 This section draws heavily on the analytical framework applied to professional services 
outlined in Nicolaïdis 2004, which in turn draws from Nicolaïdis 1993a; 1993b; 1995, 1996, 
1997, 2000a. 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c.
4 Taken from Commission Staff Working Paper 25.08.2004.Sec 2004 1072.
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process influence the level of convergence. During cx-ante evaluation processes 
regulators review documentation, conduct onsite evaluation of laboratories, observe 
inspections and conduct audits. For full equivalency or “enhanced” agreem ents, 
which apply to standards, regulators review technical regulations, which can include 
product characteristics or related processes, production methods, as w ell as 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements of a product, process or 
production method. Conformity assessment procedures which arc assessed m ay 
include processes o f sampling, testing and inspection, evaluation, verification and 
assurance o f  conformity, registration, accreditation and approval of products.
As applied to professional services, conditions for equivalence arc established 
by determining how compatible qualification and licensing requirements are. 
Mutual recognition agreements can cover substantive requirements or professional 
standards, that is the criteria for determining adequate professional qualification and 
for accrediting training institutions, including the content of studies and licensing 
examinations. They can also be applied to qualification and licensing procedures, 
i.e. the set o f procedures by which individuals are made to conform and comply 
with these requirements, including through examination, and the process by which 
the institutions that certify them are themselves accredited. The “test of 
equivalence” between systems that underpins recognition can be conducted 
concurrently or alternatively with regards to the explicit standards of education, 
training and licensing in and of themselves or between the procedures followed by 
licensing and accreditation bodies.
B. Automaticity o f  Access
Once a decision is made about the equivalency of regulatory requirements, the 
question arises whether only national systems as a whole must pass such an 
equivalence test or whether, given some broad equivalence at the macro-level, some 
residual equivalence is to be tested at the individual level. Fully automatic 
recognition would mean that any national stamp or license from a country that is 
part of the system would attain automatic access to the rest of the system. The right 
to approve products would automatically be extended to all those capable of 
conducting tests for the domestic market. For services, it would automatically 
extend the right of professionals from one country to practice in another. However, 
because full equivalency is so difficult to establish, most MRAs are unlikely to 
allow for such a high degree of automaticity.
Many MRAs for goods limit recognition to the competence of laboratories and 
conformity assessment bodies to conduct product tests. Access is more or less 
automatic depending on the accreditation process for CABs under the agreements. 
Automaticity is higher when CABs that are approved for the domestic market are 
automatically able to operate for the foreign market. Automaticity is lower when 
CABs arc required to apply to foreign regulators for approval. Under the EU-US
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agreement, CABs have to undergo an individual evaluation process before they can 
be listed as approved bodies.
MRAs for professional services almost always fall short of setting up single 
passports for professionals. Rather, they constitute agreed mechanisms whereby the 
host country “takes into account” the qualification obtained in the home country, 
and where foreign professionals are granted “adequate opportunity for recognition.” 
Eligibility criteria include recognition of professional experience and competence. 
Competence can be ascertained through facilitated examination and aptitude tests, 
or during a transitional pre-recognition period of local practice. Here the emphasis 
is clearly put on individual professionals rather than education and accreditation 
systems.
C. Variations in Scope
Mutual recognition can also be limited in terms of its scope. Limiting scope during 
the initial phase of a mutual recognition process can be seen as an opportunity to 
create a laboratory to test the impact of liberalization. Steps towards full mutual 
recognition can be achieved through the progressive expansion o f scope. In the 
meanwhile, some beneficiaries of recognition might be satisfied with performing 
only some activities, for some period of time, as reduction in scope calls for.
Negotiators of MRAs need to determine what products will be included and 
what facets of the regulatory system are to be reciprocally recognized. The 
agreement could apply to certain parts of a finished product or to individual aspects 
of the conformity assessment procedures. For example, an agreement might include 
pre-market reports but exclude quality assessment reports. In the EU-US mutual 
recognition agreement, the pharmaceuticals sector was specifically limited to 
inspections for certain practices.
Professional services agreements can be limited by what range, mode and object 
of practice professionals will benefit from under mutual recognition. That scope of 
access falling under mutual recognition can be circumscribed in different ways. One 
basic way to limit the scope of recognition is to withhold the right to use the local 
professional title. The title signals to the potential client that the professional is a 
licensed or certified “architect,” “lawyer” or “accountant” with credentials 
equivalent to those of local practitioners and is therefore the ultimate evidence of 
recognition. Agreements can also limit the scope of permissible activity or 
consumer type, apply rules of conduct and enforcement, or grant only temporary 
access.
D. Ex-post Guarantees
MRAs may give different emphasis to the setting up of cooperative mechanisms 
between parties in order to compensate for loss of host country control. The aim is
Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace
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to increase the confidence that parties have in the mutual recognition process and 
therefore the legitimacy and sustainability o f the agreement. For mutual recognition 
of goods these include mechanisms for monitoring laboratories and conformity 
assessment bodies, processes for contesting compliance, the right to suspend or 
even withdraw activities upon non-compliance and dispute settlement processes 
through, for example, a joint committee. These mechanisms in the professional 
services sectors include mutual monitoring aided by: obligations of transparency of 
regulatory systems, decision making process, and change in such systems through 
the continued exchange o f information between licensing, registration and 
certification bodies; rights of regulatory oversight and mutual monitoring that 
allows for the continued assessment of technical competence, capabilities, and 
efficiency. The development of extant cooperative networks among parties can also 
be established to collectively "'manage” the implementation o f mutual recognition. 
Dispute settlement resolution and reversibility can also be used to maintain host 
country control.
III. The MRA Framework Agreement for Products5
The varying degrees to which ex-ante equivalency conditions, automaticity, scope 
and ex-post guarantees are used to control the application of mutual recognition 
demonstrate not only the complexity of mutual recognition agreements as a 
regulatory strategy but also their flexibility. The EU-US MRAs demonstrate just 
how difficult these agreements are to negotiate and implement and how different 
types of "management” of recognition have been used to try to circumvent such 
difficulties. The initial EU-US MRA was signed in 1997 as a framework agreement, 
which included annexes in six individual sectors (see table 1). The agreements were 
limited in scope to conformity assessment processes. In other words these were 
traditional MRAs. Their aim was to eliminate duplicate conformity assessment 
procedures that require manufacturers to undergo multiple testing, inspection and 
certification o f goods when they export products.6 The scope of the agreement in 
the phannaccuticals sectors was restricted even further to Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMPs) certification.
Conformity assessment procedures, like technical regulations, are shaped not 
only by market demands, which facilitate trade, but also by regulatory demand for 
consumer health and safety. Mutual recognition requires domestic regulators to
5 Based on Steffenson 2002,2004.
6 Conformity assessment procedures are used to assess that products comply with standards or 
regulations. These processes include sampling and testing; inspection; certification; 
management system assessment and registration; accreditation o f the competence of those 
activities and recognition of an accreditation program's capability (see the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology’s website at http://ts.nist.gOv/ts/htdocs/210/gsig/cainfo.htm.
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accept the competency o f their foreign counterparts to conduct product testing. 
However, regulators remain accountable to domestic legislators for the product 
standards that are applied both to domestic and foreign products. Regulators on both 
sides of the Atlantic arc thus generally reluctant to transfer authority to a foreign 
body, and the MRA negotiations demonstrated that some regulatory bodies are 
more reluctant than others. While European regulatory agencies expressed general 
concerns about accountability in the US regulatory system, the main objectors to the 
process were the FDA, which negotiated the annex agreements for the medical 
devices and pharmaceuticals sectors, and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), which negotiated the electromagnetic compatibility MRA.
This section examines the controls placed on the MRAs which effectively 
limited both their scope and automaticity. The attitudes of regulatory agencies to 
mutual recognition agreements has, especially in the case of the transatlantic MRAs, 
had a major impact on the negotiation and implementation of the agreements. 
During the transatlantic negotiations, trade officials adopted the role of policy 
managers over the MRA process. However, this case study highlights problems 
with the European Commission’s initial management strategy.
Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace
A. The Framework MRA
The Commission approached US regulatory agencies as early as 1992 to initiate the 
negotiation of MRAs. However, it faced strong opposition from some US domestic 
regulatory agencies. In particular the FDA argued from the start that the 
Commission’s proposed strategy was inconsistent with its regulatory mandate. The 
negotiations remained deadlocked until the “bottom-up” strategy, i.e. negotiations 
with individual regulatory agencies, was replaced with a new “top-down" strategy. 
The inclusion of MRAs in the NTA brought the negotiations under an institutional 
framework whereby the task of facilitating mutual recognition was primarily 
delegated to US trade rather than regulatory agencies (see Stcffenson 2004).
The new negotiating strategy bought a breakthrough in the negotiation process 
because the Commission naturally found USTR more receptive to the MRAs than 
US regulatory agencies had initially been. However, the new institutional 
arrangements for negotiating the MRA led to increasingly intense discussions 
between US trade officials, who negotiated the overarching umbrella agreement, 
and US regulatory agencies, who negotiated the sectoral annexes.
Under the NTA, USTR and the Commission became managers of the MRA 
process. While trade officials on both sides of the Atlantic agreed that the MRAs 
should be pursued, they clashed over how to incorporate the concept of mutual 
recognition into an agreement. First, the Commission pushed for full equivalency 
agreements similar to those which exist within the EU. However, US negotiators 
made it clear from the start that frill equivalency agreements were not feasible.
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USTR could not negotiate an agreement that would require changes to US dom estic 
laws, because it did not have negotiating authority from the US Congress.
USTR trade officials were also opposed to the framework approach advocated 
by the Commission. They argued that involving too many sectors would also 
increase the number of regulators participating in the negotiation process, which 
would ultimately result in an unreachable threshold of agreement. Instead they 
favoured negotiations for a limited number of products on a sector-by-sector basis. 
In the end, the sectors included in the framework agreement reflect the bargaining 
power o f both USTR and the Commission. The Commission would not agree to 
MRAs on telecommunications and recreational crafts—viewed as advantageous to 
the US—unless there were also MRAs on pharmaceutical and electrical safety. A 
number o f sectors suggested by the Commission were pushed off the negotiating 
table all together because they were deemed to be compatible with the US domestic 
legal system (see Ives 1997: 28; Vogel 1998). Sectors such as aviation, pressure 
valves, road safety equipment, lawn mowers and personal protective equipment 
were either viewed as too controversial, because they posed serious health and 
safety issues, or believed to have incompatible regulatory regimes. The original 
framework agreement did, however, leave open the possibility of negotiating MRAs 
in other sectors.
The framework agreement tied domestic regulators in the included annexes into 
a process managed by trade officials. While regulators maintained control o f  all 
technical, policy related negotiations, the individual annexes were bound by the 
timeframe and institutional arrangements established in the framework agreement.
The framework agreement established a process for the designation of 
procedures for mutual conformity assessment. Domestic regulators were joined in 
Designating Authorities, which were charged with evaluating, listing and monitoring 
private conformity assessment bodies. In addition, and despite objections from many 
US regulatory agencies, a Joint Committee composed of trade officials and 
regulators was established to serve as a dispute resolution forum.7 The framework 
agreement drew on the model MRA drawn up by the European Commission which 
pushed for rapid agreement in exchange for long confidence building processes.8 In
7 The FDA was opposed to setting up the Joint Committee to oversee conformity assessment 
because the committee would increase the potential opportunity for trade agencies to dominate 
the process (see Ives 1997). It requested a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
USTR to secure clear authority for the FDA in the sector annexes and reserved an “observer" 
role for USTR in Joint Committee meetings where FDA annexes were discussed. See 
Steffenson (2004).
8 The institutional design and most of the language used in the agreement is derived directly 
from a Model MRA the Commission presented to the Council when it sought negotiating 
authority for external MRAs (see Steffenson 2002).
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addition the agreement allowed for only low automati city, because individual CABs 
were required to apply for access during this transition process.
B. The Non-operational Annexes
EU regulators did have some initial concerns about the fragmented (see Egan 
2001b) and decentralized (see Cowles 1997) nature of US regulatory policy during 
the annex negotiations. They argued that the autonomous role of many US 
regulatory agencies blurred the lines of regulatory accountability in the US and they 
queried whether regulatory quality was undermined by the lack of standardized 
requirements (see also Nicolai'dis 1997b; Egan 2001b: 14). However, structural 
changes to the US regulatory system were quickly made to reassure European 
regulators. In particular, the National Institute on Standards—an agent o f the 
Commerce Department—created the National Voluntary Conformity Assessment 
Program to accredit conformity assessment in the US.
Much larger challenges were posed by diverging regulatory cultures. The 
regulatory culture within the EU internal market is considered “trade friendly,” 
because EU and national regulators operate with dual missions to promote free trade 
within the internal market while ensuring public safety (Petriccione 2001; 220; 
Shaffer 2001: 7). However, many US agencies have narrower mandates that focus 
solely on public health and safety. Moreover, it can be argued that US regulatory 
agencies have a developed culture of regulatory superiority vis-à-vis European 
regulatory agencies and regulatory autonomy vis-à-vis USTR which are not 
naturally MRA friendly (see also Nicolai’dis 1997a). This certainly true of FDA and 
OSHA, which negotiated all three non-opcrational sectors.9
OSHA and FDA were able to exercise considerable control over the process 
through their strict management, as designating authorities, over the approval of 
CABs. The FDA maintained ultimate control to reject the reports issued by CABs 
should they find them to be deficient in any way (see Shaffer 2002). But, the agency 
was even more proficient in exercising ex-ante controls. Problems first arose 
initially from the use of private conformity assessment bodies (CABs) in the EU. 
The FDA argued that it could not delegate authority to approve private third party 
reports or manufacturing facilities inspections (see Ives 1997; 30). This position 
changed only when the FDA underwent structural changes to its regulatory mandate 
via the FDA Modernization Act (1997), which altered the scope of FDA control and
Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace
9 This culture of regulatory superiority is most evident in the case of the FDA, because the FDA 
considers its mark of quality to be the gold standard (Millcn 1998; Horton 19981. One FDA 
official confirmed that “the FDA has a proud history. We felt no need to play in this—we are 
used to being authoritative.” Quoted in Steffen son 2004.
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allowed delegation o f autliority to third party assessment bodies (Egan 2001b: 15 ).11 
In addition, Congress instructed the FDA, in consultation with the US Secretary of 
Commerce, to support USTR in reaching an agreement with the EU on all products 
under its jurisdiction where MRAs would not lead to a reduction in the quality of 
standards (Merrill 1998: 742). Given this clause, the FDA stressed that the MRAs 
could not be considered a transfer of authority from the FDA to EU regulatory 
bodies but only as “contracts of service” for foreign CABs.
The process of mutual recognition essentially came to a halt in this sector 
because the FDA was unable to approve any European conformity assessment 
bodies during the transition period. In 2001, the FDA claimed it was close to  being 
able to a list 4 CABs but, had not done so by June 2004. It claimed CABs had 
submitted incomplete information, and that it has received a poor response rate from 
EU companies asked to host joint audits into order to train EU CAB auditors.10 1 US 
trade officials argue that there has not been a strong interest from laboratories or 
medical devices manufacturers.12
OSHA was also unable to approve CABs sufficient to make the electrical safety 
device annex operational. The agency engaged in a number of disputes with the 
Commission when it first, started charging a “processing” fee for applications for 
conformity assessment to compensate for the costs of approving foreign CABs, and 
second, rejected a number of CAB applications because they were made in French 
and Spanish (see Stcffenson 2005). The Commission argued that OSHA had 
violated the agreement by creating a duplicating assessment fee. It also refused to 
cover the cost of translations, claiming it was too expensive, to which one OSHA 
official pointed rebutted, “we’re a domestic health and safety agency, we don’t do 
translations” (Alden 2001).
US trade officials claim that the Commission’s failure to diffuse the dispute over 
translations points to larger loss o f momentum in the MRA process. European 
enlargement is largely believed to be responsible for this change, however, the 
Commission’s disengagement in the negotiations is also viewed as a political side­
step in anticipation o f a larger dispute over the equivalency o f standards within the 
single market. The dispute stems from the fact that FDA has, in the pharmaceuticals 
sectors, insisted on evaluating each member state regime individually, and that it
10 The FCC also modified its regulations in order to recognize private testing bodies (Shaffer 
2001: 15).
11 See Minutes from the Thirteenth US/EU MRA Medical Device Annex Stakeholders 
Teleconference, November 7,2001.
12 Interview, USTR telephone, June 2004.
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has openly suggested that all member states are equal.13 To date the FDA has only 
approved testing certification in one member state, the UK. The process has now 
become dormant. FDA argues that the benefits of mutually recognizing GMPs do 
not out weight the cost of reviewing each member state.14 The Commission objects 
to FDA's approach which threatens to undermine the credibility of the single 
market.15 16
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Table 1
Correlation Between US Regulatory7 Positions and Policy Implementation16
Annexes Policy Implementation
Telecommunications 
Electromagnetic compatibility Operational
Medical Devices 
Pharmaceuticals Not Operational
Electrical Safety Not Operational
Recreational Crafts Operational
C. The Operational Annexes
The annexes negotiated by the US Coast Guard and the FCC recognized the 
competency of their European counterparts to conduct conformity assessment 
bodies. Regulators did secure a number of ex-post guarantees. For example, under 
the annex for telecommunications equipment the FCC can conduct post-market 
surveillance on labelling and numbering requirements as well as border controls 
and internal checks (Shaffer 2002). However, in general there were far less 
problems determining access and the annexes on telecommunications equipment,
13 One FDA official commented. “FDA knew Europe was not ‘whole’.” A US trade official 
affirmed the American perception that, “Portuguese standards are not the same as those in the 
UK.” Interviews, Washington and Maryland, October 2000.
14 USTR agrees claiming, “There is just no reason to spend the money to do this.” Interview, 
telephone, June 2004.
15 The Commission argues that, under the agreement, approval should be based on certification, 
issued by regulatory bodies in the domestic market, o f the inspection reports regarding 
manufacturers* compliance. In contrast, the FDA argued that it could only certify GMPs after 
reviewing the full reports composed by national regulators. The problem was defused when 
the FDA accepted that it would “normally” be able to accept certification and agreed to work 
with European regulators to devise a common inspector report format. However, the process 
stalled before a report format was agreed (see Steffenson 2004).
16 Taken from Steffenson 2004.
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electromagnetic compatibility and recreational craft were implemented with 
relative case.
The annexes on telecommunications equipment and electromagnetic 
compatibility provide for the recognition o f test reports and conformity assessment 
certificates issued by CABs. The relatively smooth implementation o f  the 
telecommunications annex has been credited to the FCC, which supports the 
agreement, and the existence of domestic constituencies which exert pressure in 
favour of deregulation of product approval processes (Shaffer 2002). The result is 
that there are now over 100 CABS operating in these sectors.
The MRAs are even credited with sparking further regulatory co-operation and 
deregulation. After the agreement was signed in 1998 the EU introduced self- 
ccrtification of telecommunications which meant that manufacturers no longer 
needed to obtain pre-market assessment certificates. The FCC in turn instituted a 
new program which led to the use o f private testing laboratories. Regulators on both 
sides supported the MRA and have supported more deregulation for pre-marketing 
approvals, in some ways, the MRA is becoming less relevant as more deregulation 
occurs.
The recreational craft annex was the easiest MRA to negotiate and implement, in 
part because there was already a large degree o f regulatory co-operation between 
the US Coast Guard and the Commission. The US Coast Guard already permitted 
firms to sclf-ccrtify, so there was no need for European CABs. In addition, the 
implementation o f the annex was facilitated by the fact that the EC regulatory 
agencies have to adapt to a single regulatory system operating in one language.17
The success of the recreational craft MRA sparked further co-operation between 
the US Coast Guard and the European Commission. The Coast Guard approached 
the USTR about negotiating another MRA for marine safety equipment. In 
December 1998, at the request o f the US Coast Guard, the USTR initiated 
negotiations with the European Commission under the TEP. The Lifesaving & Fire 
Safety Standards Division (G-MSE-4) o f the Coast Guard worked in close 
cooperation with USTR to develop the product scope based on a detailed product- 
by-product review o f the US and EC marine equipment requirements. The MRA for 
marine safety, which covers 30 types of equipment, was signed on February 27,
2004. Significantly this agreement is an MRA (+) which means that it includes the 
mutual recognition o f some standards.18 This sector was uniquely suited to an MRA
17 See Shaffer 2002.
18 The MRA product scope includes 43 products in three main categories: life saving equipment 
(e.g. visual distress signals, marine evacuation systems); fire protection equipment (e.g. fire 
doors, insulation); and navigational equipment (e.g., compasses, GPS equipment, echo­
sounding equipment). See US Coast Guard website at http://www.uscg.mil/hq'g- 
m/mse4/mra.htm.
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because there was a pre-exiting level o f harmonisation, prompted by international 
co-operation through the IMO, which also serves as a dispute settlement 
mechanism.
IV. The MRAs for Professional Services
The successful conclusion of a framework agreement for the mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment processes gave rise to a period of optimism in transatlantic 
economic relations. Why not then, extend the experience to other sectors, including 
and especially in services sectors, such as insurance as well as professional services 
(law, architecture, engineering)? By 1997-98 the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services was starting to be implemented. The GATS encouraged members, under 
article 7, to conduct MRAs in order to facilitate trade beyond the national treatment 
obligation commitments contained in national schedules. The EU suggested 
negotiations on a new framework agreement for mutual recognition of services and, 
in spite of its initial reservations due to the import of its federal structure in these 
areas, the US agreed to launch these new negotiations under the TEP (Article 3.22 
of the TEP Action Plan).19 That framework agreement was to serve as a model for 
the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements on specific services sectors where 
there was participation from relevant professional and regulatory bodies. The aim 
was to make it significantly easier for professionals and firms to operate in the 
transatlantic marketplace both as an end in itself and as a way to facilitate the 
operations of cross-atlantic investment and MNCs.
A. The Framework Agreement for Services
At the EU-US Summit in June 21, 1999 it was announced that the finalized text of a 
framework agreement had been agreed and was to be subjected to domestic review. 
It was then left to trade negotiators to find sectors with willing participants. The 
original plan was to seek out possible services sectors, including financial and 
investment services as well as professional services. In August 2000, USTR listed a 
Federal Register Notice indicated that MRAs were being considered for certain 
sectors of insurance (e.g. commercial lines, reinsurance, agency/brokcrs), private 
pension fund management, and professional services including engineering and 
architecture.20
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19 These agreements should address the commercial interests of our respective services 
suppliers. In parallel and on the same timescale, we will work together to develop support 
from a critical mass of our respective responsible authorities to accede and implement the 
agreements as soon as possible (TEP Action Plan 1998).
20 Services: Regional Initiative, USTR briefing available www.ustr.gov/sectors/serviccs/tep 
8/ 11/00.
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But the USTR quickly realized how difficult it would be to negotiate M R A s in 
each of these individual sectors. It set about approaching regulators, se rv ice  
providers and professional associations about the feasibility of negotiating M R A s, 
but its task was complicated by the fact that most of these sectors were subject to 
state regulation (some sectors exclusively). The resistance to the very idea o f  M R A s 
faced by USTR at the sub-federal level stem from a double suspicion: o f federal 
involvement on one hand, with states constantly on the defensive regarding 
Congress’ pre-emptive powers and the Commerce clause; and of foreign regulators 
suspected o f seeking to undercut state-level professional through lower standards, 
especially in the case of home countries with high skills low wage professionals. 
After a year of investigation, USTR concluded that the federal government could 
not negotiate new MRA agreements in many service sectors, which in turn seriously 
hampered the credibility of the framework agreement itself,
Meanwhile, the EU Commission was frustrated with its lack of clear negotiating 
partner. It contemplated seeking out agreements with individual states, but in the 
end concluded that such an approach would not only be extremely time consuming 
and resource intensive but would undercut the very principle it was trying to 
promote, namely mutual recognition, within the United States themselves. Besides, 
EU professional groups would be bound to protest loudly to a scheme where their 
counterparts from an individual state would get access to the whole EU market in 
exchange for one out of fifty US states. Reciprocity, at least in the transatlantic 
context, still meant symmetry of access and comparable market opportunity. In 
order to ensure a level playing field, the Commission might not need to obtain 
access for its member states to the whole US territory, but it would at least need to 
obtain a critical mass of states in order to negotiate MRAs.21
The federal structure of US services regulation might have been the dominant 
barrier to negotiating transatlantic services MRAs but it was not the only one. Thus, 
even the pensions sector, which is federally regulated, was ruled out early on in the 
process, because the Investment Company Institute, the US national association 
which has enormous clout on the Hill, categorically opposed the MRA. The ICI 
argued that mutual recognition agreements were not the best way to dc-regulate the 
sector, but called instead for removing regulatory that deny effective market 
access.22 The latter strategy would of course be unilateral and therefore conducted at 
the appropriate speed.
21 European Commission, DG Trade, The Transatlantic Economic Partnership Overview and 
Assessment, October 2000.
22 Investment Company Institute letter to USTR, September 11, 2000. Available at. 
http: //www. ici .org/issues/glo/arc-mrk/00_ustr_transat] antic com _cvr.html.
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B. Individual Sectoral Work Plans
As sector after sector was excluded from the scope of the services MRA, the 
framework agreement fell apart. Instead, it was decided at the end of 1999 to seek 
out work plans for individual professional services sectors. But, by time of the EU- 
US summit in Washington (2000) it was clear that the insurance sector was causing 
the most problems. After initial work plan discussions the US suggested it was 
interested in working towards establishing a “regulatory dialogue” rather than 
negotiating an MR A. In tenns of the four dimensions of managed recognition 
outlined above, this meant that ex-ante equivalency conditions were to become the 
sine qua non to any further move towards recognition. It meant moreover that the 
process of regulatory cooperation underpinning such evolution was to be de-linked 
from any commitment to translate regulatory convergence into recognition 
commitments. As a result the MRA negotiations for insurance became dormant.
There were nevertheless some professional associations still interested in 
making progress. In April 2000, the first meeting of architects and engineers on 
mutual recognition was held. The meeting established a work plan which addressed: 
(1) respect of each others’ regulatory systems; (2) determining equivalence of 
education: (3) determining equivalence o f qualifications other than education; (4) 
notification to the World Trade Organization of the intent to negotiate mutual 
recognition; (5) scope of practice (particularly for engineers); and (6) 
implementation of agreements. The work plan allowed for confidence building 
between EU and US regulators to determine equivalence and suggested mechanisms 
to establish the scope and automaticity of a possible agreement. Some o f these 
mechanisms included limitations on the use of professional titles (scope), and a 
timeframe to be included under mutual recognition.
The TEP Steering Group Report in 2000 gave the impression that negotiations in 
these sectors were well underway. However, many regulators and professional 
associations were unimpressed with the way the meetings had been conducted. US 
and EU government trade delegations ran the meetings, while representatives of 
professional and regulatory bodies were invited as observers.23 The two sectors 
resented being lumped together and failed to see the benefits of participating in the 
joint process. In this way, the dynamic was close to what had prevailed within the 
EU itself when the Commission had decided to pool all the professions together in 
the GeneraI Services Directive of 1989. At the time, many of the professions had 
objected to the aggregation o f their most specific and idiosyncratic universes. But 
with time, the Commission had been able to demonstrate that the GSD as a 
framework agreement allowed for flexible interpretation. It was hoped that maybe, 
just maybe, the same evolution could be engineered in the transatlantic context.
23 One association official complained that “it was conducted by trade people like a trade 
meeting!” Interv iew, telephone, June 2004.
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C. Association to Association Agreement
Between 1996 and 2002, the OECD also conducted a series o f studies and meetings 
on the relationship between trade liberalization and regulatory cooperation, 
including a special series of meetings on the professions. It was clear in these 
meetings that the professional associations would be the main players behind any 
kind of agreement and that these associations could be empowered to facilitate the 
MRA process. Indeed, while negotiations on an MRA for engineering came to a 
halt after the May 2000 meeting, the National Council of Architectural Registration 
Boards and the main US professional association, the American Institute of 
Architecture, met privately with the Architect Council of Europe to discuss a new 
negotiation process. They agreed on a primary accord, which they hoped to sign in
2005. The Accord on Co-operation and Professionalism in Architecture establishes 
that:
An American architect who possesses a professional diploma and is duly 
licensed by a US jurisdiction shall be recognized as an architect in any 
EU Member State, and an architect recognized under the terms of EU 
Directive EEC 85/384 in any Member State of the European Union shall 
be recognized as an architect throughout the United States of America.
It may have helped that European architects had been the last profession in the 
EU (after doctors and nurses) to benefit from their own sectorial directive in 1985. 
It may also have helped that this was one of the sectors with the most existing 
cooperation between firms and therefore important incentives to move the process 
forward.
Under such an approach, access to mutual recognition is ultimately placed on the 
individual who has to apply to their national association, which acts as a 
clearinghouse. Equivalence of education systems would not be established ex-ante 
and systematically but on an ad-hoc case-by-case basis. In short, the basis for 
mutual recognition would be practice and leaming-by-doing. Ex-post guarantees 
were introduced through the continued review of the level of professional standards 
on both sides. The agreement also states that participants are subject to the 
standards of ethics and professional conduct of their host country, thus reducing the 
scope of standards actually recognized as equivalent.
Many Europeans were nervous about forging an agreement without the direct 
involvement of the US government, but a government to government agreement 
was not possible in a sector that was not only regulated at the state level but where 
professional associations bare such a great burden of control. Final ratification of 
the agreement will depend on state regulators, however it is widely believed that the 
National Council o f Architects Registration Board’s vote will serve as the green 
light for state regulators. Individual states will still have to incorporate the 
agreement into their own rules and enforce such recognition in individual cases. 
Nevertheless, as with the case of products, it was important for the Commission to
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ensure that ultimately, the US government would be considered responsible for 
compliance with the agreement. As a result, once agreement has been reached at the 
level of the architectural profession, it will be passed on to the trade representatives 
of the Federal Government of the United States o f  America and of EU Member 
States and the Trade Directorate (DG TRADE) o f the European Commission. It will 
only become binding once an agreement has been reached at political level and is 
included as part o f the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) or any future 
agreement between the relevant political entities.
V. The Implications of Choices Made During MRA Negotiations
MRA negotiations for both goods and services demonstrate how important it is to 
manage mutual recognition as a process. Trade-offs can be made during the 
negotiation process between different ways o f limiting the impact of mutual 
recognition and ensuring incremental liberalization and therefore incremental 
“regulatory competition.” This section examines those trade-offs both in theory, and 
as applied to the EU-US mutual recognition agreements. Finally, it summarizes 
what lessons can be drawn from the non-implementation of three goods sectors and 
the dormant services negotiations.
A. Trading Prior Conditions for Ex-post Guarantees,
Automaticity and Scope
At the systemic level, MRAs are based on prior harmonization and/or criteria for 
equivalence and cooperative mechanisms to make up for loss of host country 
control once the agreement is in place. Less equivalence will have to be 
compensated by reduced scope and automaticity as well as ex-post guarantees. The 
individual candidate for recognition, be it a professional or a CAB, will be affected 
by the provisions on how automatically and on what basis the recognition is 
granted, and the scope of recognition set out in the MRA, that is the range and mode 
of practice accessible to the beneficiary of recognition. How confident the parties 
are on the degree of equivalence between their systems will determine how 
automatically they are ready to grant recognition. How broad a scope for access is 
envisaged will also determine automaticity. The need for spelling out prior 
conditions of equivalence may be reduced if  there arc good prospect for sustaining a 
high level of cooperation after the agreement and if reversibility is a plausible 
option of last resort.
In short, whether implicitly or explicitly, trade-offs can be exploited among the 
features of an MRA. The more parties are aware o f these potential trade-offs, the 
higher the likelihood that they will reach agreement and devise solutions acceptable 
to all. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to relax prior conditions of 
equivalence and concentrate on fine-tuning automaticity (EU). In others, reducing
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initial scope may be considered as a way to test the grounds (NAFTA, E U -U S 
product MR As). From a dynamic viewpoint, scope and automaticity can be reduced  
initially to accommodate insufficient prior equivalence and expanded later on in 
light of ex-post cooperation.
Figure 1
Trading off Between Features of Mutual Recognition (from 2004)24
Prior conditions for equivalence
Ex-post Guarantees
Parties need to decide how quickly they want the agreement to come into effect 
and how many resources they will be able to devote to managing its 
implementation. This means deciding whether the regulatory cooperation that must 
necessarily accompany mutual recognition needs to bear fruit before the agreement 
is actually implemented. Although regulatory assurances are necessary before and 
after liberalisation, if  there is a sense o f urgency, they can focus on ex-post 
guarantees. On the other hand, when resources may be insufficient to manage the 
guarantee mechanism ex-post facto , it may be wiser to seek high thresholds of 
equivalence earlier in the process. One of the central “twists” that allowed 
Europeans to respect (more or less) their 1993 deadline for the internal market is the 
resort to a shift from mandatory and extensive ex-ante cooperation and 
harmonisation to on-going ex-post cooperation. This does not mean that the scheme 
ought be reproduced everywhere, especially where no prior culture of regulatory 
cooperation exists as is often the case in the transatlantic context.
If they arc able to reach a high degree o f prior harmonization—such as with the 
marine safety equipment MRA—parties can aim for an ambitious and immediate 
full scope recognition. Alternatively, parties can also exploit the potential for 
customized automaticity and reduced scope, to design a step by step approach to 24
24 Taken from Nicolai'dis 2004.
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mutual recognition through incremental extension of automaticity and scope 
conditional on increased confidence between parties after the MRA comes into 
force. The choice hinges on the particular professional and regulatory cultures, 
whether harmonization is feasible, the characteristics of the customers of this 
particular service, whether the degree o f regulation varies significantly between 
parties, etc. It is also important to ask whether less then full recognition makes a 
significant difference to entry in a particular context.
In summary, there is a rich set of possible trade-offs between automaticity and 
scope of recognition. Negotiators can pit a position favouring greater automaticity 
with reduced scope against lesser automaticity with full scope. Compromises can be 
made by introducing the possibility for sequencing these options, for example, 
through extended confidence building periods and by adding time restrictions as an 
incentive for local adaptation for scope o f practice or by relying on local experience 
as the sole condition for scope expansion in terms of title in services.
In short, mutual recognition must be thought of as a dynamic process and the 
signing of an MRA as only one phase in this process. The key is to facilitate the 
mutual recognition process while accommodating the various interests in place 
without letting any of them stall the process. On the one hand, MRAs will certainly 
be easier to negotiate for parties who have moved down the road and have prior 
harmonization. On the other hand in cases where there is significant internal 
resistance to regulatory reform, the prospect of recognition or the actual negotiation 
of an MRA may be seen as a lever for change. An important question to ask is 
whether the real short term goal is to get an MRA up and fully functioning in order 
to facilitate trade or to get regulators and professions to embark on the road to 
mutual recognition (even at the cost of achieving an agreement with limited scope 
and limited recognition)?
B. Hard Lessons from the Transatlantic MRAs
The EU-US MRAs in both goods and services were negotiated as framework 
agreements. The Commission, in exporting its MRA model, insisted on an 
agreement that could reach a broad number of sectors, therefore fuelling more 
regulatory cooperation across the Atlantic. The horizontal approach adopted by the 
EU internally in the case of the GSD for instance attempts to ensure full sectoral 
coverage at the cost of automaticity. This model has a number o f advantages. It 
allows for quicker agreement, because it does not attempt to bridge structural 
differences b e tw e e n  national systems. It is seen as a way to achieve progressive 
liberalization, because it covers the broadest number of professional sectors 
possible. With regards to standards, it replaced ex-ante harmonization with 
conditional access and ex-post guarantees.
The aim was also to negotiate the transatlantic agreement quickly, in part 
because USTR and DG Trade were under pressure from both politicians and the
Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace
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business community to produce a much needed transatlantic “deliverable.” The 
trade oft is that these agreements relied on limiting not only the scope but also the 
automaticity of access under a number of ex-post guarantees. The idea was that US 
regulators would learn by doing and that the process would lead to  more 
progressive liberalization.^ The framework approach did manage to secure an 
agreement in sectors that had been deadlocked. The impact of mutual recognition 
could increase as MRAs in existing sectors give finns leverage to demand 
agreements in others (sec Shaffer 2002). Nonetheless, the shortcomings o f  this 
approach arc glaringly obvious. Three product sectors included in the original MRA 
remain non-opcrational and the services negotiations are essentially dormant. What 
lessons can we draw from the management of the transatlantic MRAs to date (e.g. 
June 2004)7
Government to government MRAs may be used to create frameworks and floors 
for recognition. Under the initial framework agreement trade negotiators were 
charged with managing the overall process, but ultimately some attention does need 
to be played to finding suitable sectors. Prior harmonization and comparable 
regulatory standards/processes create suitable atmospheres for mutual recognition. 
It is also key to finding sectors that are mutual recognition friendly. In some cases 
mutual recognition agreements can be used to alter domestic regulatory cultures/6 
However, the EU-US negotiations in the pharmaceuticals, medical devices and 
electrical safety sectors demonstrate how difficult it is to negotiate mutual 
recognition in environments where the regulatory culture is hostile to a trade 
agenda.
Regulatory agency support for mutual recognition agreements has proven to be 
one of the most important conditions for negotiating MRAs. Confidence building 
processes are time consuming and increase the costs of implementing agreements. 
In the case of medical devices and pharmaceuticals, the cultures o f regulatory 
insulation and autonomy of FDA and OSHA created clear barriers to the 
negotiation, and more importantly to implementation of the MRAs. Fiercely 
autonomous regulatory agencies strongly opposed to mutual recognition created 
impasses in the process by ultimately resisting any hint of automaticity in 
recognising the stamps of foreign regulators. In the end, they seemed to view 
mutual recognition as a mechanism for regulatory division of labour and cost 
cutting rather than for the sharing regulatory sovereignty based on mutual trust. The 
lesson is that trade negotiators can only accomplish so much as policy managers. 256
25 A Commerce department official argues, “The MRAs are the first step in broader 
liberalisation of trade through mutual recognition and harmonisation of health and safety, 
environmental standards,” 25.
26 One FDA official even noted that in the medical devices sector, “we’ve been able to 
accomplish much more than we thought.”
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Bringing regulators into the process can encourage regulatory dialogue including 
exploratory discussions to increase awareness of foreign systems and confidence 
building is key to both the deeper and wider application of mutual recognition, even 
if it has not prompted regulatory convergence across the board. Ultimately, 
however, it is difficult to implement any agreement where regulatory agents call 
into question the compatibility of systems. Thus, the European Commission (2004) 
recently argued that a technical dialogue should proceed and in some cases replace 
any attempt to negotiate an MRA.
The support of industry and professional associations is also crucial to an MRA. 
The TABD has played a critical role in the MRA negotiations by lobbying USTR 
and the US Commerce Department. It offered technical support and exerted 
pressure on officials on both sides of the Atlantic to conclude the agreements. 
Non-implementation of the agreements, however, has curbed the momentum of 
transatlantic business. Under the leadership o f PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
Electrolux (from 2001) the group’s attention has turned to a number of new 
strategic issues including the growth o f e-commcrce, the WTO negotiations in 
Doha, dispute management, and mergers and acquisitions. A lack of support from 
the medical devices manufacturers has also undermined this sectoral annex. It is 
worth noting that the market often finds an efficient way to accommodate market 
access even where MRAs are not in place or where delays incur, such as, for 
example, when laboratories make reciprocal agreements independently (such as in 
the telecoms sector). There is also scope for enhanced MRA type co-operation 
through voluntary schemes, as seen with Energy Star and eco-labelling (see 
Commission 2004).
These different types of co-operation raise questions about the prospects of 
negotiating MRAs outside a framework agreement? The Commission has recently 
admitted that MRAs should be considered on an individual basis and that traditional 
should not be pursued with the US (or other trading partners). It argues that its focus 
should turn instead to negotiating enhanced MRAs only where there is a high 
degree of compatibility. US negotiators have always favoured sector by sector 
negotiations which limit the number of regulatory agencies involved (Egan 2001a; 
2001b). Trade officials argued that there was no point in “lumping together 
unrelated sectors.”27 Sectoral agreements do have the potential to lead to more 
automatic recognition for qualified professionals and CABs, because they either 
involve some degree of co-ordination o f education and training or can spell out 
criteria for recognition tailored to the sector in question (Nicolai’dis 2004).
What conclusions can we draw about the management o f the transatlantic 
MRAs? The EU's framework strategy inspired by its own single market approach
27 Interview, telephone, June 2004.
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misses key elements when it is exported. In the transatlantic case it can be argued 
that the relationship lacks strong institutions with the depth to oversee and enforce 
the MRAs (see Egan and Nicolaïdis 2001, Petriccione 2001). Unlike the EU single 
market, there is no authoritative legal body— such as the ECJ—with the capacity to 
enforce mutual recognition. Although the Joint Committee is designed to act as a 
forum for dispute resolution, it has been unable to break the deadlock achieved by 
FDA and OSHA in the implementation process. The marine safety equipment 
MRA, on the other hand, benefits from the oversight of the IMO. Moreover, 
cooperative networks between professional associations are much less dense and 
there is no equivalent for the EU Commission which serves as the hub for the 
professional committees which, inside the EU, are the enforcers of ex-post 
guarantees including on the continued quality o f professional training.
Finally, the association to association agreement in services raises questions 
about the capacity for MRA without government to government negotiations. There 
are risks involved in relying on accreditation bodies to provide the first building 
block of a two-layered approach to recognition. First, as pointed out by Bernard 
Ascher, this could in itself become a basis for restriction, if foreign schools are not 
afforded adequate opportunity for accreditation and if accreditation standards 
discriminate against them. Accusation of discriminatory treatment is a staple o f  the 
accreditation world at the purely domestic level. The same types of solutions are 
therefore called internationally as domestically: as with the domestic level, there 
may be appeals procedures regarding accreditation determination, accredited 
institutions may not have a monopoly in producing candidates for licensing, 
accreditation bodies can have specific mandates to allow for accreditation at the 
national of institutions that do not meet their conventional standards of accreditation 
in order to encourage diversity provided the institution carries out the purpose o f the 
accreditation (Nicolaïdis 2004).
VI. Conclusion
MRAs cannot be crafted overnight or follow some grand design. They need to be 
adapted to the requirements of the particular industries and professions. At the same 
time, they need to be consistent with one another. Ensuring such consistency while 
spearheading faster and more efficient negotiations of mutual recognition 
agreements worldwide could be the object of new transatlantic action. In 
particularly, regulatory cooperation between the US and the EU regarding 
professional services could serve as a stepping stone in the context of the Doha 
Round by demonstrating the potential for open MRAs.
More generally, transatlantic cooperation can contribute to creating a culture of 
mutual recognition whereby the professions, industries and regulators become 
increasingly aware o f the benefits that can be had through recognition as well as the
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many ways in which recognition can be “managed” to alleviate their concerns over 
a general lowering of standards in their respective countries. Such a culture of 
mutual recognition would underscore the notion that recognition is a process not an 
outcome, and that it needs to be continually updated, reinforced and reappraised.
Ultimately, negotiators need to pay attention to conditions in individual sectors. 
MRA may not always be the best regulatory tool. MRAs are not always the best 
tool. They are time consuming, costly, difficult to implement and a sensitive issue 
for certain domestic regulators. As it stands the process of transatlantic recognition 
is already highly resource-intensive, and the future application of mutual 
recognition will need to be open to flexible and more creative arrangements in 
suitable sectors.
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Comments
Alasdair Young
Even though I am interested in the interaction of trade and regulatory policies, I 
have never found mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) very stimulating. They 
are extremely technical and there docs not seem to be all that much actually 
happening. Nonetheless, they are something I feel I should know more about, so I 
welcomed the chance to bring myself up to speed by being forced to read a paper by 
(arguably) the two leading experts on transatlantic MRAs. That said, the paper did 
not challenge my prejudices. Note, however, that this is less to do with the paper 
than the subject.
I think that the framework for analysing MRAs according to four aspects 
—ex-ante equivalence; automaticity; scope; and ex-post guarantees—is extremely 
interesting and potentially very useful. I think that the framework (and the paper as 
a whole) would have been stronger if  a distinction were drawn with regard to ex- 
ante equivalence between substantive regulatory requirements and conformity 
assessment processes. I find blurring this distinction to be a common shortcoming 
of work on MRAs and one that muddies the analytical waters (I return to this point 
later). 1 was disappointed that the framework was not explicitly applied to the 
section of the paper describing the state of play.
The section of the paper discussing the current state of play provided a useful 
overview of how things stand, but did not provide a systematic analysis of the 
different degrees o f  implementation. Table 1 suggests that the key variable 
determining whether an MRA will be implemented or not is the attitude of the 
relevant US regulatory agency. This, in turn, is attributed to a particular “regulator 
culture” in some agencies. Why does such a culture exist in some agencies and not
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others? The text introduces a more nuanced picture, with additional variables 
—“bargaining power,” industry attitudes; the regulatory role of US states; and the 
type of certification used—appearing in some o f the stories, but not in others. The 
EU’s internal preoccupations—enlargement and variation among member states— 
also popped up in some cases. It would have been helpful to have seen how all of 
these variables played out in each MRA. If the impact of “bargaining power,” US 
regulatory agencies’ attitudes and the role of the states in services regulation arc to 
be isolated, comparison with the EU’s MRAs with other countries would have been 
illuminating. Further, if we are to really understand what determines the success or 
failure of MRAs, it is important to address why MRAs are not attempted in some 
cases.
I also think the analysis would have benefited from being better contextualised 
in terms of a continuum of negative market integration. Market integration gets 
deeper as one moves from national treatment to mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment to negotiated mutual recognition of substantive requirements to the 
application of the mutual recognition principle. The vast majority of cases in the 
paper involve only mutual recognition of conformity assessment, although the 
architects agreement, if implemented, would represent negotiated mutual 
recognition of substantive requirements. My understanding is that the agreed, but 
not implemented, EU-US Veterinary Equivalency Agreement and the EU-Canada 
Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement do so as well. In addition, the paper 
mentions, but does not really engage with, the approximation of substantive 
requirements through multilateral institutions (maritime safety); an example of 
positive market integration. Treating these different modes of market integration as 
discrete would have provided a foundation for a more nuanced analysis of the state 
of (and prospects for) transatlantic regulatory cooperation.
What strikes me is that the difficultly the EU and US have had in agreeing the 
mutual recognition of conformity assessments bodes ill for any deeper form of 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation.
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Chapter 8
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences: 
The Ongoing Transatlantic Dispute over 
the Regulation o f Biotechnology*
Gregory C. Shaffer 
Mark A. Pollack
I. Introduction
In 1992, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first genetically 
engineered food—Calgene’s Flavr Savr Tomato—for sale and marketing in the 
United States. Encouraged by a regulatory system that treated genetically modified 
foods and crops as substantively equivalent to their conventional counterparts, US 
scientists have subsequently created, farmers have grown, and companies have 
marketed a wide range o f genetically modified (GM) foods and crops. By the end of 
the 1990s, in “the most rapid adoption of a new technology in the history of 
agriculture,” some sixty percent of processed foods available in US groceries were 
derived from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Hill and Battle 2000).
By contrast with the US embrace of agricultural biotechnology, European 
publics and regulators at both tire national and European Union (EU) levels have 
taken a far more cautious approach to GMOs, treating GM foods and crops as 
different from their conventional counterparts, and adopting increasingly strict and 
complex regulatory procedures for their approval and marketing. By the late 1990s,
The authors are grateful to Timo Weishaupt for excellent research assistance.
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these strikingly different regulatory approaches created serious obstacles to the 
export o f agricultural products from the United States, and in turn raised the 
prospect o f a major international trade war over the approval and marketing o f GM 
foods and crops.
In this paper, we examine and bring up-to-date the story of the US/EU conflict 
over the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. The paper is organized in six 
sections. In section II, we outline briefly the respective regulatory systems put in 
place during the 1980s and 1990s by the US and the European Union, and we trace 
the emergence of the transatlantic regulatory dispute over GMOs. In section III, we 
examine the record of bilateral regulatory cooperation, including informal 
discussions among regulators, a formal Biotechnology Consultative Forum, and the 
activities of the transatlantic civil-society dialogues, all undertaken in an effort to 
find common -or at least compatible—grounds for biotech regulation. We note that 
none of these efforts has yielded formal regulatory agreements or even informal 
common understandings among US and European regulators. Next, we then look to 
the various multilateral forums—the World Trade Organization, the Biosafety 
Protocol signed at Cartagena in 1999, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission— 
noting that both the US and EU have attempted systematically to export their 
respective regulatory approaches to biotechnology in all three forums; the net effect 
of these efforts to date, however, has been to restate rather than resolve the 
fundamental conflict of regulatory approaches. In the fifth section, we turn back to 
the domestic level, examining the recent legislative and regulatory developments in 
the US and the EU, which we argue have produced, at best, modest evidence of 
convergence between the two systems. As we shall sec, nearly a decade of dispute 
among the US and the EU has increased apprehension about GMOs, to a certain 
extent, in the United States, while leading to a greater emphasis on scientific risk 
assessment and a tentative resumption of approvals in the European Union. In both 
cases, however, the respective regulatory principles and procedures of the US and 
the EU have remained largely unchanged and starkly different. In light of these 
persistent differences, in May 2003 the United States brought a formal complaint 
before the World Trade Organization, examined in section VI of the paper. We 
elucidate the reasons w'hy the US finally brought a WTO complaint after many 
years of restraint, analyze the claims made by the US in its complaint as well as EU 
responses, and wre discuss the prospects for the complaint in the light of previous 
case-law' as wrell as the EU's recent decision to resume approvals of new GM 
varieties. The final section concludes by arguing that, despite initial hopes, both 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the US and the EU have yielded little 
evidence of genuine deliberation or convergence, and that, despite obvious risks, the 
current WTO complaint offers the prospect o f clarification and legal certainty for 
parties on both sides of the dispute.
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II. Regulation of GM Foods and Crops:
Two Regulatory Approaches
Genetic engineering, the process used to create GM seeds, crops, and the foods 
produced from them, is a technology used to isolate genes from one organism, 
manipulate them in the laboratory, and inject them into another organism. 
Supporters of agricultural biotechnology consider such genetic manipulation to be 
merely the latest step in an ongoing scientific process, from the farmer’s “old- 
fashioned” selection of seeds and Mendelian cross-breeding to the mapping o f plant 
and animal genetic codes. These supporters argue that the characteristics o f these 
new plant varieties offer significant benefits to both producers and consumers. The 
benefits to producers have been most evident, as new GM varieties (such as Bt Com, 
with its genetic resistance to the predatory com borer, or Roundup-Ready soybeans, 
with their resistance to the commercial Roundup pesticide) can provide greater 
efficiency and lower costs in agricultural production. Direct consumer benefits, by 
contrast, have been less immediately evident, since the most common GM crops 
provide lower costs to farmers without any appreciable difference in the nature or 
quality of the product to the consumer; but in principle GM foods and crops could 
benefit human health by adding vitamins and nutrients to conventional crops, 
potentially resulting in products such vitamin A-enhanccd rice, “heart-friendly” oil 
and iron-enriched wheat.
Biotechnology’s critics, by contrast, are often vociferous and have raised 
concerns over food safety, environmental harm, and ethics. Many opponents 
question the safety of GM foods, maintaining that they could encourage perverse 
selection for antibiotic resistance (through the consumption of foods with antibiotic 
marker genes) or trigger allergenic reactions (though the ingestion o f genes 
introduced from foreign species, such as peanuts). Environmental critics raise fears 
that the technology could lead to “super weeds,” most notably through cross­
pollination with pesticide-resistant GM crops. Some cthicists question the morality 
o f mankind’s manipulating genes, characterized by a statement by Britain’s Prince 
Charles that the production o f GM foods “takes mankind into realms that belong to 
God and to God alone.” 1
Crucially, we argue in this paper, the regulation of biotechnology is also a 
question about the regulation o f  risk under uncertainty, pitting against each other 
not only specific regulatory standards but broader regulatory systems that deal with 
the risk posed by GM foods and crops in distinctively different ways. Risk, in this 
context, refers to “the combination of the likelihood {probability) and the harm 
{adverse outcome, e.g. mortality, morbidity, ecological damage, or impaired quality
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences...
1 Kevin Cullen, “Genetically Modified Food Fight Growing Unpalatable,” Boston Globe, 
August 3.1999, at A1 (citing Prince Charles). See also Thompson 2003:14.
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of life) resulting from exposure to an activity (hazard)" (Wiener and Rogers 2002: 
320, emphasis in original). In principle, therefore, regulators faced with a novel 
product or process—such as the genetic modification of foods and crops— need to 
ascertain the potential harm caused by such activities, as well as the probability o f  
such harm, in order to take a decision on the legality or illegality o f that product or 
process.
In practice, however, risk regulation frequently requires regulators to act in the 
face of uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of the risks posed by new 
products and processes, raising the fundamental political question o f how 
governments should regulate risk in the face o f such uncertainty. Frequently, when 
faced with uncertainty about risks, regulators take precautionary measures, 
regulating or even banning certain products or activities even in the absence o f 
complete information about the risks posed by them. More specifically, 
Giandomenico Majone (2003a: 18-26) argues, government regulators in the United 
States and other jurisdictions have responded in four distinct ways—prohibitions, 
least feasible risk, elimination o f significant risk, and cost-benefit analysis—with a 
general trend over time from the first and least sophisticated to the fourth and most 
sophisticated approach. In the first o f these approaches, regulators exercise a high 
degree of precaution by simply banning any product (c.g. food additives) that can be 
shown to pose some level of risk to human health (e.g. carcinogens). While clearly 
motivated by a concern for human health, such outright bans ignore the potential 
societal benefits o f the banned products, as well as the probability o f risk posed by a 
given product, which in the case o f carcinogens can run the gamut from significant 
to minor. For this reason, regulators in the United States and elsewhere have moved 
over time towards other, less blunt approaches toward the regulation of risk.
According to Majonc’s second principle o f “least feasible risk,” for example, 
regulators are required to set standards that minimize risk “to the extent feasible." 
This is a more discriminating standard than outright prohibition, but it begs the 
question of technological or economic feasibility, and once again makes no 
distinction between significant and minor risks. For this reason, US lawmakers, 
regulators and courts moved during the 1970s and 1980s toward a third approach, in 
which the goal of regulators was not to eliminate all risk but rather significant risks, 
which in turn would require regulatory agencies to engage in scientific (and 
typically quantitative) risk assessments as the basis for new risk regulations. Fourth 
and finally, Majone argues, this gradual process of policy learning culminated in the 
use of cost-benefit analysis as the basis for all risk regulation. Such an approach 
involves not only the use of scientific risk assessments as the basis for assessing the 
risk of a new product or process, but also the economic calculation o f the potential 
costs and benefits o f proposed regulations, which would be adopted only if the net 
benefits to society from those regulations exceeded their costs. In the space of some 
three decades, Majone concludes, American policymakers, regulators and courts
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have progressed to a sophisticated approach to risk regulation, relying on scientific 
assessments of risk as well as economic assessments of costs and benefits 
—“an outstanding, and in many respects unique, case of policy learning” (Majone 
2003a: 26).
While a useful heuristic device to understand the range of possible approaches to 
regulating risk under uncertainty, Majone’s classification scheme simplifies a 
complex US response to risk, which even today combines elements of all four 
approaches under different laws and in different issue-areas. Even more importantly 
for our purposes, Majone’s ideal-typical progression fails to capture parallel 
developments in Europe, where risk regulation took place largely within national 
contexts until the 1980s, when EU institutions began to play an increasing role in 
harmonizing risk regulation across the EU’s various member states. In the EU 
context, David Vogel (2001) and others have argued, Europe’s approach to risk 
regulation has evolved quite differently than in the United States: whereas the 
former began with highly precautionary legislation in areas like the environment, 
consumer protection, and worker health and safety, only to adopt scientific risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis more recently, in Europe regulators have 
arguably become more precautionary and more risk-averse over time.' In effect, 
Vogel writes, US and EU risk regulation resemble “ships passing in the night,” with 
the EU becoming more precautionary and the US less precautionary over time. A 
central cause of this increasingly precautionary approach, Vogel and others argue, 
has been the long scries of European regulatory failures and crisis over the past 
several decades, including most notably the BSE or “mad cow” crisis discussed 
below. As we shall sec, these crises have weakened public trust in EU regulators 
and scientific risk assessments, increased support for highly precautionary 
regulations, and called into question the legitimacy of EU regulations and EU 
institutions in European public opinion. Responding to this crisis o f legitimacy, EU 
institutions have moved aggressively to overhaul EU risk regulation across a range 
o f areas, adopting strict new regulations for products and processes like genetically
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences...
“Between the 1960s and the 1990s,*’ Vogel writes, “a number of US regulations were more 
stringent, innovating and comprehensive than those adopted by European countries and the 
EC/EU. However, since the mid 1980s, this pattern has changed. Now in a number of 
significant areas o f regulatory policy. EU regulations are more stringent, innovative, and 
comprehensive than those adopted by the US. Prior to the mid 1980s, US policy-makers 
identified more products and processes as posing unacceptable risks to public health or the 
environment than did regulatory authorities in Europe. Now the latter regard a number of 
products and processes as posing unacceptable risks to consumers and the environment that 
US policy-makers do not. Since the mid 1980s, the political influence of constituencies 
favoring more risk averse regulatory policies have strengthened in Europe while since the 
early 1990s it has declined in the US. Likewise, since the mid 1980s regulatory politics and 
issues have become more politically salient in Europe, while since the early 1990s, they have 
declined in the US” (Vogel 2001 at 2-3).
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modified foods and crops and elevating the “precautionary principle” to the status 
of doctrine in EU regulation.3
Other scholars dispute Vogel’s “ships passing in the night” characterization o f 
US and EU risk regulation, noting that the purported “flip-flop” in US and EU 
approaches to risk regulation draws disproportionately from a few controversial 
issue-areas such as the use of growth hormones in beef cattle and the regulation of 
GMOs. In a wide-ranging survey of US and European risk regulation, Wiener and 
Rogers (2002) find a more complex set of outcomes, in which the US is more 
precautionary in some areas (e.g. nuclear energy, particulate air pollution) while the 
EU demonstrates greater precaution in others (e.g. GMOs, hormone-treated beef). 
“This broader analysis indicates that neither the US nor the EU is a more 
precautionary actor across the board, today or in the past. Relative precaution 
appears to depend more on the particular risk than on the country or the era” 
(Wiener and Rogers 2002: 322-23).
For this reason, we resist extrapolating from our study o f GMO regulation to the 
question of comparative precaution more generally, but we do emphasize the 
difficulty of biotechnology regulation qua risk regulation, which raises distinctive 
questions at the domestic level and in the context of international trade, 
environmental, and food-safety law.4 In any event, as we shall see, the United States 
and the European Union have taken starkly different approaches to the regulation of 
biotechnology, with the US opting in large part for science-based regulation 
undertaken largely by relatively independent regulatory agencies that have treated 
GM products as substantively similar to conventional foods; while the EU has 
adopted and elaborated a distinctive and separate system of approval and labelling 
for GM products system based on risk management by political bodies that take into 
account social and economic concerns as well as scientific risk assessment. These 
very different approaches to biotech regulation—reflecting different cultural 
attitudes toward food and agriculture, underlying differences in regulatory style, 
pressures from private interests, and contingent events such as the EU’s food-safety 
scandals of the 1990s—have in turn created significant trade frictions between the 
US and the EU, as we shall see below.
A. Regulating Biotechnology in the United States
Genetic modification and GMOs first became a concern for national and 
international regulators in the 1970s, as biological scientists began making
3 The literature on the precautionary principle in risk regulation has mushroomed in recent 
years: for a range o f supportive and critical views, see e.g. Bodansky 1991; Cameron and 
Abouchar 1991; European Commission 2000; Wiener and Rogers 2002; and Majone 2003b.
4 On risk regulation and EU governance, see e.g. Neyer 2000; Vos 2000; Joerges 2001b; Vogel 
2001; Abels 2002; Chalmers 2003; Majone 2003b.
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fundamental advances in recombinant DNA (rDNA) research.5 The debate over the 
regulation of such research is often dated to the international meeting of scientists at 
Asilomar, California, in 1975, which pointed to the promise of biotechnology but 
also called on the scientific community to exercise caution and restraint in the 
creation of genetically engineered organisms that might prove hazardous. In the 
United States, the Asilomar conference triggered a national debate over the 
regulation of biotechnology, with a number o f Congressional representatives 
introducing legislation that would ban or regulate rDNA research. At the same time, 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) created a Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee, which in June 1976 put forward a set of guidelines for rDNA research 
in the United States. By the late 1970s, initial public fears about the biohazards of 
laboratory biotech research had abated somewhat, and the US had meanwhile 
emerged as a world leader in biotechnology research. This led to strong support in 
the US Congress and the executive branch for a regulatory system capable of 
ensuring the safety of biotechnology research while at the same time encouraging 
the development of a potentially important high-tech sector.
In 1986, after public notice and comment, the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OISP) in the Reagan Administration issued a “Coordinated Framework for 
the Regulation of Biotechnology” that continues to shape US biotech regulation to 
this day. Crucially, the OISP concluded that the techniques of biotechnology are not 
inherently risky and that biotechnology could therefore be adequately regulated by 
existing federal regulators under existing statutes, obviating the need for new and 
dedicated legislation applying specifically to genetically modified organisms. More 
specifically, the Coordinated Framework establishes a division o f responsibility 
among the three primary US regulators, with the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) serving as the primary regulator of GM foods, while the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) arc charged with supervision of the planting of GM crops and the 
environmental impact of GMs with pesticidal characteristics.6
The Pure Food and Drugs Act (later expanded to the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act) delegates the primary responsibility for food safety regulation to an 
independent agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is authorized 
to inspect, test, approve, and set safety standards for foods, drugs, chemicals, 
cosmetics, and household and medical devices. Faced with the first applications
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences...
5 This section draws liberally from Lee Ann Patterson’s (2000: 319*32) analysis o f the early 
history of EU biotech regulation, as well as from Cantley’s (1995) detailed study.
6 For an excellent and up-to-date summary o f the US system, see Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology (2004). As the report (2004: 3) points out “The Central Premise o f  the 
Coordinated Framework is that the process o f biotechnology itself poses no unique risks and 
that products engineered by biotechnology should therefore be regulated under the same laws 
as conventionally produced products with similar compositions and intended uses.”
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from producers for the licensing o f GM foods and crops, the FDA decided in 1992 
(and reaffirmed in 2001) that GM foods were not substantially different than regular 
foods, and that it would therefore approve foods based on the health risks o f  the 
individual product, and not the process by which it is produced. In 1992, the FDA 
also ruled that neither any pre-market approval process nor any specific labelling 
would be required for genetically modified foods that were “substantially 
equivalent” to conventional foods and thus “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS).' 
Pre-market approval is only required by the FDA for products where the genetic 
manipulation has altered the substance and safety of the product (for example, by 
introducing new allergenic properties or changing the nutritional content of the food 
in question), in which case it is regulated as a “food additive.”7 8 Since the FDA made 
this determination, it has approved all subsequent genetically modified varieties 
without any labelling requirement. While the FDA would later prepare guidelines 
for manufacturers wishing to voluntarily label their foods either containing or not 
containing bioengineered ingredients, there remains at this writing no requirement 
for consumers to be informed that foods may contain such ingredients (Cantlcy 
1995: 566-73; Echols 1998: 538; Stewart and Johanson 1999: 248-49).
Parallel to the FDA’s activities, two other agencies play important roles in the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the United States. The USDA’s Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates the release o f new GM crops, 
which the agency categorizes as potential plant pests, into the environment. In 
practice, APHIS requires the developers of such crops to notify the agency o f field 
trials or obtain a license to conduct them, and the agency has licensed some 10,000 
field trials of new GM varieties as o f 2004. APHIS may also issue a finding that a 
given GM variety is not, in fact, a plant pest, and deregulate the crop for planting 
without restriction (a step taken for 61 varieties by 2004).9 The Environmental 
Protection Agency, finally, has responsibility under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) for regulating the use of pesticides, 
including genetically modified plant-incorporated protectants (PIPs) such as Bt com, 
which incorporates resistance to pests as a result of genetic modification (Taylor 
1996; EPA 2003, Young 2003).10 1The EPA, like the FDA, operates as an 
independent regulatory agency, while the USDA is a cabinet office under the
7 See FDCA § 409; 21 USC § 348.
8 Pew Initiative 2004:14. Pre-market approval, however, is required by the EPA for products 
with bioengineered pesticidal characteristics, as noted above.
9 Ibid, p. 8; see also US Mission to the European Union, “USDA Announces First Steps to 
Update Biotech Rules,*’ http://www.useu.be/Categories/Biotech/Jan2204USUpdateBiotcch 
Rules.html, accessed on 11 June 2004.
10 For a complete list of PIPs registered with the EPA, see the EPA website at 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/reg o f  biotcch/cparegofhiotech.htm, accessed on
11 June 2004.
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leadership of the Secretary o f Agriculture; all three o f these regulators, moreover, 
arc subject to the extensive administrative law requirements of the US 
Administrative Procedure Act, requiring prior notice and comment of all proposed 
regulations, which are also subject to judicial review before federal courts. More 
generally, the US system has been characterized by strong federal institutions, 
significant independence o f regulators from political pressures, extensive reliance 
on scientific risk assessment in regulatory decisions, and industry self-regulation, all 
of which stand in stark contrast to the historically decentralized and increasingly 
politicized food safety system of the European Union. This remains the case despite 
some degree of administrative fragmentation among the three lead agencies and 
some concern about gaps in the regulatory framework under existing US legislation.
B. Regulating Biotechnology in the European Union
The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community made no explicit 
mention of an EU policy for biotechnology, or even for the closely related areas of 
environmental and food-safety policy, which remain primarily a national 
responsibility within each o f the 15 member states. Nevertheless, just as the federal 
government in the United States used its interstate commerce authority to regulate 
food safety in the early 20th century, so the Union has developed a de facto  policy 
on biotechnology over the past three decades, as the EU’s policies on agriculture 
and the establishment of an internal market for biotech products have “spilled over” 
into the regulation of the content and labelling of European food products. By 
comparison with the United States, however, EU regulation o f biotechnology 
remained a much less centralized and incomplete regulatory patchwork, with a 
decision-making process in which the key decisions were taken not by a specialized 
regulatory agency like the FDA, but by political bodies such as the Council of 
Ministers, Commission, and European Parliament, in an uneasy cooperation with 
competent authorities in each of the member states.
The first comprehensive legislation for the regulation of biotechnology in the 
EU came in 1990, with the adoption of two directives by the EU Council of 
Ministers: Directive 90/219 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified 
Microorganisms, which regulates the use of GMOs in laboratory settings, and 
Directive 90/220 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, which governed for over a decade the approval, planting, and 
marketing of GM foods and crops within the Union and is therefore particularly 
important for our purposes here.
The Commission’s (1988) proposal for a “deliberate release” Directive began by 
noting the extraordinary diversity of existing national regulations across the various 
member states, including: (a) a ban on deliberate release (subject to exceptions) in 
Denmark and Germany; (b) a case-by-case approach to the release of individual 
GMOs in a number of member states (UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and
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Luxembourg); and (c) an absence of legislation in other member states (Ireland, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal).11 The Commission’s proposal emphasized the 
scientific uncertainty associated with genetic engineering, and therefore proposed 
an EU regulatory scheme that would provide for case-by-case assessment and 
authorization of the release of all new GM varieties into the environment. Hence, by 
contrast with the US FDA, which elected to regulate GM foods only in terms of 
their final characteristics as products, the European Union elected from the outset to 
apply distinctive regulations to GM foods as a function of the process through 
which they were developed.
More specifically, the Commission’s proposal would require any individual 
wishing to release GMOs into the environment (e.g. for farming or marketing) to 
notify and provide a detailed risk assessment to the competent regulatory authority 
of the EU member state in which the release was proposed. That member state 
would then be charged with evaluating the application in line with the provisions of 
the directive. If the member state rejected the proposal, the procedure would end. 
but if the member state accepted the proposal, the dossier would then be forwarded 
to the Commission and to the other member governments, which would have a 
limited period to object to the authorization. If no objections were put forward, the 
product would be authorized for release and/or placement on the market throughout 
the EU. By contrast, if one or more member governments or the Commission 
objected, the Commission would then undertake its own assessment and formulate a 
decision to approve or deny the application. The Commission’s draft decision 
would be circulated to an advisory committee of member-state representatives, of 
whose opinion the Commission would have to take “utmost account;” the final 
decision, however, would remain with the Commission. In a final acknowledgement 
of member-state prerogatives, however, the Commission proposed a “safeguard 
procedure” whereby a member state could, if  it had evidence of a serious risk to 
people or the environment from a previously approved GMO, “provisionally restrict 
or prohibit the use or sale of that product on its territory.” Once again, however, the 
member state in question would have to inform the Commission o f  its actions and 
give reasons for its decision, and the Commission would retain the power to 
approve or reject the measures in question.
The European Parliament—which has emerged as a consistent champion of 
strict regulation of biotechnology over the past two decades—criticized the 
Commission proposal as being too lax on a number of points, and proposed a 
number o f amendments that would have substantially tightened regulatory' 
restrictions on the approval of new' GMOs. The US government, by contrast, 
criticized both the Commission proposal and the Parliament’s proposed
11 See also European Parliament 1989, Cantlcy 1995, and Patterson 2000 for good discussions of 
existing national regulations.
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amendments as unnecessarily strict and arbitrary, particularly insofar as they 
proposed to regulate all GMOs regardless of the characteristics o f the products to 
which they gave rise.12
The Council of Ministers followed the broad lines of the original Commission 
proposal, thus rebuffing the core US objections, while at the same time rejecting the 
Parliament’s most far-reaching amendments. The Council did, however, modify the 
procedure whereby the Commission could issue approvals for new GM varieties: 
Whereas the original text provided for the Commission decision to be subject only 
to an advisoiv committee of member-state representatives, the final text featured a 
more constraining “regulatory committee,” which could approve a draft 
Commission decision by a qualified majority vote. If the regulatory committee did 
not approve the decision, however, it was to be sent to the Council of Ministers, 
which could approve the Commission decision by qualified majority or reject it by a 
unanimous vote. If the Council failed to act within three months, the directive 
provided that “the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission” (Article 
21). Finally—and significantly, in light o f later developments—the Council retained 
a slightly modified version of the Commission’s safeguard clause, whereby a 
member state could, on the basis of new evidence about risks to human health or the 
environment, “provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that product 
on its territory” (Article 16). The member state in question would be required to 
inform the Commission, which would approve or reject the measures in cooperation 
with the regulatory committee mentioned above.13
In 1997, the regulatory structure of Directive 90/220 was supplemented by 
Regulation 258/97, the so-called Novel Foods Regulation.14 According to the terms
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12 “By basing the Directive on the technique by which the organism is modified, the EC is 
regulating organisms produced by a given process. This is not a functional category directly 
related with the characteristics of the organism. As expressed in the US coordinated 
framework for the regulation of biotechnology, the US generally regulates products rather 
than the process by which they are obtained. We are concerned whether differences in 
approaches and their implementation may lead to difficulties in our attempts to achieve 
international harmonization. It is important to understand that whether an organism is 
‘unmodified* or ‘genetically modified* is, in itself, not a useful determinant of safety or risk." 
US Government, “International Harmonization in the Biotechnology Field,” 7 July 1989, 
quoted in Cantley 1995: 559.
13 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment 
of genetically modified organisms, Official Journal o f  the European Communities LI 17 of 
08/05/1990, pp. 15-27.
14 Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 of the European and o f  the Council o f 27 January 1997 
Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, Official Journal L 043, 14/02/1997, pp. 
1-6. For excellent analyses of the regulation, see also Hunter (1999: 217-225) and 
Commission of the European Communities, “Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients,” 
http://europa/eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/
121119.htm, accessed on 11 April 2004.
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of the regulation, “novel foods” were defined as all foods and food ingredients that 
had “not hitherto been used for human consumption to a significant degree w ithin 
the Community” and included both foods that had been genetically modified as well 
as foods produced from, but not containing, GMOs (for example, oils processed 
from genetically modified crops but no longer containing any traces o f  G M  
material).15 The regulation established an authorization procedure similar to that o f  
Directive 90/220, as well as labelling requirements for all approved GMOs used in 
food and foodstuffs. Significantly, however, the regulation also went on to provide a 
simplified regulatory procedure for foods derived from, but no longer containing, 
GMOs, provided that those foods remained “substantially equivalent” to existing 
foods in terms o f “their composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended use 
and the level o f undesirable substances contained therein.” Such a determination 
would be made by the competent authority in the member state receiving the 
application, and would be notified to the Commission, which would in turn notify 
the other member states. In practice, this provision would prove to be significant in 
the coming years, as member states would approve a number of products as being 
“substantially equivalent” to their conventional counterparts.16
Finally, and again significantly in terms o f later developments, the regulation 
(like the earlier Directive 90/220) contained a safeguard clause allowing member 
states, “as a result of new information or a reassessment of existing information” to 
“temporarily restrict or suspend the trade in and use of the food or food ingredient 
in question in its territory” (Article 12). Once again, any member state invoking 
such safeguards would be required to inform the Commission, giving the grounds 
for its decision, and the Commission would rule on the legality of the safeguard in 
cooperation with the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs.
By comparison with the US system, the regulatory structure established by 
Directive 90/220 and Regulation 258/97 was more complex, more decentralized, 
and more politicized than the US system, with more potential “veto players“ 
capable of blocking the approval o f new GM varieties or even the release and 
marketing of EU-approved varieties (Young 2003: 465). In practice, moreover, the 
implementation o f  the new regulations became inextricably and controversially 
linked to a series o f food-safety scandals that rocked the Union during the 1990s, 
most notably the BSE scandal that struck in 1996. In March of that year, the British 
government of Prime Minister John Major revealed a possible connection between
15 The regulation would not apply to food additives, flavorings, or extraction solvents, governed 
by other EU legislation (Article 2).
16 By contrast, no products consisting o f or containing live GMOs have been authorized under 
the terms of the Novel Foods Regulation at this writing. See Commission of the European 
Communities, “Question and Answers on the Regulation o f GMOs in the EU, 
MEMO/02/160-REV o f 4 March 2003.
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Creutzfcldt-Jacob Disease, a fatal disease for humans, and bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), a disease spread among cattle through their consumption of 
contaminated feed, popularly known as "mad cow disease.” The BSE outbreak 
infected some 150,000 cattle in the UK, triggering a wide-scale slaughter o f cattle, a 
Community ban on the export of British beef, a plummet in beef sales throughout 
Europe, and a loss of consumer confidence in regulatory officials. The crisis did not 
abate quickly, moreover, with France and Germany reporting new outbreaks o f the 
disease in 2000 and 2001. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the BSE 
scandal raised the question of risk regulation "to the level of high politics, and 
indeed of constitutional significance” (Chalmers 2003: 534-538), generating 
extraordinary public awareness of food safety issues and widespread public distrust 
of regulators and scientific assessments.17
It was in this socio-political context that genetically modified crops were first 
commercially introduced in the United States and Europe. In April 1996, within a 
month of the ban on British beef, the Commission approved the sale of genetically 
modified soy products over member state objections. In November 1996, GM soy 
was imported from the United States to the EU, spurring widespread protest by 
Greenpeace and other groups. Soybeans are ingredients in more than half of 
processed foods, and the US shipped between 25 and 40% of its soybeans to the EU 
(Vogel 2003: 10). In short, widespread media coverage and public debate about GM 
foods began just as the BSE food crisis struck, which helped link the two issues 
before the European public (Anscll et al. 2003).18
Two other events occurred in late 1996 that add important context to the 
contestation that was to engulf EU decision-making over GMOs. In December 1996, 
a Scottish scientist announced to the world the first successful reproduction of a 
cloned mammal, a sheep named "Dolly,” suggesting that the cloning o f humans 
could follow shortly. The announcement spurred ethical challenges to 
biotechnology research. Also in December, the United States and Canada lodged
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17 A study showed that around 90% of US citizens believed the US Department o f Agriculture's 
statements on biotechnology, whereas 12% of Europeans stated that they trusted national 
regulators. See Vogel 2003, citing J. Enriquez and R.A. Goldberg, “Transforming Life, 
Transforming Business: The Life Science Revolution, Harvard Business Review, Mar.-Apr. 
2000, published at http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu/products/hbr/marapr00/R00203.htm!. Vogel 
notes that, in the BSE scandal, “the European Commission had relied on the advice of the 
Scientific Veterinary Committee, which was chaired by a British scientist and primarily 
reflected the thinking of the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—advice 
w'hjch subsequently proved flawed.” Id. at 27.
18 To give just one example o f this pattern, the European Voice published two half-page articles 
under the topic "Survey: Consumer Protection” in its weekly edition of April 13, 2000. The 
article on the top half o f the page is entitled “Spate o f health scares pushes food safety to top 
of the EU agenda.” while that on the bottom half is entitled “Union faces dilemmas as it 
debates new GMO rules.” See European Voice, 13-19 April 2000, at 15.
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complaints before the World Trade Organization challenging the EU’s ban on 
hormone-treated beef on the grounds that the EU ban constituted a disguised barrier 
to trade and was not scientifically justified. The WTO judicial bodies subsequently 
held against the EU, and, when the EU failed to comply with the ruling, authorized 
the United States and Canada to adopt retaliatory tariffs on EU farm products, 
leading in turn to widespread protests among European farmers and anti­
globalization activists (sec below).
The close succession of these events illustrates how the popular understanding 
of GM products in Europe became associated with consumer anxieties related to 
food safety crises, distrust of regulators and scientific assessments, disquiet over 
corporate control of agricultural production, ethical unease over genetic 
modification techniques, environmental concerns, and anger over the use by the 
United States of international trade rules to attempt to force “unnatural” foods on 
Europeans. A widespread cross-sectoral movement organized to oppose GMOs in 
Europe, bringing together environmentalists, consumers, and small fanners. The 
movement operated at multiple levels, working the media and local and national 
political processes, coordinating transnationally, and lobbying the Commission and 
EP (Ansell et al 2003). The British media dubbed GM products “Frankenstein" 
foods, playing off fears that scientists and public officials could not control the 
release of GM products. European negative attitudes toward GM crops and foods 
rose rapidly. In early 1996, 46% of the French were against GMOs, a figure that 
rose to 65% in 1999, and 75% in 2002. Similarly, over 80% of Germans expressed 
negative opinions about GMOs in late 1998 (Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003).
In the midst of the fray, the Commission approved the sale of another GM food 
crop (Bt com) in January 1997, over the objection or abstention of all but one o f  the 
fifteen member states (Bradley 1998). The Commission was able to do so because 
of the approval procedure set forth in Directive 90/220. As we saw, a member state 
(in this case France) could approve a GM variety and forward its decision to the 
Commission and the other member states so that the variety could be marketed 
throughout the EU. Since some member states objected to this approval, the 
Commission reviewed the dossier, which it did favourably. The Commission then 
submitted a draft authorization to the regulatory committee consisting of a 
representative from each member state. Eight member state representatives on the 
committee abstained or voted against the approval, so that the Commission 
forwarded its proposal to the Council (operating as the Environment Council). 
However, the Council could only amend the Commission’s proposal by a 
unanimous vote, and France announced that it supported the Commission’s 
authorization (Bradley 1998, 212). As a result, even though fourteen member states 
refused to support the Commission, the approval went forward.
The member states did not simply accept the Commission’s decision. They 
undermined its implementation, invoking the safeguard clause of Directive 90/220
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which allowed a member state could prohibit an approved GM variety in its 
territory if it had “justifiable reasons to consider that [the] product [...] constitutes a 
risk to human health or the environment.” Austria was the first act, promptly 
prohibiting the cultivation and marketing of the GM maize variety on February 14, 
1997. Luxembourg followed suit on March 17. Overtime, moreover, member-state 
deployment of safeguards bans grew, undermining the central purpose of Directive 
90/220 to create a single market for GM crops under a harmonized regulatory 
system. By January 2004, nine member-state safeguards, applied by Austria, France, 
Greece, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, were in effect (European 
Commission 2004b). The Commission forwarded to the regulatory committee a 
proposal to initiate a legal challenge against these member state bans, but proceeded 
no further when the committee refused to support it.
Opponents of GMOs worked not only the political process, they took their battle 
to the marketplace as well. Under pressure from potential consumer boycotts of 
their foods, many large European retailers refused to buy or sell GM foods. The EU 
trade association Euro Commerce demanded that US producers and distributors 
segregate and label GM soybeans. Major purchasers of soybean imports into the EU, 
such as Unilever, simply refused to buy US soybeans (Vogel 2001: 10). Monsanto 
organized a media campaign to raise support for GM products, but the campaign 
backfired, having served primarily to increase public awareness that GM food 
products had arrived or were on their way. Surveys in the UK and France indicated 
that negative perceptions of GMOs rose following the Monsanto advertising 
campaign (Vogel 2001: 12). Thus, although GM soy and maize varieties had been 
legally authorized for marketing throughout the EU and validated by risk 
assessments conducted by EU scientific committees,19 they were subject to member 
state bans and were barely commercialized at all (Vogel 2001: 11).
Responding to the popular backlash against GMOs, a group of member states 
pronounced in June 1999 the need to impose a moratorium on approvals of GM 
products, pending the adoption of a new and stricter regulatory system, including 
provisions regarding the labelling and traceability of GM food and crops “from 
fann to fork.”20 Since the earlier date of October 1998 (when two GM varieties of
19 The Scientific Committee on Plants issued 16 favorable opinions on applications for placing 
GM plant varieties on the market under Directive 90/220/EEC, and only one unfavorable 
opinion “due to an insufficient risk assessment,” resulting in the withdrawal o f the application. 
See Commission mcmo/02/160, Oct. 15, 2002 (questions and answers on the regulation of 
GMOs in the EU).
20 In an annex to the press release of the Environment Council meeting in Luxembourg on June 
24/25 1999, the Danish, French, Greek, Italian and Luxembourg delegations declared: “The 
Governments of the following Member States (Denmark, Greece, France, Italy and 
Luxembourg), in exercising the powers vested in them regarding the growing and placing on 
the market of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), [...] point to the importance of the
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carnations were approved), no GM varieties had been authorized for sale in the EU 
market, the only exception being for foods derived from GM varieties deemed 
“equivalent” to traditional foods under the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. For the 
next five years, a blocking minority of member governments within the Council 
would obstruct the authorization o f any new GM variety, pending the adoption of a 
revised EU regulatory framework (see below).
By the late 1990s, then, the US and the EU had adopted significantly different 
regulatory standards and distinct regulatory systems, summarized in Table 1 
(adapted from Young 2003). By contrast with the US system, predicated on science- 
based decision-making conducted largely by independent regulatory agencies, the 
EU system featured decision-making by political bodies based on criteria that 
included social and economic considerations alongside scientific ones. In practice, 
these distinctive regulatoiy systems were reflected in different regulatory standards, 
with more rapid approvals and less onerous restrictions in the US case than in the 
EU.
The impact of the EU’s moratorium and its stricter standards was felt almost 
immediately in the United States, where around two-thirds of all GM crops are 
grown. US exports o f soy to the EU were valued at SI.5 billion in 1998, about 
thirteen times the value o f lost beef sales to the EU in the earlier WTO dispute, but 
these sales have since fallen by over $400 million.21 Moreover, the use of GM 
varieties developed and patented in the United States was spreading to other 
countries, including such leading agricultural producers as Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, and China, increasing the profit potential for US biotech firms. In light of the 
growth and prospects of agricultural biotechnology for US fanners and industry, 
their trade associations pressured US authorities to challenge European trade 
restrictions bilaterally and under WTO rules. The Clinton and later the Bush 
Administrations initially resisted these pressures for litigation, fearing a populist 
backlash among European consumers, yet these demands remained and grew 
increasingly vocal as the EU moratorium continued through five successive years 
(Pollack and Shaffer 2001).
------------------------------------------------------( contd )
Commission submitting without delay full draft rules ensuring labeling and traceability of 
GMOs and GMO-derived products and state that, pending the adoption of such rules, in 
accordance with preventive and precautionary principles, they will take steps to have any new 
authorizations for growing and placing on the market suspended.” Council of Ministers. 
2194lil Council meeting -  Environment -  Luxembourg, June 24-25, 1999, Press 203. 
Nr 9406/99.
21 See United States Department o f Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Bico Commodity 
Aggregations, March 20, 2004 (noting decline o f US soy imports into the EU from US$1.534 
billion in 1998 to US$1.113 billion in 2003. Available on-line at http://www.fas.usda.gov/ 
ustrdscripts/USReport.exe (visited March 20,2004).
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Tabic 1
Summary of US and EU Approaches to Biotechnology Regulation
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences...
L A m R &  4
■ View of biotech Substantiallyequivalent
Inherently 
different (de 
facto)
"v; : • J|?r . ' ' lÉIs? 1
Approach to risk 
management: Sound science
Precautionary;
principle
-.-r'v ;;x.” r'y 9 ¿¿¿r&r? • : / /X
Decision-making
style Administrative Political (de facto)
:ltf:i\r . ■' ..
Pre-release
notification
Field tests -  
mandatory
••C y y .
Pesticides -  
mandatory Mandatory
. ...
Foods -  voluntary 
if GRAS
Approval required Field tests -  yes y
Pesticides yes Yes
Foods — no if 
GRAS •
Labelling Only in specific instances Mandatory ■
Source: Abbreviated from Young 2003:466
Caught in the middle between member governments intent on evcr-strictcr 
regulations on the one hand, and a US criticizing the moratorium and the proposed 
regulations on labelling and traceability on the other, the Commission pursued a 
dual-track strategy, proposing a series o f new EU regulations to satisfy member- 
state demands while calling repeatedly for a resumption of GM approvals by the EU. 
This campaign would finally bear fruit in 2004, when the Commission approved the 
first new GM variety to be licensed in the EU since 1998. In the meantime, however, 
the transatlantic dispute over biotechnology regulation threatened to escalate into a 
full-blown trade war, spurring repeated attempts by the two sides to resolve their 
differences in bilateral or multilateral forums.
III. The NTA and Bilateral Regulatory Cooperation
As it happens, the emergence of the transatlantic biotechnology dispute coincided 
with the establishment of the New Transatlantic Agenda (1995) and the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (1998), both o f which represented efforts by
183
GREGORY C. SHAFFER and MARK A. POLLACK
Washington and Brussels to deepen their economic tics and to address long­
standing trade tensions. One of the core elements of the NTA and TEP programs 
was the establishment of informal and (increasingly) formal regulatory cooperation 
between US and EU regulators in various issue-areas (Pollack 2003). As early as 
1991, the Commission Directorate-General for Competition signed a regulatory 
cooperation agreement with the US Federal Trade Commission and the Department 
of Justice, instituting an ambitious and largely successful program of day-to-day 
cooperation and information-sharing in cases of mutual interest. Later, the US and 
EU established formal Mutual Recognition Agreements in half a dozen economic 
sectors, in which the EU and the US would recognize the validity of each others* 
testing and certification procedures, and additional cooperation agreements were to 
follow in other issue-areas such as data privacy, where the US/EU Safe Harbour 
Agreement provided an innovative mechanism whereby US firms could be certified 
as meeting the EU’s more demanding data-privacy requirements (Shaffer 2003).
In the context o f  the NTA and the TEP, biotechnology was quickly identified as 
an area in which a structured dialogue among regulators might build mutual 
understanding and trust, provide early warning of disputes, and perhaps in time 
contribute to a gradual convergence of regulatory approaches to GM foods and 
crops. Throughout the late 1990s, therefore, the US and EU established numerous 
working groups o f technical transgovemmental and scientific experts to exchange 
information relating to GMOs.22 For example, the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda 
set up a High Level Environment Consultation Group which was to work in 
conjunction with a Permanent Technical Working Group. The latter was to bring 
together representatives from the EU’s Environment and External Relations 
Dircctorates-General and from the Office o f the United States Trade Representative, 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Department of Agriculture. This 
group was soon complemented by two new groups focusing on information 
exchange over biotech issues: the Agrifood Biotech Group (which consisted of 
governmental representatives from the Commission’s agricultural and industry 
dircctorates-general and the US Department of Agriculture and USTR) and the US- 
EC Task Force on Biotechnology Research (which coordinated workshops bringing 
together US and European scientists). Then, in connection with the 1998 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership, the two trading partners set up yet another 
group—the TEP Biotech Group—to coordinate discussions and information-
22 The US Congress had, a few years earlier, explicitly amended the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act to instruct the FDA “to move toward the acceptance of mutual recognition 
agreements relating to the regulation o f  drugs, biological products, devices, foods... between 
the European Unions and the United States/’ See  FFDCA, 2 1 USC 383(c)(2) (1994).
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exchange, this time focusing on the trade effects of each side’s regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology.23
By and large, however, the output of these working groups was considered 
disappointing by both sides.24 25Despite years of regular dialogue, the two sides never 
progressed to a formal cooperation agreement in the biotech sector; nor was there 
any clear sign of convergence in the views of US and EU regulators as a result of 
their dialogue. In 1999, for example, Commission officials consulted widely with 
their US counterparts in designing the fledgling European Food Safety Authority, 
examining the structure and procedures o f the FDA closely as a potential model; the 
Commission’s eventual proposal for the EFSA, however, drew at best selectively on 
the FDA model, accepting the role o f independent agencies in scientific risk 
assessment, but insisting that risk management continue to be undertaken by 
political bodies such as the Commission, Council, and European Parliament." The 
FDA and the Commission therefore remained very different types of regulators 
guided by distinctive mandates, with the FDA in particular refusing to consider any 
serious challenge to its model of independent and science-based decision-making 
(which US officials privately referred to as the “gold standard” of biotech 
regulation), and the Commission politically unable or unwilling to move towards a 
truly independent regulatory agency along the lines of the FDA.
As little progress was made among US and EU governmental representatives, 
the US and EU decided to fonn two transatlantic civil groups in November 1999: a 
transatlantic scientific advisory committee consisting of scientists specifically 
working on genetically modified organisms, and an EU-US Biotechnology 
Consultative Forum composed of twenty independent experts charged with 
examining the issues posed by biotechnology for regulators on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In the optimistic words o f acting EU ambassador to the US John 
Richardson, these groups could help forge “a transatlantic consensus on where we 
go with biotechnology in the future” (Yerkey 1999: 2025). The Consultative Forum 
issued its final report, a consensual document representing the views of a range of 
European and American experts, in December 2000 (EU-US Biotechnology 
Consultative Forum 2000). The report was welcomed by both sides, and indeed
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23 European Commission, “ Biotechnology in Bilateral and Multilateral Fora," mimeo, Brussels, 
25 July 2000.
24 The TEP Biotech Group, for example, is known to have met three times in 1999 and once in 
2000, but the authors know o f no subsequent meetings of this group. Interviews, US and EU 
Commission officials, Brussels, July 2002.
25 Official Journal o f  the European Communities, C 96 E, 27.3.2001, p. 247.
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offered each side a partial endorsement o f its own views.26 Following this initial 
expression of support, however, the report itself was essentially shelved by both 
sides, which have scarcely ever made reference to it in the subsequent years o f  
conflict over the issue.
Along similar lines, finally, both the United States and the European U nion 
fostered the development of official “civil-society dialogues” among business, 
consumers, environmentalists, and labour unions. Although the latter two groups 
met only a few times and are currently defunct, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have both met regularly 
since the mid-1990s and both have taken clear stances on the regulation o f 
biotechnology. The TABD established an Agri-Food Biotechnology Group to 
conduct studies and prepare recommendations, and throughout the 1990s the TABD 
generally adopted a position aligned with that of the United States, calling for 
compatible standards between the US and the EU to promote transatlantic trade in 
GMOs and arguing that mandatory labelling of GMOs “unfairly discriminates 
among identical or like products” (TABD 2002). Faced with increasing public 
opposition to GMOs, however, as well as organizational difficulties among the 
CEOs who constituted its membership, the TABD has since taken a much lower 
profile on the issue of biotechnology regulation, with no mention o f GMOs or 
biotechnology in its 2004 annual report (TABD 2004; Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2001). By contrast, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue has been 
consistently active on the issue of biotechnology regulation since the 1990s, with 
US consumer organizations joining their European colleagues in calling for 
mandatory pre-market approval o f all GMOs as well as mandatory labelling and 
traceability provisions. Clearly closer to the EU position than the US position on 
biotech regulation, the TACD has also called on several occasions for the US to 
abandon its WTO complaint against the EU, warning of “a ‘pyrrhic victory’ by the 
US given tire reaction of European consumers” (TACD 2004; see also TACD 2003). 
In recent years, however, TACD representatives have grown increasingly frustrated 
at their apparently limited influence upon and access to US leaders in particular; 
hence the main importance of the TACD thus far appears to be its impact on US
26 The report, for instance, endorsed the precautionary principle as a core element of biotech 
regulation, and also called for mandatory pre-approval of all GMOs, including those generally 
recognized as safe—both core elements o f the EU regulatory procedure; sec European 
Commission, ‘'Commentary on the Report by the Commission Services." 
http://europa.eu.int/comrn/extemal_relations/us/biotcch/cc_commentary.htm, accessed on 11 
June 2004. By contrast, the US State Department highlighted the report's emphasis on the 
potentially beneficial effects of biotechnology as well as its discussion o f openness and 
transparency in the regulatory process—“many of [which] are already a part of the US 
regulatory system.” See US Department o f State, “Fact Sheet: Report of US-EU 
Biotechnology Consultative Forum,” 19 December 2000, http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_ 
12 /alia/a0121901 .htm. accessed on 11 June 2004.
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consumer groups, which have been regularly exposed to the more critical views of 
their European counterparts (see section V-B  below).
IV. Multilateral Forums: Transatlantic Contestation 
in Three International Regimes
By the late 1990s, the anti-GMO movement was rapidly moving beyond the 
European Union, potentially affecting not only US exports to Europe, but also 
around the world. Japan and Korea, two WTO members traditionally raising 
barriers to US agricultural exports, announced that they would tighten approval 
procedures for genetically modified varieties and require mandatory labelling of 
genetically modified seeds and foods (Saegusa 1999; Aritake 1999; Pruzin 2000). In 
the Japanese market, prices for GMO-free varieties were surging, companies and 
department chains were advertising GMO-free foods, and a new GMO-inspection 
industry was developing (Aritake 1999). Even Australia and New Zealand, large 
agricultural exporters, announced in 1999 that they would require labelling of all 
GMO-dcrived foods (University of Illinois 1999; 60). The majority of developing 
countries, generally concerned over the expansion of patent and other rights over 
seeds and plant varieties, supported a move toward a restrictive new treaty on 
genetically modified foods, criticizing the monopoly rights that large US and 
European finns hold over new seed technologies. Some, such as Thailand, also 
welcomed new price premiums available for their GMO-free varieties. The 
Brazilian state of Rio Grande de Sul even declared itself a GMO-free zone in the 
hope of assuring and attracting foreign buyers of its crops (Shea 2000), and in 2002 
the African countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique rejected food aid 
from the United States that was produced using biotechnology. The United States 
responded forcefully to these developments. In a June, 2003, speech to the 
Biotechnology Industrial Organization (BIO), President George Bush denounced 
EU limits on the imports of GMOs based on “unfounded, unscientific fears... For 
the sake of a continent threatened by famine,” Bush continued, “I urge the European 
governments to end their opposition to biotechnology.”27
In this context, neither the US nor the EU limited its attention to bilateral 
discussions. Rather, both actors sought systematically to “export” their respective 
regulatory approaches and philosophies within each of the three relevant 
multilateral regimes, namely the World Trade Organization and its related 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), dealing with
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27 United States Mission to the European Union, “Bush: Biotech Key to Fighting Global Hunger, 
Terrorism.” 23 June 2003, http://www.useu.be/Categories/Biotech/June2303Bush 
Biotech/html, accessed on 11 June 2004. The African situation was also invoked in the US's 
WTO complaint; see e.g. “US Argues EC GMO Moratorium Hurts Developing Countries,” 
Bridges Weekly World Trade Digest, Vol. 8, No, 15, 28 April 2004.
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trade-related aspects of GM foods and crops; the Biosafety Protocol signed at 
Cartagena in 2000, dealing with the environmental implications o f GMOs; and the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, dealing with food-safety issues. Consistent with 
the preferences and views discussed above, the United States has sought within each 
of these forums to export its relatively science-based approach to biotechnology 
regulation, while the European Union has sought to secure international recognition 
for its approach and in particular for its interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
The result thus far in each of the three regimes has been an untidy compromise 
between the two positions, with no clear victory for either side and little or no 
evidence o f convergence of views on the central issues.
A. The WTO and the SPS Agreement
Differences among, national risk regulations can create significant non-tariff 
barriers to trade in agricultural and food products. The problem of non-tariff barriers 
caused by differences in national risk regulation was addressed explicitly in the 
1994 WTO Agreement on the Application o f Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement), which was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Agreements that created the WTO and its binding dispute settlement system. The 
SPS Agreement does not establish international standards for biotechnology or 
other food-safety questions (a role left to the Codex Alimentarius Commission; see 
below), nor does it automatically pre-empt the adoption of non-discriminatory 
national food safety regulations that might inhibit international trade. However, the 
Agreement does incorporate and promote the adoption of international standards 
and establishes trade rules that limit the ability of states to adopt trade-restrictive 
regulations without scientific support. The SPS Agreement places the onus on a 
state that would restrict trade through national regulations to demonstrate that such 
regulations are based on scientific risk assessments, and arc not otherwise disguised 
restrictions on trade. The terms of the SPS Agreement, are, moreover, binding under 
international trade law, and enforceable before WTO dispute settlement panels and 
the WTO Appellate Body.28
Not surprisingly, given the importance o f transatlantic trade in foodstuffs, the 
political pressure from EU farmers to protect the EU market and from US farmers 
to open it, and the differences in the US and EU regulatory systems, the first and 
most important food safety dispute under the SPS Agreement was brought by the 
United States against the European Union, over the issue of honnone-treated beef. 
The dispute began in 1989, when the European Union (acting under the terms of a 
1988 directive) instituted a ban on the use o f synthetic growth honnones in beef 
cattle, and prohibited the import o f animals, or meat from animals, that had been 
treated with such hormones. Although the EU Directive had been adopted primarily
28 For good discussions, see Victor, 2000: 865-937; and Howse, 2000: 2329.
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on the grounds of European consumer concerns about the safety of hormone-treated 
beef, the ban had an immediate and dramatic impact on beef producers in the United 
States, where some ninety percent of all beef cattle are treated with synthetic growth 
hormones, and where FDA studies have consistently shown that the growth 
hormones in question are safe for human consumption.
In 1995, after the entry into force of the SPS Agreement and the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the US initiated legal action against the EU, alleging that 
the EU ban was inconsistent with the terms of the SPS Agreement because it was 
not based on scientific evidence, a risk assessment, or agreed international standards, 
and it arbitrarily differentiated between products. The EU, by contrast, argued that 
the SPS Agreement acknowledges the right of states to determine the appropriate 
level of health protection for their consumers, and that the ban was justified under 
the precautionary principle (Seilheimer 1998: 544-45). A WTO dispute settlement 
panel was established in May 1996, and issued its report in favour of the US in 
August 1997. The EU appealed the panel’s decision, and the WTO Appellate Body 
issued a second report in January 1998, once again in favour of the United States. 
The WTO panel and appellate decisions were both complex, involving hundreds of 
pages of scientific testimony and legal reasoning. While the Appellate Body 
overrode the panel’s assessment on several issues, it agreed that the EU had failed 
to base its beef-hormone ban on a scientific risk assessment, undermining the EU’s 
claims that the ban was adopted to protect human health (see Seilheimer 1998: 
546-59). In response to the EU’s invocation of the precautionary principle, both the 
original panel and the Appellate Body found that the precautionary principle could 
not override the express provisions of the SPS Agreement, in particular the 
requirement of a risk assessment (Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement).29 In 
accordance with the Appellate Body’s findings, the Dispute Settlement Body ruled 
in February 1998 that the EU ban was inconsistent with the terms of the SPS 
Agreement, and instructed the EU to bring its regulations into compliance by no 
later than 13 May 1999.
Facing continuing pressure from its own consumers, however, and hopeful of 
producing additional scientific findings that might justify the ban, the EU failed to 
act, and the US retaliated on 17 May 1999, applying tariffs in the amount o f $116.8 
million targeted against specific EU products such as foie gras, Rocquefort cheese 
and Dijon mustard. These US tariffs in turn sparked a wave of protests among 
French and other European fanners, including an attack in August 1999 by a group 
of French fanners on a McDonald’s restaurant, selected as the symbol of the threat
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29 Article 5.1 provides, “Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are 
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal, 
plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant 
international organizations.”
189
GREGORY C. SHAFFER and MARK A. POLLACK
of both American cuisine and globalization to French traditions.30 Although the 
leader of the farmer’s group, Jose Bove, was jailed for his part in the attack, he w as 
later hailed as a hero in the French press for his opposition to American efforts to 
force upon Europeans foods that were widely seen as both unwanted and unsafe. As 
of September 2004, both the EU’s beef hormone ban and the US punitive tariffs 
remained in place, in spite of the expressed desire of both sides to reach a 
negotiated settlement (Mavroidis 2003).
The transatlantic dispute over the EU’s moratorium on the approval o f new GM  
varieties (and its subsequent decision that all GM products be subject to pre­
approval traceability and labelling requirements) is analytically similar to the 
dispute over beef hormones. EU trade-restrictive regulations on GMOs were once 
again adopted without conducting a scientific risk assessment. US governmental 
authorities again sided with US producers and repeatedly protested to the EU 
bilaterally and before relevant WTO committees. Until 2003, however, the Clinton 
and Bush Administrations refrained from taking legal action before the WTO, 
fearing that such a case could potentially prompt a European consumer backlash 
against GMOs. In the interim, both the US and the EU took their regulatory dispute 
to other international forums, each seeking to alter the terms of the international 
debate in its own favour.
B. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle
The first—and from the perspective of the EU, the most promising—of these 
forums was the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity, one of a series of framework 
agreements adopted at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development at 
Rio dc Janeiro, Brazil. By contrast with the case of hormone-treated beef, where no 
other international treaty existed to support EU claims regarding its right to restrict 
imports of hormone-treated foods, the Convention on Biodiversity offered a forum 
within which the EU could press for an international environmental agreement 
supporting its precautionary approach to biotech regulation. In the GMO case, 
moreover, the vast majority of parties to the Convention supported a protocol to the 
Convention dealing with the transfer of living genetically modified organisms 
(LMOs). A more reticent United States and a small number of grain exporting 
countries were first able to block the signature of a protocol in February 1999 in 
Cartagena, Columbia. However, all countries eventually compromised and the 
Protocol was signed in Montreal on January 29, 2000.
The three central issues that divided the US from the EU and most of the world 
were: (i) the application of the precautionary principle to decisions to ban imports 
and require labelling; (ii) whether the Protocol should cover bulk commodities
30 “McDonald’s encapsulates it all,” in the words o f one commentator. “It’s economic horror and 
gastronomic horror in the same bun." Guillaume Parmentier, quoted in Henley 1999.
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intended for consumption (e.g. crops) or be limited to organisms intended for direct 
introduction into the environment (e.g. seeds); and (iii) the relation of the Protocol 
to WTO mlcs. The parties compromised on all three issues, though the greatest 
compromises were arguably made by the United States in that the Protocol curtails 
some US rights under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. First, the 
two sides compromised over the issue of the integration of the precautionary 
principle into the Protocol. On the one hand, Article 15 of the Protocol provides that 
countries will undertake “risk assessments... in a scientifically sound manner.” On 
the other hand. Article 10 of the Protocol expressly incorporates the precautionary 
principle, providing that a country may reject the importation of “a living modified 
organism for intentional introduction into the environment” where there is “lack of 
scientific certainty regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects... on 
biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human 
health.” A similar provision applies to a country’s rejection of bulk genetically 
modified commodities (such as soybeans, wheat, com and cotton) for food, feed or 
processing (Article 11).31
At first glance, the US largely prevailed in having the Protocol’s mandatory pre- 
shipment notification and consent provisions limited to genetically modified 
organisms intended for release into the natural environment (e.g. planting), so that 
these provisions do not apply to bulk crops intended for food processing and mass 
consumption (Article 5). Rather, as for bulk shipments of crops, the US is only 
obligated to notify a Biosafety Clearing-House once it approves a GMO for the US 
market. However, the Protocol leaves it to each country to decide whether to permit 
the importation of such products and provides that they may apply the precautionary 
principle in making this decision (see above). In addition, such shipments must be 
clearly labelled that they “may contain” living modified organisms (Article 18).
As for the relation of the Protocol to WTO rules, the US failed to obtain a clear 
reservation of its WTO rights. Rather, references to other “international 
agreements" arc only made in the Protocol’s preamble, and these references are 
contradictory. The preamble provides that “this Protocol shall not be interpreted as 
implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing 
international agreements." The next phrase, however, states that “the above recital 
is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements.” As 
an EU representative stated, the two clauses effectively “cancel each other out,” 
leaving the legal relationship between the two regimes unclear and allowing both 
sides to claim a partial victory (Inside US Trade 2000). The EU, therefore, could 
point to the Biosafety Protocol as evidence of an international consensus (involving
31 While US government authorities may maintain that this reference to ‘‘human health” is only 
made in the context of a treaty on biodiversity that does not address food safety p e r s e , clearly 
the US would have preferred that no such broad statement were included.
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over 130 countries) regarding the application of the precautionary principle to the 
regulation of biotechnology. The US, by contrast, could plausibly claim that nothing 
in the Biosafety Protocol compromised US rights under the SPS Agreement, which 
it would invoke it its 2003 challenge to the EU’s biotech regime.
The Protocol itself took effect on 11 September 2003, and at this writing has 
been ratified by 100 parties, including the European Community. 32 The United 
States, by contrast, is not a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
hence has not signed or ratified the Cartagena Protocol; nevertheless, the US 
participated as an observer in the first conference of the parties in February 2004, 
and has indicated that “as a practical matter, firms in non-Party countries wishing to 
export to Parties will need to abide by domestic regulations put in place in the 
importing Parties for compliance with the Protocol.”33
C. The Codex AUmentarius Commission
The Codex Alimcntarius Commission (Codex) is an intergovernmental body 
established in 1962 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to promote international trade in food through 
the adoption of international food-safety standards. Throughout the post-war era, 
the United States and the European Union countries (represented individually by the 
EU’s member governments) have cooperated within Codex on the establishment of 
international food-safety standards. The WTO’s SPS Agreement, however, 
substantially increased the .Codex Commission’s notoriety, providing that national 
food safety standards based on international (Codex) standards are presumed to 
comply with WTO law. For this reason, both the United States and European 
countries have placed increasing importance on the negotiation of new regulatory 
principles and standards within Codex, since these principles and standards may be 
invoked (and already have been invoked) in the decisions of WTO panels and of the 
Appellate Body. This enhanced importance o f Codex also led to a major campaign 
by the EU to gain full membership in Codex, culminating in the formal accession of 
the EU in November 2003.34 The Commission now speaks and votes on behalf of 
the EU “where an agenda item deals with matters of exclusive Community 
competence.” 35 In practice, this means that the Commission will almost always 
represent the member states in Codex on biotech matters, since annex II of the
32 See the Protocol website at: http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/, accessed on 11 June 2004.
33 United States Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety," 
http://www.state.gOv/g/ocs/rls/fs/2004/28621 .htm, accessed on 11 June 2004.
34 Sec Council Decision of Nov. 17, 2003 on the accession of the European Community to the 
Codex Alimcntarius Commission.
35 Id., Annex III, Agreement between the Council and the Commission regarding preparation for 
Codex Alimentarius Meetings and statements and exercise of voting rights.
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Council Decision provides: “As a general rule, the European Community has 
exclusive competence for agenda items dealing with harmonization of standards on 
certain agricultural products, foodstuffs [...], including labelling, methods of 
analysis and sampling, as well as codes and guidelines.”*6
The subject o f biotechnology regulation first came before Codex during the 
1990s. A dedicated Working Group on Biotechnology was established in 1999, 
negotiating and adopted a number of international guidelines on the regulation of 
biotechnology before being disbanded in 2003. The Codex Commission has 
therefore been the forum for strenuous negotiations between the governments of the 
United States and the European Union, each o f which has once again put forward 
distinctive and sharply opposed proposals for international standards on issues such 
as the use of the precautionary principle, the use o f “other legitimate factors” 
besides science in risk management, and the use of labelling and traceability 
requirements for bioengineered foods.36 7
First, with regard to the application of the precautionary principle, the Working 
Group was charged with devising guidelines on risk regulation under uncertainty, 
with the EU and the US each advocating their traditional approaches to the question 
Poli (2003: 133-137). The EU sought an expansive definition of the precautionary 
principle as applying to both risk assessment and risk management. The US 
delegation, in contrast, noted pointedly that, “a precautionary approach was already 
built into risk assessment; this concept should not be used by risk managers to 
overrule risk assessment” (quoted in Poli 2003: 134). After nearly four years of 
debate, the Codex Commission agreed to a compromise text that acknowledged 
precaution “as an inherent element o f risk analysis,” while offering little 
clarification about its use at either the national or international levels.
The US and the EU clashed in predictable fashion on a second transversal issue, 
namely the guidelines for the invocation of “other legitimate factors” (dubbed OLFs) 
besides science that could be invoked by the Codex Commission in establishing 
international standards. Following domestic EU law and practice (see below), EU 
members argued that the Codex should consider a range of OLFs, such as consumer 
concerns and animal welfare, while the United States argued that “giving 
consideration to [...] these factors could open a Pandora’s box,” and therefore 
sought to restrict Codex decision-making to scientific considerations. Here again,
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36 Id. Annex II, par. 1. Single Declaration by the European Community on the exercise of 
competence according to Rule VI of the Rules o f Procedure of the Codex Alimcntarius 
Commission.
37 This section benefits from the excellent overviews in Poli 2003 & 2004. For other discussions 
of biotechnology in the Codex, see e.g, the articles in Kalaitzandonakes and Phillips, eds. 
(2000) as well as the reports and recommendations o f  the Codex ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, accessible on the FAO web page at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ESN/food/risk_biotcch_taskforce_en.stm.
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the members eventually reached agreement on an amendment to the Codex Manual 
of Procedure allowing the invocation of OLFs in risk management decisions, but it 
provided no listing o f these other legitimate factors, noting instead that “only those 
other factors that can be accepted on a world-wide basis, or on a regional basis in 
the case of regional standards and related texts, should be taken into account in the 
framework of Codex.” The statement went on to note that consideration of other 
relevant factors should not affect the scientific basis of risk analysis or create 
“unjustified barriers to trade” (quoted in Poli 2003; 140). In effect, the compromise 
reached within the committee allowed for the invocation of unspecified OLFs in 
Codex decision-making, but proceeded to constrain that invocation with a scries of 
more or less vaguely stated restrictions.
Finally, the US and EU engaged in contentious negotiations dealing with the 
regulation of GM foods where characterized by the now-familiar US/EU divide 
over the issues o f labelling and traceability of GM foods. Although the Codex 
members w ere eventually able to agree in July 2003 to new “Principles and 
Guidelines on Foods Derived from Biotechnology,” the document provides no 
guidance regarding the labelling o f GM foods because US and EU positions proved 
impossible to reconcile.38 With regard to traceability, the Principles acknowledge 
the use o f “tracing o f products” as a risk-management tool, representing a partial 
victory for the European countries, but goes on to note in a footnote that they 
“should be consistent with the provisions o f the SPS and TBT Agreements.”39
The results of these negotiations, Poli (2003: 146-47) points out, have thus far 
proven disappointing. “After lengthy discussions,” she argues, “these conflicts led 
to poor compromises, which do not have practical impact on the activity of the 
Codex Commission.” Like the paragraphs of the Cartagena Protocol dealing with 
the relation between Cartagena and WTO law, much of the Codex texts simply 
paper over rather than settle the differences among the parties, potentially 
delegating clarification of these issues, if  at all, to the WTO dispute settlement 
system.
38 The principles were formally adopted in July 2003. See Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Report o f the Twenty-sixth Session (Rome, 30 June-7 July 2003), par. 52, document available 
at ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/food/princ_gmfoods en.pdf. See also Anne Mackenzie, "The 
Process o f Developing Labeling Standards for GM Foods in the Codex Alimentarius,'* 3 
AgBioForum  203 (2000); and Vogel 2001, at 11.
39 Sec Codex ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology. 
Codex Principles and  Guidelines on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/food/princjimfoods_en.pdf, at par. 21, accessed on 9 June 2004.
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V. US and EU Policies Since 2000: Convergence?
During the course of the 1990s and the early years of the following decade, in sum, 
both the US and the EU were involved in both bilateral efforts to coordinate their 
respective policies through transatlantic dialogue, while at the same time actively 
exporting their respective views in multilateral regimes such as Codex and the 
Biosafety Protocol. During this period, some observers hoped that the US and EU 
regulatory systems might converge as a result of joint deliberation, reducing the 
substantial disparity among the two systems and thereby mitigating the substantial 
trade tensions and resulting political conflicts between them. Many American 
observers hoped that the EU might move towards a more “science-based” and less 
“politicized” system of regulation, which would, in turn, facilitate the resumption of 
approvals for new GM varieties Many European observers, by contrast, hoped that 
the European Union’s stricter standards would prompt a process of “trading up” in 
the United States, which might become more precautionary in its own regulations 
(Young 2003). Indeed, recent years have witnessed the overhaul of EU regulations 
and the resumption of approvals within the Union, as w'ell as a significant debate 
among US producers, consumers, and regulators about the adequacy of the US 
regulatory framework. Nevertheless, a careful examination of recent developments 
reveals, at best, a modest convergence between the US and the EU, which retain 
distinctive systems in terms of regulatory philosophies, procedures, and policy 
outcomes.
A. Review o f European Regulatory Developments
By the late 1990s, the European Commission, facing competing pressures from the 
United States and domestic European opinion, looked for a way to resume 
approvals of genetically modified varieties, free up commerce in the internal market, 
assuage member states and their constituents that adequate controls were in place, 
implement an EU-w'idc labelling regime, and restrict member state opt-out rights 
under “safeguard” provisions. Toward this end, in January 2000 the Commission 
issued a White Paper on Food Safety in which it proposed that the EU overhaul its 
food safety system and establish a new centralized EU agency, wiiich was 
eventually named the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), to assist with risk 
regulation.40 The White Paper set forth the EU’s general approach to risk regulation
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40 In 2002, the Council and European Parliament adopted EC Regulation 178/2002 pursuant to 
which the new agency, named the European Food Safety Authority, was created. While 
member states debated and lobbied over its ultimate location, the EFSA was temporarily 
housed in Brussels. The European Council finally determined in December 2003 that its 
headquarters would be established in Parma, Italy. See EFSA press release at 
http://www.efsa.eu.int/press room/press release/34 en.html. When fully operational, EFSA 
is expected to employ 250 people with a budget of 40 million euros, a tiny agency compared
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in the food sector, dividing “risk assessment” from “risk management.” Specialized 
scientific committees within the new food authority would conduct risk assessments, 
and the new authority would provide food safety information to consumers and 
operate a rapid alert system in conjunction with member state authorities to respond 
to food safety emergencies. Risk management, by contrast, would remain under the 
control o f the EU’s political bodies. In an annexed “action plan,” the Commission 
set forth over eighty new food safety-related measures for adoption, including 
amendments to Directive 90/220 and the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation.
In February 2000, the Commission issued a Communication on the 
precautionary principle, indicative o f EU authorities’ more risk-averse approach in 
an increasingly politicized domain that was raising challenges to the legitimacy of 
EU law. Tire Commission declared that the “precautionary principle” would be 
applied whenever decision-makers identify “potentially negative effects resulting 
from a phenomenon, product or process” and “a scientific evaluation o f the risk [...] 
makes it impossible to determine with sufficient certainty the risk in question [on 
account] of the insufficiency o f the data, their inconclusivcness or imprecise 
nature.” It stressed that “judging what is an ‘acceptable’ level of risk for society is 
an eminently political responsibility” (Commission’s emphasis). The Commission 
nonetheless maintained that it hoped to provide some guidance regarding the 
application of the principle, which it acknowledged, was “giving rise to much 
debate and to mixed and sometimes contradictory views.”41 Building on case law of 
the European Court o f Justice, the Commission stated that where regulatory 
decisions are adopted in accordance with the principle, the resulting measures 
should meet a scries of criteria, and, in particular, they should be proportionate, 
non-discriminatory, consistent, based on cost-benefit analyses where feasible, and 
subject to review and ongoing risk assessment.43 When the Council adopted a 
resolution on the precautionary principle at the Nice intergovernmental meeting in 
December 2000, its evocation granted policymakers greater flexibility. The 
resolution maintained that risk assessments may not always be possible on account 
of insufficient data, and that cost-benefit analyses should consider the “public
-------------------------------- - -------------------- (contd)
to the US Food and Drug Administration that employs over 9,000 people and has 2,100 
scientists working for it (Buonanno 2003).
41 Commission (2000) at 15. The Commission observed that, although the precautionaiy 
principle is not defined in the EC Treaty (which only prescribes its use to protect the 
environment in article 174 o f the Treaty), the European Court of Justice's case law had 
recognized the principle’s application in other domains (Scott 2003, 228).
42 Id. The Commission observed that, although the precautionary principle is not defined in the 
EC Treaty (which only prescribes its use to protect the environment in article 174 of the 
Treaty), the European Court o f Justice’s case law had recognized the principle’s application in 
other domains. See Scott 2003:228.
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acceptability” of risk management decisions. 43 The EU’s evocation of the 
precautionary principle, already too permissive in the views of US policymakers, 
had just become more so.
In response to challenges to the legitimacy o f EU decision-making over GMOs 
from above and below, the Commission proposed new legislation in 1998 to govern 
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment and the placing of GM food 
products on the market. Both the European Parliament and Council pressed the 
Commission for further regulatory controls. The majority of the European 
Parliament insisted on tighter restrictions regarding labelling requirements and 
thresholds pursuant to which products could contain traces of GMOs and still be 
sold in the EU. The member states were mixed in their views, with some appearing 
to do whatever possible to ensure that no GM crops would be grown in their 
territories (such as Austria and Luxembourg), and others being tom between the 
demands of GM opponents and those of the biotech sector (such as Germany and 
the United Kingdom). A “conciliation committee,” consisting of the members o f the 
Council and fifteen representatives of the European Parliament, drafted the final 
text.44
The resulting legislation. Directive 2001/18, was finally adopted in March 2001 
by co-decision between the Council and the European Parliament.45 The directive’s 
twin objectives were to protect the environment and human health when GMOs are 
released into the environment and placed on the market “as or in products,” in both 
cases to be applied “[i]n accordance with the precautionary principle.” Once more, 
the need to assuage those member states that desired stringent regulation of GMOs 
had led to a ratcheting up of EU regulatory requirements for GMOs so as to 
facilitate the free circulation of agricultural and food products in a single EU market 
(Young 2003). More specifically, under the directive’s environmental release 
requirements, member state and applicant obligations had been enhanced to include 
a more extensive environmental risk assessment, further information concerning the 
conditions of the release, and monitoring and remedial plans. The directive 
instructed the member states to adapt their laws to comply with its requirements by 
October 17,2002, at which time Directive 90/220 would be repealed.
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43 See Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, Annex III to the Presidency 
Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting, 7-9 December 2000. See also Vogel 2001: 
28-29.
44 For good accounts of the conciliation process, and the key issues separating the EP and 
Council delegations, see “Genetic Engineering: Key Issues in G MO Conciliation Become 
Clearer," European Report, 1 November 2000; and “Biotechnology: Conciliation Talks Move 
Towards Agreement on GMOs,” European Report, 13 December 2000.
45 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and o f the Council, Officiai Journal of the 
European Communities, L 106 17 April 2001, pp. 1-38.
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Although touted by the EP’s rapporteur David Bowe as “the toughest laws on 
GMOs in the whole world,”46 the adoption of Directive 2001/18 did not satisfy a 
core of a core of member states (in particular Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Italy, and Luxembourg), which continued to insist on the moratorium’s continuation 
and on the need to impose national safeguard bans in the absence of still more 
stringent EU regulations.47 Unable to obtain the regulatory committee’s approval of 
a legal challenge against these bans, the Commission worked toward passage of yet 
further EU legislation governing the authorization, labelling, and traceability of GM 
products. For this reason, only the directive’s provisions governing the release of 
GMOs into the environment were fully implemented,48 49while its provisions 
governing the marketing of GMOs used for commercial crops were largely replaced 
within a mere eighteen months by two new EU regulations regarding the labelling 
and traceability o f GM foods and their use in food and feed, respectively. Proposed 
by the Commission in 2001, these new regulations were finally adopted in 
September 2003, once again after drawn-out bargaining among the Commission. 
Council, and European Parliament.44 Both legislative instruments took the form of 
regulations, and not directives, placing authority predominantly in the hands of 
Community institutions. Regulation 1829/2003, regarding the authorization of 
GMOs in food and feed, replaced the provisions of Directive 2001/18 governing the 
authorization for marketing of GMOs as or in products,50 and the labelling
46 Quoted in Blake Evans-Pritchard, “Vote on GMO Legislation Today,“ euobserver.com, 14 
February 2001, accessed on 6 June 2003.
47 In a joint statement. France, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg *'reaffirm(ed] 
their intention of ensuring that the new authorizations for cultivating and marketing 
GMOs are suspended pending the adoption” o f new provisions on traceability, labeling, and 
environmental liability. Quoted in Michael Mann, “Six EU States Refuse to Lift Block on 
New Modified Crops,” Financial Times, 16 February 2001, p. 8.
48 Part B of the directive covers the “deliberate release of GMOs for any other purpose than for 
placing on the market“ that go beyond the “contained use“ of GMOs (i.e. it addresses pilot the 
testing o f GMOs in pilot plots). Directive 90/219, as amended, continues to govern the 
contained use o f GMOs. Council Directive 98/81/EC of 26 Oct. 1998 amended Directive 
90/219.
49 The Commission initiated its original proposals in 2001. See Commission of the European 
Communities, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
Genetically Modified Food and Feed,“ COM(2001)425 final o f 25 July 2001; and 
Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council Concerning Traceability and Labeling o f Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18/EC," COM(2001)182 final o f 25 July 2001. For 
the Commission's amended proposal, sec COM(2002)559 final.
50 Article 5.5 of Regulation 1829/2003 provides that articles 13-24, constituting Part C of 
Directive 2001/18, “ shall not apply,” but rather be replaced by the new, more centralized 
authorization procedures. Note that, in order to be marketed in the Union, GM seeds must also 
meet the standards requirements for all seed varieties to be placed in the Union's “common
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provisions of the Novel Foods Regulation. Regulation 1830/2003, in turn, created 
new rules on the traceability of GM products throughout the production and 
distribution process. Both regulations became effective on April 18, 2004. The 
revised EU regulatory scheme is summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2
EU Legislation Governing GMOs and GM  Products as of May 2004
■sgs . i  ^  '  - ¿ ¿ ¿ ¡ y > ■ ¡¡g - -1 *• ■ -fW ' a r .  n tyf  ¡J, ■
GMO research in laboratories Contained Use Directive 90/219 ;
GMO experimental releases (trials) Directive 2001/18
GMO environmental releases for crops Regulation 1829/2003 and Directive 98/95/EC (common seed catalogue)
Authorization of marketing of GM seeds 
(for environmental releases for crops)
Regulation 1829/2003 and Directive
98/95/EC
Authorization of marketing of GM food ^  
and feed Regulation 1829/2003
Labelling of GM seed, food and feed Regulation Ï 829/2003
Traceability and labelling o f GM products Regulation 1830/2003
Importantly, Regulation 1829/2003 created a more centralized authorization 
procedure to regulate the placing of GM food and feed on the EU market. With a 
more centralized procedure, the Commission hopes to better manage countervailing 
member-state and US challenges to the EU’s regulatory regime. The application 
process still begins when an operator submits an application file to the competent 
authority from one of the member states. That member state authority, however, 
now immediately provides the file to the new European Food Safety Authority, 
which, in turn, provides a copy to the other member states and the Commission, and 
makes a summary of the file publicly available. EFSA is to issue its opinion, based 
on risk assessments, within six months from its receipt of the file, subject to 
extensions if  further information is needed. EFSA submits its opinion to the 
Commission, the member states, and the applicant, and, after the deletion of any 
confidential information, makes it publicly available. The Commission is then to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------( contd.)
catalogue of agricultural plant species.” See e.g. Council directive 98/95/EC of 14 December 
1998 (concerning requirements for such listings).
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issue a draft decision, which may vary from EFSA’s opinion. The Commission's 
draft decision is again provided to the regulatory committee consisting of member 
state representatives. The committee is to deliver its opinion on the Commission's 
proposed decision by a qualified majority. If  the committee delivers no opinion or a 
negative opinion, the Commission must submit its proposal to the Council. If the 
Council docs not adopt (or indicate its opposition to) the Commission’s proposal 
(but this time by a qualified majority vote, as opposed to a unanimous one), then the 
proposed decision ‘"’shall be adopted by the Commission.” Any authorization o f a 
GM variety is now limited to a term of ten years, although it is subject to renewal. 
(For a b rie f  sum m ary of current authorization procedures, see Table 3.)
Although the procedural scheme at the EU level is somewhat similar to that 
provided under Directives 90/220 and 2001/18, it became more centralized in two 
primary respects. First, EFSA, a centralized EU agency, oversees the application 
file and works in conjunction with member state competent authorities and a 
Community reference laboratory to conduct risk assessments and product 
evaluations. Second, the regulation restricts the grounds on which member states 
may ban GMOs unilaterally as a “safeguard" measure. A member state may adopt 
“interim protective measures [...] where it is evident that products authorized [...] 
are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health or the 
environment,” provided that it first informs the Commission of the “emergency” 
situation and the Commission does not act. The Commission's original proposal 
provided for no member state safeguard powers, but the Parliament and Council 
succeeded in including this clause.51
The regulation also broadened the scope o f product coverage in two ways. First, 
the regulation’s authorization and labelling requirements covered GM animal feed 
for the first time, in addition to food for human consumption. Second, the regulation 
covered food and feed that do not contain or consist of GMOs, but nonetheless are 
“derived, in whole or in part, from GMOs” or contain ingredients that are “derived, 
in whole or in part, from GMOs.” The regulation likewise reduced the threshold for 
permitted traces o f genetically modified ingredients, provided their presence is 
“adventitious” (although it did not go as far as the Parliament preferred), and it 
provided that the Commission may further lower these thresholds over time.
One o f  the m ost controversial elements of the new' regulation was the 
establishment of a set o f thresholds for permitted traces of genetically modified 
ingredients, provided their presence is “adventitious.” Recognizing that it is 
practically impossible to ensure that any crop is entirely GM free, the Commission 
initially proposed a threshold of 1% GM material, below which any crop would not 
have to be labelled as containing GM foods. The Commission’s proposed threshold
51 See COM (2001 > 425 (GM food and feed).
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Table 3
Authorization Process for GM Food and Feed under Regulation 1829/2003
Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences...
1. An operator submits an application to the competent authority from one 
of the member states.
2. The member state provides the file to the new European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA).
3. The EFSA provides a copy to the other member states and the 
Commission, and makes a summary of the file publicly available, and 
makes a summary of the file publicly available.
4. Within six months, the EFSA its opinion, based on risk assessments 
submits its opinion to the Commission, the member states, and the 
applicant, and, after the deletion of any confidential information, makes it 
publicly available.
5. The Commission is then to issue a draft decision, which may vary from 
EFSA’s opinion, based on the regulatory committee consisting of 
member state representatives.
6. The committee is to deliver its opinion on the Commission’s proposed 
decision by a qualified majority. If the committee delivers no opinion o ra  
negative opinion, the Commission must submit its proposal to die 
Council. If the Council docs not adopt (or indicate its opposition to) the 
Commission’s proposal (but this time by a qualified majority vote, as 
opposed to a unanimous one), then the proposed decision “shall be 
adopted by the Commission’’
was contested, however, by environmental groups such as Greenpeace and the 
European Consumers Organization (BEUC), by the European Parliament, and by 
several member governments in the Council, all of which called for lower 
thresholds. European biotech companies and the United States government, by 
contrast, criticized the one percent threshold as unrealistic, unnecessarily costly and 
scientifically unjustified. These divisions were mirrored in the Council, where the 
United Kingdom favoured the Commission’s proposed 1% threshold, while Austria 
at the other extreme favoured thresholds as low as 0.1%.52 The final regulation 
represents a compromise among these two positions, and establishes two distinct
52 “Biotechnology: Member States Agree on GM-Labelling of Food,*’ European Report, 4 
December 2002. For other good accounts of the debate over thresholds in Regulation 
1829/2003, see e.g. “Biotechnology: MEPs Draw Inspiration from Hearing on Labeling and 
Tracing GM Food,” European Report, 1 May 2002; Bettina Berg, “GMO Proposals Adopted 
in European Parliament.” euobsetver.com, 3 July 2002.
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thresholds. First, it provides that food products will not violate its labelling 
requirements if  they contain material consisting of or produced from EU-approved 
GMOs “in a proportion no higher than 0.9% of the food ingredients considered 
individually [...] provided that this presence is adventitious or technically 
unavoidable,” Second, however, the regulation establishes a second and stricter 
threshold o f 0.5% for GMOs not yet approved for environmental release in the EU, 
and establishes a three-year window after which no residues of such non-approved 
GMOs will be allowed in food and feed products.
Regulation 1830/2003, Finally, complemented the new authorization and 
labelling rules with a more centralized framework for tracing genetically modified 
products, as Directive 2001/18 had left this responsibility to the member states. The 
new regulation required the Commission to establish a system of unique identifiers 
for each genetically modified organism in order “to trace GMOs and products 
produced from GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market through the 
production and distribution chain.” More specifically, the regulation requires 
producers to collect and retain for five years data regarding the GM content of foods 
and crops one step backward and one step forward in the distribution chain. These 
strict traceability requirements have been bitterly criticized by many US producers 
(whose commodity system does not require and is not designed for tracing GMOs 
through the distribution chain), as well as by some European producers. The 
Commission, however, has justified it as vital to the EU labelling system as well as 
for any future recalls o f GM foods or crops.53
The Commission and biotech companies tried to step up enforcement against 
member state non-compliance in 2003. In April of that year, the Commission issued 
a “letter of formal notice” to twelve member states that had failed to implement 
Directive 2001/18, as required (Kirwin 2003). It initiated a lawsuit against eleven of 
them in July pursuant to Article 226 o f the Treaty. When Austria proposed to make 
the region of Upper Austria a GM-free zone in March 2003, the Commission 
(following an opinion from EFSA)54 ruled that Austria’s general ban would be 
illegal since GMO restrictions should be based on attributes of specific GMOs. 
Concurrently, three biotechnology companies (Monsanto, Syngenta, and Pioneer) 
challenged Italy’s ban of food products containing authorized GM maize before the 
Italian courts. An Italian lower court referred the matter to the European Court of 
Justice for an interpretation of EU law pursuant to Article 234 o f the Treaty. In 
September 2003, the European Court o f Justice ruled that Italy must conduct “a risk
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53 See e.g. the comments o f Tony Van Der Haegen, minister counselor at the EU Delegation in 
Washington, D.C., who referred to the US grain handling system as “very efficient, but [...] 
totally incompatible with the traceability system.” Quoted in “US Grain System Said 
Incompatible with EU Rules,” Reuters, 13 July 2001.
54 See The EFSA Journal 2003 (opinion o f 4 July 2003).
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assessment which is complete as possible [...] from which it is apparent that, in 
light of the precautionary principle, the implementation of such measure is
necessary in order to ensure that novel foods do not present a danger,” which Italy 
had so far failed to show.55
Finally, the EU resumed approvals o f new GM varieties in May 2004, By early 
2004, the Commission had received twenty-two notifications for approvals of 
genetically modified varieties—eleven involving import processing only, and 
eleven for cultivation (Commission 2004b)— and with the completion of the 
proposed regulatory framework, it moved to resume approvals of new GM varieties. 
In November 2003, therefore, the Commission proposed to approve the importation 
of a variety of GM maize (Bt-11 sweet com), for which EFSA had delivered a 
favourable opinion. It was the first time that the Commission had initiated a GM 
approval since 1998. The regulatory committee, however, again refused to approve 
the Commission's proposal so that the matter was referred to the Council, which 
was given until the end of April to act.56 On 26 April, a divided Agriculture Council 
failed to reach agreement on the Commission’s proposal.57 In the absence of a 
decision by the Council, the Commission was free to adopt the proposal—the first 
new approval of a GM variety in nearly six years.
Despite this apparent breakthrough, US officials noted that the Commission’s 
decision — greeted by a chorus of condemnation among European environmentalists 
and consumer groups—was taken over the objections of a bloc of implacably 
hostile member governments, with no guarantee that additional approvals were to 
follow or that EU risk managers would continue to be guided by the scientific risk
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55 The matter then returned to the Italian courts to apply the ruling based on Italy's presentation 
of any studies supporting its restrictions. See Judgment o f the Court, Case C-236/01 
(reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale del Lazio): 
Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidcnza del Consiglio dei Ministri and 
Others (Sept. 9, 2003). Similarly, the Court o f Justice ruled in March 2000 that France could 
not ban the sale o f GM crops that had been approved at the EL) level without producing new 
information regarding health and environmental risks. The case was referred to the Court o f 
Justice bv a French court following a challenge by Greenpeace of France's initial approval of 
a GM maize variety. Sec Judgment of the Court, Case C-6/99 (reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Conseil d'État): Association Greenpeace France and Others v French State, 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche and Others, In the presence of Novartis Seeds SA 
and another (March 21, 2000).
56 Austria. Denmark, France, Greece, and Luxembourg voted against the proposal, while 
Germany. Belgium, and Italy abstained. See Bridges on-line report 2004.
57 Six states (Ireland. Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and the UK) voted in favor o f the 
Commission proposal, six others (Denmark, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Austria, and 
Portugal) voted against, and three states (Belgium, Germany, and Spain) abstained. 
Commission 2004c: 4.
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assessments carried out by the EFSA.58 Moreover, the Commission's approval 
applied only to importation and not cultivation, and was subject to the full range of 
EU regulations regarding traceability and labelling, with all their attendant costs. 
Under the circumstances, Syngenta, the crop's manufacturer, indicated that it had 
no immediate intention of marketing Bt-11 sweet com in Europe (Mcllcr and 
Pollack 2004; Pollack 2004; European Report 2004).
Subsequent approval procedures appeared to support this cautious interpretation 
of the “end” of the moratorium. One month following the approval o f Bt-11 sweet 
maize, a regulatory committee o f member-state representatives from the now- 
enlarged EU failed to agree on the Commission’s proposed approval of a 
genetically modified rapesecd (or canola). Significantly, six of the ten new member 
states (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, and Poland) joined six existing 
members (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and the UK) in voting 
against the approval, which was then scheduled for decision by the Council of 
Ministers.59 A similar pattern emerged later the same month when the Environment 
Council met to consider the Commission’s recommendation to approve another 
Monsanto variety, the NK603 genetically modified com. Here again, the Council 
was divided, with nine member states (including four of the new members) 
reportedly voting against and nine in favour, and a number of abstentions.60 
Although the Commission remained free to take a positive decision in the absence 
of Council agreement, this case once again demonstrated the persistent divisions in 
the Council on new approvals. Significantly, these two cases also seemed to dispel 
some initial concerns that the new member states—most of which were already 
engaged in the cultivation of GM crops, often without adequate controls—might 
serve as a “Trojan horse” for the United States and the biotech industry.61 Ensuring 
adequate testing facilities in the new member states docs indeed remain a challenge
58 As one US official put it, ‘'The approval of a single product is not evidence that applications 
are moving routinely through the approval process in an objective, predictable manner based 
on science and EU law, rather than political factors.” Quoted in Anthony Browne, “Protests 
after Europe Ends GM Food Freeze,” The Times, 20 May 2004, p. 18.
59 The Council decision is still pending at this writing. For good accounts of the debate over the 
approval o f the GT73 rapesecd, see “ Biotechnology: EU Member States Fail to Agree on GM- 
Rape GT-73,” European Report, 19 June 2004; and Andrew Beatty, “Majority of New EU 
States Block GMO Approval ''euobserver.com, 21 June 2004.
60 See “EU Governments Deadlocked over Monsanto's Genetically Modified Com Product.” 
Associated Press, 28 June 2004; and Sharon Spiteri, “Member States Split on GM Maize 
Approval,” euobserver.com, 29 June 2004.
61 On the new members as a “Trojan horse,” see Paul Brown, “EU Races to Thwart Influx of 
GM Food from East,” The Guardian, 14 February 2004. A more detailed but equally critical 
study is Thomas Schweiger, EU Enlargement: The Introduction o f GMO’s by the Backdoor of 
EU Accession? (Northern Alliance for Sustainability and Friends o f the Earth Europe, May 
2003).
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for the EU post-accession, but it seems clear that the ambivalence toward 
agricultural biotechnology in the “old” EU is reflected in the public opinion and 
governmental positions o f the new members as well.62
In sum, the European Union’s regulatory framework for the approval, tracking, 
marketing, and labelling o f GMOs has been substantially overhauled over the past 
five years, in the light o f both US and WTO external pressures and domestic 
European pressures. Some of these reforms—such as the increased emphasis on 
scientific risk assessment by the EFSA and the de facto end of the moratorium on 
new approvals—appear to be responses to international pressures, adopted in the 
hope of mitigating or forestalling WTO legal challenges (Skogstad 2001; Scott 
2003). Nevertheless, by contrast with the US, the EU retains a system in which 
GMOs are regulated according to process rather than product standards, where strict 
regulations on traceability and labelling now impose new and unprecedented 
constraints on GM foods and crops, and where “risk management" remains in the 
hands of political bodies which remain free to take decisions according to social and 
economic as well as scientific criteria. There is therefore little evidence, on balance, 
of convergence of the EU regulatory system on that of the United States.
B. Review o f  US Regulatory Developments
What, then, of the United States? If the EU has not converged on the American 
system of relatively science-based regulation by independent agencies, have US 
regulations and the US regulatory system converged on that of the EU? Or in David 
Vogel’s phrase (1995), has the United States “traded-up” to EU standards in order 
to gain access for US farm products to the EU market? As Alasdair Young (2003: 
458) points out in a sophisticated analysis, the question of US “trading up” requires 
us to distinguish analytically among three inter-related phenomena: (1) “commercial 
adaptation,” which occurs when US firms or farmers voluntary comply with EU 
standards (e.g., growing only EU-approved GM varieties) in order to gain access to 
the EU market; (2) political mobilization, which occurs when domestic US interest 
groups, spurred on (at least in part) by events in Europe, mobilize for stricter GM 
regulations; and (3) policy change, when US authorities adopt stricter framework 
legislation or stricter implementing regulations. As Young (2003: 46) points out, the 
last type of change is the most demanding, since in the GMO case it would require 
not only the adoption of specific regulatory standards, but a significant change in
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62 A survey of citizens of the EU’s ten new members conducted in 2003 showed that sixty-eight 
percent held negative views toward GMOs, a result roughly similar to surveys of citizens of 
the “old” Europe. “Genetically Modified Food,” Economist, Apr. 3, 2003, at. 5 A second 
major change in the European Union, the constitutional treaty agreed in Brussels in June 2004, 
does not alter the substance of EU policy or policy-making with regard to agricultural 
biotechnology, and is therefore unlikely to affect policy toward GMOs if  it is ratified and 
comes into force.
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the regulatory style and framework outlined above. In fact, a careful examination o f 
recent US events (reflecting and updating Young’s analysis) provides some 
evidence of commercial adaptation and political mobilization. However, policy 
changes largely reflect an incremental elaboration of the traditional US system 
rather than any regulatory overhaul in the direction of the EU approach.
With regard to commercial adaptation, Young finds some evidence o f US 
farmers and growers’ associations taking decisions on which crops to plant based at 
least in part on the regulatory standards o f the EU and other target markets such as 
Japan and Canada. The National Com Grower’s Association, for example, has 
established a "know before you grow/know where to go” program to advise farmers 
about the GM varieties accepted in various foreign markets, and Young points to 
evidence that US farmers have concentrated production in those varieties of GM 
com and soybeans approved for marketing in the EU (Young 2003: 468-70). 
Farmers' concerns about market reception have been even more striking in relation 
to the controversy over the introduction o f Monsanto’s GM wheat. The new variety, 
a “Roundup Ready” wheat resistant to the Roundup herbicide, was submitted for 
regulatory approval by Monsanto in the US and Canada, only to encounter 
widespread concern among farmers concerned that approval and adoption of GM 
wheat could imperil their markets in the EU and other countries.63 Under the 
circumstances, Monsanto promised to wait for regulatory approval in both the US 
and Canada (the largest exporters of wheat) as well as Japan (one of the largest 
importers) before moving ahead with field trials. Finally, on 10 May 2004, the 
company announced that it was “deferring all further efforts to introduce Roundup 
Ready wheat.”64
The commercial prospects for GM foods and crops in the United States, 
therefore, remain unclear at this writing. On the one hand, US farmers have showed 
little inclination to abandon established GM varieties, with the total acreage devoted 
to GM crops rising by some 15% in 2003, to include 81% of soybeans, 73% of 
cotton, and 40% o f com.65 On the other hand, GM production in the United States
63 Several industry associations, including the National Association of Wheat Growers, called 
for a reliable system for segregating and tracing crops before GM wheat was introduced, in 
the words o f  the vice-president o f  the North American Millers Association, “ Our customers 
are telling us that they have very serious concerns or are flat-out opposed to GM wheat.... 
While this opposition may have nothing to do with science, the customer is always right.” Jim 
Bair, quoted in Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. "A Wheaty Issue: GM Wheat 
Enters the Regularity Arena,” http://pewagbiotech.org/buzz/display.php3?Story 10^6 . 
accessed on 3 April 2004. See also Pollack 2004b.
64 Monsanto Company, “Monsanto to Realign Research Portfolio, Development o f Roundup 
Ready Wheat Defended,” http://www.worc.org/pdfs/monsantodropsPR.pdf, accessed on 11 
June 2004.
65 Pew Initiative 2004: 3 (citing figures for 2001-2003).
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was increasingly concentrated in these three core crops, while notification of new 
varieties and commercial acceptance o f other GM crops (including various fruits 
and vegetables) had decreased from the rapid pace of the late 1990s (Pollack 2004a).
With regard to political mobilization, there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that media attention given to the US/EU dispute influenced the activities of 
consumer and environmental groups in the United States, as well as public opinion 
about GMOs. Prior to the onset of the dispute, US consumers had indicated 
virtually no opposition to—and indeed virtually no awareness of—the existence of 
GM foods and crops.66 Following the outbreak of the dispute, as well as the 
opportunity for US interest groups to interact with their European counterparts in 
the transatlantic consumer and environment dialogues, consumer groups such as 
Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen and environmental groups such as the Sierra Club 
adopted publicly critical positions toward GM foods and crops, pressing for stricter 
regulations and mandatory labelling of GMOs.
Public opposition to GM foods and crops was fed as well by internal US 
developments. In the May 1999 issue of Nature, Cornell University researchers 
reported that laboratory tests had shown that the use of a genetically modified Bt- 
com variety could kill not only targeted pests, such as the com borer, but also 
Monarch butterfly larvae were the com variety’s pollen to travel to nearby 
milkweed, the larvae’s source of food (University of Illinois 1999: 95). In the 
monarch butterfly, the Bambi of the insect world, opponents of genetically modified 
foods suddenly found a potentially powerful rallying symbol. The following year, in 
October 2000, the first major GMO scandal emerged when Starlink com—a GM 
variety marketed by Aventis and approved for use in animal feed but not for human 
consumption—was found to have worked its way into the food supply, turning up in 
Taco Bell taco shells and causing allergic reactions among some consumers. The 
Starlink incident, which led to a major recall of the com by Aventis, also stoked the 
debate over GM foods and over the adequacy of US regulatory oversight.67 In 
response to consumer concerns, some US retailers—including Whole Foods 
supermarkets, Gerber and Heinz baby foods, and the makers o f Frito-Lay com 
chips—followed their European counterparts in announcing that henceforth their 
products would be GMO-free.
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66 Surveys showed that while approximately 60% of processed foods consumed in the United 
States contain genetically modified seeds, only about 33% of Americans even knew that 
genetically modified foods were available in supermarkets, and 60% claimed that they would 
not buy foods labeled to contain genetically modified ingredient. See Hill and Battle 2000.
67 “Furore over Starlink Triggers Regulatory Rethink,’* Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 
4, No. 45 (28 November 2000). See also the discussion in Lawrence Busch, et al., Amicus 
Curiae Brief: Submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel o f  the World Trade Organization in 
the Case o f  EC: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing o f  Biotech Products, 30 
April 2004, pp. 34-35.
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Despite this substantial mobilization, there is little evidence that US public 
opinion is converging on the deep distrust toward GMOs among European publics. 
A September 2003 poll for the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, for 
example, indicated that GM foods and crops had become a less salient issue for 
Americans as compared to a previous poll two years earlier (immediately following 
the Starlink controversy), and that opposition to GM foods remained but had 
weakened during that period. Perhaps most strikingly in contrast with the European 
Union, poll data indicated weak support for a complete ban on GM foods, together 
with high confidence in the FDA’s regulatory competence. In the survey, for 
example, only 28% o f respondents agreed with the statement, “genetically modified 
foods should not be allowed to be sold even if  the Food and Drug Administration 
believes they are safe,” while 64% disagreed; and other results indicate strong 
public support for the regulatory role of the FDA.68
With regard to regulatory change, finally, recent years have witnessed a 
significant debate among US legislators and regulators about possible reforms of the 
US regulatory process. Within both the US Congress and in various state assemblies, 
legislators have introduced dozens of bills with a potential impact on the regulation 
of biotechnology, including bills sponsored by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D- 
Ohio) and Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Califomia) that would introduce mandatory 
labelling for all GM foods. Tliese legislative initiatives have so far failed, however, 
and the few modest measures that were adopted at the federal level have merely 
instructed the US executive to support biotechnology internationally.69
In the absence o f any major legislative changes, the FDA and the USDA have 
conducted hearings and studies to consider administrative changes to the regulatory 
existing system, including the possibility o f introducing mandatory labelling or pre- 
approvals o f new GM varieties. In 1999, for example, the FDA held public hearings 
on the regulation o f GM foods and crops, during which it received more than fifty 
thousand written submissions regarding the agency’s rules on the approval and 
labelling of GM foods. After several years of collecting and analyzing these 
submissions, however, the agency rejected arguments for mandatory labelling, 
which it continued to  hold were not required under the Federal Food, Drug and
68 Interestingly, the results also indicate that respondents arc consistently more supportive of 
genetically modified plants than of genetically modified animals, which suggests that public 
support tor bioengineering may be negatively affected as the latter proceed through approvals 
to marketing in the United States. See Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2003; 
Mcllman Group, 2003.
69 For a detailed listing o f biotech-related legislation introduced at the federal and state levels in
the United States, see the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology's Legislative Tracker, 
available on-line at: http://pewagbiotech.org/resourccs/factsheets/legislation/index.php,
accessed on 3 April 2004.
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Cosmetic Act,70 opting instead for the issuing o f guidelines for voluntaiy labelling 
to indicate whether a product had been made with, or without, the use of 
bioengineering. At the same time, the FDA announced that it was considering 
requiring prior notification of new GM varieties, and that much of the information 
provided by companies would be made publicly available; at this writing, however, 
the FDA has yet to finalize the latter proposal, which in any event falls far short of 
the EU requirement of prior authorization of new GM varieties.
The debate about the regulation o f biotechnology in the United States is 
certainly not over. Many environmentalists and consumer groups continue to press 
the FDA and Congress for stricter regulation and labelling of GM foods, while 
others such as the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (2004) have called for 
incremental reforms to the system to deal with the imminent introduction o f new 
GM products including plants intended for pharmaceutical use as well as genetically 
modified animals. The Pew report is particularly noteworthy in that, unlike many 
European critics of the US system, it does not call into question the fundamentals of 
the US’s relatively science-based system, but rather points to lacunae in the 
regulatory authority of the three core agencies under existing legislation, 
particularly with regard to bioenginecred animals, and puts forward a menu of 
possible reforms to clarify and strengthen the agencies’ regulatory authority. On 22 
January 2004, moreover, the USDA announced its intention to update and 
strengthen its biotechnology regulations, beginning with a complete environmental 
impact assessment of the current system as measured against several possible 
reforms, and called for public comment, “Any proposed changes to the regulations,” 
the announcement noted pointedly, “will be science and risk-based.”71 Reform of 
the current system is thus likely to remain on the US agenda, resulting in 
administrative and possibly legislative changes to the current system, yet there is 
little sign that the United States is preparing to move away from its core practice of 
science-based regulation by agencies such as the FDA.
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70 As the FDA reported. “Many of the comments expressed concern about possible long term 
consequences from consuming bioengincered foods, but they did not contend that any o f the 
bioenginecred foods already on the market have adverse health effects. The comments were 
mainly expressions of concern about the unknown. The agency is still not aware of any data or 
other information that would form a basis for concluding that the tat that a food or its 
ingredients was produced using bioengineering is a material fact that must be disclosed under 
sections 403(a) and 201(n) o f the Act. FDA is therefore reaffirming its decision not to require 
special labeling of all bioengineered foods” (FDA 2001).
71 United States Mission to the European Union, “USDA Announces First Steps to Update 
Biotech Rules,” http://www.uscu.be/Categories/Biotech/Jan2204UpdateBiotcchRules.html, 
accessed on 11 June 2004.
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VI. The United States’ W TO Challenge against 
the EU’s Regulation of GMOs
The United States delayed for years bringing a WTO case against the EU. It finally 
initiated requests for consultations in May 2003 after President Bush declared the 
end of “major combat operations” in the second Iraq war.72 In August 2003, the 
United States requested the establishment o f a dispute settlement panel, which was 
formed in March 2004.73 This section is in three parts. The first part addresses why 
the United States delayed bringing a complaint before the WTO for so long, but 
eventually initiated one. The second part addresses the United States’ claims and the 
EU’s defences under the applicable WTO rules. The third part examines the 
potential role, if  any, of the WTO dispute settlement system in helping to resolve 
the US-EU regulatory conflict.
A. Explanation o f  The Delay and Initiation o f  the US Complaint
Unlike in its earlier challenge against the EU’s ban on meat hormones, the United 
States refrained from bringing a WTO claim over EU restrictions on genetically 
modified products for years, preferring to conduct bilateral and multilateral 
discussions. It appears to have initially chosen this less aggressive route for four 
primary reasons: (i) US authorities, in consultation with US industry, understood 
that EU authorities were severely constrained by the demands of EU consumers and 
member state politicians, and believed for a long time that bringing a WTO case 
might be counter-productive; (ii) there was some risk that media coverage of a 
WTO dispute over GMOs could adversely affect the political and commercial 
situation within the United States itself; (iii) following the mass demonstrations at 
the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, US authorities were reticent to initiate a 
new controversial case involving consumer health and environmental protection, 
and bided their time; and (iv) European concerns over genetically modified foods 
appeared to have growing support around the world, as represented by the January 
2000 signature o f the Biosafety Protocol and new' labelling requirements imposed 
by other countries. The United States waited to see the fallout of these 
developments. Wc examine each of these issues below, as well as developments 
that eventually led the United States to bring the WTO case.
72 President Bush declared the end of hostilities on May 1, 2003 from the aircrafr carrier USS 
Abraham Lincoln. See Karen DeYoung, “Bush Proclaims Victory in Iraq; Work on Terror Is 
Ongoing, President Says,“ Washington Post, May 2,2003, at A l.
73 We should hear the result of the WTO panel decision in September or October 2004.
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}. US Recognition o f  European Consumer Opinion and
the Potential o f a Populist Backlash
US authorities and affected US industries recognized that the EU stance was a 
populist one and that EU authorities’ hands had been tied. US industries did not 
want to be seen as forcing genetically modified foods on European consumers, since 
the market backlash could be severe, with an increasing number o f brand food 
companies and retail chains forsaking products with genetically modified 
ingredients. US authorities and companies rather hoped to work with EU authorities 
and EU scientists to, over time, convince the European public that genetically 
modified foods arc safe and can be beneficial to human health and the environment. 
Nonetheless, US commercial constituencies became concerned over the slow pace 
of change in the EU, and increasingly pressed the US government, in particular 
through Congressional representatives, to bring die case.74
2. Spillover Effects o f  EU Policy in the United States
It at first appeared that the media attention given to the US-EU dispute over 
European restrictions on genetically modified foods could affect the political and 
commercial playing fields within the United States, triggering greater US 
regulations of GMOs. As we have seen, however, despite the increased media 
attention, consumer attitudes did not fundamentally change in the United States, and 
concerns about an anti-GM backlash in the US had eased. The policy space within 
the United States was thus relatively clear to bring a WTO case.
3. The Fallout o f  the A nti- WTO Seattle Demonstrations
The Seattle demonstrations in opposition to the launching of a “millennium round” 
of trade negotiations undercut US strategies to place legal pressure on EU 
authorities. The demonstrators forced a cancellation of the ministerial’s first day of 
meetings and ultimately the collapse of the ministerial without a mandate for a new 
round of negotiations. By joining an anti-WTO coalition that rallied a number of 
constituencies, anti-GMO activists could foment opposition to the administration’s 
hopes to obtain Afast-track@ trade negotiating authority from Congress, and, 
ultimately, Vice President Gore’s candidacy in the November 2000 elections. 
Moreover, other US commercial interests— including telecommunications, 
industrial property industries, and other “new economy” sectors—did not wish the 
United States to trigger further opposition to trade liberalization endeavours on 
account of another WTO lawsuit over food. In short, this was not an opportune time 
for the Clinton administration to legally challenge the EU’s trade restrictions on 
genetically modified foods.
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74 See “Invasion of the Transgen ics,” The Economist, May 14,2003.
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By August 2002, however, the new Bush administration had received T rade 
Promotion Authority, the Doha negotiating round had been launched, and an ti- 
WTO protests had somewhat mollified in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.75 In short, the US administration was less fearful that a WTO case 
could upset its other trade policy and political goals.
4. Foreign and International Developments
Finally, as we have seen, the anti-GMO movement was moving beyond the 
European Union to both advanced industrialized and less developed countries. 
Among the former, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Australia joined the EU in 
adopting stringent GM regulations, while the majority of developing countries, 
generally concerned over the expansion of patent and other rights over seeds and 
plant varieties, supported a move toward a potentially restrictive new treaty on 
genetically modified foods. On January 29, 2000, the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 
was signed.
Yet, by 2002, it was clear that the United States had a number of allies in its 
challenge against European trade restrictions on GMOs. Argentina, Canada, China. 
South Africa, and Brazil are increasingly adopting GM seed varieties. Together with 
the United States, they were “responsible for about 99 percent of bioengineered 
crops around the world” in 2003, when production increased “roughly 15 percent 
from the year before.”76 The United States ultimately brought the WTO challenge 
along with Canada and Argentina, with Egypt dropping out at the last moment.77
In short, it appears that the United States finally initiated the WTO complaint 
because o f a combination o f (i) increased frustration of commercial constituents 
over lost sales to Europe, (ii) US commercial concerns over the impact of EU 
regulatory restrictions on third countries, (iii) US commercial concerns over future 
GM varieties that the US hoped to market abroad, and (iv) hopes that a WTO case 
could help influence debates within the EU and elsewhere over GMOs toward more 
“science-based” determinations. Since anti-WTO demonstrations had somewhat
75 Congress granted the Bush administration trade promotion authority by one vote, subject to 
numerous conditions, including an expiration date of June 1, 2005, to be extended 
automatically until June 1, 2007 if  neither congressional chamber adopts a resolution 
opposing extension. See Trade Act o f 2002, Public Law Number 107-210, § 2103, 116 Statute 
933 (August 6, 2002).
76 “Genetically engineered Crops Up 15 percent; China, South Africa Report Biggest 
Increases," 21:4 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 124 (Jan. 22, 2004) (citing report of the 
International Service for the Acquisition o f Agri-biotech Applications, available at 
http://www.isaaa.org, noting that the United States was responsible for “about 63 percent of 
the world’s bioengineered crops”).
77 See Tobias Buck, “Blow to US as Egypt pulls out o f modified crops case," Financial Times. 
May 29, 2003.
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subsided, since the US administration had obtained trade promotion authority, and 
since the Doha negotiating round was in process, there seemed to be less of a 
downside from a WTO legal case compared to the risks of continued European 
intransigence toward approving new GM varieties and increased EU biotech 
regulation in general. As USTR Robert Zoellick stated in January 2003, “we’ve 
tried to be patient, we’ve tried to work the system, we tried to pay attention to 
European political sensitivities. It’s not moving. It's not being solved.”78 7980
B. The WTO Legal Issues
In their May 2003 request for consultations, the complainants Argentina, Canada, 
and the United States limited their WTO claims to a challenge of the EU’s dc facto 
moratorium on approvals of biotech products and member state “national marketing 
and import bans on biotech products” that had been approved. Agricultural trade 
associations within the United States, led by the American Soybean Association, 
have pressed the USTR to initiate a WTO challenge against the EU’s new labelling 
and traceability rules as well. However, there is no indication that such a complaint 
will be filed imminently. The filing of such a complaint will likely depend on the
"TOoutcome of the current case.
The three complainants made their initial request for consultations under 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitaiy and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS 
Agreement”), the Agreement on Agriculture (“Agriculture Agreement”), the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Tradç (“TBT Agreement”), and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994"). The United States’ initial written submission, 
however, focused on the provisions of the SPS Agreement, although it “reserved the 
right” to bring claims under the TBT Agreement. Canada and Argentina also 
focused on the SPS Agreement, but they set forth cumulative and alternative claims 
under the TBT Agreement and under Article III.4 o f GATT 1994.fl°
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78 “Europe Warns US: Hand Off Our Biotech Food Ban,” American Federated Press, Feb. 04,
2003, Available at F.U Business, http://www.eubusiness.com/importcd/2003/02/102617/view.
79 See “ASA Takes Lead in Pushing for New WTO GMO Case Against EU,” Inside US Trade, 
at 25 (March 12, 2004) (noting that the American Soybean Association is taking the lead in 
hiring private lawyers to prepare the background for such a WTO challenge). For a legal 
assessment of how the United States could prevail in a WTO case against the EU’s new 
labeling and traceability requirements, see Mansour and Key, Spring 2004. Mansour and K.ey 
work for the Washington D.C. office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.
80 Argentina's written submission has not been made publicly available. The EC’s public 
submission, however, responds to arguments made in the submissions of all three 
complainants, Canada and Argentina set forth their TBT claims either as “cumulative" or 
“alternative" claims. See First Written Submission by the European Communities, May 17,
2004, at pars. 435-436. The also made claims under GATT article I1I.4. Id., at par. 518.
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The United States* claim is set forth in three parts, in which the United S tates 
respectively challenges the EU’s “general moratorium,” its “product-specific 
moratoria,” and EU member state marketing and import bans. The United S tates 
contends that the SPS Agreement applies, since the EC maintains that its m easures 
are needed, on the one hand, to protect humans from toxicity, allergenicity, 
horizontal gene transfer, and antibiotic resistance, and, on the other hand, to p ro tec t 
the environment from the potential invasivencss of new species, from the  
development o f resistance in pests, and from other unintended effects arising 
through GMO use. The SPS Agreement covers “measures,” including “testing, 
inspection, certification and approval measures,” applied to protect animal and plant 
life and health from pests and diseases, and human and animal life and health from 
the risks of additives, toxins, and diseases.81
The United States challenges “the general moratorium** and “the product- 
specific moratoria” for violations of SPS procedural and substantive risk assessment 
requirements. It maintains that the EU imposes “undue delay” in its product and 
marketing approvals, in violation of article 8 and annex C of the SPS Agreement. It 
contends that the EU failed to “publish promptly” its “moratorium” in violation o f 
article 7 and annex B of the agreement. It argues that the general moratorium and 
product-specific moratoria are not based on risk assessments as required under 
article 5.1, thus also resulting in a violation of article 2.2. The United States points 
to tw enty-eight product-specific moratoria. It claims that in fourteen of them, the 
EU “has not put forth any risk assessments whatsoever,” In the remaining fourteen 
where the EU undertook risk assessments, it states that “the product-specific 
moratoria are not based on these assessments,” since the “scientific assessments... 
concluded that there was no evidence that these biotech products would pose a risk 
to human, animal or plant life or health or cause other damage.”82 The United States 
also maintains that the EU applies arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels 
of protection required for GM products compared to products produced with 
“biotech processing aids,” such as enzymes used in the production of European 
cheeses, which is in violation of article 5.5 o f the agreement.
The United States then challenges the nine “safeguard” measures adopted by six 
member states, which ban the importation or marketing of biotech products that had 
been approved under Directive 90/220 or Regulation 258/97.83 The United States 
maintains that these member state measures were also not based on a risk 
assessment, as required under article 5.1. Moreover, in each case, the “EU scientific
81 See article 1 and annex A, paragraph 1 of the SPS Agreement.
82 First submission o f  the United States, April 21,2004, at par. 143, 145.
83 Three o f these measures were adopted by Austria (biotech com products), two by France 
(oilseed rape), and one each by Germany (com), Greece (oilseed rape), Italy (com), and 
Luxembourg (com).
214
committees considered and rejected the information provided by the member 
States.”84 Finally, the United States specifically challenges Greece’s import ban 
under article XI: 1 of GATT 1994. Article XI prohibits the use of quantitative 
restrictions, subject to the exceptions set forth in GATT Article XX. Greece's 
measure expressly ‘"prohibits the importing into the territory of Greece of seeds of 
the genetically modified rape-plant line bearing reference number 
C/UK/95/M5/1.”85
The EU responded that the SPS Agreement in large part does not even apply to 
the GMO dispute since “the scope of the SPS Agreement is limited.” The EU 
contends that the agreement’s provisions “are simply not designed to address [the] 
risks” posed by GMOs, which “are o f a different nature” and were not in 
consideration when the SPS Agreement was adopted.86 In particular, the EU 
maintains that GMOs are not “additives,” “contaminants,” “toxins,” “diseases,” or 
“pests” within the meaning set forth in annex A of the SPS Agreement, which 
defines a “sanitary or Phytosanitary measure” covered by the agreement. Rather, the 
EU states that the focus of Directive 90/220 is “on environmental protection,” 
including long-term risks to “biodiversity,” which “fall outside the SPS 
Agreement.”87 The EU maintains that the “Biosafety Protocol” was subsequently 
negotiated "which lays down the most pertinent provisions to any consideration of 
any problems related to GMOs.”88
Second, the EU maintains that it has not instituted either a general or product- 
specific moratorium. Rather, it contends that the complainants “arc attacking what 
they consider to be undue delay in the conduct of the EU approvals system for 
GMOs” under article 8 o f the SPS Agreement.89 That is, they arc challenging the 
application of EU procedures, and not the underlying EU legislation itself.90 The 
EU contends, however, that there were no “undue” delays. It rather characterizes the 
delays in terms of “requests for additional information” related to issues o f risk 
assessments that were sometimes based on changes in EU legislation, and that often 
resulted from the applicant’s tardiness or incompleteness in providing the additional 
information.91 These requests for additional information, the EU argues, are 
legitimate, especially in light of “new technology which is generally untried and
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84 Id., at par. 170.
85 Id., at par 174.
86 First W ritten Submission by the European Communities, May 17,2004, at par. 385.
87 Id. at par. 416-420.
88 Id, at par 386.
89 Id, at par. 460.
90 Cite.
91 Id, at par 486.
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untested and which is recognized by the international community to hav e  
characteristics which inherently require prudence and caution/’92
The EU similarly maintains that no “general moratorium” exists, but rather, each  
application “has been taken on its own merits.”93 The EU notes, in particular, th a t 
five biotech food products have been placed on the EU market through “the  
simplified procedure” of Regulation 258/97. It also contends that, since Directive 
90/220 has been replaced by a new directive, the complainants’ claims have no 
validity. In the EU’s words, “WTO dispute settlement docs not provide for remedies 
in respect of past measures, not least where they arc no longer in existence.”94 The 
EU characterizes its delayed measures as an “interim approach” required in the 
context of changing internal EU legislation adapting to ongoing risk assessments o f  
the technology.
In response to claims from Argentina and Canada that the EU measures violate 
the GATT national treatment provision, article III.4, the EU contends that no 
violation has occurred because it treats foreign GMOs no differently than EU ones. 
The key term in GATT article III.4 is “like product,” with Argentina and Canada 
maintaining that GM products and their non-GM conventional counterparts are 
indeed “like products.” The EU responds that “the international Community has, 
through the Biosafety Protocol, recognized that GM products are such that they 
require their own, distinct authorization procedure,” and thus are not “like” 
products,95 It concludes that Canada and Argentina have failed to establish “that the 
product-specific delays provide ‘less favourable treatment’ for imported GM 
products as compared with domestically produced GM products.”96
Finally, the EU characterizes the member state “safeguards” as “provisional and 
temporary” measures in compliance with article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. The EU 
contends that the term “reasonable period o f time” as used in this provision is 
contingent on the circumstances and in light o f the level o f acceptable risk which 
“prudent and rational legislators” have determined “on the basis of the pertinent 
infonnation.”97 The EU likewise contends that the SPS Agreement does not fully 
apply to the member state “safeguards” on account of the agreement’s limited scope.
92 Id, at par. 488. The Amicus Brief o f Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, Sheila JasanofT. 
David Winickoff, and Brian Wynn, agrees, maintaining, “what looks like ‘delay’ in one 
regulatory culture may be *bona fide  prudence’ in another.” Amicus brief, at 37.
93 Id., at par 546.
94 Id.,atpar. 551,
95 Id, at par. 535.
96 Id. at par. 538.
97 Id., at par. 605-606, 664,
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C The Potential Role o f  the WTO Case
For many commentators, the SPS Agreement is a problematic one. A simple 
reading of the SPS Agreement could be that WTO rules require that “science” 
always trump politics in national (and, in the EU case, regional) regulatory policy.98 
Such a reading would surely raise concerns about a “democratic deficit” in the 
design and application o f WTO rules.99 As Robert Hudec has pointed out:
Traditionally, trade agreements have focused on eliminating 
discrimination against foreign trade by disciplining governmental 
measures that impose competitive disadvantages on foreign goods vis-à- 
vis domestic goods with which they compete. In the recent Uruguay 
Round trade agreements, however, it appears that the draftsmen [...] 
added another goal, one that can be described as the prevention of 
unjustifìcd regulation per sc, whether or not such a regulation creates a 
competitive disadvantage for foreign goods vis-à-vis domestic goods.
Thus, for example, a food safety measure that is not based on scientific 
principles would be a violation of Article 2 of the [SPS Agreement], 
whether or not it discriminates against foreign goods.100
These new WTO rules, however, arc subject to legitimate challenge in that 
democratic governments, in response to constituent demands, may decide for 
multiple reasons to regulate in a manner that is not rationally justified according to 
most scientists, but is nonetheless not discriminatory. As Hudec points out, a WTO 
rule that requires regulatory “rationality” can provide “foreign traders [...] a greater 
set of legal rights than is given to the domestic producers with whom they 
compete.”101
The WTO Appellate Body has, however, responded to some of these concerns 
over the SPS Agreement in its jurisprudence. The Appellate Body has appeared to 
provide significant discretion for domestic regulatory policymakers. In the EC-meat 
hormones case, for example, the Appellate Body stated that, under WTO rules,
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98 On the notion that science is not purely objective and value-free, see Walker 1998; Wirth, 
1994 at 857-859. See also Amicus Curiae Brief o f Lawrence Busch. Robin Grove-White, 
Sheila Jasanoff, David Winickoff, and Brian Wynn, at 12 (“According to a growing body of 
social scientific research and expert panel reports, judgment enters into both risk assessment 
and risk management”).
99 See Amicus Curiae Brief o f LawTence Busch, Robin Grove-White, Sheila Jasanoff, David 
Winickoff, and Brian Wynn, at 7 (“The GMO dispute implicates not only technical concerns 
about barriers to trade but also political concerns about a democratic deficit in the design and 
operation of the WTO itself’). Compare Guruswamy, 2002 at 497. (“the risk assessment 
procedures under the SPS Agreement are fair and reasonable and are qualitatively superior to 
the precautionary principle embodied in the Biosafety Protocol”).
100 Robert Hudec, “Science and ‘Post-Discriminatory WTO Law,” ’ 26 Boston College Int 7 
Comp. L. Rev. 186, 187 (2003).
101 Id., at 188.
217
GREGORY C. SHAFFER and MARK A. POLLACK
members retain discretion to determine the level of appropriate risk. It confirme« 
that members may rely on minority scientific opinions, and can take account o 
“factors which arc not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical o 
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the physica 
sciences."1"“ In the EC-ashestos case, the Appellate Body found that risk factors 
alone can differentiate products that are otherwise similar.101 As Alasdair Young 
and Peter Holmes conclude,
The approach of the Appellate Body in clarifying the SPS Agreement and 
other related texts essentially affirms the right of the EU to choose 
whatever food safety objectives it wishes... The combination of the 
clarification of the WTO's rules and the development of the EU's food 
safety policy making, particularly greater reference to risk assessment, 
should ce te r is  p a r ib u s  mean that new EU rules are less likely than in the 
past to fall foul of its WTO obligations.102 304
In sum, WTO jurisprudence appears to require the EU to apply a procedural 
approach pursuant to which decision-makers must rationally take into account risk 
assessments in pursuit of their regulatory objectives. As the Appellate Body wrote 
in the Japan-Y'arieials case, “whether there is a rational relationship between an 
SPS measure and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a casc-by-casc basis 
and will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, including the 
characteristics o f the measure at issue and the quality and quantity o f the scientific 
evidence."105
This dispute highlights the issue o f the potential role of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in the governance of transnational conflicts over the regulation of
102 See Appellate Body report, European Communities—Import Restrictions on Meat and Meal 
Products (Hormones) WTO Doc WT/DS26/AG/R, at par. 253. See discussion of this decision 
in Petros Mavroidis, “The Trade Disputes Concerning Health Policy between EC and the US," 
in eds. Petersmann and Pollack (2003).
103 See Appellate Body report, European Communities— Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products. WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R of 12 March 2001, especially at 
par. 122.
104 See Alasdair Young and Peter Holmes, “Protection or Protectionism? EU Food Safety Rules 
and the WTO.” in eds. Ansell and Vogel. Mavroidis and Ilovvse conclude that “The stmehtre 
of EU regulation as reflected in the amended directive raises few serious risks of violating the 
SPS Agreement." Sec liowse and Mavroidis (Nov.-Dec. 2000).
105 See Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report o f  the Appellate Body. 
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999), at par. 84. Similarly, in the EC-mcat hormones case, the 
Appellate Body stated that: “The requirement that an SPS measure be ‘based on' a risk 
assessment is a substantive requirement that there be a rational relationship between the 
measure and the risk assessment." Hormones, Report of the Appellate Body, at par. 163. The 
AB further maintained that “determination o f  the presence or absence of that relationship can 
only be done on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all considerations rationally 
bearing upon the issue o f potential adverse health effects.” Id.
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risk. In our view, the WTO judges, and in particular, the members of the Appellate 
Body see their role not only as interpreters and appliers of WTO legal provisions. 
The pattern of their jurisprudence suggests that they also assume a mediating role to 
induce members to take account of each others’ views and interests, and to spur the 
settlement of disputes, including by facilitate members’ compliance with WTO 
rules, or settlement of disputes in the context o f WTO rules, thereby upholding the 
overall WTO legal system.106
WTO judges’ concern over the legitimacy of their judicial decisions will likely 
shape their judgment of the GMO case. By legitimacy, we refer to the social 
acceptance of WTO decisions, and, in particular, the acceptance of legal decisions 
by WTO members. The EU is the largest trader in the world. Were the WTO 
Appellate Body to come down hard on the EU in the GMO case, the EU would 
likely not be able to comply with its requirements. Such a ruling could provide 
fodder to anti-globalist challenges to trade liberalization, and fuel further mass 
protests against the organization. It could also provide a rationale for other WTO 
members not to comply with the Appellate Body’s legal rulings. One non- 
compliance could trigger tit-for-tat strategies o f non-compliance. As McDougal and 
Lasswell wrote about international law over forty years ago, “Since the legal 
process is among the basic patterns of a community, the public order includes the 
protection of the legal order itself, with authority being used as a base of power to 
protect authority.”107 The Appellate Body and judicial panels can help uphold the 
system by shaping their decisions to induce compliance or amicable settlement.
In our view, it is likely that the Appellate Body will tread softly and wish not to 
be seen as second-guessing the EU’s risk assessment and management decisions. As 
a result, the WTO ruling could take a procedural turn, in line with the procedural 
turn in the EU’s regulation of GMOs.108 Even if  the United States prevails on some 
o f its procedural claims, we believe that the WTO decision, at a minimum, will 
leave significant discretion to the EU in determining the level of acceptable risk.
The WTO legal process nonetheless can serve a positive role in the ongoing 
transatlantic and global conflicts over the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. 
First, WTO rules arguably have already made the EU decision-making process 
somewhat more flexible, as they have pushed EU and member state authorities, 
directly, and European constituencies, indirectly, to justify their decisions over 
biotech regulatory measures. By providing a framework of legal rules, the WTO can 
facilitate dialogue between governments and constituencies concerning the 
objectives of GMO regulation, the means used to achieve these objectives, and the
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impact of these choices on different constituencies.m  WTO rules, in particular 
have already pressed the EU not simply to ban all GMOs, but rather to engage ir 
case-by-case risk assessments and the adoption of a new labelling regime. In oui 
view, non-discriminatory labelling rules, in particular, should survive a WTO legal 
challenge.109 10 In this sense, WTO rules press parties to justify their decisions and 
thereby potentially facilitate, in a diffuse manner, rational exchange between 
governments at the international level, and between governments and their 
constituencies nationally.
It is not coincidental that the EU finally approved a biotech variety for the first 
time since the start o f the moratorium in 1998 in May 2004, in the middle o f  the  
WTO case. The WTO case provided the European Commission with a sense o f  
justification to approve the GM com variety over member state reticence. Of course, 
the member states can again reject that decision by implementing national bans. 
However, the WTO case could facilitate the approval and marketing of some 
biotech products in the EU more quickly than otherwise would occur. Over time, to 
the extent that European constituents feel at greater ease with biotech products, the 
potential for ongoing policy adaptation is left open. We are not predicting, by any 
means, a convergence of US and EU approaches toward GMOs. However, the 
WTO legal framework, to the extent that it is applied in a manner that leaves for 
considerable member state flexibility, potentially can facilitate transatlantic 
dialogue and adaptation.
VII. Conclusion: Bargaining, Deliberation, and the Choice of 
International Governance Mechanisms
The regulation o f genetically modified foods and crops has been, and continues to 
be, one o f the most difficult and intractable disputes in the US/EU economic 
relationship. Beginning in the late 1980s with the establishment o f their respective 
frameworks for regulating agricultural biotechnology, the US and the EU have 
regulated GM foods and crops very differently, and these differences have 
manifested themselves substantively in terms of longer authorization times and 
stricter standards for approval, release, and marketing of GMOs in the EU than in
109 Similarly, Rob llowse writes, “SPS provisions and their interpretation by the WTO dispute 
settlement organs [...] can be, and should be, understood not as usurping legitimate 
democratic choices for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality o f rational democratic 
deliberation about risk and its control.” Howse 2000:2329-2330.
110 See also Macmillan and Blakeney, spring 2001: 113-114.(finding that “the issue of labeling of 
GM foods falls more properly within the ambit o f the TBT Agreement,” and that “at a time 
when the WTO is facing unprecedented, and increasingly well-organized opposition, the 
revelation that the WTO was antagonistic to the labeling of GMOs in food would be a 
publicity nightmare.”).
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the US. More important than any specific regulatory standard, however, is the fact 
that the GMO dispute brings into confrontation two distinctive systems of risk 
regulation. On the US side, the long-standing system of relatively science-based 
regulation is not without its critics, but nevertheless has the strong support of 
farmers, industry and government officials, as well as an impressive degree of 
social legitimacy in US public opinion. On the EU side, European publics and 
institutions have from the beginning favoured a more cautious approach to GMOs, 
including the establishment of specialized procedures to regulate GM foods and 
crops in terms of the process by which they arc made, and the subsequent food 
safety scandals of the 1990s increased the resolve of EU member governments to 
put in place ever more strict regulation for the pre-approval, traceability and 
labelling of all GMOs independent of their individual safety characteristics.
Under the circumstances, efforts to bridge the gap between the US and the EU 
through bilateral regulatory cooperation—in the hopes that US and EU regulators 
would engage in joint scientific deliberation and come to common understandings 
of their regulatory tasks—have been almost uniformly disappointing. While EU 
observers in particular have expressed optimism regarding such deliberative 
approaches to public policy-making, most theoretical accounts of deliberative 
decision-making concede that genuine deliberation is most likely under certain 
scope conditions, including dcpoliticized and often in camera settings, where state 
representatives enter discussions in a mutual search for truth.111 By contrast, the 
regulation of GMOs is a highly politicized issue-area in which US and EU 
representatives negotiate in the light of strongly mobilized domestic opinion, and in 
which the negotiators themselves often believe strongly in the superiority o f their 
own regulatory system. In Thomas Risse’s (2000) language, these conditions are far 
more conducive to “bargaining” than to “arguing” (deliberation). In this context, it 
is not surprising that the most productive o f the transatlantic dialogues on 
biotechnology—the 1999 Biotechnology Consultative Forum, and the TACD 
meetings and working groups—have been undertaken either by experts participating 
in their personal capacity, or by like-minded activists under no constraint to 
represent their respective countries. By contrast with these two cases, the official 
bilateral dialogues and the three multilateral negotiations examined in part 3 o f this 
paper (the WTO discussions, the Biosafety Protocol, and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission) were all textbook cases o f “bargaining,” with both sides seeking to 
negotiate on the basis of fixed positions and both jockeying for advantage by 
exporting their preferred models to the global stage and thereby influencing the 
outcome of future negotiations or litigation. In the absence of any meaningful
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deliberation, however, each of these forums has thus far yielded little clarification 
but rather inelegant compromises that obscure rather than clarify the nature o f th e  
differences in question. This is not to say that bilateral or multilateral dialogue is 
fruitless, since even “bargaining” can result in useful exchanges o f information and  
sometimes mutual accommodation; but initial hopes for transatlantic deliberation 
and convergence in such forums have clearly faded with the passage of time.
Against this backdrop, the US complaint before the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body presents significant risk o f backlash against GMOs or the WTO, or both — 
risks of which we have warned at length (Pollack and Shaffer 2001). Yet the U S 
case also holds the promise of clarification and legal certainty that nearly a decade 
of bilateral and multilateral negotiation has failed to produce. As wc have seen, 
previous WTO rulings (most notably in the beef-hormones case) have already 
clarified the obligations of all parties in undertaking risk regulation, with 
particularly evident effects on the regulatory processes of the European Union 
(Mavroidis 2003; Skogstad 2001; Scott 2003). In a similar fashion, the legal setting 
of the Dispute Settlement Body has already forced both sides in the current dispute 
to argue their respective cases in the language of international law. Should the WTO 
panel (and, in all likelihood, the Appellate Body) produce a ruling that provides 
clarity about the obligations of each side without provoking a backlash in domestic 
public opinion and calling into question the legitimacy of the WTO itself, then the 
significant gamble o f bringing a WTO complaint may well have paid off.
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Comments
Christian Joerges
No issue in the trade relations between the US and the EU is more contested than 
that of genetically modified organisms. Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack have 
delivered substantial contributions to that multi-faceted debate.1 My comment 
cannot but be selective. The focus I have chosen for this comment mirrors the 
interests of a lawyer with interdisciplinary ambitions. Thus I concentrate on a 
methodological issue, albeit one which concerns a particularly interesting 
dimension of this co-authored work.
Let me take the liberty of starting with a so-to-speak Teutonic, />., abstract and 
systematic, perspective. In a short essay already published 10 years ago, Jurgen 
Habermas2 characterized lawyers’ and social scientists’ treatment of law and 
democracy as opening up a kind of schism between the disciplines. Each discipline, 
he argued, tends to approach law according to its particular logic which cannot be 
communicated across the disciplinary borders. Lawyers restrict themselves to 
normative issues (and, specifically, to legal reasoning), whereas social scientists 
specialize in empirical dimensions (and their explanations). Social scientists tend to 
perceive law—if they see it at all—from external perspectives. They do not engage 
in the business o f a lege artis application of rules, but explore their impact on
1 Mark A. Pollack/Gregory C. Shaffer, “The Challenge of Reconciling Regulatory Differences: 
Food Safety and GMOs in the Transatlantic Relationship", in: M.A. PoIlack/G.C. Shaffer 
(eds.l. Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield 2001, 153-178.
2 Jiirgcn Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union o f Contradictory 
Principles?*’, Political Theory 29:6 (2001), 766-781.
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society, their effectiveness, or they analyze the implementation or compliance of 
law. Thus, they tend to avoid the prescriptive dimension of law. Normative issues, 
as dealt with by lawyers, arc an aliud to truly scientific operations. Habermas’ 
observation concerned the law of constitutional states and the legitimacy of 
democratic governance within nation states. But his methodological observations 
are equally relevant in post-national constellations;3 they concern the realms of 
European and international law on the one hand, and of transnational governance 
and international regimes on the other. Accordingly, we can expect Mark Pollack to 
analyze and explain political processes and decisions whereas Greg Shaffer would 
look at their “juridification”, i.e., the legal framework of political controversies, the 
contents of legal arguments—with the ambition to tell us who is right or wrong, or 
even which claims arc just or unjust.
This, however, is not exactly what happens in this paper. Mark Pollack the 
political scientist, and Greg Shaffer the lawyer are clearly convinced that they can 
and should do what Louis Hcnkins expected them to do, namely, to listen to and to 
lcam from each other.4 Both the realist heritage in American international law 
scholarship and the readiness of American political scientist to take the impact of 
law seriously are a strong basis for such orientations. They inform the inquiries into 
the philosophies underlying American and European regulatory approaches to 
GMOs. They help the reader to understand how policy issues are framed and 
translated into legal positions. They illuminate how the shift from political 
controversy to international litigation occurs. All of this is clearly significant and 
instructive. But do these inquiries suffice to overcome the schism which Habermas 
has identified?
Not fully, I submit. Sections V-VII seem most revealing in this respect. In 
Section V, the paper looks at the degree to which US and EU policies have 
converged since 2000. The convergence is, however, limited. GMOs are an 
enonnously sensitive issue in Europe. Policy-makers have to mediate between 
consumer anxieties, economic interests, and broader philosophical debates—to 
which, unsurprisingly, nobody less than Jürgen Habermas delivered a widely 
acclaimed contribution. 5 The positions taken by the EU reflect these 
controversies—and also reflect the EU’s legitimacy problems when seeking to 
arrive at an authoritative decision. The US are, in this respect, in a legally and
3 Cf. most recently Jürgen Habermas, “Der gespaltene Westen (The Divided West),“ Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp 2004.
4 The famous quote reads: “The student o f law and the student of politics [...] purport to be 
looking at the same world from the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems 
unfortunate, indeed destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each other” , Louis 
Henkins, “How Nations Behave”, Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. New Haven, Columbia 
University Press 1979.
5 Jürgen Habermas, “The Future of Human Nature”, Cambridge (UK): Polity Press 2003.
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institutionally-speaking more comfortable position, but by no means in a politically 
easy one, as the survey on the intra-American debates documents. What will happen 
in the WTO dispute settlement procedure which Argentina, Canada and the US have 
initiated? Mark Pollack, the political scientist, reconstructs the policy framework o f  
the on-going contest instructively. Gregory Shaffer, the lawyer, analyses the 
transformation o f  the political discourse into a legal contest with great subtlety. But 
he hesitates to tell us what will happen. However, confronted with such a quest for 
prophesy, the legal realist gives in. But he is not speechless. The paper—botli 
authors in this respect—points to trans-political and trans-lcgal dimensions o f the 
WTO dispute. This body is not legitimated or authorized to hand down a decision 
on such controversies. The best we can hope for, the paper concludes, would be “ a 
ruling that provides clarity about the obligations of each side without provoking a 
backlash in domestic public opinion and calling into question the legitimacy of the 
WTO itself.” Would this be a further step towards the “judicialization” of the WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings? Or should wc interpret the conclusion that 
legalization remains imperfect? I believe that the findings of this instructive paper 
can be interpreted in a conflict-of-laws approach to WTO law which distinguishes 
between the principles and rules that the parties to a conflict can subject themselves 
to and the conflicts that should definitely not be settled legally. An elaboration of 
this suggestion, however, would have to go far beyond the limits of this comment.6
6 Cf. for an elaboration Christian Joerges, “Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the 
WTO: A Theoretical Framework” , Ms. EUI Florence 2004; Christian Joerges/Christine Godt, 
“Free Trade: The Erosion of National and the Birth of Transnational Governance” 
forthcoming in: Stephan Leibfried/Michael Züm (eds.). Transformations of the State?. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005 (= European Review 2005 (13) 1).
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Chapter 9
Market Power without a Single Market:
The New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services
Elliot Posner
I. Introduction
American and European banks, insurance companies, asset managers and other 
financial services companies have long competed in multiple jurisdictions with 
distinct and sometimes incompatible regulatory systems. Financial authorities on 
both sides of the Atlantic are seasoned to the classic problems this arrangement 
often sparks. Since the mid-1990s, however, differences in regulatory approaches 
have been at the centre o f  a host of intense and increasingly frequent conflicts.
This paper explores a change in the way American and European officials 
manage them. While some disputes remain very much unresolved, a clear pattern is 
emerging. Until three years ago, US regulators jealously guarded their regulatory 
sovereignty in handling transatlantic disputes. They typically exported American 
solutions by pressuring, persuading or outmanoeuvring their European counterparts 
and resisted making accommodations to European demands and proposals. If 
adjustments were going to occur, European national regulators tended to make 
them. Recently, by contrast, US authorities have made significant concessions in 
several high-profile transatlantic conflicts, and there are strong indications this 
behaviour will continue. European regulators are not achieving all their goals but 
are doing much better than in the past. Transatlantic relations in financial services, 
in short, have entered a new stage characterized by mutual accommodation.
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What accounts for the cooperation in financial services at a moment when 
transatlantic relations in general are under unusual stress? I argue that the “EU-US 
Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue” launched in May 2002,1 the Norwalk 
Agreement o f September 2002 and other related new cooperative efforts are 
products of a fundamental shift in the relative market power of American and 
European regulators. The primary cause is the creation of an EU regulatory system 
for financial services, which is transferring authority from the national to the 
European level. This development, deeply rooted in the politics of regional 
integration and itself a spillover of the euro’s introduction, has led to a more 
accommodative US stance because American financial services companies that 
operate in Europe have much at stake in the shape of the embryonic EU financial 
regulatory regime.
Under pressure from US companies to protect their interests or from EU 
regulators pressing their own and their constituents’ agendas, American officials 
have had to come to terms with newly empowered counterparts. EU officials now 
have the potential to affect US firms in ways similar to American authorities’ 
influence over European corporations with US businesses. While European choices 
may benefit US finns by promoting transatlantic regulatory harmonization, they 
may just as readily harm them through retaliatory responses. Thus, the construction 
of a European-level regulatory regime triggered new private sector political 
behaviour and US regulatory positions and altered transatlantic relations in financial 
services.
This more balanced transatlantic relationship represents a curious turn. It is 
difficult to find in the current scholarship on cross-border financial integration even 
a hint that European-US financial relations were about to be transformed in this 
way, let alone an explanation for it. Recent accounts expect continued US 
dominance in global financial regulatory developments for two reasons:2 a 
conceptualization of market power that emphasizes market size and the 
concentration o f  financial activity; and statist assumptions that eliminate the 
possibility that supranational developments may transform the international political 
economy.
Since the scale o f national financial services industries in Europe does not rival 
those in the US and a single European financial market remains still very much a 
goal, analysts too readily dismiss the potential relative market power of EU officials 
in their interactions with US financial regulators. They overlook the possibility that 
the degree to which foreign finns participate in and rely on a regulator’s 
jurisdiction, not just size or levels of financial activity, may be a source of relative
1 The Dialogue was part o f the “Positive Economic Agenda" introduced at the US-EU Summit 
in May 2002.
2 Simmons 2001 is a leading example.
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market power. US firms operating in Europe must increasingly comply with a 
single supranational regulatory regime. This regional institutional reform is what 
has changed in the EU and empowered it in its dealings with the US.
Two EU developments were chiefly responsible for shifting financial regulation 
from the national to the European level and simultaneously netting US financial 
firms under what is quickly becoming a single authority. The Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP), proposed in May 1999 and endorsed by the European Council 
in March 2000, is the proposed list, most of which has already been passed, of new 
regulations with which European and US firms operating in the EU will have to 
comply. The second is the Lamfalussy Process, the new formal decision-making 
procedures that are expediting the creation of new regulations and facilitating their 
implementation and enforcement. Both EU initiatives, adopted to achieve internal 
goals and improve Europe’s international competitiveness, have created a soon-to- 
be realized single regulatory regime that will apply as readily to US firms formerly 
operating under twenty-five different authorities as to European ones.
Anticipating this change and the potential for harmful EU regulations, US firms 
kept Washington politicians and regulators apprised of European developments and 
enlisted their assistance in pressing for a new regime that would be coordinated with 
the American one. In the process, US authorities became more responsive to the 
demands of European officials, though only after testing the new power realities and 
their counterparts’ resolve. The role of US financial companies was thus a primary 
transmission mechanism, linking institutional change in Europe to enhanced EU 
market power and more symmetrical transatlantic financial relations.
In a preliminary empirical evaluation, I compare the historical record o f five 
“hot” issues from the securities market sector3 with hypotheses drawn from the 
above theoretical argument: accounting standards, corporate board composition, 
stock exchange screens and the regulation of auditors and financial conglomerates. 
The empirical evidence offers reasonable confirmation of the constructed market 
power hypotheses and only weak support for alternative explanations. I find that 
internal decisions about how to integrate a sector in Europe structures EU-US 
interactions, constraining and enabling the management of the same issue. In the 
cases where Europeans have been most ambitious at home (accounting standards 
and financial conglomerates), US regulators have made the most concessions. In the 
case where Europeans selected the least ambitious form of integration (governing 
competition among stock exchanges), US regulators have made none. The two cases 
stemming from the passage of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (rules governing auditors 
and corporate board composition) demonstrate the extent to which mutual
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3 Analysts usually divide the industry into three categories: banking, insurance and 
securities/investment services, which includes investment banking, brokering and dealing, 
clearing and settling and managing assets. These old divisions have increasingly blurred.
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adjustment has become the new standard. This empirical evidence suggests that 
variation in the way US-EU regulators manage conflicts does not depend primarily 
on decisions made only in Washington. I find instead that political decisions made 
in the EU about how to structure cross-border integration are at least as important as 
those stemming from the US.
Before developing the constructed market hypotheses and the preliminary 
empirical evidence in more detail, I give some background on the motives and 
calculations o f  financial regulators and on general trends in transatlantic relations in 
financial services. In the concluding section, I discuss the implications for debates 
between rationalist and constructivist approaches to the IPE.
II. The Financial Services Industry and
the Mixed Motives of Financial Regulators
Policymakers are well aware that financial intermediaries—banks, brokerage houses, 
asset managers, stock exchanges, insurers and other financial services firms—differ 
from other companies because o f the central role they play in the allocation of 
capital. Decisions made by these firms strongly affect other industries and economic 
growth and have far-reaching political and social implications. As John Zysman 
argued two decades ago, national financial systems come in many flavours 
depending on who determines the price and allocation of capital. In systems 
dominated by banks, governments can more easily control which companies receive 
financing. Those dominated by financial markets leave such decisions to a large 
number of dispersed investors.4 His main point is still relevant today. Alternative 
types of financial arrangements create different groups of winners and losers and 
affect the ability o f governments to carry out policies. Financial systems help 
differentiate alternative styles of capitalism. How firms are financed shapes 
companies and industries and affects the risks citizens must bear, how they save for 
retirement, where they work, their job security and ability to buy homes, and the 
disparity between rich and poor.
In the aftermath o f WWII, financial arrangements followed highly idiosyncratic 
national trajectories, reflecting Bretton Woods arrangements that promoted free 
trade but permitted relatively closed capital accounts. Propelled by new electronic 
technologies, the lifting of capital controls and regulatory competition, the financial 
industry has been for decades in a constant state of change, characterized by the 
blurring of walls between sectors, the creation of new financial assets and markets, 
and the internationalization of competition.5 Indeed, the return of global finance in
4 Zysman 1983.
5 While internationalization has received much of the attention from scholars, domestic 
dynamics and structures have been equally important. Sec Deeg 1999 and Verdier 2003.
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the post-Brctton Woods era is in large part about the cross-border integration of this 
industry—financial intermediaries increasingly competing in foreign jurisdictions.
The clashes that characterize transatlantic relations in financial services are 
rooted in the industry’s complexity and the multiple motives of national officials.6 
Policymakers weigh competing goals in deciding how and to what degree to open 
their financial services industries to foreign companies.7 On the one hand, well- 
known benefits of economic internationalization are in some ways similar for 
national financial services as for other industries—enhanced domestic competition, 
larger markets for internationally competitive national firms, the spreading of 
innovation and better uses of resources.8 The integration of national financial 
services also brings benefits special to the industry, at least in the case of rich 
countries. As manufacturers expand their operations, services and marketing to 
other countries, internationalization o f financial services industries allows them to 
continue long-nurtured national banking relationships in other settings.
On the other hand, finance is a strategic sector, and policymakers and regulators 
have good reasons for being cautious about how and to what degree they integrate 
national financial services industries. Some stem from the economic importance and 
the international competitive advantages of having a vibrant national financial 
services industry and the fact that financial markets in many sectors can migrate 
quickly in the age of fleet-footed capital and split-second electronic transactions.9 
The industry’s importance to rich economies cannot be overstated. Financial 
services companies contribute to economic prosperity by providing large numbers 
of well-paid, non-polluting jobs and purchasing large amounts o f high-tech 
electronic equipment. In 2001, banks employed 437,000 workers in the UK,
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ft Regulation o f financial intermediaries is complex, including not only principles and rules and 
but also implementation and enforcement. Even the replication of the US rulcbook may yield 
a system wholly incompatible, let alone convergent, with the American one. In the EU, where 
integration has gone the furthest, contrasting regulatoiy systems have obstructed deeper 
integration o f national financial sectors at every turn. Of course, regulatory differences have 
not been the only obstacle. As discussed below, politicians and regulators have not always 
wanted further integration. See Story and Walter 1997.
7 There is a large literature about the causes and direction of financial regulatory reform. See, 
for example, Cemy 1989; Moran 1991; Sobel 1994; Vogel 1995; Loriaux, Woo-Cumings et 
al. 1997; and Laurence 2001.
8 For estimates of the benefits from deeper integration of transatlantic financial services 
industries, see Steil 2002.
9 The story o f the Eurobond market, for example, in which US regulations sent activity to 
London, continues to haunt American policymakers. Interview with senior staff officials of 
Committee on Financial Services, US House o f Representatives, Washington DC, May 6, 
2004. A more recent example is the German government bond future market which migrated 
to the German-Swiss derivatives market, Eurex, from London's Liffe.
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412,000 in France, 717,000 in Germany, 344,000 in Italy and 1,939,000 in the US.10 
In 2002, insurance companies had 217,500 workers in the UK, 138,700 in France, 
248,100 in Germany and 40,000 in Italy.11 Security and commodity brokers and 
services companies had 743,500 employees in the US in 2001.12 13
In addition to these contributions to employment and economic growth in an 
absolute sense, policymakers and regulators also recognize the international 
competitive advantages of a large and robust national financial services industry. 
International Relations scholars have long included finance as a critical source of 
relative national power for achieving international goals.11 The presence of large 
financial markets perceived by domestic and foreign investors as secure and fair is, 
no doubt, an important factor behind the US government’s ability to borrow at 
relatively low rates for long periods of time. It has also been an advantage for US 
companies, especially those developing and commercializing new technologies with 
uncertain prospects.14 The deep and liquid financial markets have also been an 
important magnet attracting the world’s brightest engineers, investment capital and 
technology to the US. In the 1990s, moreover, the SEC was able to use its market 
power and prestige as the regulator of the world’s largest financial services industry 
to shape the agenda and organization of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) to a considerable extent.15 Indeed, the status and power that 
came with this leading role was an impetus for creating similar types of securities 
regulators in Germany and other countries where they did not already exist.16
Policymakers and regulators have a second set of reasons for being cautious 
about how and to what degree to promote cross-border integration of financial 
services industries. These reflect the democratic nature of the political systems in 
which they operate.17 Not all financial intermediaries benefit from the opening of 
domestic markets. Some enjoy the rents o f protected markets and oligopolistic and 
monopolistic arrangements. Sometimes, as in the case of stock exchanges, financial 
intennediaries serve as the hub of multiple tiers of financial activity. Policymakers
10 Source: OECD as printed in Commission 2004a.
11 Source: Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) as printed in Commission 2004a.
12 Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics as printed in SLA 2002.
13 See, for example. Strange 1994,25.
14 The relative absence of risk capital markets in Europe was a key motivation for a European 
Commission's 1994 intervention. See Posner 2002.
15 On the SEC’s role in IOSCO, see Bach 2004.
16 Lutz 1998.
17 Moran 1991.
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and regulators have to balance the benefits of liberalizing cosy old arrangements18 
against the pressures of important constituencies and the possibility that inviting 
foreign competition will undermine an entire national financial sector.19
Financial regulators also have statutory obligations to protect investors and 
minimize systemic risk. While expectations about the rise of institutional investors 
and newly empowered shareholders have fallen short,20 recent events nevertheless 
remind us of how quickly politicians and regulators can react to financial scandals. 
Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and EC directives on auditing and market abuse came 
in response in large part to well-publicized financial malfeasance cases.
With so many possibilities, it is often extremely difficult for foreign regulators 
to decipher what combinations of goals generate policies. Old fashioned 
protectionism, a bid for competitive advantage, a genuine belief that liberalization 
would benefit all and legitimate domestic protections for investors are all 
possibilities. The mixed nature of motives and the uncertainty about foreign 
regulators’ goals arc the background to interactions between regulators deciding 
whether and how to integrate financial services industries.
III. The Old and the New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services
National central bankers, treasury and finance ministry officials and securities 
regulators have for decades interacted in a web of bilateral connections and 
multilateral forums such as the Bank for International Settlements, IOSCO, the 
Financial Action Taskforce of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the Financial Stability Forum.21 The cooperation tended 
to be fragmented by sectors.22 In the area of securities regulation since the 1980s, it 
was driven by the SEC and encompassed primarily enforcement issues.23 European 
national and US regulators established bilateral relationships and promoted the
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18 The relationships between regulators and financial intermediaries are often symbiotic. Some 
describe them as meso-corporatist (Moran 1991); others, as regulatory capture (Laurence
2001).
19 These types o f concerns, for example, produced the watered-down mutual recognition regime 
of the 1993 EC Investment Services Directive, which limited national stock exchanges’ 
exposure to cross-border competition. In an infant-industry-type scenario, the directive gave 
more time to the continental exchanges to improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis the London 
Stock Exchange and thereby prevented the migration of equity trading and all its associated 
business to the UK (Steil 1998a).
20 Steil 1996.
21 Bach calls it a transgovemmental regulatory network (Bach 2004). For a contrasting view, see 
Simmons 2001.
22 The Financial Stability Forum is the exception.
23 Bach 2004.
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sharing of enforcement-related information codified in memoranda of 
understanding.24
In 1997 the SEC’s Office of International Affairs began to focus on how to 
manage increasingly apparent differences in regulatory approaches.25 Paradoxically, 
regulatory conflicts became more intense in the aftermath o f major reforms to 
European national regulatory systems. The reforms, especially those governing 
securities markets, had moved European regulatory regimes closer to the American 
model.26 In fact, vexing conflicts of the late 1990s came about in large part because 
of this institutional isomorphism. The new similarities changed expectations of 
European firms and regulators about the prospects for deeper integration and 
emboldened them to demand that the SEC recognize their regulations. This seemed 
only right to the Europeans. As US regulations were often perceived as best 
practice, European regulators were more flexible than their American counterparts 
in extending exemptions and accepting compliance with US rules as equivalent to 
their own.
Under the post-war transatlantic regulatory regime, which operated largely 
under the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination, European banks 
and insurance companies had gained large market shares in several sectors in the 
US. They complied with federal and state regulations in part by setting up American 
entities, occasionally acquiring partial exemptions.27 28Inside the EU, the extension of 
the mutual recognition principle to insurance, banking and investment services 
regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s generally helped US firms compete 
across the continent as it did for European firms. By establishing foreign entities 
that complied with one national regulatory regime (often the UK’s), US companies 
could operate in any other EU national market. Indeed, US firms became leaders in 
a number of sectors on the continent, most notably in investment banking.
As the number o f European-US regulatory conflicts mounted in the late 1990s, 
the SEC was no more inclined to share regulatory sovereignty with foreign 
authorities or make adjustments to American rules than they had been previously 
when the issues were primarily about enforcement,2s The Europeans reformed their
24 Tafara 2004. These are published on www.iosco.org.
25 Interview with former SEC official, Washington DC, May 20 2004. See, for example, SEC 
1997.
26 The reasons for convergence and the degree o f  change are hotly debated (Cemy 1989; Loriaux 
1991; Moran 1991; Pauly 1994; Sobel 1994; Coleman 1996; Vogel 1996; Perez 1997; Story 
and Walter 1997; Dceg 1999; Adelberger 2000; Ziegler 2000; Laurence 2001; Posner 2002 
and Verdier 2003).
27 The SEC's reporting requirements for foreign firms listing on US exchanges (they can 
reconcile national standards with US GAAP) is an example of a partial exemption from 
national treatment.
28 Simmons 2001.
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regulation of financial services, but they still did not meet US standards—at least in 
the view of American regulators who believed the current regime o f national 
treatment and non-discrimination worked reasonably well and that exceptions could 
be used to manage the most costly negative effects of multiple and conflicting 
regulatory requirements.29 The SEC, moreover, was as effective during the late 
1990s as it had been before in getting what it wanted.30 Since the 1980s, it had used 
a range of strategies to achieve its goals with respect to European regulators, who 
were often more concerned about their own competition over which national 
financial centre would emerge as the future financial capital of Europe than about 
whether they were conceding too much to the SEC’s agenda. Its officials used their 
expertise and prestige to persuade, their markets to cajole and multilateral settings, 
like IOSCO, to take advantage of divisions among Europeans.
A. The New Transatlantic Relationship
Led and coordinated by the US Treasury and the European Commission, American 
and European officials have entered a new, more structured relationship that has 
affected the management of conflicts and, in some instances, produced new 
regulations and changes to previous ones. The new developments not only added a 
layer to and changed the tenor of the old country-to-country bilateral and IOSCO 
interactions but also shifted attention to EU-US bilateralism. The new regime is 
anchored by the “EU-US Regulatory Dialogue on Financial Services” introduced in 
May 2002 and also includes negotiations in accordance with the September 2002 
Norwalk Agreement and the March 2003 initiated SEC-CESR31 32 cooperative 
framework.12 Officials at multiple levels of government and in several agencies now 
engage more frequently and regularly than in the past. There is an observable move 
away from uncoordinated consultations and ad hoc problem-solving toward
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29 The SEC had changed its approach to some degree. Before the late 1980s, for example, the 
SBC was so domestically oriented that it had minimal interest in how US regulations affected 
the ability of foreign firms to compete in their home markets, interview with former SEC 
official. Washington DC, May 20 2004. Also, new issues, such as the influx of foreign issuers 
in the US, prompted the SEC to reconsider traditional positions. Interview with SEC staff 
members. Washington. DC, August 17,2004.
30 This was true in the US context as well. The SEC worked effectively with the US Treasury, 
which was under pressure from the Europeans. Interview with former SEC official, 
Washington DC, May 20, 2004. On the SEC's relative autonomy and power within the US 
political system, sec Bach 2004.
31 The Committee of European Securities Regulators replaced FESCO and is comprised of the 
EU national securities regulators and a representative from the European Commission. CESR 
advises the European Commission on securities regulation and coordinates the policies o f its 
members.
32 Tafara 2004.
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informal discussions about regulatory developments and even formal negotiations 
over the harmonization o f standards/3
Whereas in the past US regulators interacted primarily with their national 
European counterparts, today EU member states are also represented by two 
European-level bodies and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
The European Commission, an EU supranational bureaucracy with legislative, 
executive and regulatory powers, was a catalyst in revamping relations and still 
plays the most important European role, engaged directly in informal discussions 
with the US Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank, the SEC and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), newly created in June 2001, is now part of regularized 
interactions with the SEC. The SEC-CESR cooperative framework focuses on 
managing mutual regulatory risks and coordinating and where possible converging 
regulatory approaches. Finally, the IASB, the EU’s new accounting standards setter, 
is engaged with its American counterpart, the Federal Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), to make the US and the EU’s new standards fully compatible.3 4
In the last two years, visits by high-level financial authorities have given the 
new cooperative relationship stature and publicity. On the US side, Chairman of the 
US House o f Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services Michael Oxley, 
SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson and his predecessor, Harvey L. Pitt, led 
delegations to Europe. European Commissioner for Internal Market, Taxation and 
Customs Frits Bolkestcin. has visited Washington several times to meet with 
Treasury, FRB, SEC and Members o f Congress, and Director General of DG 
Internal Market Alexander Schaub testified before Oxley’s committee in May 
2004.35 These high officials and politicians laud the new more cooperative relations 
and claim the discussions and consultations have helped to clarify one another’s 
regulatory systems, anticipate and manage problems and coordinate reforms.36
Underneath the diplomacy and new levels of intergovernmental coordination, a 
more fundamental change has occurred. Making mutual adjustments has now 
become a routine part of managing conflicts. National treatment and non­
discrimination still anchor the new regime. What is novel, however, is the growing 
frequency and importance of exemptions, exceptions and examples of both sides 
making adjustments to new' and old legislation to accommodate the laws of the
33 Norris 2004a.
34 In January 2005, the seven-thousand publicly-listed EU companies are expected to adopt a 
single set o f accounting standards for consolidated accounts, produced by the IASB and 
subject to European Commission endorsement. The IASB, though a private organization, thus 
represents the EU in the convergence project.
35 Testimony available at http://financialserviccs.housc.gov/index.asp.
36 Quarles 2003; Bolkestein 2004; Miller 2004; Nicolaiscn 2004; and Schaub 2004.
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other. In some areas, like accounting standards, officials are working to develop 
compatible standards to achieve the explicit goal of a mutual recognition regime.37 389
A long-time aim of European regulators, this marks a major reversal from the 
American position. Indeed, as a whole, the transatlantic regime has moved towards 
a more even balance, whereby US regulators are just as likely to make adjustments 
as their European counterparts,3* Still in its early days, the regulatory regime 
governing the transatlantic integration of financial services has changed 
substantially and triggered more ambitious expectations among firms and analysts.3’
IV. Explaining Change
The most remarkable characteristic of the new transatlantic relations in financial 
services, then, is an observable balance, in which European officials have become 
relatively more influential. What might account for the new symmetry in 
transatlantic regulatory relations in financial services? The question presents a 
conundrum for standard thinking about financial regulation in the international 
context, which expects US regulators to determine outcomes in large part because 
they govern the world’s largest markets. I focus on two logical flaws with this 
mainstream view.
First, analysts who focus on the role of market power tend to equate it with 
market size and the concentration of financial activity.40 Simmons, for example, 
argues that “financial power” is based in large part on the size of capital markets 
and the concentration of financial activity within national borders and for this 
reason expects the US (and sometimes the UK) to be able to exercise it. As a 
financial hegemon, she maintains, the US does not need to adjust its own policies in 
response to external pressures. Her model instead seeks to explain whether the US 
will expend resources to achieve its goals or wait for market forces to pressure 
others to adjust.41
If the key determinants of US relative market power were size and activity, we 
would expect American regulators to have made fewer adjustments in recent years. 
US regulators would have gained power relative to their European counterparts 
because by most measures the size gap between American and European national 
markets, either individually or aggregated, has expanded not contracted over the last
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37 According to FASH, the two standard setters will overcome differences by selecting the 
highest quality standard between US GAAP and IFRS. See "Short-term convergence project,“ 
www.fasb.org/intl/convergencejasb.shtml.
38 For one SEC Commissioner’s list of recent US adjustments made, see Campos 2003.
39 Steil 2002; SFRC 2004; and S1A 2004.
40 Aggarwal 1985; James and Lake 1989; and Simmons 2001.
41 Simmons 2001, 592-601.
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decade. US markets remain by far the largest and deepest for almost every financial 
asset.42 As every recent study attests, the one potential challenge to US capital 
markets dominance—a single European financial market—still remains very much 
a far-off goal,4'
Market size does not translate directly into market power. Instead, relative 
market power depends heavily on the degree to which foreign firms participate in 
and rely on a regulator’s jurisdiction 44 The international power of US regulators 
stems largely from the numbers of foreign firms who depend on its financial 
markets and must comply with their rules. Many major European banks and 
insurance companies have competed in the US for decades, and judging by the net 
purchases of US equities by EU investors ($83,271 million in 2001),45 European 
securities firms also rely on American markets. European and other foreign 
regulators bend to SEC preferences because they want their firms to be able to 
continue benefiting from American markets and fear the US regulator’s ability to 
prevent it. As the number of European firms benefiting from American markets has 
hardly diminished, a focus on the US is not likely to yield an explanation for the 
more accommodative US stance.
For answers, we must to turn to developments at the European-level and this 
requires challenging statist assumptions. Since the introduction of the euro, 
policymakers have primarily concerned themselves with finishing the jo b -  
understanding the obstacles to a single financial market and the best way to remove 
them in order to reap the full benefits o f a single currency. These concerns, shared 
equally by euro-zone countries and London, with perhaps the most to gain, led 
directly to two intertwined EU developments. The Financial Services Action Plan 
provides the content—the legislation deemed necessary to integrate European 
national financial services industries—and an ambitious timetable. The FSAP 
originally had 42 measures that covered nearly every area of financial regulation46
42 Some of the more common measures of market size arc industry revenues, number of firms, 
capitalization, volumes of transactions and internationalization of flows.
43 For a recent example, see Commission 2004a; b.
44 See Aggarwal for a discussion of monopsonistic power (Aggarwal 1985, 29-33).
45 Source: US Treasury Department as printed in SI A 2002.
46 This is a classic case of spillover. The European Commission bundled together a wish-list of 
proposals for financial legislation, some traceable to the 1960s and ‘70s. They used the ‘*euro" 
issue to win the support of Ecofin, arguing that the lack of integration in financial services 
prevented the Europe from reaping the frill benefits of a single currency. Interview with 
European Commission official, Delegation o f the European Commission, Washington DC, 
May 5. 2004.
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As of May 2004, EU policymakers had almost completed the original list as well as 
a few additional measures.47
Attention has now turned away from the framework laws to the production of 
detailed regulations, implementation, enforcement and correcting poorly performing 
legislation.48 These are the core subjects of the second EU reform, the Lamfalussy 
Process, the new fonnal decision-making procedures for expediting the creation of 
EC legislation for insurance, banking and investment services and coordinating 
implementation and enforcement.49 In addition to these formal procedures, the new 
process created new European-level bodies.50
Consumed with the effects of these twin developments on Europe, policy 
analysts have paid scant attention to their international implications.51 This is in part 
because they have made an implicit assumption that enhanced relative market 
power for the EU would remain elusive until it had financial markets equal to those 
o f the US. For political scientists, however, the oversight is largely a consequence 
o f traditional statist assumptions that downplay the potential independent effects on 
state behaviour of supranational developments.52 Simmons’ model, for example, 
only includes national regulators and treats international institutions as tools of US 
foreign policy.53
Considering how US firms are likely to react to recent EU institutional change 
reveals the limits of statist reasoning and the merits of expanding assumptions to 
allow for the independent effects of supranational variables. Large American 
securities firms make approximately 20 percent of their net revenues from the 15 
original EU markets, close to double the same number from Asia.54 By creating a
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47 Among the more important pieces of legislation already adopted (though not in every case 
implemented) are European Company Statute (October 2001), Money Laundering Directive 
(November 2001), Directives on UCITS 1 and II (January 2002), Regulation on International 
Accounting Standards (July 2002), Market Abuse Directive (January 2003), Directive on 
Occupational Pensions Funds (June 2003) and Prospectuses Directive (July 2003).
48 See llertig and Lee 2003; Dombey 2004; and FT 2004.
49 Originally, the Lamfalussy Process only included the securities industry. It now includes 
banking and insurance as well (Lannoo and Levin 2003).
50 The adoption of the Lamfalussy Process remains contentious among the EU institutions and 
rests on a tentative bargain between the EP, the Council and the EC. Because the process 
created and relies heavily on the European Securities Committee, it opened a “procedural 
Pandora’s Box." See Dinan 2002.
51 For example, see the publications listed on the Centre for European Policy Studies website 
(www.ceps.be).
52 For examples of work in this tradition, see Mearsheimer 1990; Keohane and Martin 1995; and 
Moravcsik 1998.
53 Simmons 2001, 597.
54 See SlA’s policies positions toward EU capital markets at www.sia.com.
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single set of rules with which US financial services companies operating in Europe 
have to comply, EU regulators will affect the ability o f US firms to compete in the 
same way that American authorities have long influenced European companies. 
Before the shift to supranational authority, US firms had access to national markets 
in Europe and were able to circumvent unfavourable national regulations by setting 
up operations in London or Luxembourg and exercising the principle of mutual 
recognition. The firms might logically support a single set of rules in the EU but 
only as long as it did not favour local competitors and was compatible with the US 
regulations so as to avoid extra compliance costs.55 Facing the proposed EU 
financial integration project, US firms would thus want to ensure favourable 
reforms in Europe and close EU-US regulatory coordination and, to achieve these, 
would likely turn for assistance to US politicians and regulators. With the potential 
to do as much harm to US firms as American authorities have long been able to do 
to European companies, we would expect EU regulators to find themselves in a 
much stronger position when bargaining with their US counterparts than in the past. 
The logic for more balanced relations holds whether American authorities respond 
directly to pressure from constituent firms or from EU authorities responding to 
theirs.
The above argument suggests that an increase in EU relative market power 
would not depend on the completion o f a single financial market, however defined, 
or even the complete harmonization o f regulations. We would instead expect the 
new relative market power to obtain the moment US firms and regulators 
anticipated the implementation o f the EU regulatory regime. The expectations of a 
single set of rules or the potential to produce them, not the actual implementation, 
are what are important. I thus argue that regional developments in Europe, not only 
decisions made in Washington as Simmons and others expect, are important causes 
of the more cooperative transatlantic relations in financial services.
V. Empirical Evidence and Constructed Market Power Hypotheses
Preliminary empirical evidence from my five-case comparison supports this 
argument well. I examine how five of the most difficult transatlantic conflicts in 
financial services, listed in Table 1, have been or arc in the process of being 
managed.
If the argument were correct, we would expect that the way Europeans integrate 
their own financial services industries affects their interactions with US regulators. 
The exogenous independent variable is the degree of regional financial integration. 
Even though the FSAP and Lamfalussy Process arc rapidly integrating national
55 See www.sia.com/international/html/eu_capi tal_markets.html and SI A 2004.
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Table 1
List and Description of Cases
Issue Area Description of Conflict
Stock Exchanges EU demands that US change from national treatment 
to mutual recognition.
Financial Conglomerates EU passes new legislation with international 
spillovers. US firms face high compliance costs 
because US regulations are incompatible and unable 
to meet EU equivalency provisions.
Public Company 
Auditors
US passes new legislation with international 
spillovers. EU firms face the costs of compliance 
with multiple regulators. EU demand mutual 
recognition.
Corporate Board 
Composition
US passes new legislation with international 
spillovers. Some EU firms cannot comply with US 
law without breaking their own national laws.
Accounting Standards for 
Publicly Listed 
Companies
EU demands US change from national treatment to 
mutual recognition.
regulatory regimes, they have not affected every financial sub-sector equally or at 
the same time. My study thus takes advantage o f variation over time and between 
sub-sectors.
There are several principles for integrating economies. When Europeans use 
principles such as harmonization or standardization—which mandate or move 
toward a single set of rules with which US firms must comply—we would expect an 
increase in EU relative market power and a more accommodative behaviour on the 
part of US regulators. This is because EU officials would have to set competition 
rales for foreign firms. Would they have to comply with the new EU-widc rules or 
would the way they arc regulated at home have to meet new equivalency standards? 
Either way, EU officials could credibly threaten to use their authority in ways that 
damage the businesses o f  US firms. I call this type of integration “deep integration,” 
and it characterizes several sub-sectors covered by the FSAP. By contrast, looser 
forms of integration such as the principle of mutual recognition do not create a 
single set of rules for companies operating in the EU, and we would not therefore 
expect a change in Europe’s bargaining power with the US. This type o f integration
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typified efforts before the FSAP and the Lamfalussy Process. I summarize these 
empirical expectations in Table 2.
Tabic 2
Empirical Expectations
(t2) Expectations for Management 
of EU-US Conflicts
(tl)
EU
chooses 
a principle 
for
integration
Loose
Integration
No Change in US behaviour. US reluctant to make 
adjustments.
Deep
Integration
US much more inclined to make adjustments. More 
balanced relations defined by mutual adjustments.
A. Cross-Border Rules Governing Stock Exchanges Competition
The rules governing competition among stock exchanges have been on domestic 
agendas in Europe and the US for decades. The public discussions tend to be 
contentious because the issues go to the core of national financial systems. The key 
question is to what extent stock exchanges should compete over customers.56 57At one 
level arc academic debates about the economic efficiency costs of concentrated 
versus fragmented trading for investors and companies in need of capital.' At 
another level lie concerns about the public benefits and positive externalities of 
having a highly concentrated international centre of trading. As mentioned above, 
stock exchanges can be hubs o f financial and entrepreneurial activity and have an 
extensive political and social impact domestically and globally.
The historical pattern in Europe has tended toward centralization at the national 
level.58 Regional cross-border competition among stock exchanges has followed a 
chequered pattern. Episodes of unrestrained competition have prompted politically 
managed efforts to limit the costs for the less competitive exchanges. The heated 
and drawn-out negotiations that led to the first Investment Services Directive, for 
example, helped the continental exchanges fend off the LSE’s bid to dominate 
trading in large European companies. Likewise, a venture capitalists foray to create
56 Stock exchange have two main sets of customers: Companies who want to raise capital 
through and have their shares traded on an exchange, and investors who want to buy and sell 
those shares.
57 Schwartz 1996 and Lee 2002.
58 For an example o f  how this process worked in Germany, sec Lutz 1998.
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a pan-European Nasdaq copy met with a fierce reaction from national exchanges 
and governments to divert the new sector for entrepreneurial finance back to the 
national financial capitals.59 The most recent example of cross-border competition is 
the LSE’s effort to take away market share in the trading of Dutch stocks from 
Euronext, the pan-Europcan exchange that combines the Paris, Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Lisbon exchanges.60
In the US, the historical trend towards concentration in the NYSE was 
interrupted by the unexpected emergence of the rival Nasdaq Stock Market.61 In the 
aftermath of the 1987 global stock market crash and again following public scandals 
concerning market-makers, the SEC revisited the rules of competition governing the 
trading of Nasdaq stocks. One consequence has been intense competition between 
Nasdaq's market makers and new firms using electronic communication networks 
(ECNs). These issues are very much alive and unresolved. Controversy surrounding 
Nasdaq’s proposal in 2000 to introduce Supermontage, a new electronic trading 
system, once again brought the issue o f competition rules before the SEC and 
Congress.62 The SEC is currently deciding whether to change the long-standing 
trade-through rule that has prevented similar types of electronic competition from 
making inroads into the NYSE’s trading business.
For almost a decade, stock exchange competition has been a contentious issues 
in the transatlantic arena as well. The story begins in the 1990s with European 
demands for a change from the current transatlantic competition based on national 
treatment to a mutual recognition regime, whereby European stock exchanges 
would be able to place their screen monitors on traders’ desks in the United States 
and vice versa without having to comply with additional host regulatory 
requirements.63 It is not surprising that the initiative came from Europe. Three 
factors motivated the EU’s demands. First, stock exchanges in the EU had more 
competitive electronic trading systems than the NYSE or Nasdaq. This was a legacy 
of the spurts of cross-border competition over which national financial centre would 
emerge as the EU’s leading city of finance. Second, the EU exchanges wanted to 
win back trading of the 300 or so European company stocks listed in the US and 
gain direct access to American investors.64 Third, since 1996 Europeans have used
Market Power without a Single Market The New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services
59 See Weber and Posner 2000 and Posner 2002; 2004. , ,
60 Dickson 2004.
61 Congress, the SEC and the NASD introduced an electronic price and trading system in 1971, 
which became known as Nasdaq, to clean up the scandal-ridden over-the-counter market. At 
the time, the NYSE wanted nothing to do with OTC types o f companies.
62 Labate 2000; Smith and Ip 2000; VandeHei and Eilperin 2002.
63 Franke and Potthoff 1997. Author's interview with Federation o f European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) official, June 9,2004, Brussels.
64 For a detailed discussion, sec Steil 2002.
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the mutual recognition principle to encourage competition among stock exchanges 
in the EU. Although the results have been decidedly mixed and have prompted a 
revision o f the first Investment Services Directive, European regulators find the 
principle to be an appropriate means for deepening economic integration.65
Nor is it surprising that US regulators have preferred the current regime and 
resisted making accommodations to the European entreaties. They did so for two 
overlapping reasons. First, the SEC’s primary domestic mandate is to protect 
investors. It is justifiably concerned about sharing regulatory sovereignty, especially 
in sectors like equity markets where individuals regularly participate.66 The SEC is 
not only responsible for regulating exchanges operating in the US but also for the 
companies that list their shares on those exchanges. A mutual recognition regime 
would require the US regulator to accept that Americans could buy foreign 
company stocks in the US not vetted by the SEC.67 Second, US politicians and the 
SEC care deeply about the vitality of the NYSE and the Nasdaq and have symbiotic 
relations with them. Their aims are to balance reforms that might bring benefits 
against the possibility that changes could undermine the US financial services 
industry and see financial activity move off shore.68 69
Despite EU pressure and even a threat from the European Commission to turn 
stock exchange competition into a trade issue,6q the SEC has successfully avoided 
making accommodations. The primary reason stems from the principle by which the 
EU integrated the sector. The applicable of a mutual recognition regime in 
Europe,70 plagued by controversies over its meaning, created no single set of rules 
with which US stock exchanges and other providers of trading services would have 
to comply. For example, London and Brussels both agreed to allow the US Nasdaq 
Stock Market to set up a European market that could have customers throughout the 
EU, and US broker-dealers “internalize'’ continental stocks in London even though 
the activity is forbidden elsewhere in the EU.71 As a consequence of this loose form 
of integration, US regulators, exchanges and financial firms can play one EU 
regulator against another, and no single European body can make credible threats
65 Stcil 1998b.
66 Technically, of course, this is not true as individuals buy and sell stocks via professional 
intermediaries.
67 The argument is not air tight as Americans can now buy foreign stocks from foreign 
exchanges via multiple layers of intermediaries. Still, the SEC would be party to these 
transactions were it to facilitate such trading on US soil. See Steil 2002 for a contrary 
argument.
68 See Conley 1997for the potential for US markets to go off shore.
69 Author’s interview with European Commission official (Internal Market), June 9. 2004. 
Brussels.
70 EC Investment Services Directive of 1993.
71 Boland 2001.
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that have the potential to harm large numbers o f US financial services companies 
doing business across Europe. Relations remain asymmetrical. In short, adopting 
the principle of mutual recognition fostered only loose levels of integration in the 
European equity trading. Without a single set of rules, it did not have significant 
effects on the EU’s relative market power.
B. Financial Conglomerates
The potential harmful spillover effects on US financial firms o f the EC Financial 
Conglomerates Directive was one of the primary factors behind the US decision to 
participate in the “EU-US Financial Regulatory Dialogue.” Even before December 
2000, when the European Commission formally opened the directive’s consultation 
period, US financial services companies were concerned about possible negative 
implications and have not ceased to this day to pressure US lawmakers and 
regulators to protect their interests.72 The conflict appears to be in its final stages. 
The US has made a significant adjustment to the way it regulates financial services 
companies and expects the Europeans to deem the changed US regime to meet the 
EU’s “equivalency” standards.
The Financial Conglomerates Directive, adopted in November 2002, requires 
that the holding company of non-EU companies be subject to consolidated 
supervision. This means that a single regulator must oversee all parts o f large 
financial conglomerates including the domestic and foreign banking, insurance and 
securities operations. A home-regulator can be the supervisor under the new 
directive so long as its regulatory system meets the EU’s “equivalency” standards.73
US financial services firms, especially investment banks operating in Europe, 
have complained loudly and consistently ever since, and US officials have taken no 
chances in the way they have responded.74 The companies have been concerned for 
at least two reasons. The first is that at the time of the directive’s adoption, US 
supervision was based on a different operating principle and would not have met the 
new EU standards. The second is that an EU finding of non-equivalency might be 
extremely harmful to US-based companies because they would face costly and 
unwanted changes that included accepting an EU authority as its global 
consolidated regulator.
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72 Reacting to the concerns of the US securities industry, the US Congress included provisions in 
thel999 US Financial Modernization Act (known as the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) that 
would allow companies and the SEC to comply with future EU “equivalency standards” (SEC 
2003a, 62911).
73 Tafara 2004.
74 Sec the Securities Industry Association's key issues section at www.sia.com. Also see reports 
by the Financial Services Roundtable's Global Financial Issues Committee at 
www.fsround.org.
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4While still suspicious about European intentions and irritated by the FCD,75 US 
regulators had little choice other than to make their regulations more compatible 
with the new EU law, forcing far-reaching adjustments that resulted in provisions in 
the 1999 Financial Modernization Act that enabled the creation of the Supervised 
Investment Bank Holding Company.76 This alternative to the SEC’s traditional net 
capital rule allows securities firms to calculate on a consolidated basis. The SEC 
can look at the whole capital of a firm, just as its EU counterparts do.
The new rule represents a major change. The American supervision of financial 
services companies is deeply rooted in the Depression-era Glass-Stcagall Act, the 
consequential industry structure of separate investment and commercial banking 
firms and the underlying objective of protecting investors. This combination 
produced the SEC’s very rigorous capital requirements for broker-dealers,77 a 
regime distinct from the EU’s new system that reflects a different history o f 
consolidated supervision and a banking industry without sharp divisions between 
lending and securities businesses.78
The SEC’s rule change demonstrates a remarkable adjustment for a second 
reason. Because o f the fragmentation of financial regulation among different 
regulators, adopting the investment bank holding company was complicated by the 
involvement o f  several other financial regulators. Some have claimed, in fact, that 
the SEC took advantage of the pressure from the private sector for consolidated 
supervision to extend its authority, undermining the underlying bargain of the 1999 
US Financial Modernization Act (which officially unwound Glass-Steagall).79
It is hard to imagine US regulators would have made such a concession if it had 
had another viable option. The EU’s directive deeply constrained the range of 
choices. Making no adjustments was not an acceptable option for US firms, who 
successfully lobbied the Congress and found support for their cause in an SEC 
eager to expand its powers. Making no adjustments would have placed US firms in 
a precarious position and undermined the SEC role as their primary regulator.
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75 Some in Washington believe that the PCD was a UK competitive bid to pressure US global 
financial firms into making the City of London their home base. Others think the directive 
reneges on a bargain from the late 1980s whereby US financial firms would use London to 
access the EU while keeping the SEC as their primary supervisor. The SEC, for its part, never 
agreed that its previous regulations would not meet EU equivalency.
76 The SEC publicly downplays the adjustments it has made, claiming “the new rules formalize 
and strengthen” the SEC's role as a consolidated supervisor (Tafara 2004). Also see SEC 
2003a.
77 The US system is a source of pride for some SEC regulators who believe it prevented the 
Drexel Burnham and other financial scandals from turning into much worse crises.
78 interview with former SEC official, Washington DC, May 20, 2004.
79 Callcott 2003.
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C. Public Company Auditors and Corporate Board Composition
The US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to the 
Worldcom. Enron, Adelphia and other financial scandals. The rapid reaction to 
what was potentially a cataclysmic domestic political, financial and economic crisis 
paid little or no account to the legislation's international effects. Tw'o financial 
services regulatory issues brought immediate and angry European complaints. US 
regulators interpreted and implemented the act in ways that have largely 
accommodated both.80
The first has to do with provisions in the act that required foreign auditors of 
US-listed firms and o f foreign affiliates of American companies to register with the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and be subject to 
inspections, investigations and disciplinary proceedings.81 In 2002, 333 European 
companies were publicly listed in the US and were audited by 58 EU-based 
auditors.82 Compliance by foreign firms with US mles governing public company 
auditing was the basis of the previous national treatment/non-discrimination regime. 
The new laws move away from self-regulation and establish much more rigorous 
oversight that made compliance for foreign auditors onerous and, at times, 
impossible. The two main problems were the costs of duplicative oversight and 
conflicts that put foreign firms complying with US measures in violation of home 
country laws.
The initial US position was intransigence, a stance that led European economic 
and finance ministers in June 2003 to support European Commission retaliation.83 
After extensive consultations, including exchanges between the PCAOB Chairman 
McDonough and European Commissioner Bolkcstcin and Director General Schaub, 
the board made extensive accommodations in implementing the act. First, it 
extended the registration deadline to July 19, 2004 from October 22, 2003. Second, 
PCAOB created a rule allowing foreign auditors to omit information required of 
US-based auditors if disclosure would violate home country law.84 Finally, it has 
developed a creative cooperative framework with European and other foreign 
regulators on a “sliding scale.”85 PCAOB will rely on home-country authorities to 
varying degrees for carrying out inspections, acquiring information and other 
requirements of the new law, depending on the compatibility of the latter’s 
regulatory system.
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81 Ross 2004.
82 Ibid.
83 Author's interview with European Commission official (Internal Market), June 9, 2004,
Brussels.
84 PCAOB Rule 2105.
85 Ross 2004.
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The Sarbancs-Oxlcy Act affected European firms in a second way. New 
requirements for corporate board and audit committee independence put some 
European companies, especially German firms, with US listings in an untenable 
bind.86 If not modified, these companies would have had to decide whether to 
comply with US rules to keep their listing and direct access to US investors or 
continue following domestic laws and forgo their US presence. The effected 
companies have two boards. While management boards have no outside members, 
supervisory boards have employee representatives. Both compositions violate 
Sarbanes-Oxley.87
The SEC made three main concessions to accommodate these European firms.88 8901
First, because the body responsible for auditing within the corporate structure was 
independent o f management, the SEC interpreted German company boards to be 
compliant with audit committee requirements. Second, the US securities regulator 
made an exception permitting non-management employees to serve on auditing 
committees even though such arrangements arc forbidden under SEC rules.8'* 
Finally, it accepted a broader definition o f an “audit committee financial expert” to 
accommodate home country practice.
Europeans have made accommodations of their own to assist PCAOB make 
adjustments and to coordinate auditing committee composition with the new US 
rules.**0 The more compatible the EC regulatory system, the easier it will be for 
PCAOB to involve European regulators in the enforcement of US auditing rules and 
the SEC to accept European corporate governance practices. The European 
Commission jumped at the opportunity to add another directive to the original 
FSAP list. The proposed 8th Company Law Directive would introduce in the EU a 
similar auditing regulatory regime, making cooperation with PCAOB much easier, 
and also would require the establishment o f audit committees with non-executives 
as currently mandated in the US.
Both sides consider the cooperation displayed in managing the spillover effects 
of Sarbanes-Oxley to be success stories and are especially pleased by the handling 
of the auditing regulation dispute, which officials often cite as a model for EU-US 
relations in financial services.01 They and outside observers see the conflicts 
stemming from Sarbanes-Oxley as a major test of the new “EU-US Financial 
Markets Regulatory Dialogue” and attribute the successful outcomes largely to
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86 Stcil 2002; and Tatara 2004.
87 Stcil 2002.
88 Campos 2003.
89 Tatara 2004.
90 Miller 2004.
91 Bolkestein 2004; Miller 2004; Sehaub 2004.
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diplomatic skills (especially those of PCAOB Chairman McDonough), new 
working relationships among authorities and learning on both shores.92 While 
personal skills, relations and consultations made cooperation easier, interpretations 
that rely on them miss the more fundamental reason for why the US made 
adjustments in these two cases. After introducing sweeping changes to financial 
regulations that had the potential to affect negatively European firms competing in 
the US, American regulators faced the unspoken but real possibility of EU 
retaliation. Because o f the FSAP and the Lamfalussy Process, the EU could 
creditably threaten to create new regulations that could levy equal harm to US firms 
operating in Europe. These new constraints, reflecting the EU’s increased relative 
market power, pressured US regulators to make adjustments.
D. A ccounting Standards for Publicly Listed Companies
The conflict over mutual recognition of accounting standards is similar in several 
respects to the stock exchange dispute. It began in the 1990s when the Europeans 
proposed a mutual recognition regime, whereby EU companies with listings in the 
US would use national accounting standards and vice versa.9* American regulators 
showed little interest in mutual recognition regimes or convergence initiatives. The 
SEC view was that the rest of the world would eventually adopt US accounting 
standards.94 US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) was already 
accepted by all EU regulators, and the SEC did not consider European standards 
and IAS to be as rigorous. The SEC, moreover, made no new accommodations and 
continues to this day to require European companies listed in the US using non-US 
standards to reconcile them with US GAAP.
Unlike in the stock exchange dispute, however, the SEC has recently made 
concessions to the EU in the area o f  accounting standards, embracing a process 
intended to harmonize transatlantic standards. In a stunning turnabout, the US 
securities regulator now embraces convergence, with the ultimate goal being a 
mutual recognition regime.95
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92 Author's interview with European Commission official (Internal Market), June 9, 2004, 
Brussels.
93 Commission 1995.
94 Simmons 2001, 611, fti 93; Bach 2004, Chapter 5, 30; and van Hulle, 6. In 1981, the number 
of foreign companies registered with the SEC was 173. By 2001 it was more than 1,300 
(Accountancy Age 2002).
95 “The FASB and 1ASB support moving toward a single conceptual framework that would be 
used by both Boards,” said the SEC Chief Accountant in an August 2004 speech. “The work 
of these two boards, and other national standards setters involved in the 1ASB process, is an 
important part o f building and maintaining an effective global financial reporting 
infrastructure. I support global convergence. It's in the best interest o f investors” (Nieolaisen 
2004). Also sec SEC 2004.
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The IASB, the new EU standard setter, and FASB, the US standard setter, arc 
deeply engaged in a project aimed to converge US GAAP and IAS/IFRS." In the 
Norwalk Agreement, a memo of understanding dated September 2002, the FASB 
and the IASB pledged to make their existing standards fully compatible and to 
coordinate future changes.96 7 In addition, because compatibility of standards lies as 
much in implementation and enforcement as in the similarity o f principles, the 
SEC's Office o f Chief Accountant is working closely with the European 
Commission in preparation for an eventual mutual recognition regime.98
The IASB-FASB convergence project, though still in its early days, comprises 
six initiatives including the exchange of liaisons, research into differences between 
the two standards, on-going step-by-step reconciliation and a mutual effort to 
consider both sets o f standards before adopting new measures.99 10Few anticipate a 
level of convergence that might pennit a mutual recognition regime before the 
advent of EU harmonization in 2005.lofl Nevertheless, the project represents 
extensive cooperation characterized by mutual adjustments. According to FASB's 
description of how the two standard setters will overcome differences, “it is 
expected that a high-quality solution can usually be achieved by selecting between 
existing US GAAP and IFRS.”101
Several factors contributed to the changed behaviour of US regulators. The 
corporate scandals o f the 2000s fuelled a domestic debate about the effectiveness of 
the US disclosure regime and created a window of opportunity for those in favour 
of substantial revision and undermined claims of its superiority relative to other 
standards. The Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act mandated that the SEC investigate the merits of 
shifting US GAAP towards a principlcs-based model and required that US
96 International financial Reporting Standards or IFRS is the new label for IAS.
97 The text o f The Norwalk Agreement is available at www.sec.gov.
98 Tatara 2004.
99 Sec www.tasb.org/intI/convcrgence_iasb.sbtml.
100 For the SEC Chief Accountant's views on this matter, see ‘*11 August 2004: SEC Chief 
Accountant stresses global convergence" at www.iasplus.com/index.htm. As recently as 2001, 
the European Commission appeared to believe the US would approve IAS within a short 
period o f time. "The Commission hopes and expects that the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) will accept in the near future financial statements prepared by EU issuers 
without requiring a reconciliation to US GAAP” (Commission 2001).
101 See “Short-term convergence project.” www.fasb.org/intl/convergence_iasb.shtml. One 
important example of a significant US adjustment is FASB's proposal that voluntary changes 
in accounting policies would be required to be applied by retrospective application rather than 
by cumulative effect adjustment. See FASB News release 12/15/03.1 thank Joel Mathen for 
his assistance in interpreting the significance o f particular accounting measures. Also, FASB 
has been moving toward more principles-based standards to balance the traditional rules- 
based approach and the SEC and Congress have encouraged it SEC 2003b. Also see 
MacDonald 2002 and FASB 2004.
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standards setters consider convergence with international standards among criteria 
used to create new standards.102 Yet the scandals were more a trigger of change, as 
the SEC was already by 2000 supporting the IASB in its efforts to improve IAS and 
encouraging FASB toward working with the international body.10'1
A  second set of factors revolve around changes within the IASB itself.104 These 
reforms included an organizational overhaul of IASB’s predecessor, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), as part of the successful 
mid-1990s project to improve the quality of IAS and increase the autonomy of 
IA SB.105 The process did make LAS/IFRS and US GAAP more compatible. In 
carrying out its improvements project, the IASB deliberately tried to converge IAS 
with US GAAP where possible. While this made cooperation somewhat easier, it 
would be wrong to exaggerate the similarities. The two sets of standards remain 
vastly different and the challenge to converge them is fonnidable. FASB’s most 
recent study on the differences and similarities between the two sets of standards is 
a 500-page document.106 Even if the EU and the US were to accept FASB and IASB 
as functional equivalents, financial analysts and investors would still need to learn 
two separate “languages” and implementation and enforcement would remain 
uneven. The presence of highly regarded international standards and the newly 
reformed and respected standard setter provided an international alternative to US 
GAAP and FASB and an obvious necessary condition of the US decisions to 
engage in the convergence project. But they do not explain why the SEC supported 
IASC in the first place.
The primary factor behind the US backing of IASC lies largely in the role o f EU 
decisions that subsequently led to a US interest and involvement in IAS. While 
European policymakers finally passed in July 2002 the regulation mandating that 
companies listed on EU stock exchanges apply IAS/IFRS by 2005,107 their 
influence on US officials started earlier. In 1995, the EU announced its new strategy 
toward harmonization of accounting standards.108 Rather than adopt US GAAP or 
create its own standards, the EU decided to put its weight behind IAS. The move
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102 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Title 1, Section 108. b.l.A.v and d.) SF.C, 2003 #414. Also 
see MacDonald 2002; FASB 2004. For a discussion, see Dewing and Russell 2004,301.
103 SEC 1997; 2003b. Author's interview with SEC staff members, August 17, 2004, 
W ashington, DC.
104 For a chronology of 1ASC/1ASB, see http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/chrono.htm and 
http://www.iasb.org/about/history.asp. For histories, sec Steinberg, Amer et al. 1999; and 
Knorrand Ebbers 2001.
105 http.7/www. iasb, org/about/stmcture. asp.
106 FASB 1999. A summary comparison can be found on http://www.iasplus.com/usa/iffsus.htm.
107 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002.
108 Commission 1995.
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began to alter the prospects for the international standards project in two ways. EU 
adoption of IAS had the potential to turn the Europeans into the most influential 
players behind the IASC and create a global rival to US GAAP and the prestige and 
authority that accompany it. Suddenly, the IASC initiative to improve its standards, 
originally encouraged by the US via IOSCO, had new meaning and potential. The 
adoption of IAS in Europe also had the possibility of capturing US firms listing in 
the EU’s fifteen member countries under a single authority. This would give the EU 
a credible threat to force US companies to provide IAS reconciliation to US GAAP 
if the SEC refused to offer mutual recognition.109
By 1999 US SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt was fully involved in the IASB's 
improvements project. At the time, consensus was building in the EU for the 
European Commission’s ambitious FSAP, which featured harmonization to IAS as 
a central component.110 In 1998, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy had changed 
their national laws to permit domestic companies to report in accordance with the 
international standards and, perhaps most important to the SEC, the UK was a 
driver behind the renewed integration of European finance. The UK is the primary 
rival to US dominance in financial regulation. Its turn toward Europe was a blow to 
Americans who had cultivated the US-British accounting alliance with the hope of 
re-centring IASC around a core group of like-minded standard setters.111 Levitt’s 
involvement in the IASC was in part an attempt to pre-empt the possibility of a rival 
standards setter with alternative ideas about the future character of international 
standards. In 2000, the same year that the European Commission proposed 
complete standardization, not merely harmonization, the SEC issued a concept 
release asking for comments on the application of IAS in the US.112 In 2001, the 
SEC Chief Accountant endorsed the global convergence of accounting standards.
The above sequence of events shows how movements toward standardization in 
the EU transformed the calculations of US regulators even before the formal 
regulation was passed in 2002. The new regulation not only mandated that all listed
109 This is indeed what the Europeans are doing today. While US officials are insisting on an 
accommodation for US firms raising capital on exchanges throughout the 25 EU member 
states, the European Commission and other EU policymakers, flexing their new muscles, have 
been slow to grandfather in US firms already listed, let alone extend a blanket exemption. 
Interview with European Commission official, Washington DC, May 5, 2004. Dam and Scott 
2004, 4. Author’s notes on questions by Michael G. Oxley (Chairman, Committee on 
Financial Services, US House of Representatives! addressed to Alexander Schaub (Director 
General, Internal Market. European Commission), Hearings entitled, “US-EU Regulatory 
Dialogue and Its Future,” May 13,2004, Washington DC.
110 Commission 1998; 1999.
111 The British-US accounting alliance was the foundations of the “Group of 4 + 1” countries 
—the US, UK, Australia and Canada, plus an IASC representative (Simmons 2001,611, fh 93).
112 Release Nos. 33-7801,34-42430; International Series Release No. 1215; File No. S7-04-00 at 
http:/Avww. sec .gov/rules/concept/s70400. shtml.
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companies apply IAS/IFRS by 2005 but also set up an elaborate endorsement 
mechanism designed in part to counter the SEC’s influence over the IASCF board 
members and IASB standard setters.13 415 Two months after the regulation’s passage, 
the signing of the Norwalk Agreement illustrated the changed US position.
The key variable behind the altered stance was EU progress toward 
standardization. It improved Europe’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the US, because 
each perceives the other capable of doing significant harm to its firms. The verdict 
is still out as to whether the EU's endorsement mechanisms are sufficient for 
influencing the IASB and overcoming its “Anglo-American” bias in the long run.114 
However, perceptions, not reality, of what might emerge in Europe have fuelled the 
regulatory competition from the start.
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VI. Conclusion
The empirical evidence from my five-case comparison, summarized in Tables 3 
and 4, offers convincing support for the constructed market hypotheses. I find that 
previous EU choices concerning integration affect its relative market power in 
interactions with the US and are important driving forces behind the new symmetry 
in transatlantic relations in financial services. Variation in the way that the US and 
the EU manage problems largely reflects differences in the way Europeans 
integrated a sub-sector.
Can alternative explanations do a better job in accounting for the new balance in 
transatlantic relations in financial services? None docs well against the empirical 
record. If inherent qualities of particular assets or policy areas are important, they 
are not the only source of variation as sometimes argued in the functionalist 
tradition.115 Moreover, contrary to the expectations of Beth Simmons and others 
who argue that variation in cross-border harmonization o f financial regulations 
depends primarily on US incentives and goals, my evidence highlights EU decisions 
about European integration.
Explanations from further afield also fail to offer a satisfactory account of 
the new relationship. Policy makers and analysts often point to the introduction of 
email, the internet and other electronic communications technologies to explain 
change in financial markets and regulations.116 The new speed by which transactions
113 van llulle 2004.
114 Barber 2004; Kcrrison 2004; Lex Column 2004; and Norris 2004b.
115 See Aggarwal for an early example. Simmons avoids this trap to some extent by combining 
functionalist assumptions about the inherent qualities of issue areas with a consideration of 
relative power (Aggarwal 1985 and Simmons 20011.
116 Interview with senior staff officials o f Committee on Financial Services, US House of 
Representatives, Washington DC, May 6.2004.
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Tabic 3
Empirical Findings Across Issue Areas
(t2) Management of EU-US Conflicts
<t.)
EU
chooses 
a principle 
for
integration
Loose
Integration
Stock Exchanges: US has not made adjustments. 
Conflict festers since the mid-1990s. US resists 
making changes.
Deep
Integration
Financial Conglomerates: EU and US make 
adjustments. US changes domestic rules to meet 
EU equivalency. EU creates lenient standard for 
equivalence.
Public Company Auditors: EU and US make 
adjustments. US makes exceptions for EU firms. 
EU passes similar legislation.
Corporate Board Composition: US adjusts. US 
reinterprets foreign laws to comply with US rules. 
Accounting Standards: Mutual adjustments in 
formal negotiations to develop compatible 
standards. Conflict started in the mid-1990s. 
Norwalk Agreement of 2002 commits US and EU 
to good faith negotiations to create compatible 
standards.
Table 4
Empirical Findings Over Time
Issue Area
(ti) Change in EU 
Approach to 
Integration?
(t2) Change in 
Management of 
EU-US Conflicts?
Stock Exchanges No. No.
Accounting Standards Yes, 2002 regulation 
mandating
standardization by 2005,
Yes, mutual adjustments 
in formal negotiations to 
develop compatible 
standards. Conflict 
started in the mid-1990s. 
Norwalk Agreement of 
2002 commits US and 
EU to good faith 
negotiations to create 
compatible standards.
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take place, markets change and new assets arc introduced is an important factor 
behind the increasing number of cross-border conflicts challenging regulators, as 
incompatibilities between regulations come more readily into sharp relief 
Nevertheless, it does not offer an explanation for why the Europeans and American 
authorities would alter the way they manage conflicts, however often they may 
arise.
Another alternative explanation highlights a different type of power. The 
influence of US regulators has never relied on relative market power alone. The 
attraction of the US model, a form of soft power, has also been an important source 
o f  influence.117 Foreign regulators and financiers long considered the US regulatory 
model as best practice and the most appropriate to emulate. The Enron, Worldcom 
and other scandals may have chipped away at the attractiveness of the US model to 
some degree and arc a factor in the new transatlantic relationship. Still, the timing 
o f  the scandals came too late to have been a cause of the new symmetry.
A final possibility is that frequent consultations, discussions and mutual learning 
have themselves improved relations and led to a better understanding of one 
another’s positions and cooperative outcomes.118 These types of interactions and 
outcomes are exactly what I find in the empirical record. But they are an outcome 
not a cause. The new, more structured interactions, which are central to the on­
going “EU-US Financial Regulatory Dialogue,” came about in response to a 
fundamental change in relative market power. The timing o f developments again 
undermines this argument. The perceived possibility of European retaliation 
constrained American regulators, under pressure from US firms and EU officials, to 
he more cooperative. In fact, financial regulators have not been immune to the 
broader tensions in transatlantic relations. The new pattern o f mutual adjustments 
has occurred despite sometimes tense personal interactions among some of the 
participants. Even with a better understanding o f one another’s perspectives, the 
new “willingness” to compromise on the part o f US regulators stems primarily from 
a fundamental shift in their relative market power vis-à-vis the European 
counterparts.119
If substantiated with additional evidence, my conclusions about the effects of 
European institutional reforms would not only add to our understanding o f EU-US 
regulatory relations in financial services and other economic sectors, but also help 
clarify the EU’s impact on global governance and the international economy. In 
addition, by identifying independent regional effects, my findings demonstrate the 
benefits of relaxing statist assumptions. National politics and domestic actors are
Market Power without a Single Market The New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services
117 On soft power, sec Nyc 1990. Also see McNamara 2001 for an example of how sociological 
factors affect financial and monetary arrangements.
118 Farrell 2003.
119 Interview with former SEC official, Washington DC, May 20, 2004.
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not the only components of global political space. The European Union is a deeply 
institutionalized polity populated with a variety of possible agents of change. 
Arguably, the current effort to create a regional financial system is the most 
important contemporary development in global finance. Arguments based on statist 
assumptions are likely to miss a key causal variable shaping the global regulation of 
finance.
I end on a paradoxical note. Politicians and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic 
now recognize that they and their opposites possess the authority to bring great harm 
to one another’s financial services firms. With so much at stake, there is substantial 
pressure from firms to maintain and enhance current cooperative relations.
262
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Comments 
Sir Nigel Wicks
1. I like Elliot Posner’s paper. It deals with issues of global importance. I say 
that for three reasons—micro-economic, macro-economic and political 
reasons.
• It is a truism now in the European Union that integrated financial 
markets in Europe will enhance prosperity. An efficient transatlantic 
financial market linking the European and US markets should bring 
even greater benefits.
• A stable transatlantic financial market place is a requirement for global 
financial stability. If a major firm or market either side of the Atlantic 
runs into trouble, there will be transatlantic and probably global 
repercussions.
• Financial markets are—to use Professor Posner’s own words— a 
critical source of relative national power for achieving international 
goals.”1 2And “Financial systems help differentiate alternative styles of 
capitalism.”“
2. So with this much at stake, it is good that those on both sides of the 
Atlantic with political and regulatory responsibilities for financial services 
are in regular dialogue.
1 Posner, supra, page 238.
2 Id., page 236.
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3. As I understand it, the objective o f this dialogue is limited, but realistic. It 
is not to “integrate” the two markets, in the way that the European Union 
member states are seeking to integrate—that is make one—their financial 
markets.
4. Such an objective—the creation o f an integrated transatlantic financial 
market—is, and I believe forever will be, constitutionally and politically 
unrealistic. The purpose o f the current dialogue is more realistic. It seeks 
to create a state of peaceful coexistence between the two markets so as to 
permit market participants on either side of the Atlantic, who arc often the 
same firms, to penetrate each other’s markets with the minimum of 
frictions and barriers.
5. Professor Posner’s paper raises the interesting question why did the 
dialogue start when it did—around 2002. The three issues—micro- 
economic, macro-economic and political—are certainly not new. They 
were around for a good part of the nineties. So what was new in 2002? 
What was it that caused the more balanced strategic interaction?3 Or to put 
it the point more plainly: why did the US financial authorities start to treat 
seriously with the European authorities?
6. After all, the wider climate for transatlantic co-operation in the early 
twenty first century was not propitious. Moreover, the US official 
economic establishment, be it in the legislative, executive or central 
banking branches, has sometimes been reluctant to give credence to EU 
financial ambitions.
7. I find the paper’s explanation in its “constructed market power 
hypothesis”4 reasonably compelling—that the “‘EU-US Financial 
Regulatory Dialogue’ came about in response to a fundamental change in 
relative market power.”5 And that change—again to put it in plain terms- 
was because, after years of high flown rhetoric, there was credible 
evidence that the EU was at last getting its act in order in creating an 
integrated market in financial services. That evidence was the creation of 
the Euro, the steady enactment of the FSAP and the agreement to the 
streamlined legislative process recommended by the Lamfalussy 
Committee.
8. As an explanation, that certainly rings true. Market power recognises 
market power, even when the EU power is, in this case to a large extent 
embryonic, rather than actual.
3 Id., page 246.
4 Id., page 235.
5 Id., page 261.
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9. But I would take the argument one step further and ask, “What, or rather 
who, was it that prompted this recognition?”
10 .1 believe that the real movers and shakers behind the establishment of the 
Transatlantic Financial Dialogue are the US securities houses, the broker 
dealer community, and all credit to them for it. The Securities Industry 
Association’s International Committee wrote to US Treasury Under 
Secretary John Taylor as long ago as December 2001 supporting the 
creation o f a new US-EU financial markets dialogue saying: “The 
extensive capital markets linkages that have developed between the US 
and EU make it all the more important that a more formal dialogue be 
established to supplement the ad hoc contacts that have existed and 
sufficed up till now.”6
11. By the beginning of the twenty first century, this community was making 
significant profits in Europe, mainly, but not entirely, through their 
London offices. For example, the US Securities Industry Association’s 
“[...] largest members engaging in global business receive about 20 
percent o f their net revenues (excluding interest) from European 
markets.”7
12. That community was well attuned too to the developing political realities 
within the European Union. Tire expertise in lobbying garnered over long 
years on Capitol Hill had been transplanted into the corridors of Brussels 
and Strasbourg. I can testify from my membership of the Lamfalussy 
Committee that the evidence of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
the EU was among the most cogent and forward looking.
13. My hypothesis, which is consistent with Professor Posner’s, is that the 
broker dealer community sensed which way the wind was blowing, 
mobilised their forces in Washington to begin to engage with the 
Europeans and the New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services was 
the result.
14. Of course, the US industry’s stance did not arise out of pure altruism. It 
suited their business interests, though it is worth emphasising that the 
motivation was not old-fashioned trade protectionism. In fact, the reverse 
was true. The US industry was motivated by the wish to support the 
creation of the European Single Market in financial services and to avoid, 
in their transatlantic business, the frictions, tit for tatting and reciprocity 
games that are so redolent of trade negotiations.
Comments on “Market Power without a Single Market...'
6 Testimony o f Chairman o f  the Securities Industry Association before the House Financial 
Services Committee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, June 17 2004, page 14.
7 Ibid., page 4.
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15. It should not be surprising if the US financial houses active in Europe 
acted in the way that I suggested.
16. They act on a pan-European basis and take a pan-European view. Most 
American investment banks, broker dealers and global custodians have 
offices in London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Milan and often in Madrid, 
Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Stockholm and in other capitals too.
17. Very few indigenous European financial houses have such a pan-European 
coverage.
18. This makes the American financial community best placed among the 
entire financial community active in Europe to benefit from the creation o f 
the Europe Single Market in Financial Services. It is not therefore 
surprising that the Securities Industry Association is such a strong 
supporter o f the Financial Sendees Action Plan.
19. That is not a reality to regret or to fight. It is a force to harness in the 
interests of creating a competitive European economy and competitive 
financial institutions in Europe.
20. Tlic motives of the EU side in espousing the dialogue are somewhat easier 
to divine. Prior to 2002, there had been spasmodic contacts between a few 
of the member states and the US authorities, but nothing on a regular or 
organised basis. The same was true too for Cominission-US contacts. It 
was hardly surprising that the Commission welcomed the opportunity for 
more regular dialogue with the US authorities. Understandably enough 
from their Treaty mandate, the Commission arc always ready to take up 
opportunities to represent the EU in international forums. Rivalries within 
the Commission between the Financial Markets and Trade Directorates 
may also have played a part here. If the Financial Markets Directorate had 
not taken the lead, the Trade Directorate may well have sought to divert 
the transatlantic financial dialogue into trade channels. I f  that route had 
been chosen, the subsequent story may have been rather different.
21. Professor Posner goes on to argue that the empirical findings from his five 
ease studies demonstrate support for the constructed market hypothesis 
and that “[...] EU choices concerning integration affect its relative market 
power in strategic interactions with the US and arc the primary driving 
forces behind the new symmetty in transatlantic relations in financial 
services.”8 The harmonisation route, he argues, elicits a more forthcoming 
response from the US authorities than mutual recognition. The argument 
here is that the concentration in the Commission of powers implicit in the 
harmonisation route make the Commission more likely to win concessions
8 Posner, supra, page 259.
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from the US side than the mutual recognition route, where power is 
dispersed to the member states.
22. If this is the conclusion, I suspect that the US financial community may 
not much relish it. They normally have a preference for the mutual 
recognition route, not much relishing what can sometimes be a one sized 
fits all harmonisation route.
23. Three further thoughts stimulated by the paper.
24. First, the current dialogue is institutionally asymmetric. What I mean by 
that is that the participants on each side, inevitably, have different 
constitutional statuses. The main protagonists on the EU side are the 
Commission; on the US side, there is the US Treasury, who lead, 
supported by the Fed and the SEC. There have been spasmodic contacts 
between the respective Committees in the European Parliament and the 
House o f Representatives. Representatives of the member states are 
conspicuous by their absence. This institutional asymmetry is highlighted 
by the fact that all three representatives on the US side go to the Financial 
Stability Forum, which brings together the regulators from eleven 
countries with financial centres, yet the Commission arc not members 
though the European Central Bank does attend.
25. Second point, the political accountability of the process, at least on the EU 
side, is a bit obscure. The Commission does make reports to the Council 
from time to time, but these arc, I understand, brief and anodyne. Very 
little is made public. Member states and national legislators are not much 
involved.
26. Third point, the private sector, market participants on both sides of the 
Atlantic, are not much involved.
27. It is unclear whether these three points, the asymmetric institutional 
representation and the lack of political accountability and private sector 
involvement, matter. The process is intended to be low key, informal and 
non-political. It appears to be working. So if it ain’t broke...
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Chapter 10
Calming the Waters:
The Rebirth of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
Maria Green Cowles
I. Introduction
S in c e  its inception in 1995, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has served 
as  an important symbol o f the transatlantic economic relationship.1 To American 
a n d  European Union governments, the TABD represents an important partnership 
th a t  informs government decisions on transatlantic and global trade and regulatory 
m atte rs . To many in the non-govcmmcntal organization (NGO) community, the 
T A B D  is focused on advising governments on how to remove “important worker, 
consum er and environmental laws and regulations which it views as ‘barriers to 
t r a d e /  and which everyone else views as measures that save lives, keep our air and 
w a te r  clean, and protect endangered animals and plants” (Public Citizen 2004). To 
th o s e  less charitable, the TABD symbolizes business-government conspiracy theory 
a t  its  best (Mokhibcr and Weissman 2000).
T o  many, the TABD is also a bellwether of the health of the transatlantic 
econom ic relationship. During its early years, the TABD’s success was largely 
m irro red  in the broader US-EU political relationship, despite the two entities’ 
W o rld  Trade Organization (WTO) rows over bananas and beef hormones. By the
1 1 thank the many business and government officials who granted me interviews for this
project. 1 also thank Jessica Gilroy for her work on this research, and Wakenda Tremmel for 
her editorial assistance.
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end of 1999, the TABD was losing its direction with an American president whose 
attention to transatlantic affairs was shortened by impeachment proceedings, and 
with a new administration coming to power whose views on US-EU relations were 
unknown. The arrival of the George W. Bush administration in 2000 brought new 
uncertainty to both the future of the US-EU relationship and the TABD. While the 
11 September 2001, terrorist attacks shocked both sides of the Atlantic, “the events 
o f September and afterwards marked a dramatic and abrupt change in the balance of 
leadership [between the US and EU ]...” not only in the war against terrorism, but 
also in trade negotiations, international monetary policy, and “the whole business of 
global order and governance” (Allen and Smith 2002, 112). Indeed, transatlantic 
debates over Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and the Bush 
Administration’s entrée into the Iraq war appeared to sound a death knell for the 
TABD. The same year, one of TABD’s biggest critics, the Corporate Europe 
Observer, proclaimed that the TABD was in “troubled water” (CEO 2001). In 2002, 
the group went further to question whether the TABD was a “sinking ship” in 
“stormy waters” (CEO 2002).
Less than two years later, however, the European Commission Enterprise and 
Industry Directorate General would contradict the TABD’s demise with its own 
headline, “Business Bridges Transcend Troubled Waters” (European Commission 
2004). TABD business leaders met directly with President Bush, Bertie Ahem 
(President of the EU Council and Taoiseach of Ireland), and Romano Prodi 
(President of the European Commission), to present their recommendations at the 
US-EU Summit in Ireland. As one official who has worked closely with the TABD 
for many years acknowledges, “2004 has been one of the most successful years for 
TABD”2
One might argue that the TABD’s rebirth can be directly linked to the improved 
climate between US and EU political leaders. Indeed, considerable effort has been 
made on both sides of the Atlantic to avoid rhetoric such as Robert Kagan’s oft- 
cited phrase that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans arc from Venus: They 
agree on little and understand one another less and less” (Kagan 2003). Moreover, 
as evidenced by the results of the June 2004 US-EU summit, the United States and 
Europe—while in retrospect not sharing a political consensus about Iraq—now 
share a broader political consensus (though not without dissension) on the way 
forward in Iraq and the Broader Middle East. However, to suggest that the TABD 
re-emerged due to the improved US-EU political-military climate would be 
misleading. Indeed, as argued in this chapter, TABD’s revival can be directly linked 
to a time period when the US-EU political environment, according to some 
commentators, was arguably worse than at any other point since the Second World 
War (Schweiss 2003, 1). Business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic publicly
2 Correspondence, December 5,2004.
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c a l le d  on  government leaders not to lose sight of the US-EU important relationship, 
e c o n o m ic  and otherwise. At the same time, key EU, Member State, and US 
g o v e rn m e n t officials began to regard the TABD as a vehicle to promote dialogue 
b e tw e e n  the two sides—to promote “practical plans” that could divert the attention 
o f  o ffic ia ls who were otherwise focused on ideological divides. At the 2002 
C h ic a g o  TABD conference, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy noted,
[...J We desperately need the stabilising role that transatlantic business 
has on the overall EU-US relations... By your [TABD] actions, you never 
fail to remind us of the level of EU-US interdependence, and of how 
much we rely on business to drive forward economic growth (Lamy 
2002 ) .
A  number of European leaders including Spanish President José Maria Aznar 
a n d  British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown publicly called for 
re inv igo ra ting  the TABD (“Brown,” 2003). Within the US administration, Grant 
A ld o n a s , the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, also saw the 
n e e d  to  create some form o f economic counterweight to the political differences in 
th e  relationship. In his discussions with Commerce Secretary Don Evans, Aldonas 
a d v a n c e d  the TABD as an important means to reengage transatlantic dialogue and 
to  p rom ote  the US-EU economic relationship as the “ballast in a relationship where 
th is  is always going to be some amount of political friction” (US Mission 2003).
Today, the TABD has re-emerged as an important means—among other 
f a c to r s —to help right the US-EU ship and to guide the transatlantic economic 
re la tionsh ip  inro calmer waters. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
T A B D ’s future role in the health and direction of this relationship. The chapter 
b e g in s  by identifying key developments in the TABD’s rise and decline. The 
fo llo w in g  section assesses the strengths and weaknesses of this public-private 
partnersh ip , including the diverging institutional regulatory frameworks under 
w h ic h  the US and EU operate. The latter part of the chapter analyzes the rebirth of 
th e  TA BD  and its new and arguably dramatic goal: the creation of a barrier-free 
transatlantic  marketplace. I conclude that the TABD’s success in achieving this goal 
w i l l  rely less on the firms’ guidance, and more on the governments’ willingness and 
a b ility  to address key domestic institutional impediments to transatlantic economic 
governance.
II. Origins, Success and Demise
O v e r  the years, the TABD has defined itself in a variety of ways. Early on, the 
T A B D  referred to itself as an entity—a business-to-business dialogue on US-EU 
econom ic and regulatory issues. Over time, however, TABD officials repeatedly 
re fe rred  to the TABD “process”—the means by which US and EU governments and 
businesses address these issues. In 2004, the TABD has redefined itself as “an
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effective framework for enhanced cooperation between the transatlantic business 
community and the governments of the European Union and United States” (TABD 
2004b). The current TABD definition more closely reflects what I have defined in 
academic terms as a “public-private partnership” in transatlantic economic 
policymaking (Cowles 2004).
Despite its name, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has always 
included an important government dimension. The idea for the TABD, in fact, did 
not originate with the business community, but with the late US Commerce 
Department Secretary Ron Brown.3 Brown believed that international companies 
were at least five years ahead of governments in their thinking about trade 
liberalization, and thus better positioned to inform transatlantic policy goals. Brown 
envisioned a process in which the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) o f leading US 
and EU companies would identify key issues and bring them directly to government 
leaders. The Commerce Secretary reasoned that the CEOs would bring the visibility 
and political impetus necessary for government leaders to respond—particularly 
European Commission officials whom Brown believed were too removed from 
business interests.
While some in the European Commission were initially sceptical, key European 
Commission officials soon supported Brown’s initiative. Sir Leon Brittan, the EU 
Commissioner responsible for US-EU relations, welcomed a process that could 
bring greater trade liberalization. EU Industry Commissioner Martin Bangemann, a 
strong supporter of European business, also supported the initiative. Of course, both 
men were receptive to a process that would give the Commission greater visibility 
vis-à-vis major firms in an area where member states continued to exert 
considerable influence.
In April 1995, Brown, Brittan, and Bangemann sent letters to 1,800 US and EU 
industry officials asking for their input on a trade liberalization agenda. The 
business community’s response surprised the government leaders and perhaps 
confirmed Brown’s own thinking on the disconnect between government and 
business perceptions on market issues. The companies argued that the elimination 
o f transatlantic tariffs was not a top priority for companies operating in both the 
United States and Europe. Instead, the companies pointed out that duplicate 
standards, testing, and certification procedures were far more arduous and 
expensive for firms engaged in transatlantic business. Put another way, for global 
companies with considerable foreign investment in the transatlantic marketplace, it 
was not the “border issues” (i.e. tariffs) that were of concern, but the “behind the 
border" regulatory issues.
3 For an extensive history on the early years of the TABD, see Cowles (2001).
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T h e  TABD was launched in July 1995 when a joint US-EU steering committee 
c o m p r i s e d  o f government and industry officials met to discuss business concerns. 
F o u r  transatlantic working groups were created to develop papers in the following 
a r e a s :  1 ) standards, testing/certification, and regulatory issues; 2) trade liberalization, 
3 )  in v e s tm e n t, and 4) third country relations. The group decided to hold a conference 
i n  S e v i l l e ,  Spain, in December 1995 that would bring together the CEOs and high 
l e v e l  governm ent officials to discuss recommendations in these four areas. The goal 
w a s  t o  formally offer the Seville recommendations to government leaders at the US- 
E U  s u m m it  the following month.
T h e  period leading to the Seville conference proved challenging as the two sides 
b e g a n  to  identify problem areas and to discuss divergent regulatory systems. 
C o n s id e ra b le  discussion and “confidence building” took place as participants 
p o i n t e d  to  market and regulatory impediments on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite 
e a r l y  tensions, the Seville conference proved successful as the US and EU CEOs 
a n d  governm ent leaders sat down to constructively discuss a myriad of issues. The 
“ s p i r i t  o f  Seville,“ as it became known, resulted in over 70 recommendations 
p r e s e n t e d  to the two governments, many o f which were later incorporated in the 
“N e w  Transatlantic Agenda (NT A) the following month. The NT A, which ushered in 
a  n e w  format for US-EU government relations, made special reference to the 
b u s i n e s s  group’s activities:
We will not be able to achieve these ambitious goals without the backing 
o f  our respective business communities. We will support, and encourage 
the development of, the transatlantic business relationship, as an integral 
part of our wider efforts to strengthen our bilateral dialogue. The 
successful conference of EU and US business leaders which took place in 
Seville on 10/11 November 1995 was an important step in this direction.
A number of its recommendations have already been incorporated into 
our Action Plan and we will consider concrete follow-up to others (NT A 
1995, title IV).
T h e  TABD engendered a novel form of policymaking process in the 
t ra n s a tla n t ic  partnership. Whereas historic negotiations over trade matters were 
c o m b a t iv e  and defensive, the TABD brought a new tenor to the negotiations. 
P a r tic ip a n ts  had come to recognize that “they needed to develop very deep 
in te r re la tio n s  between two big systems [...]. The TABD was a paradigm for how 
t h i s  k in d  o f exchange could take place” (Cowles 2001: 264-265).
>1. Transatlantic Economic Governance in Practice
T h e  ea rly  years of the TABD were characterized by institutional adaptation and 
p o l i c y  learning as new business-government relations were forged and the various 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  learned to work with one another. The TABD CEOs and business 
rep resen ta tives  were also interested in results. In the early years, the two sides
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experienced a number of success stories. In 1996, despite a US-EU political climate 
tainted by disagreement over the Hclms-Burton legislation on Cuban investment, 
the Chicago TABD conference heralded several important breakthroughs including 
an agreement on the Information Technology Agreement and the conclusion of 
several Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) covering over $40 billion of 
transatlantic trade a year. Several o f the MRAs, for example, laid out agreements 
for US and EU testing facilities to recognize each others’ standards over time, thus 
allowing firms to have their products tested once on cither side of the Atlantic 
before coining to market. (See Table 1.)
Table 1
Summary of TABD Highlights
Year Conference Outcome Highlights
1995 Seville NTA recommendations
1996 Chicago Information Technology Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)
1997 Rome Preventing “protectionist” legislation in areas such as labeling and electronic commerce
1998 Charlotte TABD scorecards
1999 Berlin Early Warning System, WTO
2000 Cincinnati Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency
In 1997, the TABD continued to identify regulatory problems and succeeded in 
delaying what the companies viewed as protectionist legislation in labelling and 
electronic commerce at the TABD Rome conference in November. The TABD’s 
“success” also became wider known through the companies’ efforts to inform 
Congressional and member state leaders o f their agenda. Testifying before a 
Congressional committee in 1997, Undersecretary of Commerce Timothy Hauser 
noted “it is difficult to overstate the effect the TABD has had on trade 
liberalization... Virtually every market-opening move undertaken by the United 
States and the EU in the last couple years has been suggested by the TABD” 
(quoted in Mokhibcr and Weissman 2000).
By 1998, the TABD’s achievements in proposing transatlantic regulatory reform 
ironically led to disappointment within the organization. CEOs and corporate 
chairmen quietly expressed frustration with governments for failing to implement 
TABD recommendations in a timely manner. The business leaders developed a
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TABD “scorecard” to publicly rate government activity on various initiatives. 
Government officials, for their part, expressed annoyance at the business 
community’s naivete both in assuming that most TABD recommendations would be 
implemented and in not recognizing the considerable bureaucratic, and in some 
cases, new legislative and administrative measures that were needed for other 
regulatory changes to take place.
The TABD’s relative success also created an unwanted bandwagon effect as 
more companies became involved in the process. The 1998 Charlotte TABD 
conference featured more than 500 business and government officials, compared to 
300 two years earlier. With more individuals demanding podium time, the more 
intimate discussions between CEOs and high-level government figures on 
transatlantic regulatory issues began to disappear.
In 1999, the TABD saw the creation of more working groups that focused on 
everything from fasteners to cosmetics. The TABD conference in Berlin attracted 
over 700 participants and resulted in a dense 65-page report. The business leaders’ 
primary touted success was the incorporation of an “Early Warning System” 
through which US and EU governments would alert one another to potential 
regulatory conflicts before they transformed into significant transatlantic disputes. 
TABD CEOs also sought to solidify the transatlantic position on several WTO 
matters pending the ministerial the following month with government leaders. The 
triumph of anti-globalization protest groups in shutting down the Seattle WTO 
ministerial, o f course, largely negated any TABD positions at the time.
The following year, the TABD business leaders attempted to reinvigorate the 
TABD process by promoting “Guidelines on Regulatory Co-operation and 
Transparency” that would encourage greater cooperation on TABD issues. The 
2000 TABD Conference in Cincinnati attracted several hundred protesters who 
spoke out against “corporate globalization.” The irony was that as the public 
spotlight grew on the TABD's purported secret “dercgulatory plots” and other 
“scheming” (Mokhiber and Weissman 2000), TABD officials were questioning its 
very future. The conference was marred not so much by the protestors and 
newspaper headlines as by the new US administration’s relatively tepid show of 
support at the event.
The TABD’s demise appeared cemented over the next two years. In the 
aftermath of 11 September, the TABD cancelled its 2001 scheduled conference in 
Stockholm and held a teleconference meeting instead with a small group of high- 
level business and government officials. The meeting resulted in general agreement 
to move ahead on the “Guidelines on Regulatory Co-operation and Transparency.” 
In yet another effort to revive the group, the TABD was reorganized again in 2002. 
Its efforts at the second Chicago conference, however, were largely focused on 
damage control. One TABD person was designated to work full-time with media to 
answer questions not only about TABD proposals, but more often about crowd
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control. The Chicago police force dedicated upward of 1,000 officers and shut down 
eight city blocks for five days. While the TABD produced an unwieldy 52-pagc 
report, the TABD conference could count barely 70 high level business leaders in 
attendance. As one individual close to the TABD noted, the organization was soon 
on “life support.’*4
In 2003, efforts began anew to resuscitate the TABD. EU Commissioners Pascal 
Lamy and Erkki Likkanen continued to speak out in favour of the TABD process. 
Yet, the TABD’s success was not eminent. In the words of one commentator “It all 
looks like a desperate effort to revive the embers of a dying fire” (“Europe” 2003).
But the TABD did not die out. Instead it re-cmcrged with the support of both 
governments and a forceful new goal o f creating a barrier-free transatlantic 
marketplace, TABD’s importance to the transatlantic economic relationship can be 
seen in why and how it was revived. Whether or not it will be successful in 
transatlantic economic governance will depend in part on the extent to which its 
strengths and weaknesses are addressed.
III. Strengths and Weaknesses
The TABD model of structured interaction between CEOs and high-level 
government officials is now recognized and emulated by various groups involved in 
European and American international trade and regulatory issues. Yet over the 
years, various TABD chairmen have attempted to restructure this model. They have 
wrestled with ways to engage tire governments and to keep them on track to 
implement TABD companies’ proposals. These reorganizations—including the 
efforts in 2003-4—can only transform TABD to a certain degree.
There arc four key factors that have defined the TABD and that speak to both 
the strengths and weaknesses of this public-private partnership. The first two—the 
TABD’s political nature and institutional framework—are inherent to the 
organization. Past reorganizations largely have failed to address these political and 
institutional dynamics. The second two factors—the TABD’s practical strategy and 
conference format—are procedural and more malleable. As I argue in the last 
section of this chapter, an awareness of these factors is important for understanding 
the TABD’s demise and rise, and critical to assessing its future in transatlantic 
economic governance.
A. The Politica! Nature and PoUticai/Economic Cycles
As highlighted in Figure 1 below, the TABD is a public-private partnership. This 
means that for the TABD to be effective, three different relationships matter: the
4 Interview, February 5,2004.
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business-to-busincss dialogue, the govemment-to-govcmmcnt dialogue, and the 
busincss-to-govcmment dialogue. It is thus inherently political in nature.
The TABD’s strength lies in the dynamic interaction of these dialogues. Positive 
interaction in one dialogue can enhance the interaction in another dialogue. 
Technical details and regulatory minutiae aside, the TABD is effective precisely 
because higli-level government officials—Commissioners and to a lesser extent 
member state leaders in the EU, and presidents and political appointees in the 
United States—are committed to the process, and because CEOs become personally 
vested in transatlantic economic cooperation.
Of course, an inherent weakness is that the breakdown of one relationship—for 
example, the govemment-to-govemment dialogue—ultimately influences the ability 
of the partnership as a whole to operate. In the case of the TABD, there arc inherent 
political cycles that impinge on these relationships. When President Bush took 
office after President Clinton in January 2001, the future of the TABD was 
uncertain. Similarly, the transition to the new European Commission in 2004 also 
posed challenges to the partnership, as did the views of newly admitted Eastern 
European countries that had little or no experience with the TABD process. In 2005, 
the departure of Commerce Secretary Evans and the arrival of his replacement will 
also alter the relationship.
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Business cycles also impact the dialogue. CEOs step down from their office 
when the companies are not performing as well as the Board of Directors and/or 
shareholders deem appropriate. TABD organizers often joke about the “curse” of 
the TABD chair persons—many of whom have been required to relinquish their 
one-year TABD positions when forced to resign from office or announce their early 
retirement. In addition, poor economic conditions often require CEOs to stay in the 
office and not to be in the headlines for their TABD work. The fact that many 
TABD issues are broader in nature and only tangentially related to a company's 
bottom line will also impact a CEO’s decision to participate.
B. The Institutional Framework and “Political Wilt**
As noted above, one of the great strengths o f the TABD over the years has been the 
role of the US-EU government officials in shaping the dialogue, attending 
conferences, and commenting on drafts. Government leaders were instrumental in 
creating the dialogue in 1994, and in relaunching it almost a decade later. 
Government officials have also been somewhat successful in organizing themselves 
for the TABD process. The European Commission, for example, developed a 
contact list to clarify the points of contact for various government activities. The 
Commerce Department has sought to bring together officials from various 
regulatory agencies to facilitate discussions on regulatory issues.
Despite these efforts over the years, business leaders have often criticized 
government leaders for not having the “political will” to address and implement key 
business proposals. TABD scorecards and progress reports were initiated to 
encourage governments to find the means to bring about these changes. The 
problem with this approach is that business has often mistaken “lack of political 
will” with the inherent rules and institutional frameworks on each side of the 
Atlantic. For example, TABD issues that arose in the aftermath of 11 September 
highlighted the institutional issue of EU “competency.” While the EU has taken 
tremendous strides in addressing internal security issues under the direction of 
fonner Commissioner Vittorino, it is not clear how a TABD homeland security 
taskforce would neatly separate issues dealing with “security” (still a member state 
competency) and trade (the European Commission). For their part, Commission 
officials are quick to point out that the US also must address “mixed competences” 
between the federal government and the 50 states.5 Services regulations, for 
example, often reside in part with the states— whether they are mundane issues like 
elevator operations or headline stories like financial services.
Even more critical to the TABD is the extent to which regulatory rules and 
institutions are set up on both sides o f  the Atlantic to address the “deeper
5 Interview, March 11,2004.
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transatlantic integration” championed in TABD. Because TABD focuses on 
“behind-the-border issues,” it inherently addresses the convergence of domestic 
regulatory rule-making. While American companies may complain that the 
European Commission fails to adequately heed the advice of transatlantic business 
(a point at odds with the NGO perception of TABD Commission-business 
relations), the EU’s institutional framework is rather adept in implementing TABD 
regulatory change—and is an important strength to the TABD. One key reason for 
this is because the EU already has the institutional framework to allow for “re- 
regulation” under the Single Market. As Majone has pointed out, the EU was 
designed in part as a “regulatory state” (Majone 1996). In most instances, TABD 
proposals do not entail any additional institutional changes to EU regulatory policy­
making. On the contrary, while the Commerce Department may tout itself as a 
champion o f transatlantic business concerns and promoter of US business interests, 
neither it nor the United States Trade Representative has the authority to overhaul 
domestic regulatory policymaking. While Commerce officials may bring the heads 
of US regulatory agencies to the negotiating table, the regulatory agencies are 
neither funded nor mandated to undertake the supranational regulatory coordination 
called for in TABD. In short, political will alone cannot bring about change in 
regulatory mandates. Rather, executive and legislative leaders must dedicate 
considerable effort and capital to reform—or more appropriate, transfonn—long- 
established domestic regulatory rule-making and to develop the mechanisms 
necessary to engage in significant transatlantic and global regulatory policymaking.
C  The Strategy: Practical and/or Grand?
The focus o f  the TABD agenda has changed often since 1995 with different priority 
areas and different working groups. Indeed, each successive TABD business 
leadership team has attempted to improve the process and redefine or streamline 
committee structures. A deliberate strategy, formally known early on as the 
“building block” approach, remained largely untouched.
Since its inception, the TABD did not attempt to develop a major project such as 
a US-EU Free Trade Agreement, but rather to make small integrative steps that 
would build on one another. Coupled with this is what TABD officials have termed 
a positive “bottom-up approach” to US-EU trade relations—developing practical, 
results-oriented proposals among business and pushing them up through the 
government—in contrast to the traditional “top-down” mandate of government 
actors. Indeed, the TABD business groups have been hesitant to embrace “top- 
down” initiatives such as Sir Leon Brittan’s proposal for a New Transatlantic 
Marketplace (NTM) in March 1998. In the early years of the TABD, companies 
raised concerns that such initiatives might detract from the day-to-day progress 
achieved in the TABD, or that such an approach might result in a large “package 
deal” that would make successful negotiation all the more difficult. In general,
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TABD companies who had experienced bruising battles in various WTO arenas 
were wary to commit the time, money, and capital necessary to promote such an 
initiative given the demands of their overall public affairs activities.
The TABD’s “practical approach” has been an important strength to the process. 
When US and EU government officials were exchanging words over the Helms- 
Burton legislation in the late 1990s, the TABD provided a non-contentious means to 
bring the two parties back to the table. By focusing on practical matters, 
governments were able to refocus on the transatlantic economic relationship. As 
discussed below, the TABD’s practical orientation also provided a critical focal 
point when US and EU officials became immersed in more political, ideological 
battles. Indeed, the TABD’s "practical” strength became a key reason why 
government officials wanted to resurrect the organization in 2003-4, As more than 
one official noted at the time, if  the TABD did not exist, the governments would 
have to create it.
Yet, there was an important weakness to the TABD's practical focus—at least in 
the bottom-up building blocks approach. As Michael Smith points out, the TABD’s 
building blocks approach lacked a “grand strategy” —an overall plan to address the 
growing interdependence of the two markets in the face of divergent regulatory 
structures and industrial cultures (Smith 2001). There was no defined endpoint or 
recognition of how to achieve such an endpoint. This meant to some companies and 
government leaders that the organization’s purpose was difficult to discern.
D. The TABD Conference: Building Support and Legitimacy
Over the years, the annual conference became a TABD hallmark. Beginning with 
the 1994 Seville conference, the TABD’s timetable was driven by this annual event. 
The conference served as an action-forcing event requiring companies to come to 
agreement on core issues and governments to provide the “deliverables.” The 
meeting provided the means to remind governments of the urgency of certain 
recommendations.
In supporting the TABD, government officials and company representatives 
cite the drawn-out and technical negotiations that occurred in past US-EU trade 
and regulatory negotiations. Industry recommendations from national industry 
association became lowest-common-dcnominator responses that were of little value 
or interest to policymakers. The TABD CEO-led format, on the other hand, brought 
a political dynamism to the process and the major players to the table at the annual 
conference. Secretaries of Commerce, Commissioners of industry, heads of 
independent regulatory agencies were willing and interested to sit down with the 
titans of industry. CEOs, for their part, did not want to focus on the technical 
minutiae, but promoted broader initiatives that governments could embrace and 
undertake. The conference, in effect, became the arena around which the TABD 
business-government relationship was defined.
286
The TABD conference also became an important means to help legitimize 
TABD proposals by opening up the dialogue to other transatlantic business 
communities and government constituencies. Key representatives from small- and 
medium-sized companies were given prominent roles at the event. Outreach 
meetings to various business groups took place before and after the conference. 
Working group recommendations were highlighted in the conference report. 
Member state representatives, regulatory agency officials, and trade association 
presidents were invited to the annual conference.
Yet, the TABD conference also had its weaknesses. First, bringing CEOs to the 
TABD conference was not always easy. CEOs needed to justify to their 
shareholders that participating in the TABD conference and devoting oneself to 
TABD issues would make economic sense for the company. Much of the TABD 
administrative work over the years simply was ensuring that the CEOs show up at 
the conference. This was especially difficult once companies began experiencing 
economic downturns around 2000-1. Second, despite the efforts of organizers, the 
TABD focus on regulatory issues often resulted in looking at the very technical 
minutiae that TABD creators initially disdained. Thus, CEOs often showed up at the 
annual meetings with briefing books in hand to discuss nitty-gritty details that 
usually were reserved for the company lobbyists. High-level government officials 
likewise needed to be extensively briefed in order to participate in these discussions. 
CEOs again began to question whether the annual conference was worth their effort, 
and/or whether their meetings with senior governments officials could have been 
better spent on other matters.
Time revealed another weakness of the conference when it became “too 
defining” an event. TABD coordinators found themselves spending an inordinate 
amount of time on conference details. During TABD’s early years, they had to 
address unwieldy numbers of participants, such as the 700-plus individuals who 
attended the Berlin conference in 1999. During the later years, they focused on 
simply getting a large enough number of prominent CEOs to attend. Then they 
worked to accommodate the egos of high-level officials who wanted to give 
speeches and/or wanted to receive the proper seating arrangement in comparison to 
his/her European/Amcrican counterpart.
Perhaps more importantly, the conference began to represent the life or death of 
the TABD. The TABD agenda was drawn up around the conference schedule and if 
the proper results were not achieved and/or if not enough CEOs appeared at the 
conference, the TABD itself was deemed a failure. In many respects, the conference 
overshadowed all the positive work of the TABD partners throughout the year.
By the late 1990s, the role of the TABD conference as a means to open up and 
legitimize TABD actions to a larger business-government community also was 
under attack. The TABD conference became a focal point for protestors who 
disagreed with the government-business initiative, and/or who disagreed with the
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purported power of major multinational corporations involved in the public-private 
partnership. TABD organizers soon found themselves paying significant attention to 
conference security details so as to permit business and government officials to 
convene, while allowing protestors to express their views outside the conference 
meeting place. As discussed below, while protesters were criticizing the “behind- 
the-scenes” meeting between government and “big business,” their actions were 
sowing the seeds for TABD to be less visible in the future.
As discussed below', these strengths and weaknesses came to the fore in 2001-2 
and ironically led to both the fall and rebirth of TABD in 2003-4. They will also 
matter in the future US-EU economic relationship.
IV. The W a r in I ra q  an d  the R elaunch  o f the TABD
Government and industry officials cite a number of factors leading to the general 
decline of the TABD—many of which can be linked to the strengths and 
weaknesses identified above.6 To begin, the TABD was in a sense a victim of its 
own success. The bottom-up approach produced a number of important 
breakthroughs. However, the TABD agenda soon became cluttered with too many 
regulatory issues on the table and no clear sense of the business community’s 
priorities on the issues. The process became unmanageable as governments became 
inundated with the laundry list of items, and business became disappointed with the 
slow pace of policy implementation.
Complicating this situation was the fact that the TABD focused on the “low- 
lying fruit” in the early years—on the non-contentious issues that were “doable” for 
governments. As the companies turned to regulatory issues involving deeper 
integration, they encountered a number o f obstacles, notably with US regulatory 
agencies. This led to frustration on the CEOs’ part about the lack o f government 
“political will.” Yet, as noted above, it was not a lack of government advocacy per 
se that left the companies dissatisfied. It was the perceived inability to effectuate 
change vis-à-vis government institutions, notably US regulatory agencies, that 
proved frustrating.
Yet another factor that led to the TABD’s decline was the political cycles and 
the subsequent lack o f attention to the transatlantic agenda. In the US, the Clinton 
impeachment process soon consumed the administration and left the TABD, among 
other policies, on the fringes. The arrival o f the George Bush administration in 2000 
severely tested the dialogue. The Commerce Department under Secretary Don 
Evans was rather reluctant to pick up on an initiative that had been a “Brown 
project” and “Clinton administration initiative.” The Bush administration also
6 This section benefited from joint research with Jessica Gilroy. See also Cowles and Gilroy 
(2004).
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believed that given its good relations with the business community, “the 
Republicans didn’t need the TABD” the way that Democrats did.7 The US 
government’s reticence was not lost on the business community and the European 
Commission which became reluctant to use its political chips on the TABD.8
A. 11 September 2001
The new Bush administration tested the TABD in non-cconomic ways as well. The 
larger transatlantic political relationship experienced setbacks when the US 
administration began to distance itself from multilateral negotiations such as the 
Kyoto Protocol and International Criminal Court. Concerns over diverging 
viewpoints on the Middle East peace process fiirthcr contributed to the US-EU 
tensions. Confounding the situation was a worsening world economy and the failure 
to restart WTO actions at the Doha and Cancún meetings. 11 September 2001, 
however, proved to be the defining factor in testing not only the broader US-EU 
relationship, but also the TABD itself.
The 11 September attacks in the United States immediately stopped the 
transatlantic squabbling as European leaders expressed solidarity with the United 
States, even invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In time, however, the 
attacks also contributed to further divisions within the relationship as the Bush 
Administration radically shifted its focus toward national security matters. The 
political rhetoric and policy shift that followed the 9/11 attacks proved most 
difficult for the TABD. The administration’s stance, in which the president argued 
that countries were either for or against the United States in its fight against 
terrorism, resulted in three outcomes for the TABD. First, the new political/military 
focus immediately overshadowed the TABD, along with many other initiatives. 
Second, the organization was put on “life support” as transatlantic political tensions 
grew. With the US and EU exchanging caustic remarks with one another, and the 
EU Member States finding themselves divided over Iraq, there was little room for 
dialogue on economic matters. Third, and somewhat ironically, the new 
political/military dynamics planted the seeds for the TABD’s relaunch.
Before the TABD could emerge again as an important focal point in US-EU 
relations, however, it would undergo its own near-death experience. The 
cancellation of the 2001 TABD conference in Stockholm, Sweden, and its 
replacement with a videoconference—hampered by technical glitches and voice 
delays—denied the TABD one of its defining features. Without a conference, there 
was little momentum to move forward the following year. In January 2002, the EU 
announced that John Weston of BAE Systems would be the new European TABD
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co-chair. For the next several months, however, no American CEO could be found 
to lead the American side until Phil Condit o f Boeing Corporation was recruited in 
late March. The quarterly profit reports that influence business cycles and determine 
the tenure of chief executive officers quickly dashed glowing TABD 
announcements of the new leadership team. Days after Condit’s role was revealed, 
the BAE Systems board announced the firing of Weston. TABD officials were 
relieved when Mike Turner, Weston’s replacement, declared that he would serve as 
TABD co-chair.
Critics of TABD quickly pointed out the “militarization” of the organization. 
With BAE Systems as “the world’s largest weapons producer” and Boeing 
Corporation as “the largest US arms exporter,” it appeared that TABD was 
positioning itself to capitalize on the post-9/11 environment (CEO 2002). The 
reality, however, was that TABD was limping along.
In certain respects, 2002 was the TABD’s year that never was. Business cycles 
again contributed to TABD’s weak showing in 2002. In 1998-1999, many TABD 
CEOs had enjoyed booming economies, Wall Street success, and what one official 
called “rock star status.” By 2002, with the economy in a significant downturn, the 
same CEOs were consumed with turning around poor corporate earnings and 
keeping their boardroom positions. They could not afford to be seen “palling around 
at a trade policy forum” while their stockholders were watching the quarterly 
earnings.4’ European leaders suggested that American CEOs’ reticence to become 
involved was due also to the Bush Administration’s lack of commitment to TABD 
("Europe” 2003). As a consequence, “big name” CEO participation at the Chicago 
2002 TABD conference was lower than at any time since the inaugural conference 
in Seville. When BAE Systems stepped down as co-chair following the conference, 
the Brussels TABD office became defunct. Only the US office remained with a 
single staff person—and only then due to Boeing’s willingness to provide office 
space and basic expenditures.
In the meantime, transatlantic frictions continued unabated in 2002. Tensions 
surged in January with US President Bush’s State of the Union speech in which he 
referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, as part of the “Axis of Evil” that threatened 
the US. The speech immediately drew criticism from French officials who 
questioned the American president’s reduction of global issues to a war on 
terrorism, and from German officials who suggested it was the administration’s 
excuse to settle old scores with Saddam Hussein. That same month, the World 
Trade Organization affirmed that the US system of Foreign Sales Corporations 
(FSCs) were illegal export subsidies, thus allowing the Europeans to begin levying 
“nuclear” sanctions o f $4 billion. In March, US-EU economic relations were further 9
9 Interview, February 5, 2004.
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strained when the President Bush decided to impose tariffs of up to 30% on steel 
imports. While recognizing that the American president’s actions were largely due 
to the future presidential election, the EU threatened to counter with sanctions worth 
over S2 billion (European Report, 2002). European efforts to promote a “positive 
agenda” at the April 2002 summit were short-lived. In September 2002, the Bush 
administration released its National Security Strategy, calling for a more militarized 
approach that would include first-strike options. Most European allies and Bush 
administration critics viewed the strategy as a significant challenge to “just-war” 
doctrine. In October 2002, the US Congress adopted a joint resolution authorizing 
the use of force against Iraq and giving the president implicit first-strike authority. 
A day after the 7 November 2002, TABD conference in Chicago, the UN Security 
Council approved Resolution 1441 which imposed new arms inspections on Iraq 
and warned o f “serious consequences” should the resolution be breached. The 
resolution had been a source of intense negotiations between the Americans, British, 
and French and provided hope to certain European allies that US military action 
might be further delayed. This hope was dashed a month later on 21 December 
2002, when President Bush approved the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf 
region.
The US-EU tensions were not lost on the transatlantic business communities 
who were nervous about the economic spillover effects in an already weakened 
global economy.10 1It was not the renaming of “Freedom Fries” in the US Capitol 
cafeteria or the manifestations at the Paris McDonalds that caused concern. Rather, 
it was the realization that there were “seismic shifts” in the US-EU relationship, and 
not just a blow-up over WTO banana wars.11 For CEOs, the tensions grew out-of­
hand at the World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2003, 
where the US government in particular was derided for its global policies. As one 
attendee noted, the situation became “surreal.” Government officials from both 
sides of the Atlantic began buttonholing the CEOs to “take sides” on the looming 
Iraq war and to halt transatlantic trade as a means to punish the other side. The 
reaction by the business leaders was “fury.”12 Corporate executives’ sense that 
certain government officials had become embroiled in the ideological conflicts, and 
either had lost sight or had no clear understanding of the US-EU economic 
interdependence further troubled the CEOs. In Washington, DC, a number of 
companies began to lobby the US government to step back and to reassess its 
confrontational relationship with the Europeans. A separate ad-hoc group, the “EU 
Vanguard Group,” comprised of major firms like AOL, GE, and Citigroup, was 
formed to encourage the government to reengage the EU. One goal of the Vanguard
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4Group was “to be sure Congress didn’t do anything stupid;” another was to call for 
some sort of dialogue,13 As one US government official noted, “it didn’t matter 
what it was called, TABD or whatever,” the firms simply wanted a means to 
reintroduce positive discussion back into the US-EU relationship.14
Within the US administration, the State and Commerce Departments also grew 
wary of the increasing US-EU tensions. Grant Aldonas, the Under Secretary of 
Commerce for International Trade, began to champion the TABD as an important 
practical means to bring the governments together. Aldonas also regarded the 
TABD process as a vehicle to “reinvent growth both in the United States and 
Europe” by lowering transaction costs through improved cooperation on US-EU 
regulatory issues (US Mission 2003). The study released in Spring 2003 by Dan 
Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan of the Center for Transatlantic Relations also focused 
political leaders on the economic importance of the transatlantic relationship 
(Hamilton and Quinlan 2003; this volume).
On the European side, European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and 
Enterprise Commissioner Erkki Liikanen continued to advocate the TABD. The 
political tensions in 2002 had, o f course, not only soured relations across the 
Atlantic, but within the European continent as well. US Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld’s jab at the divisions between “Old Europe”—namely, France and 
Germany who largely disagreed with US policy—and “New Europe”—many of the 
new members of the EU who—along with Britain and Spain, generally supported 
US actions in Iraq—were npt well received in Brussels. For Lamy and Liikanen, the 
TABD remained a tried and true mechanism to bring the transatlantic and European 
partners back to the table. It became clear to them that if  the TABD companies 
couldn’t relaunch the organization, someone else would have to do it.15
B. Relaunch: Part I  and Part II
Just as they did in 1995, it was the government leaders who led the relaunch of 
TABD in 2003. In April 2003, Commissioners Lamy and Liikanen, and US 
Commerce Secretary Evans exchanged letters supporting TABD’s relaunch.
Evans, known for being “results-driven” wanted to ensure that the TABD 
become more effective. The Commission, with the assistance of the Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board of BASF, Jürgen Strube, began identifying a core group of 
US-EU CEOs who would be supportive o f the initiative. Strube had previously 
served as one of the first TABD co-chairs, and was the current president of UNICE, 
the EU business peak association. American officials, including Stuart Eizenstat
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—a key government figure in TABD during the Clinton years and co-chair of the 
European-Amcrican Business Council—also helped recruit the companies. 
Arrangements were made for a special meeting on 24 June 2003, between Liikanen, 
Evans, and the business leaders to relaunch the TABD in a new format and to stress 
that the TABD would be “a key interlocutor in ensuring that [...] transatlantic 
economic issues are addressed” (Commission 2003). The “new TABD” submitted a 
political statement to leaders of the US-EU summit the following day, noting that 
the TABD was “bom out of a political need for closer interaction” (Werner 2003).
The “new” TABD would draw from the organization’s strengths and avoid some 
o f its weaknesses. The TABD would remain an organization driven by high-level 
meetings o f CEOs and government officials. Gone, however, was the annual 
conference that had come to define and delimit the organization’s success. Instead, 
it was agreed that “smaller meetings between CEOs and government principals 
focused on results more closely tied to the government calendar” would take place, 
notably in half-day meetings at the time of US-EU summits (Werner 2003). 
Government and business leaders also agreed that 10-12 companies from each side 
o f the Atlantic would serve as an Executive Board for the two corporate co-chairs 
leading the organization.
The momentum for the TABD initiative was growing in 2003. UK Chancellor 
Gordon Brown, for example, encouraged the US and EU governments to restate 
their commitment to the TABD process. Later, Brown, together with US Treasury 
Secretary John Snow, announced plans in November 2003 to conduct a joint study 
identifying barriers to trade in the transatlantic marketplace (“Brown” 2003). The 
study would be modelled after the European Union’s own Cecchini Report in 
the 1980s which identified costs associated with the lack of a single European 
market.
In Brussels, the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), an influential think tank 
comprised of business, European Parliament leaders, and US Congressional 
leaders16 involved in transatlantic issues, emerged as an important voice in TABD’s 
resurgence. By late 2003, the TPN began to wrap up an 18-month study to identify 
ways to revive the transatlantic relationship. In its report of December 2003, entitled 
“Strategy to Strengthen Transatlantic Partnership,” the TPN explicitly called for the 
creation of a barrier-free transatlantic marketplace (BFTM) to be completed by 
2015, and possibly 2010 (TPN 2003).17 The report noted that the initiative would
16 These same US and EU legislators are involved in the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue 
(TLD).
17 The TPN report was drawn up by two TPN Co-rapporteurs—Peter Linton o f 13KSII, Brussels, 
and Bruce Stokes, Journalism Fellow with the German Marshall Fund o f the United States 
(see also his contribution in this book)—as well as two TPN Advisors—Simon Serfaty o f the
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not require a free trade agreement or any new treaty, but would focus on domestic 
impediments to regulatory cooperation. While downplaying any treaty, the TPN 
proposal was, in fact, a bold initiative. Moving away from the “building blocks 
approach” of the past, the TPN called for a grand strategy reminiscent of the ELTs 
own Single Market initiative. The TPN also singled out the TABD to play a 
prominent role in creating the BFTM.
Not surprisingly, TPN had a strong link to the TABD. It was the same TPN that 
served as a caretaker for the TABD when BAE Systems stepped down as EU co­
chair in 2002. The chair of the EU Business Committee was Hanns Glatz, who had 
worked intimately on TABD issues when Daimler-Chrysler chaired the TABD. The 
US Business chair was Lisa Schroeter, the former Executive Director the TABD, 
who previously worked on TABD matters with EDS, and who was now addressing 
TABD issues for the Dow Chemical Company. Moreover, at least one-third of the 
TPN business membership would later serve on the 2004 TABD Executive 
Committee, including the two TABD co-chairs.
Of course, as a public-private partnership, the TABD also needed high-level 
business leadership. It would take the Commission, Commerce, and government 
leaders several more months to identify and cajole two CEOs to assume the co-chair 
positions within the organization. Finally, on 4 December 2003, US Secretary 
Evans and EU Commissioner Liikanen announced the Douglas Daft, CEO of The 
Coca-Cola Company, and Niall FitzGerald, Chairman o f Unilever PLC, would be 
the TABD co-chairs for 2004-5. The recruitment had not come easily. FitzGerald 
was a solid choice for the position not only because of his interest in larger policy 
issues, but also because the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—Unilever’s 
“home countries”—would be presiding over the EU presidency during the formal 
TABD relaunch. It took strong influence from EU Commission President Prodi, the 
Prime Ministers o f the UK, the Netherlands, and Ireland, and a very high-level level 
Bush administration official to recruit FitzGerald of Unilever to lead the TABD 
effort.18 FitzGerald made it clear to government officials that he would assume the 
position only if there was a clear commitment from the governments to move 
forward on tire process. Unilever officials created a “demand list” to take to the US 
government, the Commission, and the UK government insisting on the certain types 
of support, to which the governments agreed.19 FitzGerald, in turn, played an 
important role in recruiting his US colleague, CEO Douglas Daft of Coca-Cola, to 
be the American co-chair. In a Financial Times commentary, the two co-chairs 
discussed their role as CEOs of “transatlantic” companies in the TABD. While
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( conJd.)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (and host to the US TABD office!, and Lord 
William Wallace o f Saltaire of the London School o f Economics.
18 Interview with US business officials, March 4, 2004.
19 Interview with TABD official, March 4,2004.
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recognizing that jobs and competitiveness were important reasons for renewing the 
TABD process, the chairmen also cited the need “to foster greater transatlantic co­
operation at this critical time.” The larger goal of the TABD was to “try to prevent 
current US-Europcan diplomatic tensions spilling over into the economic sphere. It 
is not the business community’s role to heal this rift. But we do believe that a 
renewed strategic vision for TABD can provide a positive agenda [for government 
cooperation]...” (Daft and FitzGerald 2004).
TABD’s formal rebirth took place at the January 2004 World Economic Forum 
when the newly recruited TABD business chairs were present along with Secretary 
Evans, and Commissioners Liikancn and Lamy. Evans went to Davos explicitly for 
the TABD meeting. At the TABD meeting, the companies agreed at the business- 
only session that they should concentrate their efforts on only a small group of 
“‘horizontal,’ cross-cutting issues” and that the TABD CEOs “must take full 
ownership o f these issues” (TABD 2004d). In addition, they agreed to focus on a 
number of core policy issues: 1) WTO Doha Development Round; 2) Intellectual 
Property Protection and the Fight against Counterfeiting; 3) Capital Markets; 4) 
International Accounting Standards; 5) Corporate Governance; 6) Regulatory 
Coordination; 7) Regulatory Sub-sectors (sectoral regulatory issues such as 
chemicals); 8) Open Markets and Security.
Echoing the objective identified in the TPN report a month earlier, the TABD 
business and government leaders called for the creation o f a barrier-free 
transatlantic marketplace. A similar call was made by Spanish Prime Minister 
Aznar a week earlier at a Washington, DC conference. The Davos meeting 
participants also noted the strong support shown by the US government, European 
Commission, and European Council. They agreed, however, that “if the TABD 
determines that political backing from the governments were to decline 
significantly, members could choose to disband the TABD” (TABD 2004d). The 
warning, although explicit, was not necessary. As one government official 
explained, after all the work to reenergize the TABD, “no one wanted this to fail.”20
C. TABD Reorganization
Like many of the chairmen before them, Daft and FitzGerald sought to restructure 
the TABD. Building on the agreements outlined in government-business 
discussions of June 2003, Daft and FitzGerald decided to make TABD much 
smaller by design. The US and EU have 15 members each on the Executive Board. 
(See Table 2 below.) With the Commission’s assistance, European companies were 
recruited in part to balance the companies’ country of origin, and therefore, the 
support of the Member States. Efforts also were made to recruit small and medium-
2 0  In terv iew , M arch  16, 2004.
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Tabic 2
2004 TABD Co-Chairs and Executive Board
2004 TABD Co-Chairs
E. Neville Isdell,
The Coca-Cola Company*
Niall FitzGerald, 
Reuters (Unilever)
Executive Board Companies
Bison Gear and Engineering Corp. Arcelor
Citigroup AstraZencnca
Dcloitte Touche Tomatsu BASF*
The Dow Chemical Company* British Airways
EDS* British American Tobacco
Ernst & Young Deutsche Bank*
The Esteé Lauder Companies Ericsson
FedEx KPMG International
General Electric* Lafarge
Merck and Co, Inc.* Philips*
PricewaterhouseC oopers Renault
Time Warner* Repsol
Tramco Inc. SAP*
UPS* SEB
Visa International Unilever*
* Denotes TPN member
sized enterprises that would serve as the voice of the US Chamber of Commerce, 
the National Association of Manufacturers, and UNICE—providing further 
representativeness and “legitimacy” to the organization. It was agreed that TABD 
companies would serve as the Executive Board members and would also contribute 
S25,000 or 25,000 Euros to cover TABD costs. In the past, TABD co-chairs bore all 
major costs of the organization.
As part of Daft’s imprint, the US business organization is now housed in the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington, DC think
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tank.21 The CSIS has provided the US TABD group with strategic thinking on how 
to advise the governments. It provides a more neutral meeting place for the 
companies and government officials to meet. The think tank also serves as an 
outreach mechanism for the larger DC think tank community to ensure broad 
consensus on the issues (TABD 2004a). The EU business grouping, although 
housed within Unilever, also works with individuals at the European Policy Centre 
for strategic guidance. Both think tanks have strong links with the TPN as well.
In a final move to strengthen the organization, it was agreed that the TABD co­
chairs would preside for two years, as opposed to one. The purpose was to provide 
greater continuity to the organization. Now that the financial burden was shouldered 
by all TABD Executive Board Members instead of the two co-chairs, this was 
feasible. Yet, in what can only be attributed to the “curse of the TABD co-chairs,” 
both TABD co-chairs found themselves pressured into retirement by their own 
corporate boards in February 2004. First, FitzGerald announced that he would be 
retiring at the end o f September 2004, but that Unilever would continue to support 
him as co-chair of TABD. FitzGerald would later become chairman of Reuters. 
Days later, Daft announced his plan to retire from Coca-Cola by the end of the year. 
He was later replaced by E. Neville Isdcll who pledged to continue serving as 
TABD co-chair. Despite the change in the TABD co-chair’s status, the TABD 
organizational structure remained stable.
The TABD began by focusing on four priority areas:
1) Open Trade and Security—to ensure that open trade and the fight against 
terrorism arc complementary and not competing objectives, such as in the 
area of express shipping;
2) Intellectual Property Rights and the Fight against Counterfeiting—-to 
recognize the importance o f protecting intellectual property rights;
3) Capital Markets and International Accounting Standards—to ensure that 
the company voice is heard to bridge the gap by 2007 between the new 
International Financial Reporting Standards with the US Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles; and
4) World Trade Organization and the Doha Development round—to ensure 
that the US and EU move forward on Doha, notably in the area of 
agriculture (European Commission 2004).
21 W hile  th e  CSIS a ffilia tio n  allow s fo r  larger m ee tin g  space, log is tic  su p p o rt, and  stra teg ic  
g u id an ce  g iven th e  re la tiv e  sm all s iz e  o f  the D C  C oca-C ola Public  A ffa irs  o ff ice , the C S IS 's  
5 0 Ic 3  u m b re lla  u n d e r  w hich  T A B D  functions a llo w s the co m p an ies to  c o u n t  th e ir  S25 .000  as 
a  ta x -e x em p t con trib u tio n .
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At the same time, it continued to promote the larger goal o f a barrier-free 
transatlantic marketplace—an undertaking that would require significant new forms 
of US-EU regulatory cooperation.
V. Assessing the Future
With the success o f TABD’s relaunch at Davos, a number o f key government 
and business actors began to speak out in favour of the TABD’s agenda. In 
February 2005, the TPN formally launched its report at the Centre for European 
Policy Studies in Brussels, calling again for the BFTM’s creation. In April, TPN 
members of the European Parliament succeeded in passing a resolution on EU-US 
relations and the transatlantic marketplace (Hoedeman, 2004). In May 2004, a 
number of key US and EU business groups and associations issued a joint statement 
calling for “a new, more ambitious transatlantic trade and investment initiative”— 
namely, the BFTM (USCIB 2004)."" Leading the initiative was a familiar name, 
Jürgen Strubc, president of UNICE and former TABD Chair.
The actions were well-timed for the US-EU Summit on 25-26 June, at 
Dromoland Castle, Ireland. On 25 June, several TABD Executive Board members 
— 14 CEOs from the US and EU—met with several senior officials from the US 
administration, the Commission, and the Irish presidency to finalize TABD 
recommendations. The following day, TABD co-chair Fitzgerald and TABD 
Executive Board member and then-acting TABD co-chair Michael Eskew, Chair 
and CEO of UPS, delivered the TABD report to President Bush, Bertie Ahem, the 
President of the EU Council and Taoiseach o f  Ireland, and Romano Prodi, President 
of the European Commission (TABD 2004c).2 3 As the TABD press release 
trumpeted: “The TABD’s goal o f a barrier free transatlantic market took an 
important step forward today [with the presentation o f the TABD 
recommendations)... The TABD will now begin work on a detailed work plan for 
achieving its goal in close cooperation with the governments” (TABD 2004c).
Of course, press headlines about the US-EU Summit naturally focused on Iraq, 
the Middle East, weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism and non­
proliferation. Yet the summit also produced a number of important documents on 
the transatlantic economic relationship. The summit produced a declaration,
22 The sig n a to ries  in c lu d e d  U N IC E , B u s in e ss  R o u n d tab le , CSI (C o a litio n  o f  S e rv ice  Industries), 
EABC (E u ro p ea n -A m erica n  B u sin ess  C o u n c il) , E C A T  (E m erg en cy  C o m m itte e  fo r A m erican  
Trade), N A M  (N a tio n a l A sso c ia tio n  o f  M an u fac tu re rs ). N F T C  (N a tio n a l Foreign  T rade 
C ouncil), OF1I (O rg a n isa tio n  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l Investm en ts, a n d  U S C IB  (U nited  S ta tes 
C ouncil fo r  In te rn a tio n a l B usiness).
23  M em bers o f  th e  T ra n sa tla n tic  C o n su m e rs  D ia lo g u e  b o y co tted  th e  su m m it u p o n  learn ing  th a t 
the bu sin ess d ia lo g u e , b u t n o t the  c o n su m er d ia lo g u e , w ou ld  m e e t w ith  th e se  governm ent 
officials. S ee  T A C D , 20 0 4 .
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“Strengthening the Transatlantic Economic Partnership” that supported government 
efforts “to explore means to eliminate trade, regulatory, and investment 
impediments to further economic integration [between the US and EU]” (White 
House 2004b). As noted in the statement, these efforts may include the relevant 
regulatory agencies. An accompanying factsheet welcomed recommendations 
concerning the creation of a barrier-free transatlantic market. It also identified US 
plans to convene a series of public meetings with representatives from business, 
labour, consumer and environmental groups, and academia to develop a US strategy 
on how to achieve this economic integration.
The leaders also produced the “US-EU Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap” 
designed to provide a framework for cooperation on a broad range of issues including 
pharmaceuticals, auto safety, information and communications technology, cosmetics, 
consumer product safety, chemicals, nutritional labelling, and eco-dcsign of electrical/ 
electronic products. Again, the goal was to minimize US-EU regulatory differences in 
these areas through careful consultations.
Finally, government leaders welcomed the joint report from US and EU officials 
participating in the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue (sec Posner’s contribution 
to this volume).
Wliile the US presidential elections and the arrival of the new Commission 
shifted considerable focus away from these US-EU initiatives, progress was made 
on a number of fronts. On 17 August 2004, the USTR issued a notice and request 
for comments on the “Public Dialogue on Enhancing the Transatlantic Economic 
Relationship” in the Federal Register. The US government's objective in this 
"Stakeholders Dialogue” is “to stimulate concrete ideas from interested stakeholders 
for specific government actions that could enhance US-EU economic integration” 
as called for in the White House Fact Sheet at the US-EU Dromoland Castle 
Summit (USTR 2004). Indeed, the dialogue is not designed to debate whether or not 
a barrier-free transatlantic marketplace is desirable (at least from the perspective o f 
certain consumer and environmental groups), but on how to achieve it.24 Suggested 
topics to be explored in the dialogue include: “Where should the US and EU 
economic relationship be in 10 years and what steps should wc take to meet these 
goals?” “What should be done to better mesh US and EU regulatory approaches?” 
“What should be done to further liberalize transatlantic trade in services?" As one 
government official pointed out, the Stakeholders Dialogue directly addresses the 
TABD goal of creating the barrier-free transatlantic marketplace.25 Based on 
comments from the Stakeholder Dialogue, the US government will prepare a report
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24 A s no ted  in  th e  W hite  H o u se  Fact S hee t, “ W e w ill b e n e f it  from  th e  adv ice  o f  b usiness, 
co n su m er, a n d  o th e r  g ro u p s  w ho  sh a re  p re s id en t B u sh 's  goal o f  b road -based  grow th and  
eco n o m ic  o p p o rtu n ity "  (W h ite  H ouse  2 0 0 4 a).
25 In te rv iew , D e ce m b er 13, 2004 .
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of key recommendations to be presented to US government leaders prior to the 2005 
US-EU summit.26
The “Stakeholders Dialogue” is a significant departure from the transatlantic 
dialogues created under the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in 1998. This 
is not a “Dialogue o f Dialogues” among the TABD, TACD, and other dialogues. 
Rather, it is designed as a dialogue around the specific BFTM goal that, at least 
according to press accounts, both governments accept. As discussed below, whether 
or not this will be regarded as a “legitimating dialogue" in the eyes of traditional 
stakeholders is yet to be determined.
By December 2004, a number of discussions were underway between US-EU 
government and industry officials on TABD recommendations. Certain TABD 
companies were readying themselves to participate in specific sector discussions of 
the US-EU Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap. The TABD was also tracking 
developments in its four priority areas, and was pleased with the progress to date in 
areas such as Intellectual Property Rights and Anti-Counterfeiting as well as the 
efforts to promote the BFTM.27
A. Strengths and Weaknesses
While government and business officials arc pleased with TABD’s turnabout, 
reviewing TABD’s four key strengths and weaknesses provides a greater 
appreciation for the extensive nature of the organization’s transformation. First, the 
TABD rid itself o f the annual conference that defined the organization in a manner 
both positive and negative. In doing so, the TABD “lost” the public face to the 
organization as well as the public momentum for further cooperation. At the same 
time, it no longer tied its fate to the vagaries of a single annual conference. By 
focusing its meetings around the Davos summit in January and the US-EU summit 
in June, the TABD has created for itself a schedule that is more in tune with the 
government calendar as well. Of course, the lack of a public conference has meant 
that TABD protesters can now focus their activities on Davos as well as the US-EU 
summit.
The second important change is in the TABD agenda itself. Historically, the 
TABD focused on a “building blocks approach” which lent itself to step-by-step 
consolidation, but often resulted in an organization without a clear goal. By far one 
of the most important changes to TABD in 2003-4 has been its formal adoption of 
the goal of a Barrier-Free Transatlantic Marketplace. While supporters are careful to 
note that the BFTM will not entail a free trade agreement, the BFTM has the
2 6  O n N o v e m b er 9 , 2 0 0 4 , U S T R  issu e d  an u p d a te  on  the P u b lic  D ia lo g u e , ex ten d in g  to  
D ecem b er 31, 2 0 0 4 , th e  subm ission  o f  w ritte n  co m m en ts regard ing  id eas o n  h o w  to  deepen  
tran satlan tic  e c o n o m ic  ties.
2 7  C o rre sp o n d en ce , D e c e m b e r  5 ,2 0 0 4 .
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potential to become a dynamic project similar to the EU’s adoption of its own single 
market. In this sense, the BFTM is a far more radical idea and arguably more prone 
to public protest than any transatlantic free trade agreement could ever engender. It 
thus remains to be seen whether or not the TABD's “practical focus” can continue 
in light of this more radical proposal.
A third significant development is the TABD’s attempt to address problems 
associated with its political nature and political/business cycles. While these cycles 
are inevitable, the TABD's new' format and calendar may be better suited to adjust 
to them. In the past, for example, the TABD found itself holding its November 
summit in the midst of a presidential election and/or at a time of a lame duck 
president. Whether purposively designed or not, the new meetings scheduled around 
US-EU summits and Davos avoid this problem. Also positive arc the TABD’s 
decisions to create 2-year terms for the co-chairs and to spread the organization’s 
financial support among the Executive Committee. Historically, considerable time 
and effort was spent in recruiting TABD co-chairs each year—a process that 
oftentimes stopped any progress on activities until the new individuals were on 
board. Moreover, the organization faced significant financial constraints if either 
co-chair stepped down from office. The new arrangements, while not avoiding 
business cycles, now allow for greater leadership and more secure financial support 
within the business community.
Finally—and most importantly— is the institutional set-up of transatlantic 
regulatory policymaking. It i$, on this point that the TABD’s future is less evident. 
What companies call a “lack of political will” is in reality the governments’ limited 
ability to transform domestic regulatory structures. As US and EU policymakers 
have come to accept, it is not merely the EU and EU regulatory policies that 
diverge, but the regulatory structures themselves. In broad terms, the European 
Union has developed through its single market program a means to coordinate 
transnational and therefore, transatlantic regulatory policy positions. That these 
policy mechanisms arc not always transparent is now being addressed through the 
Guidelines o f US-EU Regulatory Cooperation. The United States, on the other 
hand, has formal rulemaking procedures as identified in the Administrative 
Procedures Act. What the US is lacking, however, is the specific means to 
coordinate transnational and therefore, transatlantic cooperation on regulatory 
issues. In general, US regulatory agencies have the mandate and the funding to 
focus on domestic regulatory policy issues. These agencies, who can enjoy a fair 
amount of independence on policy and implementation procedures, are not 
necessarily designed to address the ‘Trans-domestic” issues for which the TABD’s 
barrier-free transatlantic marketplace calls.
The Bush Administration’s “Stakeholders Dialogue” may be a first step in 
providing the political justification for institutional change in regulatory agencies 
and policies. The dialogue itself, however, cannot engender the transformation in
Calming the Waters: The Rebirth of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
301
MARIA GREEN COWLES
culture and practice necessary to create the BFTM envisioned. Whether or not the 
Bush administration will have the time and political capital to take on these 
regulatory reforms in light o f  other high profile domestic and international issues 
(i.c. the war in Iraq, the budget deficit, social security, etc.) also is unknown. Yet 
failure to address regulatory reform will undoubtedly lead to the TABD’s decline 
once again as corporate executives lose faith in government support for the 
initiative.
VI. Conclusions: Calming the Waters?
In a period of tumultuous transatlantic relations over Iraq, the Middle East, and the 
larger war on terrorism, it is perhaps surprising that US and EU government 
officials on both sides of the Atlantic would spend so much time and effort to revive 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. It is also instructive to understand why they 
would do so.
As one official noted, “Iraq saved TABD.”28 At the same time, the TABD 
process provided government officials the opportunity to save themselves from their 
own ideological warfare over the Gulf state. Since its inception, TABD’s raison 
d'etre has not only been economic (to promote regulatory cooperation and 
ultimately, to promote economic growth), but also political. The TABD has 
provided a practical means to bring government and business officials to the 
negotiating table to find both their commonalities as well as their differences. In this 
sense, the TABD has helped to calm the waters o f the US-EU economic and 
political relationship.
To be sure, the future o f  the TABD as well as the larger US-EU economic 
relationship is unclear. On one hand, the TABD has undergone significant change in 
recent years. The goal of creating a barrier-free transatlantic marketplace has 
prompted new dialogue on US-EU regulatory cooperation. That the US and EU 
governments have strongly supported these developments is in itself a positive sign 
for the TABD's future. Yet, the larger TABD goal cannot be achieved without 
serious efforts to reform regulatory rulemaking procedures and agencies, and to 
address the concerns of stakeholders who do not welcome the larger BFTM 
initiative.
As several government and business officials noted in the past five years, “if  the 
TABD didn’t exist, you would have to create it.” Learning how to use it to promote 
transatlantic economic relations remains the challenge of this public-private 
partnership.
28  In terv iew , February  5 ,2 0 0 4 .
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Comments 
Hugo Paemen
Maria Cowles very well explained the origins of the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD) and the conditions under which it has been working since its 
creation. Having been set up with the strong support of the US Department of 
Commerce and the European Commission, it was soon integrated in the renewed 
efforts for deeper ties and cooperation between representatives of various sectors in 
both societies, as put forward in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995. 
Following the TABD model, the NTA promoted similar “dialogues” between 
representatives of the Unions, consumer organizations, environmental organizations 
and also between the US Congress and the European Parliament (the so-called 
Legislative Dialogue).
The TABD has thereupon been considered as one of the success stories of the 
NTA. But it lost some of its initial momentum after three or four productive annual 
meetings, attended by an impressive number of CEO's of American and European 
companies. Successive efforts afterwards to regain the initial impetus seem to 
indicate that the basic idea o f the dialogue is still considered worth pursuing by at 
least part of the two business communities as well as by the public authorities.
The concept o f having permanent “dialogues” between the main components of 
the civil societies on both sides of the Atlantic reflected well the spirit of a renewed 
partnership, as it was outlined in the NTA. Deeper cooperation could not only be 
the task of the governments. As both societies were growing closer, it responded to 
the spirit of the times to offer civil society representatives the opportunity to discuss 
their (similar) problems and concerns, in order to explore common approaches to
306
solutions, which could then be submitted for decision to the governments on both
sides.
This attractive, but rather idealistic approach, which also aimed at bringing the 
decision-making processes somewhat closer to the people, was soon confronted 
with the harsh reality of different legislative, regulatory, organizational traditions on 
the two continents. Most interest groups, NGO’s and professional organizations 
remained indeed closely tied up with the national, if not local and social 
administrative cultures. At the level of the governments, the political authority 
needed for the follow-up and the implementation of the recommendations was not 
always there.
As far as the TABD itself is concerned, its CEO driven structure makes its 
activity largely dependent on the leadership exercised by the annually changing 
presidencies. In fact, most of the driving energy and political input has rather come 
from the two administrations (US Department of Commerce and the European 
Commission), For them the “dialogue” is evidently a useful vehicle for general 
discussion, consultation and stocktaking with an important part of their 
constituencies. On most issues they are also in a better position to produce the 
background material, as well as the political assessment for the discussions, most of 
which have already taken place at the level of their officials. This top-down 
procedure, without permanent administrative support, favours the trend for 
leadership to be exercised by the representatives of the governments and probably 
explains some lack o f durable motivation on the side of the private sector, as well as 
the uneven results o f this dialogue.
During its most productive period the TABD managed to have the governments 
accept, in 1997, six Mutual Recognition Agreements in sectors like 
pharmaceuticals, telecom equipment, medical devices, etc, but the economic impact 
of these agreements was finally limited, largely due to the already mentioned lack 
of consistent follow-up and implementation by the bureaucracies on both sides.
To underline, however, the importance which both administrations attach to 
these contacts, the two private co-presidents of the TABD have been regularly 
invited to meet the political leadership at the occasion of the annual US-EU summit 
meetings. No other dialogue has until now been considered worthy of the same 
treatment by the summit participants. In 2004, the representatives o f the consumer 
organizations on both sides were offered a discussion only with some high officials 
who accompanied the summit participants. In protest of this discriminatory 
treatment they refused to take part.
For the TABD, the undeniable promotional potential of these meetings could not 
always be valorised as it became part o f the annual pressure for “deliverable 
results”, which comes along with their political nature. Recently, the meetings with 
the business leaders at these summits have mainly consisted in the latter handing
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over a list of recommendations, which the political authorities consistently and 
politely promised to give careful consideration.
It seems that the effectiveness of the “dialogues” will largely depend on the 
structure which the private representatives provide for their regular participation. 
The TABD is in that respect already more advanced than are the other interest 
groups. However, its top-down, CEO driven organization will probably have to be 
complemented by a bottom-up, consistent issues management at the level of the 
daily market operators. On the side of the governments, a more open approach in 
the discussions and, particularly, a closer follow-up and more methodical 
implementation procedures, adapted to each sector, would greatly increase the trust 
and credibility of the dialogues.
308

II
I

